interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added:
* jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails.
This replaces jail(2).
* jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the
security.jail.list sysctl.
* jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail.
Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be
set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system
call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2).
Approved by: bz (mentor)
jail doesn't support. This involves a new function prison_check_af,
like prison_check_ip[46] but that checks only the family.
With this change, most of the errors generated by jailed sockets
shouldn't ever occur, at least until jails are changeable.
Approved by: bz (mentor)
return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors
are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the
prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in
that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the
returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or
EINVAL.
Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed
cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit
jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls.
Approved by: bz (mentor)
After running a `make buildkernel', I noticed most of the Giant locks in
sysctl are only caused by a very small amount of sysctl's:
- sysctl.name2oid. This one is locked by SYSCTL_LOCK, just like
sysctl.oidfmt.
- kern.ident, kern.osrelease, kern.version, etc. These are just constant
strings.
- kern.arandom, used by the stack protector. It is already protected by
arc4_mtx.
I also saw the following sysctl's show up. Not as often as the ones
above, but still quite often:
- security.jail.jailed. Also mark security.jail.list as MPSAFE. They
don't need locking or already use allprison_lock.
- kern.devname, used by devname(3), ttyname(3), etc.
This seems to reduce Giant locking inside sysctl by ~75% in my primitive
test setup.
outside the prison_states array.
When checking if there is a name configured for the prison, check the
first character to not be '\0' instead of checking if the char array
is present, which it always is. Note, that this is different for the
*jailname in the syscall.
Found with: Coverity Prevent(tm)
CID: 4156, 4155
MFC after: 4 weeks (just that I get the mail)
Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch.
This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple
addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well.
Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without
an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with
restricted process view, no networking,..
SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well.
Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor
sets after creation.
Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name
in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from
within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes
or as audit-token in the future.
DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging.
Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit
systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where
possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management
utilities.
Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features.
A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been
used by various patches floating around the last years.
Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes.
Special thanks to:
- Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches
and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches.
- Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their
help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support.
- Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions,
suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages.
- John Baldwin (jhb) for his help.
- Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes
on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people
who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and
other channels.
- My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this.
Reviewed by: (see above)
MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail)
X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
This bring huge amount of changes, I'll enumerate only user-visible changes:
- Delegated Administration
Allows regular users to perform ZFS operations, like file system
creation, snapshot creation, etc.
- L2ARC
Level 2 cache for ZFS - allows to use additional disks for cache.
Huge performance improvements mostly for random read of mostly
static content.
- slog
Allow to use additional disks for ZFS Intent Log to speed up
operations like fsync(2).
- vfs.zfs.super_owner
Allows regular users to perform privileged operations on files stored
on ZFS file systems owned by him. Very careful with this one.
- chflags(2)
Not all the flags are supported. This still needs work.
- ZFSBoot
Support to boot off of ZFS pool. Not finished, AFAIK.
Submitted by: dfr
- Snapshot properties
- New failure modes
Before if write requested failed, system paniced. Now one
can select from one of three failure modes:
- panic - panic on write error
- wait - wait for disk to reappear
- continue - serve read requests if possible, block write requests
- Refquota, refreservation properties
Just quota and reservation properties, but don't count space consumed
by children file systems, clones and snapshots.
- Sparse volumes
ZVOLs that don't reserve space in the pool.
- External attributes
Compatible with extattr(2).
- NFSv4-ACLs
Not sure about the status, might not be complete yet.
Submitted by: trasz
- Creation-time properties
- Regression tests for zpool(8) command.
Obtained from: OpenSolaris
from the vimage project, as per plan established at devsummit 08/08:
http://wiki.freebsd.org/Image/Notes200808DevSummit
Introduce INIT_VNET_*() initializer macros, VNET_FOREACH() iterator
macros, and CURVNET_SET() context setting macros, all currently
resolving to NOPs.
Prepare for virtualization of selected SYSCTL objects by introducing a
family of SYSCTL_V_*() macros, currently resolving to their global
counterparts, i.e. SYSCTL_V_INT() == SYSCTL_INT().
Move selected #defines from sys/sys/vimage.h to newly introduced header
files specific to virtualized subsystems (sys/net/vnet.h,
sys/netinet/vinet.h etc.).
All the changes are verified to have zero functional impact at this
point in time by doing MD5 comparision between pre- and post-change
object files(*).
(*) netipsec/keysock.c did not validate depending on compile time options.
Implemented by: julian, bz, brooks, zec
Reviewed by: julian, bz, brooks, kris, rwatson, ...
Approved by: julian (mentor)
Obtained from: //depot/projects/vimage-commit2/...
X-MFC after: never
Sponsored by: NLnet Foundation, The FreeBSD Foundation
virtualization work done by Marko Zec (zec@).
This is the first in a series of commits over the course
of the next few weeks.
Mark all uses of global variables to be virtualized
with a V_ prefix.
Use macros to map them back to their global names for
now, so this is a NOP change only.
We hope to have caught at least 85-90% of what is needed
so we do not invalidate a lot of outstanding patches again.
Obtained from: //depot/projects/vimage-commit2/...
Reviewed by: brooks, des, ed, mav, julian,
jamie, kris, rwatson, zec, ...
(various people I forgot, different versions)
md5 (with a bit of help)
Sponsored by: NLnet Foundation, The FreeBSD Foundation
X-MFC after: never
V_Commit_Message_Reviewed_By: more people than the patch
to global hostname and domainname variables. Where necessary, copy
to or from a stack-local buffer before performing copyin() or
copyout(). A few uses, such as in cd9660 and daemon_saver, remain
under-synchronized and will require further updates.
Correct a bug in which a failed copyin() of domainname would leave
domainname potentially corrupted.
MFC after: 3 weeks
Introduce a new privilege allowing to set certain IP header options
(hop-by-hop, routing headers).
Leave a few comments to be addressed later.
Reviewed by: rwatson (older version, before addressing his comments)
conjuction with 'thread' argument passing which is always curthread.
Remove the unuseful extra-argument and pass explicitly curthread to lower
layer functions, when necessary.
KPI results broken by this change, which should affect several ports, so
version bumping and manpage update will be further committed.
Tested by: kris, pho, Diego Sardina <siarodx at gmail dot com>
Remove this argument and pass curthread directly to underlying
VOP_LOCK1() VFS method. This modify makes the code cleaner and in
particular remove an annoying dependence helping next lockmgr() cleanup.
KPI results, obviously, changed.
Manpage and FreeBSD_version will be updated through further commits.
As a side note, would be valuable to say that next commits will address
a similar cleanup about VFS methods, in particular vop_lock1 and
vop_unlock.
Tested by: Diego Sardina <siarodx at gmail dot com>,
Andrea Di Pasquale <whyx dot it at gmail dot com>
from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to
the following general forms:
mac_<object>_<method/action>
mac_<object>_check_<method/action>
The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly
reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more
consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain
multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical
parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for
certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly,
some entry point names.
All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules
not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to
conform to the new KPI.
Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
- We need to allow for PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_OWNER inside a jail.
- Move security checks to vfs_suser() and deny unmounting and updating
for jailed root from different jails, etc.
OK'ed by: rwatson
I converted allprison_mtx mutex to allprison_lock sx lock. To fix this LOR,
move prison removal to prison_complete() entirely. To ensure that noone
will reference this prison before it's beeing removed from the list skip
prisons with 'pr_ref == 0' in prison_find() and assert that pr_ref has to
greater than 0 in prison_hold().
Reported by: kris
OK'ed by: rwatson
It may be used for external modules to attach some data to jail's in-kernel
structure.
- Change allprison_mtx mutex to allprison_sx sx(9) lock.
We will need to call external functions while holding this lock, which may
want to allocate memory.
Make use of the fact that this is shared-exclusive lock and use shared
version when possible.
- Implement the following functions:
prison_service_register() - registers a service that wants to be noticed
when a jail is created and destroyed
prison_service_deregister() - deregisters service
prison_service_data_add() - adds service-specific data to the jail structure
prison_service_data_get() - takes service-specific data from the jail
structure
prison_service_data_del() - removes service-specific data from the jail
structure
Reviewed by: rwatson
unmount jail-friendly file systems from within a jail.
Precisely it grants PRIV_VFS_MOUNT, PRIV_VFS_UNMOUNT and
PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_NONUSER privileges for a jailed super-user.
It is turned off by default.
A jail-friendly file system is a file system which driver registers
itself with VFCF_JAIL flag via VFS_SET(9) API.
The lsvfs(1) command can be used to see which file systems are
jail-friendly ones.
There currently no jail-friendly file systems, ZFS will be the first one.
In the future we may consider marking file systems like nullfs as
jail-friendly.
Reviewed by: rwatson
system calls now enter without Giant held, and then in some cases, acquire
Giant explicitly.
Remove a number of other MPSAFE annotations in the credential code and
tweak one or two other adjacent comments.
VFS privilege namespace: exceedquota, getquota, and setquota. Leave
UFS-specific quota configuration privileges in the UFS name space.
This renumbers VFS and UFS privileges, so requires rebuilding modules
if you are using security policies aware of privilege identifiers.
This is likely no one at this point since none of the committed MAC
policies use the privilege checks.
privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9)
interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege
checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of
privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the
existing suser(9) interface:
suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv)
suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags)
A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be
found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the
comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read
before doing so.
The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the
privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to
determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine,
rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the
SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail
check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used
by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted
in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail
is now present in kern_jail.c.
The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both
to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant
privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy
modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader
range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with
root privilege.
The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms
of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition
and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not
been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to
check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier.
This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it
modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security
policy become more feasible.
Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Discussed on: arch@
Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri,
Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>,
Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>,
Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
begun with a repo-copy of mac.h to mac_framework.h. sys/mac.h now
contains the userspace and user<->kernel API and definitions, with all
in-kernel interfaces moved to mac_framework.h, which is now included
across most of the kernel instead.
This change is the first step in a larger cleanup and sweep of MAC
Framework interfaces in the kernel, and will not be MFC'd.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA
with other commonly used sysctl name spaces, rather than declaring them
all over the place.
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc.
of whether or not Giant was picked up by the filesystem. Add VFS_LOCK_GIANT
macros around vrele as it's possible that this can call in the VOP_INACTIVE
filesystem specific code. Also while we are here, remove the Giant assertion.
from the sysctl handler, we do not actually require Giant here so we
shouldn't assert it. Doing so will just complicate things when Giant is removed
from the sysctl framework.
and extend its functionality:
value policy
0 show all mount-points without any restrictions
1 show only mount-points below jail's chroot and show only part of the
mount-point's path (if jail's chroot directory is /jails/foo and
mount-point is /jails/foo/usr/home only /usr/home will be shown)
2 show only mount-point where jail's chroot directory is placed.
Default value is 2.
Discussed with: rwatson
