Requested by: bde
Since locking sigio_lock is usually followed by calling pgsigio(),
move the declaration of sigio_lock and the definitions of SIGIO_*() to
sys/signalvar.h.
While I am here, sort include files alphabetically, where possible.
not removing tabs before "__P((", and not outdenting continuation lines
to preserve non-KNF lining up of code with parentheses. Switch to KNF
formatting and/or rewrap the whole prototype in some cases.
spares (the size of the field was changed from u_short to u_int to
reflect what it really ends up being). Accordingly, change users of
xucred to set and check this field as appropriate. In the kernel,
this is being done inside the new cru2x() routine which takes a
`struct ucred' and fills out a `struct xucred' according to the
former. This also has the pleasant sideaffect of removing some
duplicate code.
Reviewed by: rwatson
but never accept'ed, so they must be destroyed. Originally, unp_drop()
detected this situation by checking if so->so_head is non-NULL.
However, since revision 1.54 of uipc_socket.c (Feb 1999), so->so_head
is set to NULL before calling soabort(), so any unix-domain sockets
waiting to be accept'ed are leaked if the server socket is closed.
Resolve this by moving the socket destruction code into uipc_abort()
itself, and making it unconditional (the other caller of unp_drop()
never needs the socket to be destroyed). Use unp_detach() to avoid
the original code duplication when destroying the socket.
PR: kern/17895
Reviewed by: dwmalone (an earlier version of the patch)
MFC after: 1 week
Seigo Tanimura (tanimura) posted the initial delta.
I've polished it quite a bit reducing the need for locking and
adapting it for KSE.
Locks:
1 mutex in each filedesc
protects all the fields.
protects "struct file" initialization, while a struct file
is being changed from &badfileops -> &pipeops or something
the filedesc should be locked.
1 mutex in each struct file
protects the refcount fields.
doesn't protect anything else.
the flags used for garbage collection have been moved to
f_gcflag which was the FILLER short, this doesn't need
locking because the garbage collection is a single threaded
container.
could likely be made to use a pool mutex.
1 sx lock for the global filelist.
struct file * fhold(struct file *fp);
/* increments reference count on a file */
struct file * fhold_locked(struct file *fp);
/* like fhold but expects file to locked */
struct file * ffind_hold(struct thread *, int fd);
/* finds the struct file in thread, adds one reference and
returns it unlocked */
struct file * ffind_lock(struct thread *, int fd);
/* ffind_hold, but returns file locked */
I still have to smp-safe the fget cruft, I'll get to that asap.
always deriving the credential for a newly accepted connection from
the listen socket. Previously, the selection of the credential
depended on the protocol: UNIX domain sockets would use the
connecting process's credential, and protocols supporting a creation
of the socket before the receiving end called accept() would use
the listening socket. After this change, it is always the listening
credential.
Reviewed by: green
vnodes. This will hopefully serve as a base from which we can
expand the MP code. We currently do not attempt to obtain any
mutex or SX locks, but the door is open to add them when we nail
down exactly how that part of it is going to work.
sysctl_req', which describes in-progress sysctl requests. This permits
sysctl handlers to have access to the current thread, permitting work
on implementing td->td_ucred, migration of suser() to using struct
thread to derive the appropriate ucred, and allowing struct thread to be
passed down to other code, such as network code where td is not currently
available (and curproc is used).
o Note: netncp and netsmb are not updated to reflect this change, as they
are not currently KSE-adapted.
Reviewed by: julian
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
a single kern.security.seeotheruids_permitted, describes as:
"Unprivileged processes may see subjects/objects with different real uid"
NOTE: kern.ps_showallprocs exists in -STABLE, and therefore there is
an API change. kern.ipc.showallsockets does not.
- Check kern.security.seeotheruids_permitted in cr_cansee().
- Replace visibility calls to socheckuid() with cr_cansee() (retain
the change to socheckuid() in ipfw, where it is used for rule-matching).
- Remove prison_unpcb() and make use of cr_cansee() against the UNIX
domain socket credential instead of comparing root vnodes for the
UDS and the process. This allows multiple jails to share the same
chroot() and not see each others UNIX domain sockets.
- Remove unused socheckproc().
Now that cr_cansee() is used universally for socket visibility, a variety
of policies are more consistently enforced, including uid-based
restrictions and jail-based restrictions. This also better-supports
the introduction of additional MAC models.
Reviewed by: ps, billf
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
kern.ipc.showallsockets is set to 0.
Submitted by: billf (with modifications by me)
Inspired by: Dave McKay (aka pm aka Packet Magnet)
Reviewed by: peter
MFC after: 2 weeks
1) Allow the sending of more than one control message at a time
over a unix domain socket. This should cover the PR 29499.
2) This requires that unp_{ex,in}ternalize and unp_scan understand
mbufs with more than one control message at a time.
3) Internalize and externalize used to work on the mbuf in-place.
This made life quite complicated and the code for sizeof(int) <
sizeof(file *) could end up doing the wrong thing. The patch always
create a new mbuf/cluster now. This resulted in the change of the
prototype for the domain externalise function.
4) You can now send SCM_TIMESTAMP messages.
5) Always use CMSG_DATA(cm) to determine the start where the data
in unp_{ex,in}ternalize. It was using ((struct cmsghdr *)cm + 1)
in some places, which gives the wrong alignment on the alpha.
(NetBSD made this fix some time ago).
This results in an ABI change for discriptor passing and creds
passing on the alpha. (Probably on the IA64 and Spare ports too).
6) Fix userland programs to use CMSG_* macros too.
7) Be more careful about freeing mbufs containing (file *)s.
This is made possible by the prototype change of externalise.
PR: 29499
MFC after: 6 weeks
Note ALL MODULES MUST BE RECOMPILED
make the kernel aware that there are smaller units of scheduling than the
process. (but only allow one thread per process at this time).
This is functionally equivalent to teh previousl -current except
that there is a thread associated with each process.
Sorry john! (your next MFC will be a doosie!)
Reviewed by: peter@freebsd.org, dillon@freebsd.org
X-MFC after: ha ha ha ha
`struct xucred` with the credentials of the connected peer.
Obviously this only works (and makes sense) on SOCK_STREAM
sockets. This works for both the connect(2) and listen(2)
callers.
There is precise documentation of the semantics in unix(4).
Reviewed by: dwmalone (eyeballed)
real uid, saved uid, real gid, and saved gid to ucred, as well as the
pcred->pc_uidinfo, which was associated with the real uid, only rename
it to cr_ruidinfo so as not to conflict with cr_uidinfo, which
corresponds to the effective uid.
o Remove p_cred from struct proc; add p_ucred to struct proc, replacing
original macro that pointed.
p->p_ucred to p->p_cred->pc_ucred.
o Universally update code so that it makes use of ucred instead of pcred,
p->p_ucred instead of p->p_pcred, cr_ruidinfo instead of p_uidinfo,
cr_{r,sv}{u,g}id instead of p_*, etc.
o Remove pcred0 and its initialization from init_main.c; initialize
cr_ruidinfo there.
o Restruction many credential modification chunks to always crdup while
we figure out locking and optimizations; generally speaking, this
means moving to a structure like this:
newcred = crdup(oldcred);
...
p->p_ucred = newcred;
crfree(oldcred);
It's not race-free, but better than nothing. There are also races
in sys_process.c, all inter-process authorization, fork, exec, and
exit.
o Remove sigio->sio_ruid since sigio->sio_ucred now contains the ruid;
remove comments indicating that the old arrangement was a problem.
o Restructure exec1() a little to use newcred/oldcred arrangement, and
use improved uid management primitives.
o Clean up exit1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup due to
pcred removal.
o Clean up fork1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup and
allocation.
o Clean up ktrcanset() to take into account changes, and move to using
suser_xxx() instead of performing a direct uid==0 comparision.
o Improve commenting in various kern_prot.c credential modification
calls to better document current behavior. In a couple of places,
current behavior is a little questionable and we need to check
POSIX.1 to make sure it's "right". More commenting work still
remains to be done.
o Update credential management calls, such as crfree(), to take into
account new ruidinfo reference.
o Modify or add the following uid and gid helper routines:
change_euid()
change_egid()
change_ruid()
change_rgid()
change_svuid()
change_svgid()
In each case, the call now acts on a credential not a process, and as
such no longer requires more complicated process locking/etc. They
now assume the caller will do any necessary allocation of an
exclusive credential reference. Each is commented to document its
reference requirements.
o CANSIGIO() is simplified to require only credentials, not processes
and pcreds.
o Remove lots of (p_pcred==NULL) checks.
o Add an XXX to authorization code in nfs_lock.c, since it's
questionable, and needs to be considered carefully.
o Simplify posix4 authorization code to require only credentials, not
processes and pcreds. Note that this authorization, as well as
CANSIGIO(), needs to be updated to use the p_cansignal() and
p_cansched() centralized authorization routines, as they currently
do not take into account some desirable restrictions that are handled
by the centralized routines, as well as being inconsistent with other
similar authorization instances.
o Update libkvm to take these changes into account.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Reviewed by: green, bde, jhb, freebsd-arch, freebsd-audit
other "system" header files.
Also help the deprecation of lockmgr.h by making it a sub-include of
sys/lock.h and removing sys/lockmgr.h form kernel .c files.
Sort sys/*.h includes where possible in affected files.
OK'ed by: bde (with reservations)
nam for an unbound socket instead of leaving nam untouched in that case.
This way, the getsockname() output can be used to determine the address
family of such sockets (AF_LOCAL).
Reviewed by: iedowse
Approved by: rwatson
credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison).
o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence.
o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and
pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference
management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code.
o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead
of struct proc arguments.
o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed,
rather than directly checking pointers all over the place.
o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function.
o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h.
o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the
flag in the process flags field itself.
o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect
mutex use.
Notes:
o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required.
o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs
credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code.
o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is
required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the
structure.
Reviewed by: freebsd-arch
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
This is because calls with M_WAIT (now M_TRYWAIT) may not wait
forever when nothing is available for allocation, and may end up
returning NULL. Hopefully we now communicate more of the right thing
to developers and make it very clear that it's necessary to check whether
calls with M_(TRY)WAIT also resulted in a failed allocation.
M_TRYWAIT basically means "try harder, block if necessary, but don't
necessarily wait forever." The time spent blocking is tunable with
the kern.ipc.mbuf_wait sysctl.
M_WAIT is now deprecated but still defined for the next little while.
* Fix a typo in a comment in mbuf.h
* Fix some code that was actually passing the mbuf subsystem's M_WAIT to
malloc(). Made it pass M_WAITOK instead. If we were ever to redefine the
value of the M_WAIT flag, this could have became a big problem.
because it only takes a struct tag which makes it impossible to
use unions, typedefs etc.
Define __offsetof() in <machine/ansi.h>
Define offsetof() in terms of __offsetof() in <stddef.h> and <sys/types.h>
Remove myriad of local offsetof() definitions.
Remove includes of <stddef.h> in kernel code.
NB: Kernelcode should *never* include from /usr/include !
Make <sys/queue.h> include <machine/ansi.h> to avoid polluting the API.
Deprecate <struct.h> with a warning. The warning turns into an error on
01-12-2000 and the file gets removed entirely on 01-01-2001.
Paritials reviews by: various.
Significant brucifications by: bde
chgsbsize(), which are called rather frequently and may be called from an
interrupt context in the case of chgsbsize(). Instead, do the hash table
lookup and maintenance when credentials are changed, which is a lot less
frequent. Add pointers to the uidinfo structures to the ucred and pcred
structures for fast access. Pass a pointer to the credential to chgproccnt()
and chgsbsize() instead of passing the uid. Add a reference count to the
uidinfo structure and use it to decide when to free the structure rather
than freeing the structure when the resource consumption drops to zero.
Move the resource tracking code from kern_proc.c to kern_resource.c. Move
some duplicate code sequences in kern_prot.c to separate helper functions.
Change KASSERTs in this code to unconditional tests and calls to panic().
the chgsbsize() call to use a "subject" pointer (&sb.sb_hiwat) and
a u_long target to set it to. The whole thing is splnet().
This fixes a problem that jdp has been able to provoke.
the gating of system calls that cause modifications to the underlying
filesystem. The gating can be enabled by any filesystem that needs
to consistently suspend operations by adding the vop_stdgetwritemount
to their set of vnops. Once gating is enabled, the function
vfs_write_suspend stops all new write operations to a filesystem,
allows any filesystem modifying system calls already in progress
to complete, then sync's the filesystem to disk and returns. The
function vfs_write_resume allows the suspended write operations to
begin again. Gating is not added by default for all filesystems as
for SMP systems it adds two extra locks to such critical kernel
paths as the write system call. Thus, gating should only be added
as needed.
Details on the use and current status of snapshots in FFS can be
found in /sys/ufs/ffs/README.snapshot so for brevity and timelyness
is not included here. Unless and until you create a snapshot file,
these changes should have no effect on your system (famous last words).
1) while allocating a uidinfo struct malloc is called with M_WAITOK,
it's possible that while asleep another process by the same user
could have woken up earlier and inserted an entry into the uid
hash table. Having redundant entries causes inconsistancies that
we can't handle.
fix: do a non-waiting malloc, and if that fails then do a blocking
malloc, after waking up check that no one else has inserted an entry
for us already.
2) Because many checks for sbsize were done as "test then set" in a non
atomic manner it was possible to exceed the limits put up via races.
fix: instead of querying the count then setting, we just attempt to
set the count and leave it up to the function to return success or
failure.
3) The uidinfo code was inlining and repeating, lookups and insertions
and deletions needed to be in their own functions for clarity.
Reviewed by: green
Alot of the code in sys/kern directly accesses the *Q_HEAD and *Q_ENTRY
structures for list operations. This patch makes all list operations
in sys/kern use the queue(3) macros, rather than directly accessing the
*Q_{HEAD,ENTRY} structures.
This batch of changes compile to the same object files.
Reviewed by: phk
Submitted by: Jake Burkholder <jake@checker.org>
PR: 14914
Make a sonewconn3() which takes an extra argument (proc) so new sockets created
with sonewconn() from a user's system call get the correct credentials, not
just the parent's credentials.
udev_t in the kernel but still called dev_t in userland.
Provide functions to manipulate both types:
major() umajor()
minor() uminor()
makedev() umakedev()
dev2udev() udev2dev()
For now they're functions, they will become in-line functions
after one of the next two steps in this process.
Return major/minor/makedev to macro-hood for userland.
Register a name in cdevsw[] for the "filedescriptor" driver.
In the kernel the udev_t appears in places where we have the
major/minor number combination, (ie: a potential device: we
may not have the driver nor the device), like in inodes, vattr,
cdevsw registration and so on, whereas the dev_t appears where
we carry around a reference to a actual device.
In the future the cdevsw and the aliased-from vnode will be hung
directly from the dev_t, along with up to two softc pointers for
the device driver and a few houskeeping bits. This will essentially
replace the current "alias" check code (same buck, bigger bang).
A little stunt has been provided to try to catch places where the
wrong type is being used (dev_t vs udev_t), if you see something
not working, #undef DEVT_FASCIST in kern/kern_conf.c and see if
it makes a difference. If it does, please try to track it down
(many hands make light work) or at least try to reproduce it
as simply as possible, and describe how to do that.
Without DEVT_FASCIST I belive this patch is a no-op.
Stylistic/posixoid comments about the userland view of the <sys/*.h>
files welcome now, from userland they now contain the end result.
Next planned step: make all dev_t's refer to the same devsw[] which
means convert BLK's to CHR's at the perimeter of the vnodes and
other places where they enter the game (bootdev, mknod, sysctl).
unp_internalize() takes a reference to the descriptor. If the send
fails after unp_internalize(), the control mbuf would be freed ophaning
the reference.
Tested in -CURRENT by: Pierre Beyssac <beyssac@enst.fr>
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
