points to convert _sema() to _sem() for consistency purposes with
respect to the other semaphore-related entry points:
mac_init_sysv_sema() -> mac_init_sysv_sem()
mac_destroy_sysv_sem() -> mac_destroy_sysv_sem()
mac_create_sysv_sema() -> mac_create_sysv_sem()
mac_cleanup_sysv_sema() -> mac_cleanup_sysv_sem()
Congruent changes are made to the policy interface to support this.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
This information will be very useful for people who are tuning applications
which have a dependence on IPC mechanisms.
The following OIDs were documented:
Message queues:
kern.ipc.msgmax
kern.ipc.msgmni
kern.ipc.msgmnb
kern.ipc.msgtlq
kern.ipc.msgssz
kern.ipc.msgseg
Semaphores:
kern.ipc.semmap
kern.ipc.semmni
kern.ipc.semmns
kern.ipc.semmnu
kern.ipc.semmsl
kern.ipc.semopm
kern.ipc.semume
kern.ipc.semusz
kern.ipc.semvmx
kern.ipc.semaem
Shared memory:
kern.ipc.shmmax
kern.ipc.shmmin
kern.ipc.shmmni
kern.ipc.shmseg
kern.ipc.shmall
kern.ipc.shm_use_phys
kern.ipc.shm_allow_removed
kern.ipc.shmsegs
These new descriptions can be viewed using sysctl -d
PR: kern/65219
Submitted by: Dan Nelson <dnelson at allantgroup dot com> (modified)
No objections: developers@
Descriptions reviewed by: gnn
MFC after: 1 week
return EINVAL rather than setting error, and don't free sops
unconditionally. The first change was merged accidentally as part of
the larger set of changes to introduce MAC labels and access control,
and potentially lead to continued processing of a request even after
it was determined to be invalid. The second change was due to changes
in the semaphore code since the original work was performed.
Pointed out by: truckman
to be modified and extended without breaking the user space ABI:
Use _kernel variants on _ds structures for System V sempahores, message
queues, and shared memory. When interfacing with userspace, export
only the _ds subsets of the _kernel data structures. A lot of search
and replace.
Define the message structure in the _KERNEL portion of msg.h so that it
can be used by other kernel consumers, but not exposed to user space.
Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
free one sem_undo with un_cnt == 0 instead of all of them. This is a
temporary workaround until the SLIST_FOREACH_PREVPTR loop gets fixed so
that it doesn't cause cycles in semu_list when removing multiple adjacent
items. It might be easier to just use (doubly-linked) LISTs here instead
of complicated SLIST code to achieve O(1) removals.
This bug manifested itself as a complete lockup under heavy semaphore use
by multiple processes with the SEM_UNDO flag set.
PR: 58984
flexible process_fork, process_exec, and process_exit eventhandlers. This
reduces code duplication and also means that I don't have to go duplicate
the eventhandler locking three more times for each of at_fork, at_exec, and
at_exit.
Reviewed by: phk, jake, almost complete silence on arch@
there is a global lock over the undo structures because of the way
they are managed.
Switch to using SLIST instead of rolling our own linked list.
Fix several races where a permission check was done before a
copyin/copyout, if the copy happened to fault it may have been
possible to race for access to a semaphore set that one shouldn't
have access to.
Requested by: rwatson
Tested by: NetBSD regression suite.
- Move jail checks and some other checks involving constants and stack
variables out from under Giant. This isn't perfectly safe atm because
jail_sysvipc_allowed is read w/o a lock meaning that its value could be
stale. This global variable will soon become a per-jail flag, however,
at which time it will either not need a lock or will use the prison lock.
Remove the explicit call to aio_proc_rundown() from exit1(), instead AIO
will use at_exit(9).
Add functions at_exec(9), rm_at_exec(9) which function nearly the
same as at_exec(9) and rm_at_exec(9), these functions are called
on behalf of modules at the time of execve(2) after the image
activator has run.
Use a modified version of tegge's suggestion via at_exec(9) to close
an exploitable race in AIO.
Fix SYSCALL_MODULE_HELPER such that it's archetecuterally neutral,
the problem was that one had to pass it a paramater indicating the
number of arguments which were actually the number of "int". Fix
it by using an inline version of the AS macro against the syscall
arguments. (AS should be available globally but we'll get to that
later.)
Add a primative system for dynamically adding kqueue ops, it's really
not as sophisticated as it should be, but I'll discuss with jlemon when
he's around.
Updated by peter following KSE and Giant pushdown.
I've running with this patch for two week with no ill side effects.
PR: kern/12014: Fix SysV Semaphore handling
Submitted by: Peter Jeremy <peter.jeremy@alcatel.com.au>
Reviewed by: audit
Add tunables for the sem* and shm* syscontrols for tuning on boottime
until they become dynamic.
SAP R/3 doesn't like the compiled in defaults.
Note ALL MODULES MUST BE RECOMPILED
make the kernel aware that there are smaller units of scheduling than the
process. (but only allow one thread per process at this time).
This is functionally equivalent to teh previousl -current except
that there is a thread associated with each process.
Sorry john! (your next MFC will be a doosie!)
Reviewed by: peter@freebsd.org, dillon@freebsd.org
X-MFC after: ha ha ha ha
overflow if uap->nsops (which is already unsigned) is over INT_MAX;
consequently, the bounds check below becomes valid. Previously, if a
value over INT_MAX was passed in uap->nsops, the bounds check wouldn't
catch it, and the value would be used to compute copyin()'s third
argument.
Obtained from: NetBSD
* all members of msginfo from sysv_msg.c;
* msqids from sysv_msg.c;
* sema from sysv_sem.c; and
* shmsegs from sysv_shm.c;
These will be used by ipcs(1) in non-kvm mode.
Reviewed by: tmm
credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison).
o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence.
o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and
pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference
management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code.
o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead
of struct proc arguments.
o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed,
rather than directly checking pointers all over the place.
o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function.
o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h.
o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the
flag in the process flags field itself.
o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect
mutex use.
Notes:
o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required.
o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs
credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code.
o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is
required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the
structure.
Reviewed by: freebsd-arch
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
current implementation, jail neither virtualizes the Sys V IPC namespace,
nor provides inter-jail protections on IPC objects.
o Support for System V IPC can be enabled by setting jail.sysvipc_allowed=1
using sysctl.
o This is not the "real fix" which involves virtualizing the System V
IPC namespace, but prevents processes within jail from influencing those
outside of jail when not approved by the administrator.
Reported by: Paulo Fragoso <paulo@nlink.com.br>
