Commit Graph

9 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Peter Wemm
c3aac50f28 $Id$ -> $FreeBSD$ 1999-08-28 01:08:13 +00:00
Sean Eric Fagan
49356a1f4a Fix procfs security hole -- check permissions on meaningful I/Os (namely,
reading/writing of mem and regs).  Also have to check for the requesting
process being group KMEM -- this is a bit of a hack, but ps et al need it.

Reviewed by:	davidg
1997-08-12 04:34:30 +00:00
Bruce Evans
1fd0b0588f Removed unused #includes. 1997-08-02 14:33:27 +00:00
Peter Wemm
6875d25465 Back out part 1 of the MCFH that changed $Id$ to $FreeBSD$. We are not
ready for it yet.
1997-02-22 09:48:43 +00:00
John Dyson
996c772f58 This is the kernel Lite/2 commit. There are some requisite userland
changes, so don't expect to be able to run the kernel as-is (very well)
without the appropriate Lite/2 userland changes.

The system boots and can mount UFS filesystems.

Untested: ext2fs, msdosfs, NFS
Known problems: Incorrect Berkeley ID strings in some files.
		Mount_std mounts will not work until the getfsent
		library routine is changed.

Reviewed by:	various people
Submitted by:	Jeffery Hsu <hsu@freebsd.org>
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
Jordan K. Hubbard
1130b656e5 Make the long-awaited change from $Id$ to $FreeBSD$
This will make a number of things easier in the future, as well as (finally!)
avoiding the Id-smashing problem which has plagued developers for so long.

Boy, I'm glad we're not using sup anymore.  This update would have been
insane otherwise.
1997-01-14 07:20:47 +00:00
Peter Wemm
0cc7521383 Major fixes for procfs..
Implement a "variable" directory structure. Files that do not make
sense for the given process do not "appear" and cannot be opened.
For example, "system" processes do not have "file", "regs" or "fpregs",
because they do not have a user area.

"attempt" to fill in the user area of a given process when it is being
accessed via /proc/pid/mem (the user struct is just after
VM_MAXUSER_ADDRESS in the process address space.)

Dont do IO to the U area while it's swapped, hold it in place if possible.

Lock off access to the "ctl" file if it's done a setuid like the other
pseudo-files in there.
1996-01-24 18:41:41 +00:00
David Greenman
3c4dd3568f Added $Id$ 1994-08-02 07:55:43 +00:00
Rodney W. Grimes
df8bae1de4 BSD 4.4 Lite Kernel Sources 1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00