and the new setmode and setowner fileops in FreeBSD 9.0:
- Add new MAC Framework entry point mac_posixshm_check_create() to allow
MAC policies to authorise shared memory use. Provide a stub policy and
test policy templates.
- Add missing Biba and MLS implementations of mac_posixshm_check_setmode()
and mac_posixshm_check_setowner().
- Add 'accmode' argument to mac_posixshm_check_open() -- unlike the
mac_posixsem_check_open() entry point it was modeled on, the access mode
is required as shared memory access can be read-only as well as writable;
this isn't true of POSIX semaphores.
- Implement full range of POSIX shared memory entry points for Biba and MLS.
Sponsored by: Google Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Approved by: re (kib)
to implement fchown(2) and fchmod(2) support for several file types
that previously lacked it. Add MAC entries for chown/chmod done on
posix shared memory and (old) in-kernel posix semaphores.
Based on the submission by: glebius
Reviewed by: rwatson
Approved by: re (bz)
extended attribute get/set; in the case of get an uninitialized user
buffer was passed before the EA was retrieved, making it of relatively
little use; the latter was simply unused by any policies.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
naming by renaming certain "proc" entry points to "cred" entry points,
reflecting their manipulation of credentials. For some entry points,
the process was passed into the framework but not into policies; in
these cases, stop passing in the process since we don't need it.
mac_proc_check_setaudit -> mac_cred_check_setaudit
mac_proc_check_setaudit_addr -> mac_cred_check_setaudit_addr
mac_proc_check_setauid -> mac_cred_check_setauid
mac_proc_check_setegid -> mac_cred_check_setegid
mac_proc_check_seteuid -> mac_cred_check_seteuid
mac_proc_check_setgid -> mac_cred_check_setgid
mac_proc_check_setgroups -> mac_cred_ceck_setgroups
mac_proc_check_setregid -> mac_cred_check_setregid
mac_proc_check_setresgid -> mac_cred_check_setresgid
mac_proc_check_setresuid -> mac_cred_check_setresuid
mac_proc_check_setreuid -> mac_cred_check_setreuid
mac_proc_check_setuid -> mac_cred_check_setuid
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
to add more V* constants, and the variables changed by this patch were often
being assigned to mode_t variables, which is 16 bit.
Approved by: rwatson (mentor)
memory mappings when the MAC label on a process changes, to
mac_proc_vm_revoke(),
It now also acquires its own credential reference directly from the
affected process rather than accepting one passed by the the caller,
simplifying the API and consumer code.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
that they operate directly on credentials: mac_proc_create_swapper(),
mac_proc_create_init(), and mac_proc_associate_nfsd(). Update policies.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
fragment reassembly queues.
This allows policies to label reassembly queues, perform access
control checks when matching fragments to a queue, update a queue
label when fragments are matched, and label the resulting
reassembled datagram.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
(1) Abstract interpreter vnode labeling in execve(2) and mac_execve(2)
so that the general exec code isn't aware of the details of
allocating, copying, and freeing labels, rather, simply passes in
a void pointer to start and stop functions that will be used by
the framework. This change will be MFC'd.
(2) Introduce a new flags field to the MAC_POLICY_SET(9) interface
allowing policies to declare which types of objects require label
allocation, initialization, and destruction, and define a set of
flags covering various supported object types (MPC_OBJECT_PROC,
MPC_OBJECT_VNODE, MPC_OBJECT_INPCB, ...). This change reduces the
overhead of compiling the MAC Framework into the kernel if policies
aren't loaded, or if policies require labels on only a small number
or even no object types. Each time a policy is loaded or unloaded,
we recalculate a mask of labeled object types across all policies
present in the system. Eliminate MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF option as it
is no longer required.
MFC after: 1 week ((1) only)
Reviewed by: csjp
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
semaphores. Specifically, semaphores are now represented as new file
descriptor type that is set to close on exec. This removes the need for
all of the manual process reference counting (and fork, exec, and exit
event handlers) as the normal file descriptor operations handle all of
that for us nicely. It is also suggested as one possible implementation
in the spec and at least one other OS (OS X) uses this approach.
Some bugs that were fixed as a result include:
- References to a named semaphore whose name is removed still work after
the sem_unlink() operation. Prior to this patch, if a semaphore's name
was removed, valid handles from sem_open() would get EINVAL errors from
sem_getvalue(), sem_post(), etc. This fixes that.
- Unnamed semaphores created with sem_init() were not cleaned up when a
process exited or exec'd. They were only cleaned up if the process
did an explicit sem_destroy(). This could result in a leak of semaphore
objects that could never be cleaned up.
- On the other hand, if another process guessed the id (kernel pointer to
'struct ksem' of an unnamed semaphore (created via sem_init)) and had
write access to the semaphore based on UID/GID checks, then that other
process could manipulate the semaphore via sem_destroy(), sem_post(),
sem_wait(), etc.
- As part of the permission check (UID/GID), the umask of the proces
creating the semaphore was not honored. Thus if your umask denied group
read/write access but the explicit mode in the sem_init() call allowed
it, the semaphore would be readable/writable by other users in the
same group, for example. This includes access via the previous bug.
- If the module refused to unload because there were active semaphores,
then it might have deregistered one or more of the semaphore system
calls before it noticed that there was a problem. I'm not sure if
this actually happened as the order that modules are discovered by the
kernel linker depends on how the actual .ko file is linked. One can
make the order deterministic by using a single module with a mod_event
handler that explicitly registers syscalls (and deregisters during
unload after any checks). This also fixes a race where even if the
sem_module unloaded first it would have destroyed locks that the
syscalls might be trying to access if they are still executing when
they are unloaded.
XXX: By the way, deregistering system calls doesn't do any blocking
to drain any threads from the calls.
- Some minor fixes to errno values on error. For example, sem_init()
isn't documented to return ENFILE or EMFILE if we run out of semaphores
the way that sem_open() can. Instead, it should return ENOSPC in that
case.
Other changes:
- Kernel semaphores now use a hash table to manage the namespace of
named semaphores nearly in a similar fashion to the POSIX shared memory
object file descriptors. Kernel semaphores can now also have names
longer than 14 chars (up to MAXPATHLEN) and can include subdirectories
in their pathname.
- The UID/GID permission checks for access to a named semaphore are now
done via vaccess() rather than a home-rolled set of checks.
- Now that kernel semaphores have an associated file object, the various
MAC checks for POSIX semaphores accept both a file credential and an
active credential. There is also a new posixsem_check_stat() since it
is possible to fstat() a semaphore file descriptor.
- A small set of regression tests (using the ksem API directly) is present
in src/tools/regression/posixsem.
Reported by: kris (1)
Tested by: kris
Reviewed by: rwatson (lightly)
MFC after: 1 month
same as the global variable defined in ip_input.c. Instead, adopt the name
'q' as found in about 1/2 of uses in ip_input.c, preventing a collision on
the name. This is non-harmful, but means that search and replace on the
global works less well (as in the virtualization work), as well as indexing
tools.
MFC after: 1 week
Reported by: julian
implement shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) in the kernel:
- Each shared memory file descriptor is associated with a swap-backed vm
object which provides the backing store. Each descriptor starts off with
a size of zero, but the size can be altered via ftruncate(2). The shared
memory file descriptors also support fstat(2). read(2), write(2),
ioctl(2), select(2), poll(2), and kevent(2) are not supported on shared
memory file descriptors.
- shm_open(2) and shm_unlink(2) are now implemented as system calls that
manage shared memory file descriptors. The virtual namespace that maps
pathnames to shared memory file descriptors is implemented as a hash
table where the hash key is generated via the 32-bit Fowler/Noll/Vo hash
of the pathname.
- As an extension, the constant 'SHM_ANON' may be specified in place of the
path argument to shm_open(2). In this case, an unnamed shared memory
file descriptor will be created similar to the IPC_PRIVATE key for
shmget(2). Note that the shared memory object can still be shared among
processes by sharing the file descriptor via fork(2) or sendmsg(2), but
it is unnamed. This effectively serves to implement the getmemfd() idea
bandied about the lists several times over the years.
- The backing store for shared memory file descriptors are garbage
collected when they are not referenced by any open file descriptors or
the shm_open(2) virtual namespace.
Submitted by: dillon, peter (previous versions)
Submitted by: rwatson (I based this on his version)
Reviewed by: alc (suggested converting getmemfd() to shm_open())
entry point, which is no longer required now that we don't support
old-style multicast tunnels. This removes the last mbuf object class
entry point that isn't init/copy/destroy.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Framework by moving from mac_mbuf_create_netlayer() to more specific
entry points for specific network services:
- mac_netinet_firewall_reply() to be used when replying to in-bound TCP
segments in pf and ipfw (etc).
- Rename mac_netinet_icmp_reply() to mac_netinet_icmp_replyinplace() and
add mac_netinet_icmp_reply(), reflecting that in some cases we overwrite
a label in place, but in others we apply the label to a new mbuf.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
in the TrustedBSD MAC Framework:
- Add mac_atalk.c and add explicit entry point mac_netatalk_aarp_send()
for AARP packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer
entry point.
- Add mac_inet6.c and add explicit entry point mac_netinet6_nd6_send()
for ND6 packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer entry
point.
- Add expliict entry point mac_netinet_arp_send() for ARP packet
labeling, and mac_netinet_igmp_send() for IGMP packet labeling,
rather than using a generic link layer entry point.
- Remove previous genering link layer entry point,
mac_mbuf_create_linklayer() as it is no longer used.
- Add implementations of new entry points to various policies, largely
by replicating the existing link layer entry point for them; remove
old link layer entry point implementation.
- Make MAC_IFNET_LOCK(), MAC_IFNET_UNLOCK(), and mac_ifnet_mtx global
to the MAC Framework rather than static to mac_net.c as it is now
needed outside of mac_net.c.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
we move towards netinet as a pseudo-object for the MAC Framework.
Rename 'mac_create_mbuf_linklayer' to 'mac_mbuf_create_linklayer' to
reflect general object-first ordering preference.
Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
primary object type, and then by secondarily by method name. This sorts
entry points relating to particular objects, such as pipes, sockets, and
vnodes together.
Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
from mac_vfs.c to mac_process.c to join other functions that setup up
process labels for specific purposes. Unlike the two proc create calls,
this call is intended to run after creation when a process registers as
the NFS daemon, so remains an _associate_ call..
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to
the following general forms:
mac_<object>_<method/action>
mac_<object>_check_<method/action>
The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly
reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more
consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain
multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical
parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for
certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly,
some entry point names.
All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules
not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to
conform to the new KPI.
Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
point to mac_check_vnode_unlink(), reflecting UNIX naming conventions.
This is the first of several commits to synchronize the MAC Framework
in FreeBSD 7.0 with the MAC Framework as it will appear in Mac OS X
Leopard.
Reveiwed by: csjp, Samy Bahra <sbahra at gwu dot edu>
Submitted by: Jacques Vidrine <nectar at apple dot com>
Obtained from: Apple Computer, Inc.
Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR
Approved by: re (bmah)
mpo_check_proc_setaudit_addr to be used when controlling use of
setaudit_addr(), rather than mpo_check_proc_setaudit(), which takes a
different argument type.
Reviewed by: csjp
Approved by: re (kensmith)
where similar data structures exist to support devfs and the MAC
Framework, but are named differently.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
variable name conventions for arguments passed into the framework --
for example, name network interfaces 'ifp', sockets 'so', mounts 'mp',
mbufs 'm', processes 'p', etc, wherever possible. Previously there
was significant variation in this regard.
Normalize copyright lists to ranges where sensible.
the introduction of priv(9) and MAC Framework entry points for privilege
checking/granting. These entry points exactly aligned with privileges and
provided no additional security context:
- mac_check_sysarch_ioperm()
- mac_check_kld_unload()
- mac_check_settime()
- mac_check_system_nfsd()
Add mpo_priv_check() implementations to Biba and LOMAC policies, which,
for each privilege, determine if they can be granted to processes
considered unprivileged by those two policies. These mostly, but not
entirely, align with the set of privileges granted in jails.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
calls. Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for
audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid().
MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where
additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other
audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9)
entry points.
Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in
some cases, other missing system-related checks.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, Inc.
LABEL_TO_SLOT() macro used by policy modules to query and set label data
in struct label. Instead of using a union, store an intptr_t, simplifying
the API.
Update policies: in most cases this required only small tweaks to current
wrapper macros. In two cases, a single wrapper macros had to be split into
separate get and set macros.
Move struct label definition from _label.h to mac_internal.h and remove
_label.h. With this change, policies may now treat struct label * as
opaque, allowing us to change the layout of struct label without breaking
the policy module ABI. For example, we could make the maximum number of
policies with labels modifiable at boot-time rather than just at
compile-time.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Exapnd comments on System V IPC labeling methods, which could use improved
consistency with respect to other object types.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
kernel. This LOR snuck in with some of the recent syncache changes. To
fix this, the inpcb handling was changed:
- Hang a MAC label off the syncache object
- When the syncache entry is initially created, we pickup the PCB lock
is held because we extract information from it while initializing the
syncache entry. While we do this, copy the MAC label associated with
the PCB and use it for the syncache entry.
- When the packet is transmitted, copy the label from the syncache entry
to the mbuf so it can be processed by security policies which analyze
mbuf labels.
This change required that the MAC framework be extended to support the
label copy operations from the PCB to the syncache entry, and then from
the syncache entry to the mbuf.
These functions really should be referencing the syncache structure instead
of the label. However, due to some of the complexities associated with
exposing this syncache structure we operate directly on it's label pointer.
This should be OK since we aren't making any access control decisions within
this code directly, we are merely allocating and copying label storage so
we can properly initialize mbuf labels for any packets the syncache code
might create.
This also has a nice side effect of caching. Prior to this change, the
PCB would be looked up/locked for each packet transmitted. Now the label
is cached at the time the syncache entry is initialized.
Submitted by: andre [1]
Discussed with: rwatson
[1] andre submitted the tcp_syncache.c changes
privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9)
interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege
checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of
privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the
existing suser(9) interface:
suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv)
suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags)
A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be
found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the
comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read
before doing so.
The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the
privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to
determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine,
rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the
SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail
check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used
by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted
in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail
is now present in kern_jail.c.
The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both
to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant
privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy
modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader
range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with
root privilege.
The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms
of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition
and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not
been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to
check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier.
This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it
modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security
policy become more feasible.
Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Discussed on: arch@
Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri,
Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>,
Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>,
Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
begun with a repo-copy of mac.h to mac_framework.h. sys/mac.h now
contains the userspace and user<->kernel API and definitions, with all
in-kernel interfaces moved to mac_framework.h, which is now included
across most of the kernel instead.
This change is the first step in a larger cleanup and sweep of MAC
Framework interfaces in the kernel, and will not be MFC'd.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA
exists to allow the mandatory access control policy to properly initialize
mbufs generated by the firewall. An example where this might happen is keep
alive packets, or ICMP error packets in response to other packets.
This takes care of kernel panics associated with un-initialize mbuf labels
when the firewall generates packets.
[1] I modified this patch from it's original version, the initial patch
introduced a number of entry points which were programmatically
equivalent. So I introduced only one. Instead, we should leverage
mac_create_mbuf_netlayer() which is used for similar situations,
an example being icmp_error()
This will minimize the impact associated with the MFC
Submitted by: mlaier [1]
MFC after: 1 week
This is a RELENG_6 candidate
credential: mac_associate_nfsd_label()
This entry point can be utilized by various Mandatory Access Control policies
so they can properly initialize the label of files which get created
as a result of an NFS operation. This work will be useful for fixing kernel
panics associated with accessing un-initialized or invalid vnode labels.
The implementation of these entry points will come shortly.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD
Requested by: mdodd
MFC after: 3 weeks
process that caused the clone event to take place for the device driver
creating the device. This allows cloned device drivers to adapt the
device node based on security aspects of the process, such as the uid,
gid, and MAC label.
- Add a cred reference to struct cdev, so that when a device node is
instantiated as a vnode, the cloning credential can be exposed to
MAC.
- Add make_dev_cred(), a version of make_dev() that additionally
accepts the credential to stick in the struct cdev. Implement it and
make_dev() in terms of a back-end make_dev_credv().
- Add a new event handler, dev_clone_cred, which can be registered to
receive the credential instead of dev_clone, if desired.
- Modify the MAC entry point mac_create_devfs_device() to accept an
optional credential pointer (may be NULL), so that MAC policies can
inspect and act on the label or other elements of the credential
when initializing the skeleton device protections.
- Modify tty_pty.c to register clone_dev_cred and invoke make_dev_cred(),
so that the pty clone credential is exposed to the MAC Framework.
While currently primarily focussed on MAC policies, this change is also
a prerequisite for changes to allow ptys to be instantiated with the UID
of the process looking up the pty. This requires further changes to the
pty driver -- in particular, to immediately recycle pty nodes on last
close so that the credential-related state can be recreated on next
lookup.
Submitted by: Andrew Reisse <andrew.reisse@sparta.com>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
MFC after: 1 week
MFC note: Merge to 6.x, but not 5.x for ABI reasons
redundant with respect to existing mbuf copy label routines. Expose
a new mac_copy_mbuf() routine at the top end of the Framework and
use that; use the existing mpo_copy_mbuf_label() routine on the
bottom end.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR
Approved by: re (scottl)
which is invoked from socket() and socketpair(), permitting MAC
policy modules to control the creation of sockets by domain, type, and
protocol.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR
Approved by: re (scottl)
Requested by: SCC
points to convert _sema() to _sem() for consistency purposes with
respect to the other semaphore-related entry points:
mac_init_sysv_sema() -> mac_init_sysv_sem()
mac_destroy_sysv_sem() -> mac_destroy_sysv_sem()
mac_create_sysv_sema() -> mac_create_sysv_sem()
mac_cleanup_sysv_sema() -> mac_cleanup_sysv_sem()
Congruent changes are made to the policy interface to support this.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
access to POSIX Semaphores:
mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore
mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore
mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore
mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed
mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried
mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened
mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to
mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked
mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore
Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points.
For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively
read/write.
Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
mac_check_proc_wait(), which control the ability to wait4() specific
processes. This permits MAC policies to limit information flow from
children that have changed label, although has to be handled carefully
due to common programming expectations regarding the behavior of
wait4(). The cr_seeotheruids() check in p_canwait() is #if 0'd for
this reason.
The mac_stub and mac_test policies are updated to reflect these new
entry points.
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations,
required for some policies:
poll() mac_check_socket_poll()
fstat() mac_check_socket_stat()
accept() mac_check_socket_accept()
Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points.
While here, add missing entry point implementations for:
mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive()
mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send()
mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send()
mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible()
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential,
including:
setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid()
seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid()
setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid()
setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid()
setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups()
setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid()
setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid()
setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid()
setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid()
MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both
current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments
to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated.
Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MAP_SHARED so that the entry point gets executed un-conditionally.
This may be useful for security policies which want to perform access
control checks around run-time linking.
-add the mmap(2) flags argument to the check_vnode_mmap entry point
so that we can make access control decisions based on the type of
mapped object.
-update any dependent API around this parameter addition such as
function prototype modifications, entry point parameter additions
and the inclusion of sys/mman.h header file.
-Change the MLS, BIBA and LOMAC security policies so that subject
domination routines are not executed unless the type of mapping is
shared. This is done to maintain compatibility between the old
vm_mmap_vnode(9) and these policies.
Reviewed by: rwatson
MFC after: 1 month
