ptrace_set_pc(), and cpu_ptrace() so that those functions are free to
acquire Giant, sleep, etc. We already do a PHOLD/PRELE around them so
that it is safe to sleep inside of these routines if necessary. This
allows ptrace() to be marked MP safe again as it no longer triggers lock
order reversals on Alpha.
Tested by: wilko
- no longer serialize on Giant for thread_single*() and family in fork,
exit and exec
- thread_wait() is mpsafe, assert no Giant
- reduce scope of Giant in exit to not cover thread_wait and just do
vm_waitproc().
- assert that thread_single() family are not called with Giant
- remove the DROP/PICKUP_GIANT macros from thread_single() family
- assert that thread_suspend_check() s not called with Giant
- remove manual drop_giant hack in thread_suspend_check since we know it
isn't held.
- remove the DROP/PICKUP_GIANT macros from thread_suspend_check() family
- mark kse_create() mpsafe
to have the kernel switch to a new thread, instead of doing it in
userland. It is in fact needed on ia64 where syscall restarts do not
return to userland first. It's completely handled inside the kernel.
As such, any context created by the kernel as part of an upcall and
caused by some syscall needs to be restored by the kernel.
parts of ptrace using proc_rwmem(). proc_rwmem() requires giant, and
giant must be acquired prior to the proc lock, so ptrace must require giant
still.
accurate reporting of multi-terabyte filesystem sizes.
You should build and boot a new kernel BEFORE doing a `make world'
as the new kernel will know about binaries using the old statfs
structure, but an old kernel will not know about the new system
calls that support the new statfs structure. Running an old kernel
after a `make world' will cause programs such as `df' that do a
statfs system call to fail with a bad system call.
Reviewed by: Bruce Evans <bde@zeta.org.au>
Reviewed by: Tim Robbins <tjr@freebsd.org>
Reviewed by: Julian Elischer <julian@elischer.org>
Reviewed by: the hoards of <arch@freebsd.org>
Sponsored by: DARPA & NAI Labs.
or unblock a thread in kernel, and allow UTS to specify whether syscall
should be restarted.
o Add ability for UTS to monitor signal comes in and removed from process,
the flag PS_SIGEVENT is used to indicate the events.
o Add a KMF_WAITSIGEVENT for KSE mailbox flag, UTS call kse_release with
this flag set to wait for above signal event.
o For SA based thread, kernel masks all signal in its signal mask, let
UTS to use kse_thr_interrupt interrupt a thread, and install a signal
frame in userland for the thread.
o Add a tm_syncsig in thread mailbox, when a hardware trap occurs,
it is used to deliver synchronous signal to userland, and upcall
is schedule, so UTS can process the synchronous signal for the thread.
Reviewed by: julian (mentor)
file/directory/link, rather than using a less explicit hack on
the extattr retrieval API:
extattr_list_fd()
extattr_list_file()
extattr_list_link()
The existing API was counter-intuitive, and poorly documented.
The prototypes for these system calls are identical to
extattr_get_*(), but without a specific attribute name to
leave NULL.
Pointed out by: Dominic Giampaolo <dbg@apple.com>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path
fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store
the chroot() point of each jail.
o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail.
o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified
vnode.
o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls
to callers of change_dir().
o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of
struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails.
Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr
kern_sigtimedwait() which is capable of supporting all of their semantics.
- These should be POSIX compliant but more careful review is needed before
we announce this.
__acl_get_link() Retrieve an ACL by name without following
symbolic links.
__acl_set_link() Set an ACL by name without following
symbolic links.
__acl_delete_link() Delete an ACL by name without following
symbolic links.
__acl_aclcheck_link() Check an ACL against a file by name without
following symbolic links.
These calls are similar in spirit to lstat(), lchown(), lchmod(), etc,
and will be used under similar circumstances.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Previously these were libc functions but were requested to
be made into system calls for atomicity and to coalesce what
might be two entrances into the kernel (signal mask setting
and floating point trap) into one.
A few style nits and comments from bde are also included.
Tested on alpha by: gallatin
handling clean and functional as 5.x evolves. This allows some of the
nasty bandaids in the 5.x codepaths to be unwound.
Encapsulate 4.x signal handling under COMPAT_FREEBSD4 (there is an
anti-foot-shooting measure in place, 5.x folks need this for a while) and
finish encapsulating the older stuff under COMPAT_43. Since the ancient
stuff is required on alpha (longjmp(3) passes a 'struct osigcontext *'
to the current sigreturn(2), instead of the 'ucontext_t *' that sigreturn
is supposed to take), add a compile time check to prevent foot shooting
there too. Add uniform COMPAT_43 stubs for ia64/sparc64/powerpc.
Tested on: i386, alpha, ia64. Compiled on sparc64 (a few days ago).
Approved by: re
__mac_set_link, based on __mac_get_proc() except with a pid,
and __mac_get_file(), __mac_set_file() except that they do
not follow symlinks. First in a series of commits to flesh
out the user API.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
This is for the not-quite-ready signal/fpu abi stuff. It may not see
the light of day, but I'm certainly not going to be able to validate it
when getting shot in the foot due to syscall number conflicts.
execve_secure() system call, which permits a process to pass in a label
for a label change during exec. This permits SELinux to change the
label for the resulting exec without a race following a manual label
change on the process. Because this interface uses our general purpose
MAC label abstraction, we call it execve_mac(), and wrap our port of
SELinux's execve_secure() around it with appropriate sid mappings.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
on the _file() theme that do not follow symlinks. Sync to MAC tree.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
__mac_get_pid Retrieve MAC label of a process by pid
Similar to __mac_get_proc() except that the target process of
the operation is explicitly specified rather than assuming
curthread.
__mac_get_link Retrieve MAC label of a path with NOFOLLOW
__mac_set_link Set MAC label of a path with NOFOLLOW
extattr_set_link Set EAs on a path with NOFOLLOW
extattr_get_link Retrieve EAs on a path with NOFOLLOW
extattr_delete_link Delete EAs on a path with NOFOLLOW
These calls are similar to __mac_get_file(), __mac_set_file(),
extattr_set_file(), extattr_get_file(), and extattr_delete_file(),
except that they do not follow symlinks. The distinction between
these calls is similar to lchown() vs chown().
Implementations to follow.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
Option 'P1003_1B_SEMAPHORES' to compile them in, or load the "sem" module
to activate them.
Have kern/makesyscalls.sh emit an include for sys/_semaphore.h into sysproto.h
to pull in the typedef for semid_t.
Add the syscalls to the syscall table as module stubs.
