Commit Graph

27 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Julian Elischer
e602ba25fd Part 1 of KSE-III
The ability to schedule multiple threads per process
(one one cpu) by making ALL system calls optionally asynchronous.
to come: ia64 and power-pc patches, patches for gdb, test program (in tools)

Reviewed by:	Almost everyone who counts
	(at various times, peter, jhb, matt, alfred, mini, bernd,
	and a cast of thousands)

	NOTE: this is still Beta code, and contains lots of debugging stuff.
	expect slight instability in signals..
2002-06-29 17:26:22 +00:00
John Baldwin
f44d9e24fb Change p_can{debug,see,sched,signal}()'s first argument to be a thread
pointer instead of a proc pointer and require the process pointed to
by the second argument to be locked.  We now use the thread ucred reference
for the credential checks in p_can*() as a result.  p_canfoo() should now
no longer need Giant.
2002-05-19 00:14:50 +00:00
John Baldwin
ff7299d998 Lock the target process in procfs_doproc*regs() for p_candebug and while
reading/writing the registers.
2002-04-13 23:14:08 +00:00
Bruce Evans
a76d60f014 FIxed the following style bugs:
- clobbering of jsp's $Id$ by FreeBSD's old $Id$.
- lost Berkeley id in procfs_dbregs.c
- long lines in recent KSE changes.
- various gratuitous differences between procfs_*regs.c.
2002-02-16 05:38:07 +00:00
Julian Elischer
079b7badea Pre-KSE/M3 commit.
this is a low-functionality change that changes the kernel to access the main
thread of a process via the linked list of threads rather than
assuming that it is embedded in the process. It IS still embeded there
but remove all teh code that assumes that in preparation for the next commit
which will actually move it out.

Reviewed by: peter@freebsd.org, gallatin@cs.duke.edu, benno rice,
2002-02-07 20:58:47 +00:00
Dag-Erling Smørgrav
3a669c52a8 Pseudofsize procfs(5). 2001-12-04 01:35:06 +00:00
Dag-Erling Smørgrav
7c62990641 Move procfs_* from procfs_machdep.c into sys_process.c, and rename them to
proc_* in the process; procfs_machdep.c is no longer needed.

Run-tested on i386, build-tested on Alpha, untested on other platforms.
2001-10-21 23:57:24 +00:00
Dag-Erling Smørgrav
3da3249106 Dissociate ptrace from procfs.
Until now, the ptrace syscall was implemented as a wrapper that called
various functions in procfs depending on which ptrace operation was
requested.  Most of these functions were themselves wrappers around
procfs_{read,write}_{,db,fp}regs(), with only some extra error checks,
which weren't necessary in the ptrace case anyway.

This commit moves procfs_rwmem() from procfs_mem.c into sys_process.c
(renaming it to proc_rwmem() in the process), and implements ptrace()
directly in terms of procfs_{read,write}_{,db,fp}regs() instead of
having it fake up a struct uio and then call procfs_do{,db,fp}regs().

It also moves the prototypes for procfs_{read,write}_{,db,fp}regs()
and proc_rwmem() from proc.h to ptrace.h, and marks all procfs files
except procfs_machdep.c as "optional procfs" instead of "standard".
2001-10-07 20:08:42 +00:00
Julian Elischer
b40ce4165d KSE Milestone 2
Note ALL MODULES MUST BE RECOMPILED
make the kernel aware that there are smaller units of scheduling than the
process. (but only allow one thread per process at this time).
This is functionally equivalent to teh previousl -current except
that there is a thread associated with each process.

Sorry john! (your next MFC will be a doosie!)

Reviewed by: peter@freebsd.org, dillon@freebsd.org

X-MFC after:    ha ha ha ha
2001-09-12 08:38:13 +00:00
Robert Watson
a0f75161f9 o Replace calls to p_can(..., P_CAN_xxx) with calls to p_canxxx().
The p_can(...) construct was a premature (and, it turns out,
  awkward) abstraction.  The individual calls to p_canxxx() better
  reflect differences between the inter-process authorization checks,
  such as differing checks based on the type of signal.  This has
  a side effect of improving code readability.
o Replace direct credential authorization checks in ktrace() with
  invocation of p_candebug(), while maintaining the special case
  check of KTR_ROOT.  This allows ktrace() to "play more nicely"
  with new mandatory access control schemes, as well as making its
  authorization checks consistent with other "debugging class"
  checks.
o Eliminate "privused" construct for p_can*() calls which allowed the
  caller to determine if privilege was required for successful
  evaluation of the access control check.  This primitive is currently
  unused, and as such, serves only to complicate the API.

Approved by:	({procfs,linprocfs} changes) des
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2001-07-05 17:10:46 +00:00
Ruslan Ermilov
99d300a1ec - FDESC, FIFO, NULL, PORTAL, PROC, UMAP and UNION file
systems were repo-copied from sys/miscfs to sys/fs.

- Renamed the following file systems and their modules:
  fdesc -> fdescfs, portal -> portalfs, union -> unionfs.

- Renamed corresponding kernel options:
  FDESC -> FDESCFS, PORTAL -> PORTALFS, UNION -> UNIONFS.

- Install header files for the above file systems.

- Removed bogus -I${.CURDIR}/../../sys CFLAGS from userland
  Makefiles.
2001-05-23 09:42:29 +00:00
Mark Murray
fb919e4d5a Undo part of the tangle of having sys/lock.h and sys/mutex.h included in
other "system" header files.

Also help the deprecation of lockmgr.h by making it a sub-include of
sys/lock.h and removing sys/lockmgr.h form kernel .c files.

Sort sys/*.h includes where possible in affected files.

OK'ed by:	bde (with reservations)
2001-05-01 08:13:21 +00:00
John Baldwin
33a9ed9d0e Change the pfind() and zpfind() functions to lock the process that they
find before releasing the allproc lock and returning.

Reviewed by:	-smp, dfr, jake
2001-04-24 00:51:53 +00:00
John Baldwin
f34fa851e0 Catch up to header include changes:
- <sys/mutex.h> now requires <sys/systm.h>
- <sys/mutex.h> and <sys/sx.h> now require <sys/lock.h>
2001-03-28 09:17:56 +00:00
John Baldwin
0087374731 Protect p_flag with the proc lock. 2001-03-07 02:07:56 +00:00
Robert Watson
387d2c036b o Centralize inter-process access control, introducing:
int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused)

  which allows specification of subject process, object process,
  inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused
  flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required
  for the call to succeed.  This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and
  regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of
  code.  Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL,
  and P_CAN_DEBUG.  p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a
  series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not
  be invoked directly.

o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks.

o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead
  of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and
  kern.ps_showallprocs.

o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies
  process flags due to the disabling of ASU.

o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead
  of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not
  be visible to other processes.  Also introduce new access checks to
  improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(),
  procfs_readdir().  Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not
  handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup().  Remove volatile flag in
  procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by
  bde).

o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access
  control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should
  probably be the same.  Further discussion should happen on this topic.

Reviewed by:	bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others
Approved by:	bde
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2000-08-30 04:49:09 +00:00
Poul-Henning Kamp
5ecdb702b0 Remove unused #includes.
Obtained from:	http://bogon.freebsd.dk/include
1999-12-08 08:59:40 +00:00
Poul-Henning Kamp
a9e0361b4a Introduce the new function
p_trespass(struct proc *p1, struct proc *p2)
which returns zero or an errno depending on the legality of p1 trespassing
on p2.

Replace kern_sig.c:CANSIGNAL() with call to p_trespass() and one
extra signal related check.

Replace procfs.h:CHECKIO() macros with calls to p_trespass().

Only show command lines to process which can trespass on the target
process.
1999-11-21 19:03:20 +00:00
Peter Wemm
c3aac50f28 $Id$ -> $FreeBSD$ 1999-08-28 01:08:13 +00:00
Sean Eric Fagan
66ad7973ce Check permissions for fp regs as well as normal regs. 1997-08-12 05:23:51 +00:00
Bruce Evans
1fd0b0588f Removed unused #includes. 1997-08-02 14:33:27 +00:00
Peter Wemm
6875d25465 Back out part 1 of the MCFH that changed $Id$ to $FreeBSD$. We are not
ready for it yet.
1997-02-22 09:48:43 +00:00
John Dyson
996c772f58 This is the kernel Lite/2 commit. There are some requisite userland
changes, so don't expect to be able to run the kernel as-is (very well)
without the appropriate Lite/2 userland changes.

The system boots and can mount UFS filesystems.

Untested: ext2fs, msdosfs, NFS
Known problems: Incorrect Berkeley ID strings in some files.
		Mount_std mounts will not work until the getfsent
		library routine is changed.

Reviewed by:	various people
Submitted by:	Jeffery Hsu <hsu@freebsd.org>
1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
Jordan K. Hubbard
1130b656e5 Make the long-awaited change from $Id$ to $FreeBSD$
This will make a number of things easier in the future, as well as (finally!)
avoiding the Id-smashing problem which has plagued developers for so long.

Boy, I'm glad we're not using sup anymore.  This update would have been
insane otherwise.
1997-01-14 07:20:47 +00:00
Peter Wemm
0cc7521383 Major fixes for procfs..
Implement a "variable" directory structure. Files that do not make
sense for the given process do not "appear" and cannot be opened.
For example, "system" processes do not have "file", "regs" or "fpregs",
because they do not have a user area.

"attempt" to fill in the user area of a given process when it is being
accessed via /proc/pid/mem (the user struct is just after
VM_MAXUSER_ADDRESS in the process address space.)

Dont do IO to the U area while it's swapped, hold it in place if possible.

Lock off access to the "ctl" file if it's done a setuid like the other
pseudo-files in there.
1996-01-24 18:41:41 +00:00
David Greenman
3c4dd3568f Added $Id$ 1994-08-02 07:55:43 +00:00
Rodney W. Grimes
df8bae1de4 BSD 4.4 Lite Kernel Sources 1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00