To quote their ls(1) specification:
-n
The same as -l, except that the owner's UID and GID numbers are
written, rather than the associated character strings.
Reviewed by: green
Use an upward approximation of the number of characters required
for decimal representations of uid_t, gid_t and u_quad_t, intead
of arbitrary values that may not be safe in the future.
Fix disordering.
Requested by: bde
supposedly it's ksh-derived, and it's not broken in pdksh. I've added
a test for test running as root: if testing for -x, the file must be
mode & 0111 to get "success", rather than just existant.
Reviewed by: chris
significantly easier to read and extend and offers a few new tests.
A few style changes taken from style(9) and OpenBSD, as well as
whitespace cleanups.
This change was discussed on freebsd-committers and freebsd-hackers
and met with approval from at least des, eivind and brian.
PR: 13091
Obtained from: NetBSD
in a long (-l) listing.
MFC-jockies should make sure that bde's concerns regarding the number
of digits required to represent a uid_t and the use of snprintf
on the associated PR have been addressed before going wild.
PR: 12866
Reported by: Philip Kizer <pckizer@nostrum.com>
Obtained from: NetBSD
request of Bruce. More changes may follow later. 'g' multiplier has
been added (i.e. dd seek=5g if=bigfile.) Some minor corrections were made
as well.
Noticed by: bde
add a -j flag that tells date not to try to set the date. This allows you
to use date as a userland interface to strptime.
example:
TZ=GMT date -j -f "%a, %d %b %Y %T %Z" "Sun, 08 Nov 1998 02:22:20 GMT" +%s
which is the standard format for Last-modified headers in HTTP requests.
only one to respond: eivind
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
statement if blocks[*] when the else could be ambiguous, not defaulting
to int type and removal of some unused variables.
[*] This is explicitly allowed by style(9) when the single statement
spans more than one line.
Reviewed by: obrien, chuckr
by default, file(1) does not follow symlinks, the -L flag must be
specified.
PR: docs/8602
Submitted by: Kazuo Horikawa <k-horik@yk.rim.or.jp>
Reviewed by: nik
