Commit Graph

30 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Warner Losh
a163d034fa Back out M_* changes, per decision of the TRB.
Approved by: trb
2003-02-19 05:47:46 +00:00
Alfred Perlstein
44956c9863 Remove M_TRYWAIT/M_WAITOK/M_WAIT. Callers should use 0.
Merge M_NOWAIT/M_DONTWAIT into a single flag M_NOWAIT.
2003-01-21 08:56:16 +00:00
Maxime Henrion
894db7b01f Don't forget to destroy the mutex if an error occurs
in the jail() system call.

Submitted by:	Pawel Jakub Dawidek <nick@garage.freebsd.pl>
2002-12-20 14:32:20 +00:00
Alfred Perlstein
b80521fee5 remove syscallarg().
Suggested by: peter
2002-12-14 02:07:32 +00:00
Robert Drehmel
e80fb43467 Use strlcpy() instead of strncpy() to copy NUL terminated strings
for safety and consistency.
2002-10-17 20:03:38 +00:00
Ian Dowse
f2f2285a6a The jail syscall calls chroot, which is not mpsafe, so put back a
mtx_lock(&Giant) around that call.

Reviewed by:	arr
2002-07-01 20:46:01 +00:00
Andrew R. Reiter
4e77f68011 - Alleviate jail() from having the burden of acquiring Giant by simply
removing.  We can do this since we no longer need Giant to safely
  execute jail().

Reviewed by:	rwatson, jhb
2002-06-26 00:29:01 +00:00
John Baldwin
6008862bc2 Change callers of mtx_init() to pass in an appropriate lock type name. In
most cases NULL is passed, but in some cases such as network driver locks
(which use the MTX_NETWORK_LOCK macro) and UMA zone locks, a name is used.

Tested on:	i386, alpha, sparc64
2002-04-04 21:03:38 +00:00
John Baldwin
44731cab3b Change the suser() API to take advantage of td_ucred as well as do a
general cleanup of the API.  The entire API now consists of two functions
similar to the pre-KSE API.  The suser() function takes a thread pointer
as its only argument.  The td_ucred member of this thread must be valid
so the only valid thread pointers are curthread and a few kernel threads
such as thread0.  The suser_cred() function takes a pointer to a struct
ucred as its first argument and an integer flag as its second argument.
The flag is currently only used for the PRISON_ROOT flag.

Discussed on:	smp@
2002-04-01 21:31:13 +00:00
Robert Drehmel
ad1ff0997e Make getcredhostname() take a buffer and the buffer's size
as arguments.  The correct hostname is copied into the buffer
while having the prison's lock acquired in a jailed process'
case.

Reviewed by:	jhb, rwatson
2002-02-27 16:43:20 +00:00
Robert Drehmel
9484d0c0e8 Add a function which returns the correct hostname for a given
credential.

Reviewed by:	phk
2002-02-27 14:58:32 +00:00
Andrew R. Reiter
d0615c64a5 - Attempt to help declutter kern. sysctl by moving security out from
beneath it.

Reviewed by: rwatson
2002-01-16 06:55:30 +00:00
Andrew R. Reiter
83aee5a8d5 - Move _jail sysctl node underneath _kern_security in order to standardize
where our security related sysctl tuneables are located.  Also, this
  will help if/when we move _security node out from under _kern as to help
  make _kern less cluttered.

Approved by:	rwatson
Review by:	rwatson
2001-12-12 05:23:20 +00:00
Robert Watson
011376308f o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the
mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount,
  pr_linux, ...)
o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/
  so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c
  protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as
  kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes.
o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux
  mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return
  a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy
  to an array passed into the calls.  Likewise, update linprocfs to
  use these primitives.
o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly
  accessing struct prison.

Reviewed by:	jhb
2001-12-03 16:12:27 +00:00
Robert Watson
fc5d29ef7d o Move suser() calls in kern/ to using suser_xxx() with an explicit
credential selection, rather than reference via a thread or process
  pointer.  This is part of a gradual migration to suser() accepting
  a struct ucred instead of a struct proc, simplifying the reference
  and locking semantics of suser().

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2001-11-01 20:56:57 +00:00
John Baldwin
a2f2b3afcd - Catch up to the new ucred API.
- Add proc locking to the jail() syscall.  This mostly involved shuffling
  a few things around so that blockable things like malloc and copyin
  were performed before acquiring the lock and checking the existing
  ucred and then updating the ucred as one "atomic" change under the proc
  lock.
2001-10-11 23:39:43 +00:00
Robert Watson
567931c8f6 o Initialize per-jail securelevel from global securelevel as part of
jail creation.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2001-09-26 20:37:15 +00:00
Julian Elischer
b40ce4165d KSE Milestone 2
Note ALL MODULES MUST BE RECOMPILED
make the kernel aware that there are smaller units of scheduling than the
process. (but only allow one thread per process at this time).
This is functionally equivalent to teh previousl -current except
that there is a thread associated with each process.

Sorry john! (your next MFC will be a doosie!)

Reviewed by: peter@freebsd.org, dillon@freebsd.org

X-MFC after:    ha ha ha ha
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
Matthew Dillon
116734c4d1 Pushdown Giant for acct(), kqueue(), kevent(), execve(), fork(),
vfork(), rfork(), jail().
2001-09-01 03:04:31 +00:00
Robert Watson
fd6aaf7fe1 Anton kindly pointed out (and fixed) a bug in the Jail handling of the
bind() call on IPv4 sockets:

  Currently, if one tries to bind a socket using INADDR_LOOPBACK inside a
  jail, it will fail because prison_ip() does not take this possibility
  into account.  On the other hand, when one tries to connect(), for
  example, to localhost, prison_remote_ip() will silently convert
  INADDR_LOOPBACK to the jail's IP address.  Therefore, it is desirable to
  make bind() to do this implicit conversion as well.

  Apart from this, the patch also replaces 0x7f000001 in
  prison_remote_ip() to a more correct INADDR_LOOPBACK.

This is a 4.4-RELEASE "during the freeze, thanks" MFC candidate.

Submitted by:	Anton Berezin <tobez@FreeBSD.org>
Discussed with at some point:	phk
MFC after:	3 days
2001-08-03 18:21:06 +00:00
Robert Watson
91421ba234 o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject
credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison).
o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence.
o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and
  pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference
  management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code.
o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead
  of struct proc arguments.
o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed,
  rather than directly checking pointers all over the place.
o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function.
o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h.
o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the
  flag in the process flags field itself.
o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect
  mutex use.

Notes:

o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required.
o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs
  credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code.
o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is
  required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the
  structure.

Reviewed by:	freebsd-arch
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2001-02-21 06:39:57 +00:00
David Malone
7cc0979fd6 Convert more malloc+bzero to malloc+M_ZERO.
Submitted by:	josh@zipperup.org
Submitted by:	Robert Drehmel <robd@gmx.net>
2000-12-08 21:51:06 +00:00
Robert Watson
cb1f0db9db o Deny access to System V IPC from within jail by default, as in the
current implementation, jail neither virtualizes the Sys V IPC namespace,
  nor provides inter-jail protections on IPC objects.
o Support for System V IPC can be enabled by setting jail.sysvipc_allowed=1
  using sysctl.
o This is not the "real fix" which involves virtualizing the System V
  IPC namespace, but prevents processes within jail from influencing those
  outside of jail when not approved by the administrator.

Reported by:	Paulo Fragoso <paulo@nlink.com.br>
2000-10-31 01:34:00 +00:00
Robert Watson
7cadc2663e o Modify jail to limit creation of sockets to UNIX domain sockets,
TCP/IP (v4) sockets, and routing sockets.  Previously, interaction
  with IPv6 was not well-defined, and might be inappropriate for some
  environments.  Similarly, sysctl MIB entries providing interface
  information also give out only addresses from those protocol domains.

  For the time being, this functionality is enabled by default, and
  toggleable using the sysctl variable jail.socket_unixiproute_only.
  In the future, protocol domains will be able to determine whether or
  not they are ``jail aware''.

o Further limitations on process use of getpriority() and setpriority()
  by jailed processes.  Addresses problem described in kern/17878.

Reviewed by:	phk, jmg
2000-06-04 04:28:31 +00:00
Robert Watson
83f1e257e0 Yet-another-update: rename ``kern.prison'' to a new sysctl root entry,
``jail'', and move the set_hostname_allowed sysctl there, as well as
fixing a bug in the sysctl that resulted in jails being over-limited
(preventing them from reading as well as writing the hostname).  Also,
correct some formatting issues, courtesy bde :-).

Reviewed by:	phk
Approved by:	jkh
2000-02-12 13:41:56 +00:00
Poul-Henning Kamp
978f8d9300 Add a version number field to the jail(2) argument so that future changes
can be handled intelligently.
1999-09-19 08:36:03 +00:00
Peter Wemm
c3aac50f28 $Id$ -> $FreeBSD$ 1999-08-28 01:08:13 +00:00
Poul-Henning Kamp
07901f227b Add beer-ware license and $Id$
Noticed by:	dillon
1999-04-30 06:51:51 +00:00
Poul-Henning Kamp
430210c00b Make BOOTP to work again.
Submitted by:	dillon
Reviewed by:	phk
1999-04-30 06:30:15 +00:00
Poul-Henning Kamp
75c1354190 This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing.  The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.

For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact:  "real virtual servers".

Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.

Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.

It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.

A few notes:

   I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.

   The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.

   mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.

   /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
   jailed processes.

   Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.

   There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.

   Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)

If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!

Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.

Have fun...

Sponsored by:   http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by:       http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00