vnode and a mode and checks if a given access mode is permitted.
This centralises the mac_bsdextended_enabled check and the GETATTR
calls and makes the implementation of the mac policy methods simple.
This should make it easier for us to match vnodes on more complex
attributes than just uid and gid in the future, but for now there
should be no functional change.
Approved/Reviewed by: rwatson, trhodes
MFC after: 1 month
- Include audit_internal.h to get definition of internal audit record
structures, as it's no longer in audit.h. Forward declare au_record
in audit_private.h as not all audit_private.h consumers care about
it.
- Remove __APPLE__ compatibility bits that are subsumed by configure
for user space.
- Don't expose in6_addr internals (non-portable, but also cleaner
looking).
- Avoid nested include of audit.h in audit_private.h.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
be called without any vnode locks held. Remove calls to vn_start_write() and
vn_finished_write() in vnode_pager_putpages() and add these calls before the
vnode lock is obtained to most of the callers that don't already have them.
In the future, we may want to acquire the lock early in the function and
hold it across calls to vn_rdwr(), etc, to avoid multiple acquires.
Spotted by: kris (bugmagnet)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
applications to insert a "tee" in the live audit event stream. Records
are inserted into a per-clone queue so that user processes can pull
discreet records out of the queue. Unlike delivery to disk, audit pipes
are "lossy", dropping records in low memory conditions or when the
process falls behind real-time events. This mechanism is appropriate
for use by live monitoring systems, host-based intrusion detection, etc,
and avoids applications having to dig through active on-disk trails that
are owned by the audit daemon.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
initialization routines into a ctor, tear-down to a dtor, cleaning
up, etc. This will allow audit records to be allocated from
per-cpu caches.
On recent FreeBSD, dropping the audit_mtx around freeing to UMA is
no longer required (at one point it was possible to acquire Giant
on that path), so a mutex-free thread-local drain is no longer
required.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
This should not happen, but with this assert, brueffer and I would
not have spent 45 minutes trying to figure out why he wasn't
seeing audit records with the audit version in CVS.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
an incompatible conversion from a 64-bit pointer to a 32-bit integer on
64-bit platforms. We will investigate whether Solaris uses a 64-bit
token here, or a new record here, in order to avoid truncating user
pointers that are 64-bit. However, in the mean time, truncation is fine
as these are rarely/never used fields in audit records.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
- td_ar to struct thread, which holds the in-progress audit record during
a system call.
- p_au to struct proc, which holds per-process audit state, such as the
audit identifier, audit terminal, and process audit masks.
In the earlier implementation, td_ar was added to the zero'd section of
struct thread. In order to facilitate merging to RELENG_6, it has been
moved to the end of the data structure, requiring explicit
initalization in the thread constructor.
Much help from: wsalamon
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
- Management of audit state on processes.
- Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state.
- Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel
thread to asynchronously store records on disk.
- Audit event argument.
- Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library.
- Audit event pre-selection.
- Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd
of kernel audit events.
Much work by: wsalamon
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
security.mac.biba.interfaces_equal
If non-zero, all network interfaces be created with the label:
biba/equal(equal-equal)
This is useful where programs which initialize network interfaces
do not have any labeling support. This includes dhclient and ppp. A
long term solution is to add labeling support into dhclient(8)
and ppp(8), and remove this variable.
It should be noted that this behavior is different then setting the:
security.mac.biba.trust_all_interfaces
sysctl variable, as this will create interfaces with a biba/high label.
Lower integrity processes are not able to write to the interface in this
event. The security.mac.biba.interfaces_equal will override
trust_all_interfaces.
The security.mac.biba.interfaces_equal variable will be set to zero
or disabled by default.
MFC after: 2 weeks
- Prefer '_' to ' ', as it results in more easily parsed results in
memory monitoring tools such as vmstat.
- Remove punctuation that is incompatible with using memory type names
as file names, such as '/' characters.
- Disambiguate some collisions by adding subsystem prefixes to some
memory types.
- Generally prefer lower case to upper case.
- If the same type is defined in multiple architecture directories,
attempt to use the same name in additional cases.
Not all instances were caught in this change, so more work is required to
finish this conversion. Similar changes are required for UMA zone names.
framework. This makes Giant protection around MAC operations which inter-
act with VFS conditional, based on the MPSAFE status of the file system.
Affected the following syscalls:
o __mac_get_fd
o __mac_get_file
o __mac_get_link
o __mac_set_fd
o __mac_set_file
o __mac_set_link
-Drop Giant all together in __mac_set_proc because the
mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse routine no longer requires it.
-Move conditional Giant aquisitions to after label allocation routines.
-Move the conditional release of Giant to before label de-allocation
routines.
Discussed with: rwatson
provided access to the root file system before the start of the
init process. This was used briefly by SEBSD before it knew about
preloading data in the loader, and using that method to gain
access to data earlier results in fewer inconsistencies in the
approach. Policy modules still have access to the root file system
creation event through the mac_create_mount() entry point.
Removed now, and will be removed from RELENG_6, in order to gain
third party policy dependencies on the entry point for the lifetime
of the 6.x branch.
MFC after: 3 days
Submitted by: Chris Vance <Christopher dot Vance at SPARTA dot com>
Sponsored by: SPARTA
entry points that will be inserted over the life-time of the 6.x branch,
including for:
- New struct file labeling (void * already added to struct file), events,
access control checks.
- Additional struct mount access control checks, internalization/
externalization.
- mac_check_cap()
- System call enter/exit check and event.
- Socket and vnode ioctl entry points.
MFC after: 3 days
process that caused the clone event to take place for the device driver
creating the device. This allows cloned device drivers to adapt the
device node based on security aspects of the process, such as the uid,
gid, and MAC label.
- Add a cred reference to struct cdev, so that when a device node is
instantiated as a vnode, the cloning credential can be exposed to
MAC.
- Add make_dev_cred(), a version of make_dev() that additionally
accepts the credential to stick in the struct cdev. Implement it and
make_dev() in terms of a back-end make_dev_credv().
- Add a new event handler, dev_clone_cred, which can be registered to
receive the credential instead of dev_clone, if desired.
- Modify the MAC entry point mac_create_devfs_device() to accept an
optional credential pointer (may be NULL), so that MAC policies can
inspect and act on the label or other elements of the credential
when initializing the skeleton device protections.
- Modify tty_pty.c to register clone_dev_cred and invoke make_dev_cred(),
so that the pty clone credential is exposed to the MAC Framework.
While currently primarily focussed on MAC policies, this change is also
a prerequisite for changes to allow ptys to be instantiated with the UID
of the process looking up the pty. This requires further changes to the
pty driver -- in particular, to immediately recycle pty nodes on last
close so that the credential-related state can be recreated on next
lookup.
Submitted by: Andrew Reisse <andrew.reisse@sparta.com>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
MFC after: 1 week
MFC note: Merge to 6.x, but not 5.x for ABI reasons
redundant with respect to existing mbuf copy label routines. Expose
a new mac_copy_mbuf() routine at the top end of the Framework and
use that; use the existing mpo_copy_mbuf_label() routine on the
bottom end.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR
Approved by: re (scottl)
which is invoked from socket() and socketpair(), permitting MAC
policy modules to control the creation of sockets by domain, type, and
protocol.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR
Approved by: re (scottl)
Requested by: SCC
points to convert _sema() to _sem() for consistency purposes with
respect to the other semaphore-related entry points:
mac_init_sysv_sema() -> mac_init_sysv_sem()
mac_destroy_sysv_sem() -> mac_destroy_sysv_sem()
mac_create_sysv_sema() -> mac_create_sysv_sem()
mac_cleanup_sysv_sema() -> mac_cleanup_sysv_sem()
Congruent changes are made to the policy interface to support this.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
access to POSIX Semaphores:
mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore
mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore
mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore
mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed
mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried
mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened
mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to
mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked
mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore
Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points.
For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively
read/write.
Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
- Introduce a global mutex, mac_bsdextended_mtx, to protect the rule
array and hold this mutex over use and modification of the rule array
and rules.
- Re-order and clean up sysctl_rule so that copyin/copyout/update happen
in the right order (suggested by: jhb done by rwatson).
mac_check_proc_wait(), which control the ability to wait4() specific
processes. This permits MAC policies to limit information flow from
children that have changed label, although has to be handled carefully
due to common programming expectations regarding the behavior of
wait4(). The cr_seeotheruids() check in p_canwait() is #if 0'd for
this reason.
The mac_stub and mac_test policies are updated to reflect these new
entry points.
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations,
required for some policies:
poll() mac_check_socket_poll()
fstat() mac_check_socket_stat()
accept() mac_check_socket_accept()
Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points.
While here, add missing entry point implementations for:
mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive()
mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send()
mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send()
mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible()
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
of the socket label to thread-local storage, and replace it with
conditional acquisition based on debug.mpsafenet. Acquire the socket
lock around the copy operation.
In mac_set_fd(), replace the unconditional acquisition of Giant with
the conditional acquisition of Giant based on debug.mpsafenet. The socket
lock is acquired in mac_socket_label_set() so doesn't have to be
acquired here.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential,
including:
setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid()
seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid()
setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid()
setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid()
setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups()
setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid()
setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid()
setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid()
setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid()
MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both
current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments
to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated.
Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MAP_SHARED so that the entry point gets executed un-conditionally.
This may be useful for security policies which want to perform access
control checks around run-time linking.
-add the mmap(2) flags argument to the check_vnode_mmap entry point
so that we can make access control decisions based on the type of
mapped object.
-update any dependent API around this parameter addition such as
function prototype modifications, entry point parameter additions
and the inclusion of sys/mman.h header file.
-Change the MLS, BIBA and LOMAC security policies so that subject
domination routines are not executed unless the type of mapping is
shared. This is done to maintain compatibility between the old
vm_mmap_vnode(9) and these policies.
Reviewed by: rwatson
MFC after: 1 month
