Commit Graph

260 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Robert Watson
95c8c170f3 Re-wrap comment at 77 character columns. 2006-12-20 23:11:01 +00:00
Robert Watson
9caab7a262 Comment and white space cleanup.
Exapnd comments on System V IPC labeling methods, which could use improved
consistency with respect to other object types.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-20 20:43:19 +00:00
Robert Watson
8f3476b39b Externalize local stack copy of the ifnet label, rather than the copy on
the ifnet itself.  The stack copy has been made while holding the mutex
protecting ifnet labels, so copying from the ifnet copy could result in
an inconsistent version being copied out.

Reported by:	Todd.Miller@sparta.com
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
MFC after:	3 weeks
2006-12-20 20:40:29 +00:00
Robert Watson
17041e6708 Expand commenting on label slots, justification for the MAC Framework locking
model, interactions between locking and policy init/destroy methods.

Rewrap some comments to 77 character line wrap.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-20 20:38:44 +00:00
Christian S.J. Peron
826cef3d75 Fix LOR between the syncache and inpcb locks when MAC is present in the
kernel.  This LOR snuck in with some of the recent syncache changes.  To
fix this, the inpcb handling was changed:

- Hang a MAC label off the syncache object
- When the syncache entry is initially created, we pickup the PCB lock
  is held because we extract information from it while initializing the
  syncache entry.  While we do this, copy the MAC label associated with
  the PCB and use it for the syncache entry.
- When the packet is transmitted, copy the label from the syncache entry
  to the mbuf so it can be processed by security policies which analyze
  mbuf labels.

This change required that the MAC framework be extended to support the
label copy operations from the PCB to the syncache entry, and then from
the syncache entry to the mbuf.

These functions really should be referencing the syncache structure instead
of the label.  However, due to some of the complexities associated with
exposing this syncache structure we operate directly on it's label pointer.
This should be OK since we aren't making any access control decisions within
this code directly, we are merely allocating and copying label storage so
we can properly initialize mbuf labels for any packets the syncache code
might create.

This also has a nice side effect of caching.  Prior to this change, the
PCB would be looked up/locked for each packet transmitted.  Now the label
is cached at the time the syncache entry is initialized.

Submitted by:	andre [1]
Discussed with:	rwatson

[1] andre submitted the tcp_syncache.c changes
2006-12-13 06:00:57 +00:00
Tom Rhodes
6aeb05d7be Merge posix4/* into normal kernel hierarchy.
Reviewed by:	glanced at by jhb
Approved by:	silence on -arch@ and -standards@
2006-11-11 16:26:58 +00:00
Robert Watson
acd3428b7d Sweep kernel replacing suser(9) calls with priv(9) calls, assigning
specific privilege names to a broad range of privileges.  These may
require some future tweaking.

Sponsored by:           nCircle Network Security, Inc.
Obtained from:          TrustedBSD Project
Discussed on:           arch@
Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri,
                        Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>,
                        Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>,
                        Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:42:10 +00:00
Robert Watson
800c940832 Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of
privilege for threads and credentials.  Unlike the existing suser(9)
interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege
checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of
privilege to be expressed.  Two interfaces are provided, replacing the
existing suser(9) interface:

suser(td)                 ->   priv_check(td, priv)
suser_cred(cred, flags)   ->   priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags)

A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be
found in priv.h.  New privileges are easily added as required, but the
comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read
before doing so.

The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the
privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to
determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine,
rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the
SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag.  For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail
check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used
by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted
in jail.  As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail
is now present in kern_jail.c.

The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both
to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant
privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy
modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader
range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with
root privilege.

The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms
of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition
and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not
been updated.  The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to
check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier.

This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it
modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security
policy become more feasible.

Sponsored by:		nCircle Network Security, Inc.
Obtained from:		TrustedBSD Project
Discussed on:		arch@
Reviewed (at least in part) by:	mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri,
			Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>,
			Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>,
			Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
2006-11-06 13:37:19 +00:00
Robert Watson
17451386d0 Forward declare struct cdev, since arguments of this type are used in
function prototypes.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-10-30 15:20:49 +00:00
Robert Watson
f776aa327d Remove extra _MAC_ from #ifdef guard. 2006-10-25 13:14:25 +00:00
Robert Watson
aed5570872 Complete break-out of sys/sys/mac.h into sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
begun with a repo-copy of mac.h to mac_framework.h.  sys/mac.h now
contains the userspace and user<->kernel API and definitions, with all
in-kernel interfaces moved to mac_framework.h, which is now included
across most of the kernel instead.

This change is the first step in a larger cleanup and sweep of MAC
Framework interfaces in the kernel, and will not be MFC'd.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	SPARTA
2006-10-22 11:52:19 +00:00
Robert Watson
738f14d4b1 Remove MAC_DEBUG label counters, which were used to debug leaks and
other problems while labels were first being added to various kernel
objects.  They have outlived their usefulness.

MFC after:	1 month
Suggested by:	Christopher dot Vance at SPARTA dot com
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-09-20 13:33:41 +00:00
Robert Watson
5702e0965e Declare security and security.bsd sysctl hierarchies in sysctl.h along
with other commonly used sysctl name spaces, rather than declaring them
all over the place.

MFC after:	1 month
Sponsored by:	nCircle Network Security, Inc.
2006-09-17 20:00:36 +00:00
Christian S.J. Peron
d94f2a68f8 Introduce a new entry point, mac_create_mbuf_from_firewall. This entry point
exists to allow the mandatory access control policy to properly initialize
mbufs generated by the firewall. An example where this might happen is keep
alive packets, or ICMP error packets in response to other packets.

This takes care of kernel panics associated with un-initialize mbuf labels
when the firewall generates packets.

[1] I modified this patch from it's original version, the initial patch
    introduced a number of entry points which were programmatically
    equivalent. So I introduced only one. Instead, we should leverage
    mac_create_mbuf_netlayer() which is used for similar situations,
    an example being icmp_error()

    This will minimize the impact associated with the MFC

Submitted by:	mlaier [1]
MFC after:	1 week

This is a RELENG_6 candidate
2006-09-12 04:25:13 +00:00
Robert Watson
198e7d90f9 Add struct msg to the forwarded declared data structures in mac_policy.h.
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-09-09 16:35:44 +00:00
Robert Watson
14f212e215 Make mpo_associate_nfsd_label() return void, not int, to match
mac_associate_nfsd_label().

Head nod:	csjp
2006-08-06 16:56:15 +00:00
Poul-Henning Kamp
9c499ad92f Remove the NDEVFSINO and NDEVFSOVERFLOW options which no longer exists in
DEVFS.

Remove the opt_devfs.h file now that it is empty.
2006-07-17 09:07:02 +00:00
Robert Watson
1d82b39143 Reconstitute struct mac_policy_ops by breaking out individual function
pointer prototypes from it into their own typedefs.  No functional or
ABI change.  This allows policies to declare their own function
prototypes based on a common definition from mac_policy.h rather than
duplicating these definitions.

Obtained from:	SEDarwin, SPARTA
MFC after:	1 month
2006-04-26 14:18:55 +00:00
Christian S.J. Peron
7935d5382b Introduce a new MAC entry point for label initialization of the NFS daemon's
credential: mac_associate_nfsd_label()

This entry point can be utilized by various Mandatory Access Control policies
so they can properly initialize the label of files which get created
as a result of an NFS operation. This work will be useful for fixing kernel
panics associated with accessing un-initialized or invalid vnode labels.

The implementation of these entry points will come shortly.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD
Requested by:	mdodd
MFC after:	3 weeks
2006-04-06 23:33:11 +00:00
Tor Egge
d50ef66d03 Don't call vn_finished_write() if vn_start_write() failed. 2006-03-19 20:43:07 +00:00
Tor Egge
3b582b4e72 Eliminate a deadlock when creating snapshots. Blocking vn_start_write() must
be called without any vnode locks held.  Remove calls to vn_start_write() and
vn_finished_write() in vnode_pager_putpages() and add these calls before the
vnode lock is obtained to most of the callers that don't already have them.
2006-03-02 22:13:28 +00:00
Christian S.J. Peron
a5b7fde722 Lock object while we iterate through it's backing objects.
Discussed with:	alc
2005-10-09 02:37:27 +00:00
Christian S.J. Peron
7367bc5a54 Use the correct object's backing_object_offset while calculating offsets.
While we are here, add a note that we need to lock the object before walking
the backing object list.

Pointed out by:	alc
Discussed with:	rwatson
2005-10-04 14:47:47 +00:00
Christian S.J. Peron
9eea3d85cc Standard Giant push down operations for the Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
framework. This makes Giant protection around MAC operations which inter-
act with VFS conditional, based on the MPSAFE status of the file system.

Affected the following syscalls:

o __mac_get_fd
o __mac_get_file
o __mac_get_link
o __mac_set_fd
o __mac_set_file
o __mac_set_link

-Drop Giant all together in __mac_set_proc because the
 mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse routine no longer requires it.
-Move conditional Giant aquisitions to after label allocation routines.
-Move the conditional release of Giant to before label de-allocation
 routines.

Discussed with:	rwatson
2005-10-04 14:32:58 +00:00
Christian S.J. Peron
dc063b81ab Conditionally pickup Giant in mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse so
we can drop it all together in __mac_set_proc.

Reviewed by:	alc
Discussed with:	rwatson
2005-10-04 14:32:15 +00:00
Robert Watson
5bb52dc4d5 Complete removal of mac_create_root_mount/mpo_create_root_mount MAC
interfaces.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Submitted by:	Chris Vance <Christopher dot Vance at SPARTA dot com>
MFC after:	3 days
2005-10-02 09:53:00 +00:00
Robert Watson
223aaaecb0 Remove mac_create_root_mount() and mpo_create_root_mount(), which
provided access to the root file system before the start of the
init process.  This was used briefly by SEBSD before it knew about
preloading data in the loader, and using that method to gain
access to data earlier results in fewer inconsistencies in the
approach.  Policy modules still have access to the root file system
creation event through the mac_create_mount() entry point.

Removed now, and will be removed from RELENG_6, in order to gain
third party policy dependencies on the entry point for the lifetime
of the 6.x branch.

MFC after:	3 days
Submitted by:	Chris Vance <Christopher dot Vance at SPARTA dot com>
Sponsored by:	SPARTA
2005-09-19 13:59:57 +00:00
Robert Watson
189c6d1a2b Insert a series of place-holder function pointers in mac_policy.h for
entry points that will be inserted over the life-time of the 6.x branch,
including for:

- New struct file labeling (void * already added to struct file), events,
  access control checks.
- Additional struct mount access control checks, internalization/
  externalization.
- mac_check_cap()
- System call enter/exit check and event.
- Socket and vnode ioctl entry points.

MFC after:	3 days
2005-08-08 16:09:33 +00:00
Robert Watson
49bb6870cc Bump the module versions of the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules
from 2 (6.x) to 3 (7.x) to allow for future changes in the MAC policy
module ABI in 7.x.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2005-07-14 10:46:03 +00:00
Robert Watson
d26dd2d99e When devfs cloning takes place, provide access to the credential of the
process that caused the clone event to take place for the device driver
creating the device.  This allows cloned device drivers to adapt the
device node based on security aspects of the process, such as the uid,
gid, and MAC label.

- Add a cred reference to struct cdev, so that when a device node is
  instantiated as a vnode, the cloning credential can be exposed to
  MAC.

- Add make_dev_cred(), a version of make_dev() that additionally
  accepts the credential to stick in the struct cdev.  Implement it and
  make_dev() in terms of a back-end make_dev_credv().

- Add a new event handler, dev_clone_cred, which can be registered to
  receive the credential instead of dev_clone, if desired.

- Modify the MAC entry point mac_create_devfs_device() to accept an
  optional credential pointer (may be NULL), so that MAC policies can
  inspect and act on the label or other elements of the credential
  when initializing the skeleton device protections.

- Modify tty_pty.c to register clone_dev_cred and invoke make_dev_cred(),
  so that the pty clone credential is exposed to the MAC Framework.

While currently primarily focussed on MAC policies, this change is also
a prerequisite for changes to allow ptys to be instantiated with the UID
of the process looking up the pty.  This requires further changes to the
pty driver -- in particular, to immediately recycle pty nodes on last
close so that the credential-related state can be recreated on next
lookup.

Submitted by:	Andrew Reisse <andrew.reisse@sparta.com>
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	SPAWAR, SPARTA
MFC after:	1 week
MFC note:	Merge to 6.x, but not 5.x for ABI reasons
2005-07-14 10:22:09 +00:00
Robert Watson
3c308b091f Eliminate MAC entry point mac_create_mbuf_from_mbuf(), which is
redundant with respect to existing mbuf copy label routines.  Expose
a new mac_copy_mbuf() routine at the top end of the Framework and
use that; use the existing mpo_copy_mbuf_label() routine on the
bottom end.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	SPARTA, SPAWAR
Approved by:	re (scottl)
2005-07-05 23:39:51 +00:00
Robert Watson
6758f88ea4 Add MAC Framework and MAC policy entry point mac_check_socket_create(),
which is invoked from socket() and socketpair(), permitting MAC
policy modules to control the creation of sockets by domain, type, and
protocol.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	SPARTA, SPAWAR
Approved by:	re (scottl)
Requested by:	SCC
2005-07-05 22:49:10 +00:00
Christian S.J. Peron
578994bbd7 Correct grammar error in comment
MFC after:	3 days
2005-06-10 04:44:38 +00:00
Robert Watson
3831e7d7f5 Gratuitous renaming of four System V Semaphore MAC Framework entry
points to convert _sema() to _sem() for consistency purposes with
respect to the other semaphore-related entry points:

mac_init_sysv_sema() -> mac_init_sysv_sem()
mac_destroy_sysv_sem() -> mac_destroy_sysv_sem()
mac_create_sysv_sema() -> mac_create_sysv_sem()
mac_cleanup_sysv_sema() -> mac_cleanup_sysv_sem()

Congruent changes are made to the policy interface to support this.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-06-07 05:03:28 +00:00
Robert Watson
5264841183 Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control
access to POSIX Semaphores:

mac_init_posix_sem()            Initialize label for POSIX semaphore
mac_create_posix_sem()          Create POSIX semaphore
mac_destroy_posix_sem()         Destroy POSIX semaphore
mac_check_posix_sem_destroy()   Check whether semaphore may be destroyed
mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue()  Check whether semaphore may be queried
mac_check_possix_sem_open()     Check whether semaphore may be opened
mac_check_posix_sem_post()      Check whether semaphore may be posted to
mac_check_posix_sem_unlink()    Check whether semaphore may be unlinked
mac_check_posix_sem_wait()      Check whether may wait on semaphore

Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points.
For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively
read/write.

Submitted by:	Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Sponsored by:	DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2005-05-04 10:39:15 +00:00
Tom Rhodes
498693053c Get the directory structure correct in a comment.
Submitted by:	Samy Al Bahra
2005-04-22 19:09:12 +00:00
Robert Watson
babe9a2bb3 Introduce p_canwait() and MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points
mac_check_proc_wait(), which control the ability to wait4() specific
processes.  This permits MAC policies to limit information flow from
children that have changed label, although has to be handled carefully
due to common programming expectations regarding the behavior of
wait4().  The cr_seeotheruids() check in p_canwait() is #if 0'd for
this reason.

The mac_stub and mac_test policies are updated to reflect these new
entry points.

Sponsored by:	SPAWAR, SPARTA
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-18 13:36:57 +00:00
Robert Watson
7f53207b92 Introduce three additional MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to
control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations,
required for some policies:

        poll()          mac_check_socket_poll()
        fstat()         mac_check_socket_stat()
        accept()        mac_check_socket_accept()

Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points.
While here, add missing entry point implementations for:

        mac_stub.c      stub_check_socket_receive()
        mac_stub.c      stub_check_socket_send()
        mac_test.c      mac_test_check_socket_send()
        mac_test.c      mac_test_check_socket_visible()

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-04-16 18:46:29 +00:00
Robert Watson
f0c2044bd9 In mac_get_fd(), remove unconditional acquisition of Giant around copying
of the socket label to thread-local storage, and replace it with
conditional acquisition based on debug.mpsafenet.  Acquire the socket
lock around the copy operation.

In mac_set_fd(), replace the unconditional acquisition of Giant with
the conditional acquisition of Giant based on debug.mpsafenet.  The socket
lock is acquired in mac_socket_label_set() so doesn't have to be
acquired here.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	SPAWAR, SPARTA
2005-04-16 18:33:13 +00:00
Robert Watson
030a28b3b5 Introduce new MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to control the use
of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential,
including:

        setuid()                mac_check_proc_setuid()
        seteuid()               mac_check_proc_seteuid()
        setgid()                mac_check_proc_setgid()
        setegid()               mac_check_proc_setegid()
        setgroups()             mac_check_proc_setgroups()
        setreuid()              mac_check_proc_setreuid()
        setregid()              mac_check_proc_setregid()
        setresuid()             mac_check_proc_setresuid()
        setresgid()             mac_check_rpoc_setresgid()

MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both
current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments
to the entry points.  The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated.

Submitted by:	Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org>
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2005-04-16 13:29:15 +00:00
Christian S.J. Peron
c92163dcad Move MAC check_vnode_mmap entry point out from being exclusive to
MAP_SHARED so that the entry point gets executed un-conditionally.
This may be useful for security policies which want to perform access
control checks around run-time linking.

-add the mmap(2) flags argument to the check_vnode_mmap entry point
 so that we can make access control decisions based on the type of
 mapped object.
-update any dependent API around this parameter addition such as
 function prototype modifications, entry point parameter additions
 and the inclusion of sys/mman.h header file.
-Change the MLS, BIBA and LOMAC security policies so that subject
 domination routines are not executed unless the type of mapping is
 shared. This is done to maintain compatibility between the old
 vm_mmap_vnode(9) and these policies.

Reviewed by:	rwatson
MFC after:	1 month
2005-04-14 16:03:30 +00:00
Robert Watson
8adc338566 Remove an accidental clearing of the new label pointer on a system V
message queue, which was introduced during the merge process.

Submitted by:	Andrew Reisse <areisse at nailabs dot com>
2005-02-24 16:08:41 +00:00
Robert Watson
69f832b45c Update copyright for NETA->McAfee. 2005-01-30 12:38:47 +00:00
Robert Watson
8b099b734b Implement MAC entry points relating to System V IPC, calling into the
MAC policies to perform object life cycle operations and access
control checks.

Submitted by:	Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2004-11-17 13:14:24 +00:00
Robert Watson
42726d8ae8 Define new MAC framework and policy entry points for System V IPC
objects and operations:

- System V IPC message, message queue, semaphore, and shared memory
  segment init, destroy, cleanup, create operations.

- System V IPC message, message queue, seamphore, and shared memory
  segment access control entry points, including rights to attach,
  destroy, and manipulate these IPC objects.

Submitted by:	Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
2004-11-17 13:10:16 +00:00
Robert Watson
af8d7cbe4c Bump MAC Framework version to 2 in preparation for the upcoming API/ABI
changes associated with adding System V IPC support.  This will prevent
old modules from being used with the new kernel, and new modules from
being used with the old kernel.
2004-11-09 11:28:40 +00:00
Robert Watson
1e4cadcb14 Disable use of synchronization early in the boot by the MAC Framework;
for modules linked into the kernel or loaded very early, panics will
result otherwise, as the CV code it calls will panic due to its use
of a mutex before it is initialized.
2004-10-30 14:20:59 +00:00
Robert Watson
3459e1d2e9 Expand comments on various sections of the MAC Framework Policy API,
as well as document the properties of the mac_policy_conf structure.
Warn about the ABI risks in changing the structure without careful
consideration.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	SPAWAR
2004-10-22 11:29:30 +00:00
Robert Watson
39cfa59162 In the MAC label zone destructor, assert that the label is only
destroyed in an initialized state.
2004-10-22 11:08:52 +00:00
Robert Watson
17eba37380 Remove extern declaration of mac_enforce_sysv, as it's not present in
the CVS version of the MAC Framework.
2004-10-22 11:07:18 +00:00
Brian Feldman
b23f72e98a * Add a "how" argument to uma_zone constructors and initialization functions
so that they know whether the allocation is supposed to be able to sleep
  or not.
* Allow uma_zone constructors and initialation functions to return either
  success or error.  Almost all of the ones in the tree currently return
  success unconditionally, but mbuf is a notable exception: the packet
  zone constructor wants to be able to fail if it cannot suballocate an
  mbuf cluster, and the mbuf allocators want to be able to fail in general
  in a MAC kernel if the MAC mbuf initializer fails.  This fixes the
  panics people are seeing when they run out of memory for mbuf clusters.
* Allow debug.nosleepwithlocks on WITNESS to be disabled, without changing
  the default.

Both bmilekic and jeff have reviewed the changes made to make failable
zone allocations work.
2004-08-02 00:18:36 +00:00
Poul-Henning Kamp
3e019deaed Do a pass over all modules in the kernel and make them return EOPNOTSUPP
for unknown events.

A number of modules return EINVAL in this instance, and I have left
those alone for now and instead taught MOD_QUIESCE to accept this
as "didn't do anything".
2004-07-15 08:26:07 +00:00
Robert Watson
2220907b6e Introduce a temporary mutex, mac_ifnet_mtx, to lock MAC labels on
network interfaces.  This global mutex will protect all ifnet labels.
Acquire the mutex across various MAC activities on interfaces, such
as security checks, propagating interface labels to mbufs generated
from the interface, retrieving and setting the interface label.

Introduce mpo_copy_ifnet_label MAC policy entry point to copy the
value of an interface label from one label to another.  Use this
to avoid performing a label externalize while holding mac_ifnet_mtx;
copy the label to a temporary ifnet label and then externalize that.

Implement mpo_copy_ifnet_label for various MAC policies that
implement interface labeling using generic label copying routines.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, McAfee Research
2004-06-24 03:34:46 +00:00
Poul-Henning Kamp
89c9c53da0 Do the dreaded s/dev_t/struct cdev */
Bump __FreeBSD_version accordingly.
2004-06-16 09:47:26 +00:00
Robert Watson
310e7ceb94 Socket MAC labels so_label and so_peerlabel are now protected by
SOCK_LOCK(so):

- Hold socket lock over calls to MAC entry points reading or
  manipulating socket labels.

- Assert socket lock in MAC entry point implementations.

- When externalizing the socket label, first make a thread-local
  copy while holding the socket lock, then release the socket lock
  to externalize to userspace.
2004-06-13 02:50:07 +00:00
Poul-Henning Kamp
5dba30f15a add missing #include <sys/module.h> 2004-05-30 20:27:19 +00:00
Robert Watson
02ebd2bcb5 Improve consistency of include file guards in src/sys/sys by terminating
them with '_', as well as beginning with '_'.

Observed by:	bde
2004-05-10 18:38:07 +00:00
Robert Watson
583284e1d7 If the mbuf pointer passed to mac_mbuf_to_label() is NULL, or the tag
lookup for the label tag fails, return NULL rather than something close
to NULL.  This scenario occurs if mbuf header labeling is optional and
a policy requiring labeling is loaded, resulting in some mbufs having
labels and others not.  Previously, 0x14 would be returned because the
NULL from m_tag_find() was not treated specially.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, McAfee Research
2004-05-03 23:37:48 +00:00
Robert Watson
19b7882215 Add /* !MAC */ to final #endif. 2004-05-03 22:54:46 +00:00
Robert Watson
8ad5e19c6b Bump copyright date for NETA to 2004. 2004-05-03 20:53:27 +00:00
Robert Watson
0a05006dd2 Add MAC_STATIC, a kernel option that disables internal MAC Framework
synchronization protecting against dynamic load and unload of MAC
policies, and instead simply blocks load and unload.  In a static
configuration, this allows you to avoid the synchronization costs
associated with introducing dynamicism.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, McAfee Research
2004-05-03 20:53:05 +00:00
Robert Watson
e33d9f2929 Define BPFD_LOCK_ASSERT() to assert the BPF descriptor lock.
Assert the BPF descriptor lock in the MAC calls referencing live
BPF descriptors.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, McAfee Research
2004-02-29 15:33:56 +00:00
Robert Watson
f97e834b02 Forward declare struct proc, struct sockaddr, and struct thread, which
are employed in entry points later in the same include file.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Air Force Research Laboratory, McAfee Research
2004-02-26 20:44:50 +00:00
Robert Watson
f47cb88655 Forward declare struct bpf_d, struct ifnet, struct image_params, and
struct vattr in mac_policy.h.  This permits policies not
implementing entry points using these types to compile without
including include files with these types.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Air Force Research Laboratory
2004-02-26 16:15:14 +00:00
Robert Watson
c66b4d8d26 Move inet and inet6 related MAC Framework entry points from mac_net.c
to a new mac_inet.c.  This code is now conditionally compiled based
on inet support being compiled into the kernel.

Move socket related MAC Framework entry points from mac_net.c to a new
mac_socket.c.

To do this, some additional _enforce MIB variables are now non-static.
In addition, mbuf_to_label() is now mac_mbuf_to_label() and non-static.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, McAfee Research
2004-02-26 03:51:04 +00:00
Pawel Jakub Dawidek
63dba32b76 Reimplement sysctls handling by MAC framework.
Now I believe it is done in the right way.

Removed some XXMAC cases, we now assume 'high' integrity level for all
sysctls, except those with CTLFLAG_ANYBODY flag set. No more magic.

Reviewed by:	rwatson
Approved by:	rwatson, scottl (mentor)
Tested with:	LINT (compilation), mac_biba(4) (functionality)
2004-02-22 12:31:44 +00:00
Robert Watson
f6a4109212 Update my personal copyrights and NETA copyrights in the kernel
to use the "year1-year3" format, as opposed to "year1, year2, year3".
This seems to make lawyers more happy, but also prevents the
lines from getting excessively long as the years start to add up.

Suggested by:	imp
2004-02-22 00:33:12 +00:00
Robert Watson
4795b82c13 Coalesce pipe allocations and frees. Previously, the pipe code
would allocate two 'struct pipe's from the pipe zone, and malloc a
mutex.

- Create a new "struct pipepair" object holding the two 'struct
  pipe' instances, struct mutex, and struct label reference.  Pipe
  structures now have a back-pointer to the pipe pair, and a
  'pipe_present' flag to indicate whether the half has been
  closed.

- Perform mutex init/destroy in zone init/destroy, avoiding
  reallocating the mutex for each pipe.  Perform most pipe structure
  setup in zone constructor.

- VM memory mappings for pageable buffers are still done outside of
  the UMA zone.

- Change MAC API to speak 'struct pipepair' instead of 'struct pipe',
  update many policies.  MAC labels are also handled outside of the
  UMA zone for now.  Label-only policy modules don't have to be
  recompiled, but if a module is recompiled, its pipe entry points
  will need to be updated.  If a module actually reached into the
  pipe structures (unlikely), that would also need to be modified.

These changes substantially simplify failure handling in the pipe
code as there are many fewer possible failure modes.

On half-close, pipes no longer free the 'struct pipe' for the closed
half until a full-close takes place.  However, VM mapped buffers
are still released on half-close.

Some code refactoring is now possible to clean up some of the back
references, etc; this patch attempts not to change the structure
of most of the pipe implementation, only allocation/free code
paths, so as to avoid introducing bugs (hopefully).

This cuts about 8%-9% off the cost of sequential pipe allocation
and free in system call tests on UP and SMP in my micro-benchmarks.
May or may not make a difference in macro-benchmarks, but doing
less work is good.

Reviewed by:	juli, tjr
Testing help:	dwhite, fenestro, scottl, et al
2004-02-01 05:56:51 +00:00
Robert Watson
2d92ec9858 Switch TCP over to using the inpcb label when responding in timed
wait, rather than the socket label.  This avoids reaching up to
the socket layer during connection close, which requires locking
changes.  To do this, introduce MAC Framework entry point
mac_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), which is called from tcp_twrespond()
instead of calling mac_create_mbuf_from_socket() or
mac_create_mbuf_netlayer().  Introduce MAC Policy entry point
mpo_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), and implementations for various
policies, which generally just copy label data from the inpcb to
the mbuf.  Assert the inpcb lock in the entry point since we
require consistency for the inpcb label reference.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-12-17 14:55:11 +00:00
Robert Watson
56d9e93207 Rename mac_create_cred() MAC Framework entry point to mac_copy_cred(),
and the mpo_create_cred() MAC policy entry point to
mpo_copy_cred_label().  This is more consistent with similar entry
points for creation and label copying, as mac_create_cred() was
called from crdup() as opposed to during process creation.  For
a number of policies, this removes the requirement for special
handling when copying credential labels, and improves consistency.

Approved by:	re (scottl)
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-12-06 21:48:03 +00:00
Robert Watson
a557af222b Introduce a MAC label reference in 'struct inpcb', which caches
the   MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and
IPv6-based protocols.  This permits MAC labels to be checked during
network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket
to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to
grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer.

This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the
MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points:
initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a
delivery access control check.

For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the
socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced,
pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label
has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding
appropriate locks.  Most protocols implement this using
pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use
the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the
MAC Framework to perform a cache update.

Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub
policy, and test policy.

Reviewed by:	sam, bms
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-18 00:39:07 +00:00
Robert Watson
b0323ea3aa Implement sockets support for __mac_get_fd() and __mac_set_fd()
system calls, and prefer these calls over getsockopt()/setsockopt()
for ABI reasons.  When addressing UNIX domain sockets, these calls
retrieve and modify the socket label, not the label of the
rendezvous vnode.

- Create mac_copy_socket_label() entry point based on
  mac_copy_pipe_label() entry point, intended to copy the socket
  label into temporary storage that doesn't require a socket lock
  to be held (currently Giant).

- Implement mac_copy_socket_label() for various policies.

- Expose socket label allocation, free, internalize, externalize
  entry points as non-static from mac_net.c.

- Use mac_socket_label_set() in __mac_set_fd().

MAC-aware applications may now use mac_get_fd(), mac_set_fd(), and
mac_get_peer() to retrieve and set various socket labels without
directly invoking the getsockopt() interface.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-16 23:31:45 +00:00
Robert Watson
920325ee1d Implement mac_get_peer(3) using getsockopt() with SOL_SOCKET and
SO_PEERLABEL.  This provides an interface to query the label of a
socket peer without embedding implementation details of mac_t in
the application.  Previously, sizeof(*mac_t) had to be specified
by an application when performing getsockopt().

Document mac_get_peer(3), and expand documentation of the other
mac_get(3) functions.  Note that it's possible to get EINVAL back
from mac_get_fd(3) when pointing it at an inappropriate object.

NOTE: mac_get_fd() and mac_set_fd() support for sockets will
follow shortly, so the documentation is slightly ahead of the
code.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-16 20:18:24 +00:00
Robert Watson
c9ea2dcf62 Abstract the label checking and setting logic from
mac_setsockopt_label() into mac_socket_label_set(); make it non-static
so that it can be invoked from kern_mac.c for mac_set_fd().

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-16 20:01:50 +00:00
Robert Watson
9e71dd0feb Reduce gratuitous redundancy and length in function names:
mac_setsockopt_label_set() -> mac_setsockopt_label()
  mac_getsockopt_label_get() -> mac_getsockopt_label()
  mac_getsockopt_peerlabel_get() -> mac_getsockopt_peerlabel()

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-16 18:25:20 +00:00
Robert Watson
5d9d409ca9 Whitespace fix. 2003-11-16 03:17:30 +00:00
Bruce Evans
57f253a4c6 Reduced prequisites by only using MALLOC_DECLARE() if it is defined.
This fixes a dependency of mac_label.c on namespace pollution in
<vm/uma.h>.

Similarly for SYSCTL_DECL() although I had no problems with it.  This
probably makes some includes of <sys/sysctl.h> bogus.
2003-11-14 21:18:04 +00:00
Robert Watson
f0ab044241 Mark __mac_get_pid() as MPSAFE in the comment, as it runs without
Giant and is also MPSAFE.

Push Giant further down into __mac_get_fd() and __mac_set_fd(),
grabbing it only for constrained regions dealing with VFS, and
dropping it entirely for operations related to labeling of pipes.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 22:19:15 +00:00
Robert Watson
39fc5d480d GC prototype for mac_destroy_vnode_label(), missed in last commit. 2003-11-12 03:33:43 +00:00
Robert Watson
eca8a663d4 Modify the MAC Framework so that instead of embedding a (struct label)
in various kernel objects to represent security data, we embed a
(struct label *) pointer, which now references labels allocated using
a UMA zone (mac_label.c).  This allows the size and shape of struct
label to be varied without changing the size and shape of these kernel
objects, which become part of the frozen ABI with 5-STABLE.  This opens
the door for boot-time selection of the number of label slots, and hence
changes to the bound on the number of simultaneous labeled policies
at boot-time instead of compile-time.  This also makes it easier to
embed label references in new objects as required for locking/caching
with fine-grained network stack locking, such as inpcb structures.

This change also moves us further in the direction of hiding the
structure of kernel objects from MAC policy modules, not to mention
dramatically reducing the number of '&' symbols appearing in both the
MAC Framework and MAC policy modules, and improving readability.

While this results in minimal performance change with MAC enabled, it
will observably shrink the size of a number of critical kernel data
structures for the !MAC case, and should have a small (but measurable)
performance benefit (i.e., struct vnode, struct socket) do to memory
conservation and reduced cost of zeroing memory.

NOTE: Users of MAC must recompile their kernel and all MAC modules as a
result of this change.  Because this is an API change, third party
MAC modules will also need to be updated to make less use of the '&'
symbol.

Suggestions from:	bmilekic
Obtained from:		TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:		DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-12 03:14:31 +00:00
Robert Watson
c8e7bf92ad Whitespace sync to MAC branch, expand comment at the head of the file. 2003-11-11 03:40:04 +00:00
Robert Watson
bea2b56b26 When allocation of a socket peer label fails, scrub what was
successfully initialized in the label as a socket peer label, not a
socket label.  For current policy modules, this didn't make a
difference, but if a policy module had label data in the peer label
that was to be GC'd in a different way than the normal socket label,
it might have been a problem.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-07 22:31:27 +00:00
Robert Watson
55b13f8d2d Trim trailing whitespace. 2003-11-07 04:48:24 +00:00
Robert Watson
83b7b0edca Remove the flags argument from mac_externalize_*_label(), as it's not
passed into policies or used internally to the MAC Framework.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-06 03:42:43 +00:00
Robert Watson
da77b2fa6b Make MAC_EXTERNALIZE() and MAC_INTERNALIZE() simply take the object
type, rather than "object_label" as the first argument.  This reduces
complexity a little for the consumer, and also makes it easier for
use to rename the underlying entry points in struct mac_policy_obj.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-10-25 15:28:20 +00:00
Robert Watson
138f64b698 Sort type declarations together.
Remove an excess carriage return.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-10-25 03:50:44 +00:00
Robert Watson
6fa0475d95 mac_Finish break-out of kern_mac.c into parts:
Include src/sys/security/mac/mac_internal.h in kern_mac.c.

  Remove redundant defines from the include: SYSCTL_DECL(), debug macros,
    composition macros.

  Unstaticize various bits now exposed to the remainder of the kernel:
    mac_init_label(), mac_destroy_label().

  Remove all the functions now implemented in mac_process/mac_vfs/mac_net/
    mac_pipe.  Also remove debug counters, sysctls exporting debug
    counters, enforcement flags, sysctls exporting enforcement flags.

  Leave module declaration, sysctl nodes, mactemp malloc type, system
    calls.

This should conclude MAC/LINT/NOTES breakage from the break-out process,
but I'm running builds now to make sure I caught everything.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-10-22 20:59:31 +00:00
Robert Watson
089c1bdac9 Variable cleanup following break-out of kern_mac.c into sys/security/mac:
Unstaticize mac_late.
  Remove ea_warn_once, now in mac_vfs.c.
  Unstaticisize mac_policy_list, mac_static_policy_list, use
    struct mac_policy_list_head instead of LIST_HEAD() directly.
  Unstaticize and un-inline MAC policy locking functions so they can
    be referenced from mac_*.c.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-10-22 20:47:41 +00:00
Robert Watson
9e7bf51ca8 Rename error_select() to mac_error_select(), and unstaticize so it
can be used from src/sys/security/mac/mac_*.c.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponosred by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-10-22 20:42:22 +00:00
Robert Watson
6cc24dcbb4 Remove non-VFS related code from mac_vfs.c. Leave:
Extended attribute transaction warning flag if transactions aren't
  supported on the EA implementation being used.

  Debug fallback flag to permit a less conservative fallback if reading
  an on-disk label fails.

  Enforce_fs toggle to enforce file systme access control.

  Debugging counters for file system objects: mounts, vnodes, devfs_dirents.

  Object initialization, destruction, copying, internalization,
  externalization, relabeling for file system objects.

  Life cycle operations for devfs entries.

  Generic extended attribute label implementation for use by UFS, UFS2 in
  multilabel mode.

  Generic single-level label implementation for use by all file systems
  when in singlelabel mode.

  Exec-time transition based on file label entry points.

  Vnode operation access control checks (many).

  Mount operation access control checks (few).

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-10-22 20:29:41 +00:00
Robert Watson
6bd1173258 Remove non-system bits from mac_system.c. Leave:
Enforce_kld, enforce_system access control toggles.
  Access control checks for: kenv operation, kld operations,
    sysarch_ioperm(), acct(), nfsd(), reboot(), settime(), swapon(),
    swapoff(), sysctl().

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-10-22 20:09:12 +00:00
Robert Watson
5a9c1aaac5 Remove non-credential/process-related bits from mac_process.c. Leave:
Enforce_process, enforce_vm access control enforcement twiddles.
  Credential, process label counters.
  VM revocation sysctls/tunables.
  Credential label management, internalization/externalization/relabel
    code.
  Process label management.
  Proc0, proc1 creation, cred creation.
  Thread userret.
  mac_execve_enter(), _exit(), transition at exec-time.
  VM revocation on process label change.
  Process-related access control checks (visibility, debug, signal, sched).

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-10-22 20:02:04 +00:00
Robert Watson
73275908f7 Remove non-pipe code from mac_pipe.c. Leave:
Pipe enforcement flag.
  Pipe object debugging counters.
  MALLOC type for MAC label storage.
  Pipe MAC label management routines, externalize/internalization/change
    routines.
  Pipe MAC access control checks.

Un-staticize functions called from mac_set_fd() when operating on a
pipe.  Abstraction improvements in this space seem likely.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-10-22 19:31:57 +00:00
Robert Watson
28e65e3d2b Remove non-network related contents from mac_net.c. Leave:
Network and socket enforcement toggles.
  Counters for network objects (mbufs, ifnets, bpfdecs, sockets, and ipqs).
  Label management routines for network objects.
  Life cycle events for network objects.
  Label internalization/externalization/relabel for ifnets, sockets,
    including ioctl implementations for sockets, ifnets.
  Access control checks relating to network obejcts.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-10-22 19:15:34 +00:00
Robert Watson
86ea834c58 The following shared types/constants/interfaces/... are required
in mac_internal.h:

  Sysctl tree declarations.

  Policy list structure definition.

  Policy list variables (static, dynamic).

  mac_late flag.

  Enforcement flags for process, vm, which have checks in multiple files.

  mac_labelmbufs variable to drive conditional mbuf labeling.

  M_MACTEMP malloc type.

  Debugging counter macros.

  MAC Framework infrastructure primitives, including policy locking
    primitives, kernel label initialization/destruction, userland
    label consistency checks, policy slot allocation.

  Per-object interfaces for objects that are internalized and externalized
    using system calls that will remain centrally defined: credentials,
    pipes, vnodes.

  MAC policy composition macros: MAC_CHECK, MAC_BOOLEAN, MAC_EXTERNALIZE,
    MAC_INTERNALIZE, MAC_PERFORM.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-10-22 18:49:29 +00:00
Robert Watson
6b66d5bb4b Use __BEGIN_DECLS and __END_DECLS around userland function prototypes
so that mac.h may be more safely included in userland C++ applications.

PR:		bin/56595
Submitted by:	"KONDOU, Kazuhiro" <kazuhiro@alib.jp>
2003-10-02 03:07:51 +00:00
Robert Watson
cc7b13bfe0 If the struct mac copied into the kernel has a negative length, return
EINVAL rather than failing the following malloc due to the value being
too large.
2003-09-29 18:35:17 +00:00
Robert Watson
953222e210 Remove extra tabs indenting MAC library calls; they were there to
line up the function names in an earlier generation of the API when
some of the functions returned structure pointers.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-29 02:43:57 +00:00
Robert Watson
a6a65b05d5 Fix a mac_policy_list reference to be a mac_static_policy_list
reference: this fixes mac_syscall() for static policies when using
optimized locking.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponosred by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-26 17:29:02 +00:00
Robert Watson
930d4ffa56 Make the elements argument to mac_prepare() be const.
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-08-22 17:49:59 +00:00