Mainly focus on files that use BSD 2-Clause license, however the tool I
was using misidentified many licenses so this was mostly a manual - error
prone - task.
The Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX) group provides a specification
to make it easier for automated tools to detect and summarize well known
opensource licenses. We are gradually adopting the specification, noting
that the tags are considered only advisory and do not, in any way,
superceed or replace the license texts.
In integrity mode, a larger logical sector (e.g., 4096 bytes) spans several
physical sectors (e.g., 512 bytes) on the backing device. Due to hash
overhead, a 4096 byte logical sector takes 8.5625 512-byte physical sectors.
This means that only 288 bytes (256 data + 32 hash) of the last 512 byte
sector are used.
The memory allocation used to store the encrypted data to be written to the
physical sectors comes from malloc(9) and does not use M_ZERO.
Previously, nothing initialized the final physical sector backing each
logical sector, aside from the hash + encrypted data portion. So 224 bytes
of kernel heap memory was leaked to every block :-(.
This patch addresses the issue by initializing the trailing portion of the
physical sector in every logical sector to zeros before use. A much simpler
but higher overhead fix would be to tag the entire allocation M_ZERO.
PR: 222077
Reported by: Maxim Khitrov <max AT mxcrypt.com>
Reviewed by: emaste
Security: yes
Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12272
so we cannot access it anymore. Setting an error later lead to memory
corruption.
Assert that crypto_dispatch() was successful. It can fail only if we pass a
bogus crypto request, which is a bug in the program, not a runtime condition.
PR: 199705
Submitted by: luke.tw
Reviewed by: emaste
MFC after: 3 days
for counter mode), and AES-GCM. Both of these modes have been added to
the aesni module.
Included is a set of tests to validate that the software and aesni
module calculate the correct values. These use the NIST KAT test
vectors. To run the test, you will need to install a soon to be
committed port, nist-kat that will install the vectors. Using a port
is necessary as the test vectors are around 25MB.
All the man pages were updated. I have added a new man page, crypto.7,
which includes a description of how to use each mode. All the new modes
and some other AES modes are present. It would be good for someone
else to go through and document the other modes.
A new ioctl was added to support AEAD modes which AES-GCM is one of them.
Without this ioctl, it is not possible to test AEAD modes from userland.
Add a timing safe bcmp for use to compare MACs. Previously we were using
bcmp which could leak timing info and result in the ability to forge
messages.
Add a minor optimization to the aesni module so that single segment
mbufs don't get copied and instead are updated in place. The aesni
module needs to be updated to support blocked IO so segmented mbufs
don't have to be copied.
We require that the IV be specified for all calls for both GCM and ICM.
This is to ensure proper use of these functions.
Obtained from: p4: //depot/projects/opencrypto
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: FreeBSD Foundation
Sponsored by: NetGate
driver when it hits a mbuf/iov buffer, it mallocs and copies the data
for processing.. This improves perf by ~8-10% on my machine...
I have thoughts of fixing AES-NI so that it can better handle segmented
buffers, which should help improve IPSEC performance, but that is for
the future...
was not updated to pass CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT flag to opencrypto. This resulted in
always using first key.
We need to support providers created with this bug, so set special
G_ELI_FLAG_FIRST_KEY flag for GELI provider in integrity mode with version
smaller than 6 and pass the CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT flag to opencrypto only if
G_ELI_FLAG_FIRST_KEY doesn't exist.
Reported by: Anton Yuzhaninov <citrin@citrin.ru>
MFC after: 1 week
create reasonably large cache for the keys that is filled when
needed. The previous version was problematic for very large providers
(hundreds of terabytes or serval petabytes). Every terabyte of data
needs around 256kB for keys. Make the default cache limit big enough
to fit all the keys needed for 4TB providers, which will eat at most
1MB of memory.
MFC after: 2 weeks
Before this change if you wanted to suspend your laptop and be sure that your
encryption keys are safe, you had to stop all processes that use file system
stored on encrypted device, unmount the file system and detach geli provider.
This isn't very handy. If you are a lucky user of a laptop where suspend/resume
actually works with FreeBSD (I'm not!) you most likely want to suspend your
laptop, because you don't want to start everything over again when you turn
your laptop back on.
And this is where geli suspend/resume steps in. When you execute:
# geli suspend -a
geli will wait for all in-flight I/O requests, suspend new I/O requests, remove
all geli sensitive data from the kernel memory (like encryption keys) and will
wait for either 'geli resume' or 'geli detach'.
Now with no keys in memory you can suspend your laptop without stopping any
processes or unmounting any file systems.
When you resume your laptop you have to resume geli devices using 'geli resume'
command. You need to provide your passphrase, etc. again so the keys can be
restored and suspended I/O requests released.
Of course you need to remember that 'geli suspend' won't clear file system
cache and other places where data from your geli-encrypted file system might be
present. But to get rid of those stopping processes and unmounting file system
won't help either - you have to turn your laptop off. Be warned.
Also note, that suspending geli device which contains file system with geli
utility (or anything used by 'geli resume') is not very good idea, as you won't
be able to resume it - when you execute geli(8), the kernel will try to read it
and this read I/O request will be suspended.
