address, to avoid confusing the users that a full address is
always required.
Submitted by: Josh Paetzel <josh@tcbug.org> (through freebsd-doc)
MFC after: 3 days
for example:
fwd tablearg ip from any to table(1)
where table 1 has entries of the form:
1.1.1.0/24 10.2.3.4
208.23.2.0/24 router2
This allows trivial implementation of a secondary routing table implemented
in the firewall layer.
I expect more work (under discussion with Glebius) to follow this to clean
up some of the messy parts of ipfw related to tables.
Reviewed by: Glebius
MFC after: 1 month
- 'tag' & 'untag' action parameters.
- 'tagged' & 'limit' rule options.
Rule examples:
pipe 1 tag tablearg ip from table(1) to any
allow ip from any to table(2) tagged tablearg
allow tcp from table(3) to any 25 setup limit src-addr tablearg
sbin/ipfw/ipfw2.c:
1) new macros
GET_UINT_ARG - support of 'tablearg' keyword, argument range checking.
PRINT_UINT_ARG - support of 'tablearg' keyword.
2) strtoport(): do not silently truncate/accept invalid port list expressions
like: '1,2-abc' or '1,2-3-4' or '1,2-3x4'. style(9) cleanup.
Approved by: glebius (mentor)
MFC after: 1 month
Since tags are kept while packet resides in kernelspace, it's possible to
use other kernel facilities (like netgraph nodes) for altering those tags.
Submitted by: Andrey Elsukov <bu7cher at yandex dot ru>
Submitted by: Vadim Goncharov <vadimnuclight at tpu dot ru>
Approved by: glebius (mentor)
Idea from: OpenBSD PF
MFC after: 1 month
doesn't exist or add one that is already present, if the -q flag
is set. Useful for "ipfw -q /dev/stdin" when the command above is
invoked from something like python or TCL to feed commands
down the throat of ipfw.
MFC in: 1 week
IPv6 support was committed:
- Stop treating `ip' and `ipv6' as special in `proto' option as they
conflict with /etc/protocols.
- Disuse `ipv4' in `proto' option as it is corresponding to `ipv6'.
- When protocol is specified as numeric, treat it as it is even it is
41 (ipv6).
- Allow zero for protocol as it is valid number of `ip'.
Still, we cannot specify an IPv6 over an IPv4 tunnel like before such
as:
pass ipv6 from any to any
But, now, you can specify it like:
pass ip4 from any to any proto ipv6
PR: kern/89472
Reported by: Ga l Roualland <gael.roualland__at__dial.oleane.com>
MFC after: 1 week
that debug.mpsafenet be set to 0. It is still possible for dead locks to
occur while these filtering options are used due to the layering violation
inherent in their implementation.
Discussed: -current, rwatson, glebius
* Correct handling of IPv6 Extension Headers.
* Add unreach6 code.
* Add logging for IPv6.
Submitted by: sysctl handling derived from patch from ume needed for ip6fw
Obtained from: is_icmp6_query and send_reject6 derived from similar
functions of netinet6,ip6fw
Reviewed by: ume, gnn; silence on ipfw@
Test setup provided by: CK Software GmbH
MFC after: 6 days
policy. It may be used to provide more detailed classification of
traffic without actually having to decide its fate at the time of
classification.
MFC after: 1 week
This is the last requirement before we can retire ip6fw.
Reviewed by: dwhite, brooks(earlier version)
Submitted by: dwhite (manpage)
Silence from: -ipfw
with the kernel compile time option:
options IPFIREWALL_FORWARD_EXTENDED
This option has to be specified in addition to IPFIRWALL_FORWARD.
With this option even packets targeted for an IP address local
to the host can be redirected. All restrictions to ensure proper
behaviour for locally generated packets are turned off. Firewall
rules have to be carefully crafted to make sure that things like
PMTU discovery do not break.
Document the two kernel options.
PR: kern/71910
PR: kern/73129
MFC after: 1 week
reversals+system lock ups if they are using ucred based rules
while running with debug.mpsafenet=1.
I am working on merging a shared locking mechanism into ipfw which
should take care of this problem, but it still requires a bit more
testing and review.
and sent to the DIVERT socket while the original packet continues with the
next rule. Unlike a normally diverted packet no IP reassembly attemts are
made on tee'd packets and they are passed upwards totally unmodified.
Note: This will not be MFC'd to 4.x because of major infrastucture changes.
PR: kern/64240 (and many others collapsed into that one)
Since the only thing truly unique about a prison is it's ID, I figured
this would be the most granular way of handling this.
This commit makes the following changes:
- Adds tokenizing and parsing for the ``jail'' command line option
to the ipfw(8) userspace utility.
- Append the ipfw opcode list with O_JAIL.
- While Iam here, add a comment informing others that if they
want to add additional opcodes, they should append them to the end
of the list to avoid ABI breakage.
- Add ``fw_prid'' to the ipfw ucred cache structure.
- When initializing ucred cache, if the process is jailed,
set fw_prid to the prison ID, otherwise set it to -1.
- Update man page to reflect these changes.
This change was a strong motivator behind the ucred caching
mechanism in ipfw.
A sample usage of this new functionality could be:
ipfw add count ip from any to any jail 2
It should be noted that because ucred based constraints
are only implemented for TCP and UDP packets, the same
applies for jail associations.
Conceptual head nod by: pjd
Reviewed by: rwatson
Approved by: bmilekic (mentor)
For incoming packets, the packet's source address is checked if it
belongs to a directly connected network. If the network is directly
connected, then the interface the packet came on in is compared to
the interface the network is connected to. When incoming interface
and directly connected interface are not the same, the packet does
not match.
Usage example:
ipfw add deny ip from any to any not antispoof in
Manpage education by: ru
RTF_BLACKHOLE as well.
To quote the submitter:
The uRPF loose-check implementation by the industry vendors, at least on Cisco
and possibly Juniper, will fail the check if the route of the source address
is pointed to Null0 (on Juniper, discard or reject route). What this means is,
even if uRPF Loose-check finds the route, if the route is pointed to blackhole,
uRPF loose-check must fail. This allows people to utilize uRPF loose-check mode
as a pseudo-packet-firewall without using any manual filtering configuration --
one can simply inject a IGP or BGP prefix with next-hop set to a static route
that directs to null/discard facility. This results in uRPF Loose-check failing
on all packets with source addresses that are within the range of the nullroute.
Submitted by: James Jun <james@towardex.com>