reversals+system lock ups if they are using ucred based rules
while running with debug.mpsafenet=1.
I am working on merging a shared locking mechanism into ipfw which
should take care of this problem, but it still requires a bit more
testing and review.
and sent to the DIVERT socket while the original packet continues with the
next rule. Unlike a normally diverted packet no IP reassembly attemts are
made on tee'd packets and they are passed upwards totally unmodified.
Note: This will not be MFC'd to 4.x because of major infrastucture changes.
PR: kern/64240 (and many others collapsed into that one)
Since the only thing truly unique about a prison is it's ID, I figured
this would be the most granular way of handling this.
This commit makes the following changes:
- Adds tokenizing and parsing for the ``jail'' command line option
to the ipfw(8) userspace utility.
- Append the ipfw opcode list with O_JAIL.
- While Iam here, add a comment informing others that if they
want to add additional opcodes, they should append them to the end
of the list to avoid ABI breakage.
- Add ``fw_prid'' to the ipfw ucred cache structure.
- When initializing ucred cache, if the process is jailed,
set fw_prid to the prison ID, otherwise set it to -1.
- Update man page to reflect these changes.
This change was a strong motivator behind the ucred caching
mechanism in ipfw.
A sample usage of this new functionality could be:
ipfw add count ip from any to any jail 2
It should be noted that because ucred based constraints
are only implemented for TCP and UDP packets, the same
applies for jail associations.
Conceptual head nod by: pjd
Reviewed by: rwatson
Approved by: bmilekic (mentor)
For incoming packets, the packet's source address is checked if it
belongs to a directly connected network. If the network is directly
connected, then the interface the packet came on in is compared to
the interface the network is connected to. When incoming interface
and directly connected interface are not the same, the packet does
not match.
Usage example:
ipfw add deny ip from any to any not antispoof in
Manpage education by: ru
RTF_BLACKHOLE as well.
To quote the submitter:
The uRPF loose-check implementation by the industry vendors, at least on Cisco
and possibly Juniper, will fail the check if the route of the source address
is pointed to Null0 (on Juniper, discard or reject route). What this means is,
even if uRPF Loose-check finds the route, if the route is pointed to blackhole,
uRPF loose-check must fail. This allows people to utilize uRPF loose-check mode
as a pseudo-packet-firewall without using any manual filtering configuration --
one can simply inject a IGP or BGP prefix with next-hop set to a static route
that directs to null/discard facility. This results in uRPF Loose-check failing
on all packets with source addresses that are within the range of the nullroute.
Submitted by: James Jun <james@towardex.com>
source address of a packet exists in the routing table. The
default route is ignored because it would match everything and
render the check pointless.
This option is very useful for routers with a complete view of
the Internet (BGP) in the routing table to reject packets with
spoofed or unrouteable source addresses.
Example:
ipfw add 1000 deny ip from any to any not versrcreach
also known in Cisco-speak as:
ip verify unicast source reachable-via any
Reviewed by: luigi
rule, thus omitting the entire body.
This makes the output a lot more readable for complex rulesets
(provided, of course, you have annotated your ruleset appropriately!)
MFC after: 3 days
code is compiled in to support the O_IPSEC operator. Previously no
support was included and ipsec rules were always matching. Note that
we do not return an error when an ipsec rule is added and the kernel
does not have IPsec support compiled in; this is done intentionally
but we may want to revisit this (document this in the man page).
PR: 58899
Submitted by: Bjoern A. Zeeb
Approved by: re (rwatson)
Allow set 31 to be used for rules other than 65535.
Set 31 is still special because rules belonging to it are not deleted
by the "ipfw flush" command, but must be deleted explicitly with
"ipfw delete set 31" or by individual rule numbers.
This implement a flexible form of "persistent rules" which you might
want to have available even after an "ipfw flush".
Note that this change does not violate POLA, because you could not
use set 31 in a ruleset before this change.
Suggested by: Paul Richards
spaces and comma-separated lists of arguments;
* reword the description of address specifications, to include
previous and current changes for address sets and lists;
* document the new '-n' flag.
* update the section on differences between ipfw1 and ipfw2
(this is becoming boring!)
MFC after: 3 days
Should work with both regular and fast ipsec (mutually exclusive).
See manpage for more details.
Submitted by: Ari Suutari (ari.suutari@syncrontech.com)
Revised by: sam
MFC after: 1 week
"ipid" options. This feature has been requested by several users.
On passing, fix some minor bugs in the parser. This change is fully
backward compatible so if you have an old /sbin/ipfw and a new
kernel you are not in trouble (but you need to update /sbin/ipfw
if you want to use the new features).
Document the changes in the manpage.
Now you can write things like
ipfw add skipto 1000 iplen 0-500
which some people were asking to give preferential treatment to
short packets.
The 'MFC after' is just set as a reminder, because I still need
to merge the Alpha/Sparc64 fixes for ipfw2 (which unfortunately
change the size of certain kernel structures; not that it matters
a lot since ipfw2 is entirely optional and not the default...)
PR: bin/48015
MFC after: 1 week
comes in on is the same interface that we would route out of to get to
the packet's source address. Essentially automates an anti-spoofing
check using the information in the routing table.
Experimental. The usage and rule format for the feature may still be
subject to change.
default-to-deny firewall. Simply turning off IPFW via a preexisting
sysctl does the job. To make it more apparent (since nobody picked up
on this in a week's worth of flames), the boolean sysctl's have been
integrated into the /sbin/ipfw command set in an obvious and straightforward
manner. For example, you can now do 'ipfw disable firewall' or
'ipfw enable firewall'. This is far easier to remember then the
net.inet.ip.fw.enable sysctl.
Reviewed by: imp
MFC after: 3 days
after -p except for the last (the ruleset file to process) to the
preprocessor for interpretation. This allows command-line options besides
-U and -D to be passed to cpp(1) and m4(1) as well as making it easier to
use other preprocessors.
Sponsored By: NTT Multimedia Communications Labs
MFC after: 1 week
to net.inet.ip.fw.one_pass.
Add to notes to explain the exact behaviour of "prob xxx" and "log"
options.
Virtually approved by: re (mentioned in rev.1.19 of ip_fw2.c)
following Julian's good suggestion: since you can specify any match
pattern as an option, rules now have the following format:
[<proto> from <src> to <dst>] [options]
i.e. the first part is now entirely optional (and left there just
for compatibility with ipfw1 rulesets).
Add a "-c" flag to show/list rules in the compact form
(i.e. without the "ip from any to any" part) when possible.
The default is to include it so that scripts processing ipfw's
canonical output will still work.
Note that as part of this cleanup (and to remove ambiguity), MAC
fields now can only be specified in the options part.
Update the manpage to reflect the syntax.
Clarify the behaviour when a match is attempted on fields which
are not present in the packet, e.g. port numbers on non TCP/UDP
packets, and the "not" operator is specified. E.g.
ipfw add allow not src-port 80
will match also ICMP packets because they do not have port numbers, so
"src-port 80" will fail and "not src-port 80" will succeed. For such
cases it is advised to insert further options to prevent undesired results
(e.g. in the case above, "ipfw add allow proto tcp not src-port 80").
We definitely need to rewrite the parser using lex and yacc!
render the syntax less ambiguous.
Now rules can be in one of these two forms
<action> <protocol> from <src> to <dst> [options]
<action> MAC dst-mac src-mac mac-type [options]
however you can now specify MAC and IP header fields as options e.g.
ipfw add allow all from any to any mac-type arp
ipfw add allow all from any to any { dst-ip me or src-ip me }
which makes complex expressions a lot easier to write and parse.
The "all from any to any" part is there just for backward compatibility.
Manpage updated accordingly.
