For certain combinations of sectorsize, mediasize and random numbers
(used to define the mapping), a multisector read or write would ignore
some subset of the sectors past the first sector in the request because
those sectors would be mapped past the end of the parent device, and
normal "end of media" truncation would zap that part of the request.
Rev 1.19+1.20 of g_bde_work.c added the check which should have alerted
me to this happening. This commit maps the request correctly and
adds KASSERTS to make sure things stay inside the parent device.
This does not change the on-disk layout of GBDE, there is no need to
backup/restore.
memory-allocation purposes. Right now it is also a very good idea
because we hit a Giant assertion in the free(9) processing if we
free something larger than 64k.
Make sure sector zero is protected if it contains metadata.
Lower WARNS for gbde to 3 on non-i386 archs. rijndael-fst is evil
but appearntly does the right thing and passes the test-vectors.
MFC Candidate.
for request sizes larger than the sectorsize or for multi-key setups.
See warning mailed to current@ for details of recovery.
Found by: Marcus Reid <marcus@blazingdot.com>
are the output of AES/128/CBC or ARC4RANDOM. Encrypt the random data with which
we wipe when we get a BIO_DELETE to make such an algorithm useful.
Sponsored by: DARPA & NAI Labs
Approved by: re (blanket)
Replace ARC4 with SHA2-512.
Change lock-structure encoding to use random ordering rather for obscurity.
Encrypt lock-structure with AES/256 instead of AES/128.
Change kkey derivation to be MD5 hash based.
Watch for malloc(M_NOWAIT) failures and ditch our cache when they happen.
Remove clause 3 of the license with NAI Labs consent.
Many thanks to "Lucky Green" <shamrock@cypherpunks.to> and "David
Wagner" <daw@cs.berkeley.edu>, for code reading, inputs and
suggestions.
This code has still not been stared at for 10 years by a gang of
hard-core cryptographers. Discretion advised.
NB: These changes result in the on-disk format changing: dump/restore needed.
Sponsored by: DARPA & NAI Labs.
WARNING: You need to backup and restore the _unencrypted_ contents
WARNING: of your GBDE disks when you take this update!
Sponsored by: DARPA & NAI Labs.
This is an encryption module designed for to secure denial of access
to the contents of "cold disks" with or without destruction activation.
Major features:
* Based on AES, MD5 and ARC4 algorithms.
* Four cryptographic barriers:
1) Pass-phrase encrypts the master key.
2) Pass-phrase + Lock data locates master key.
3) 128 bit key derived from 2048 bit master key protects sector key.
3) 128 bit random single-use sector keys protect data payload.
* Up to four different changeable pass-phrases.
* Blackening feature for provable destruction of master key material.
* Isotropic disk contents offers no information about sector contents.
* Configurable destination sector range allows steganographic deployment.
This commit adds the kernel part, separate commits will follow for the
userland utility and documentation.
This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Poul-Henning Kamp and
NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under
DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA CHATS
research program.
Many thanks to Robert Watson, CBOSS Principal Investigator for making this
possible.
Sponsored by: DARPA & NAI Labs.
