This in particular significantly shortens amd64_syscall, which otherwise
keeps jumping forward over 2KB of code in total.
Note some of these branches should be either eliminated altogether or
coalesced.
These arguments are mostly paths handled by NAMEI*() macros which already
take const char * arguments.
This change improves the match between syscalls.master and the public
declerations of system calls.
Reviewed by: kib (prior version)
Obtained from: CheriBSD
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17812
system-call entry and whenever audit arguments or return values are
captured:
1. Expose a single global, audit_syscalls_enabled, which controls
whether the audit framework is entered, rather than exposing
components of the policy -- e.g., if the trail is enabled,
suspended, etc.
2. Introduce a new function audit_syscalls_enabled_update(), which is
called to update audit_syscalls_enabled whenever an aspect of the
policy changes, so that the value can be updated.
3. Remove a check of trail enablement/suspension from audit_new() --
at the point where this function has been entered, we believe that
system-call auditing is already in force, or we wouldn't get here,
so simply proceed to more expensive policy checks.
4. Use an audit-provided global, audit_dtrace_enabled, rather than a
dtaudit-provided global, to provide policy indicating whether
dtaudit would like system calls to be audited.
5. Do some minor cosmetic renaming to clarify what various variables
are for.
These changes collectively arrange it so that traditional audit
(trail, pipes) or the DTrace audit provider can enable system-call
probes without the other configured. Otherwise, dtaudit cannot
capture system-call data without auditd(8) started.
Reviewed by: gnn
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Approved by: re (gjb)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17348
Mainly focus on files that use BSD 3-Clause license.
The Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX) group provides a specification
to make it easier for automated tools to detect and summarize well known
opensource licenses. We are gradually adopting the specification, noting
that the tags are considered only advisory and do not, in any way,
superceed or replace the license texts.
Special thanks to Wind River for providing access to "The Duke of
Highlander" tool: an older (2014) run over FreeBSD tree was useful as a
starting point.
This requires minor changes to the audit framework to allow capturing
paths that are not filesystem paths (i.e., will not be canonicalised
relative to the process current working directory and/or filesystem
root).
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 3 weeks
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
map the 'which' argument into a suitable audit event identifier for the
specific operation requested.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 3 weeks
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
(NB: This was likely a mismerge from XNU in audit support, where the
text argument to setlogin(2) is captured -- but as a text token,
whereas this change uses the dedicated login-name field in struct
audit_record.)
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
int bindat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen);
int connectat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen);
which allow to bind and connect respectively to a UNIX domain socket with a
path relative to the directory associated with the given file descriptor 'fd'.
- Add manual pages for the new syscalls.
- Make the new syscalls available for processes in capability mode sandbox.
- Add capability rights CAP_BINDAT and CAP_CONNECTAT that has to be present on
the directory descriptor for the syscalls to work.
- Update audit(4) to support those two new syscalls and to handle path
in sockaddr_un structure relative to the given directory descriptor.
- Update procstat(1) to recognize the new capability rights.
- Document the new capability rights in cap_rights_limit(2).
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Discussed with: rwatson, jilles, kib, des
- Capability is no longer separate descriptor type. Now every descriptor
has set of its own capability rights.
- The cap_new(2) system call is left, but it is no longer documented and
should not be used in new code.
- The new syscall cap_rights_limit(2) should be used instead of
cap_new(2), which limits capability rights of the given descriptor
without creating a new one.
- The cap_getrights(2) syscall is renamed to cap_rights_get(2).
- If CAP_IOCTL capability right is present we can further reduce allowed
ioctls list with the new cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall. List of allowed
ioctls can be retrived with cap_ioctls_get(2) syscall.
- If CAP_FCNTL capability right is present we can further reduce fcntls
that can be used with the new cap_fcntls_limit(2) syscall and retrive
them with cap_fcntls_get(2).
- To support ioctl and fcntl white-listing the filedesc structure was
heavly modified.
- The audit subsystem, kdump and procstat tools were updated to
recognize new syscalls.
- Capability rights were revised and eventhough I tried hard to provide
backward API and ABI compatibility there are some incompatible changes
that are described in detail below:
CAP_CREATE old behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
- Allow for linkat(2).
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
CAP_CREATE new behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
Added CAP_LINKAT:
- Allow for linkat(2). ABI: Reuses CAP_RMDIR bit.
- Allow to be target for renameat(2).
Added CAP_SYMLINKAT:
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
Removed CAP_DELETE. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing non-directory object.
- Allow to be source for renameat(2).
Removed CAP_RMDIR. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing directory.
Added CAP_RENAMEAT:
- Required for source directory for the renameat(2) syscall.
Added CAP_UNLINKAT (effectively it replaces CAP_DELETE and CAP_RMDIR):
- Allow for unlinkat(2) on any object.
- Required if target of renameat(2) exists and will be removed by this
call.
Removed CAP_MAPEXEC.
CAP_MMAP old behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2) with any combination of PROT_NONE, PROT_READ and
PROT_WRITE.
CAP_MMAP new behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2)+PROT_NONE.
Added CAP_MMAP_R:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ).
Added CAP_MMAP_W:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_X:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RW:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_RX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_WX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RWX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Renamed CAP_MKDIR to CAP_MKDIRAT.
Renamed CAP_MKFIFO to CAP_MKFIFOAT.
Renamed CAP_MKNODE to CAP_MKNODEAT.
CAP_READ old behaviour:
- Allow pread(2).
- Disallow read(2), readv(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_READ new behaviour:
- Allow read(2), readv(2).
- Disallow pread(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
CAP_WRITE old behaviour:
- Allow pwrite(2).
- Disallow write(2), writev(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_WRITE new behaviour:
- Allow write(2), writev(2).
- Disallow pwrite(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
Added convinient defines:
#define CAP_PREAD (CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_PWRITE (CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_R (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_MMAP_W (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_X (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | 0x0000000000000008ULL)
#define CAP_MMAP_RW (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W)
#define CAP_MMAP_RX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_WX (CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_RWX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_RECV CAP_READ
#define CAP_SEND CAP_WRITE
#define CAP_SOCK_CLIENT \
(CAP_CONNECT | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | CAP_GETSOCKOPT | \
CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
#define CAP_SOCK_SERVER \
(CAP_ACCEPT | CAP_BIND | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | \
CAP_GETSOCKOPT | CAP_LISTEN | CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | \
CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
Added defines for backward API compatibility:
#define CAP_MAPEXEC CAP_MMAP_X
#define CAP_DELETE CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKDIR CAP_MKDIRAT
#define CAP_RMDIR CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKFIFO CAP_MKFIFOAT
#define CAP_MKNOD CAP_MKNODAT
#define CAP_SOCK_ALL (CAP_SOCK_CLIENT | CAP_SOCK_SERVER)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Reviewed by: Christoph Mallon <christoph.mallon@gmx.de>
Many aspects discussed with: rwatson, benl, jonathan
ABI compatibility discussed with: kib
Fix path handling for *at() syscalls.
Before the change directory descriptor was totally ignored,
so the relative path argument was appended to current working
directory path and not to the path provided by descriptor, thus
wrong paths were stored in audit logs.
Now that we use directory descriptor in vfs_lookup, move
AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1() and AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2() calls to the place where
we hold file descriptors table lock, so we are sure paths will
be resolved according to the same directory in audit record and
in actual operation.
Sponsored by: FreeBSD Foundation (auditdistd)
Reviewed by: rwatson
MFC after: 2 weeks
We wish to be able to audit capability rights arguments; this code
provides the necessary infrastructure.
This commit does not, of itself, turn on such auditing for any
system call; that should follow shortly.
Approved by: mentor (rwatson), re (Capsicum blanket)
Sponsored by: Google Inc
provide specific macros, AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1() and AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2()
to capture path information for audit records. This allows us to
move the definitions of ARG_* out of the public audit header file,
as they are an implementation detail of our current kernel-internal
audit record, which may change.
Approved by: re (kensmith)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 1 month
to avoid exposing ARG_ macros/flag values outside of the audit code in
order to name which one of two possible vnodes will be audited for a
system call.
Approved by: re (kib)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 1 month
instead of the root/current working directory as the starting point for
lookups. Up to two such descriptors can be audited. Add audit record
BSM encoding for fooat(2).
Note: due to an error in the OpenBSM 1.1p1 configuration file, a
further change is required to that file in order to fix openat(2)
auditing.
Approved by: re (kib)
Reviewed by: rdivacky (fooat(2) portions)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 1 month
specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to
follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as
fxr).
In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be
used by third-party kernel modules.
Suggested by: brooks
Approved by: re (kib)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 1 week
not there is an audit record hung off of td_ar on the current thread.
Test this flag instead of td_ar when auditing syscall arguments or
checking for an audit record to commit on syscall return. Under
these circumstances, td_pflags is much more likely to be in the cache
(especially if there is no auditing of the current system call), so
this should help reduce cache misses in the system call return path.
MFC after: 1 week
Reported by: kris
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
record is active on the current thread--historically we may always
have wanted to enter the audit code if auditing was enabled, but now
we just commit the audit record so don't need to enter if there isn't
one.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
regular header tokens. The extended header tokens contain an IP
or IPv6 address which makes it possible to identify which host an
audit record came from when audit records are centralized.
If the host information has not been specified, the system will
default to the old style headers. Otherwise, audit records that
are created as a result of system calls will contain host information.
This implemented has been designed to be consistent with the Solaris
implementation. Host information is set/retrieved using the A_GETKAUDIT
and A_SETKAUDIT auditon(2) commands. These commands require that a
pointer to a auditinfo_addr_t object is passed. Currently only IP and
IPv6 address families are supported.
The users pace bits associated with this change will follow in an
openbsm import.
Reviewed by: rwatson, (sson, wsalamon (older version))
MFC after: 1 month
than checking whether audit is enabled globally, instead check whether
the current thread has an audit record. This avoids entering the audit
code to collect argument data if auditing is enabled but the current
system call is not of interest to audit.
MFC after: 1 week
Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
exit requires entering the audit code. The result is much the same,
but they mean different things.
MFC afer: 3 days
Submitted by: Diego Giagio <dgiagio at gmail dot com>
This change introduces audit_proc_coredump() which is called by coredump(9)
to create an audit record for the coredump event. When a process
dumps a core, it could be security relevant. It could be an indicator that
a stack within the process has been overflowed with an incorrectly constructed
malicious payload or a number of other events.
The record that is generated looks like this:
header,111,10,process dumped core,0,Thu Oct 25 19:36:29 2007, + 179 msec
argument,0,0xb,signal
path,/usr/home/csjp/test.core
subject,csjp,csjp,staff,csjp,staff,1101,1095,50457,10.37.129.2
return,success,1
trailer,111
- We allocate a completely new record to make sure we arent clobbering
the audit data associated with the syscall that produced the core
(assuming the core is being generated in response to SIGABRT and not
an invalid memory access).
- Shuffle around expand_name() so we can use the coredump name at the very
beginning of the coredump call. Make sure we free the storage referenced
by "name" if we need to bail out early.
- Audit both successful and failed coredump creation efforts
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Reviewed by: rwatson
MFC after: 1 month
- In audit_bsm.c, make sure all the arguments: ARG_AUID, ARG_ASID, ARG_AMASK,
and ARG_TERMID{_ADDR} are valid before auditing their arguments. (This is done
for both setaudit and setaudit_addr.
- Audit the arguments passed to setaudit_addr(2)
- AF_INET6 does not equate to AU_IPv6. Change this in au_to_in_addr_ex() so the
audit token is created with the correct type. This fixes the processing of the
in_addr_ex token in users pace.
- Change the size of the token (as generated by the kernel) from 5*4 bytes to
4*4 bytes (the correct size of an ip6 address)
- Correct regression from ucred work which resulted in getaudit() not returning
E2BIG if the subject had an ip6 termid
- Correct slight regression in getaudit(2) which resulted in the size of a pointer
being passed instead of the size of the structure. (This resulted in invalid
auditinfo data being returned via getaudit(2))
Reviewed by: rwatson
Approved by: re@ (kensmith)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 1 month
embedded storage in struct ucred. This allows audit state to be cached
with the thread, avoiding locking operations with each system call, and
makes it available in asynchronous execution contexts, such as deep in
the network stack or VFS.
Reviewed by: csjp
Approved by: re (kensmith)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
tokens. Currently, we do not support the set{get}audit_addr(2) system
calls which allows processes like sshd to set extended or ip6
information for subject tokens.
The approach that was taken was to change the process audit state
slightly to use an extended terminal ID in the kernel. This allows
us to store both IPv4 IPv6 addresses. In the case that an IPv4 address
is in use, we convert the terminal ID from an struct auditinfo_addr to
a struct auditinfo.
If getaudit(2) is called when the subject is bound to an ip6 address,
we return E2BIG.
- Change the internal audit record to store an extended terminal ID
- Introduce ARG_TERMID_ADDR
- Change the kaudit <-> BSM conversion process so that we are using
the appropriate subject token. If the address associated with the
subject is IPv4, we use the standard subject32 token. If the subject
has an IPv6 address associated with them, we use an extended subject32
token.
- Fix a couple of endian issues where we do a couple of byte swaps when
we shouldn't be. IP addresses are already in the correct byte order,
so reading the ip6 address 4 bytes at a time and swapping them results
in in-correct address data. It should be noted that the same issue was
found in the openbsm library and it has been changed there too on the
vendor branch
- Change A_GETPINFO to use the appropriate structures
- Implement A_GETPINFO_ADDR which basically does what A_GETPINFO does,
but can also handle ip6 addresses
- Adjust get{set}audit(2) syscalls to convert the data
auditinfo <-> auditinfo_addr
- Fully implement set{get}audit_addr(2)
NOTE: This adds the ability for processes to correctly set extended subject
information. The appropriate userspace utilities still need to be updated.
MFC after: 1 month
Reviewed by: rwatson
Obtained from: TrustedBSD
Add the argument auditing functions for argv and env.
Add kernel-specific versions of the tokenizer functions for the
arg and env represented as a char array.
Implement the AUDIT_ARGV and AUDIT_ARGE audit policy commands to
enable/disable argv/env auditing.
Call the argument auditing from the exec system calls.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Approved by: rwatson (mentor)
- Correct audit_arg_socketaddr() argument name from so to sa.
- Assert arguments are non-NULL to many argument capture functions
rather than testing them. This may trip some bugs.
- Assert the process lock is held when auditing process
information.
- Test currecord in several more places.
- Test validity of more arguments with kasserts, such as flag
values when auditing vnode information.
Perforce change: 98825
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
This should not happen, but with this assert, brueffer and I would
not have spent 45 minutes trying to figure out why he wasn't
seeing audit records with the audit version in CVS.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
