uptime. Where necessary, convert it back to Unix time by adding boottime
to it. This fixes a potential problem in the accounting code, which would
compute the elapsed time incorrectly if the Unix time was stepped during
the lifetime of the process.
printed out needs a prefix such as when a thread is blocked on a lock.
- Use another local variable to close another race for the td_wmesg and
td_wchan members of struct thread.
constants VM_MIN_ADDRESS, VM_MAXUSER_ADDRESS, USRSTACK and PS_STRINGS.
This is mainly so that they can be variable even for the native abi, based
on different machine types. Get stack protections from the sysentvec too.
This makes it trivial to map the stack non-executable for certain abis, on
machines that support it.
pointer instead of a proc pointer and require the process pointed to
by the second argument to be locked. We now use the thread ucred reference
for the credential checks in p_can*() as a result. p_canfoo() should now
no longer need Giant.
New locks are:
- pgrpsess_lock which locks the whole pgrps and sessions,
- pg_mtx which protects the pgrp members, and
- s_mtx which protects the session members.
Please refer to sys/proc.h for the coverage of these locks.
Changes on the pgrp/session interface:
- pgfind() needs the pgrpsess_lock held.
- The caller of enterpgrp() is responsible to allocate a new pgrp and
session.
- Call enterthispgrp() in order to enter an existing pgrp.
- pgsignal() requires a pgrp lock held.
Reviewed by: jhb, alfred
Tested on: cvsup.jp.FreeBSD.org
(which is a quad-CPU machine running -current)
- clobbering of jsp's $Id$ by FreeBSD's old $Id$.
- long lines in recent KSE changes (procfs_ctl.c).
- other style bugs in KSE changes (most related to an shadowed variable
in procfs_status.c -- the td in the outer scope is obfuscated by
PFS_FILL_ARGS).
Approved by: des
this is a low-functionality change that changes the kernel to access the main
thread of a process via the linked list of threads rather than
assuming that it is embedded in the process. It IS still embeded there
but remove all teh code that assumes that in preparation for the next commit
which will actually move it out.
Reviewed by: peter@freebsd.org, gallatin@cs.duke.edu, benno rice,
mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount,
pr_linux, ...)
o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/
so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c
protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as
kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes.
o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux
mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return
a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy
to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to
use these primitives.
o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly
accessing struct prison.
Reviewed by: jhb
quad_t cannot be printed with %lld on 64 bit systems.
Dont waste cpu to round user and system times up to long long, it is
highly improbable that a process will have accumulated 68 years of
user or system cpu time (not wall clock time) before a reboot or
process restart.
Note ALL MODULES MUST BE RECOMPILED
make the kernel aware that there are smaller units of scheduling than the
process. (but only allow one thread per process at this time).
This is functionally equivalent to teh previousl -current except
that there is a thread associated with each process.
Sorry john! (your next MFC will be a doosie!)
Reviewed by: peter@freebsd.org, dillon@freebsd.org
X-MFC after: ha ha ha ha
The p_can(...) construct was a premature (and, it turns out,
awkward) abstraction. The individual calls to p_canxxx() better
reflect differences between the inter-process authorization checks,
such as differing checks based on the type of signal. This has
a side effect of improving code readability.
o Replace direct credential authorization checks in ktrace() with
invocation of p_candebug(), while maintaining the special case
check of KTR_ROOT. This allows ktrace() to "play more nicely"
with new mandatory access control schemes, as well as making its
authorization checks consistent with other "debugging class"
checks.
o Eliminate "privused" construct for p_can*() calls which allowed the
caller to determine if privilege was required for successful
evaluation of the access control check. This primitive is currently
unused, and as such, serves only to complicate the API.
Approved by: ({procfs,linprocfs} changes) des
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
real uid, saved uid, real gid, and saved gid to ucred, as well as the
pcred->pc_uidinfo, which was associated with the real uid, only rename
it to cr_ruidinfo so as not to conflict with cr_uidinfo, which
corresponds to the effective uid.
o Remove p_cred from struct proc; add p_ucred to struct proc, replacing
original macro that pointed.
p->p_ucred to p->p_cred->pc_ucred.
o Universally update code so that it makes use of ucred instead of pcred,
p->p_ucred instead of p->p_pcred, cr_ruidinfo instead of p_uidinfo,
cr_{r,sv}{u,g}id instead of p_*, etc.
o Remove pcred0 and its initialization from init_main.c; initialize
cr_ruidinfo there.
o Restruction many credential modification chunks to always crdup while
we figure out locking and optimizations; generally speaking, this
means moving to a structure like this:
newcred = crdup(oldcred);
...
p->p_ucred = newcred;
crfree(oldcred);
It's not race-free, but better than nothing. There are also races
in sys_process.c, all inter-process authorization, fork, exec, and
exit.
o Remove sigio->sio_ruid since sigio->sio_ucred now contains the ruid;
remove comments indicating that the old arrangement was a problem.
o Restructure exec1() a little to use newcred/oldcred arrangement, and
use improved uid management primitives.
o Clean up exit1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup due to
pcred removal.
o Clean up fork1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup and
allocation.
o Clean up ktrcanset() to take into account changes, and move to using
suser_xxx() instead of performing a direct uid==0 comparision.
o Improve commenting in various kern_prot.c credential modification
calls to better document current behavior. In a couple of places,
current behavior is a little questionable and we need to check
POSIX.1 to make sure it's "right". More commenting work still
remains to be done.
o Update credential management calls, such as crfree(), to take into
account new ruidinfo reference.
o Modify or add the following uid and gid helper routines:
change_euid()
change_egid()
change_ruid()
change_rgid()
change_svuid()
change_svgid()
In each case, the call now acts on a credential not a process, and as
such no longer requires more complicated process locking/etc. They
now assume the caller will do any necessary allocation of an
exclusive credential reference. Each is commented to document its
reference requirements.
o CANSIGIO() is simplified to require only credentials, not processes
and pcreds.
o Remove lots of (p_pcred==NULL) checks.
o Add an XXX to authorization code in nfs_lock.c, since it's
questionable, and needs to be considered carefully.
o Simplify posix4 authorization code to require only credentials, not
processes and pcreds. Note that this authorization, as well as
CANSIGIO(), needs to be updated to use the p_cansignal() and
p_cansched() centralized authorization routines, as they currently
do not take into account some desirable restrictions that are handled
by the centralized routines, as well as being inconsistent with other
similar authorization instances.
o Update libkvm to take these changes into account.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Reviewed by: green, bde, jhb, freebsd-arch, freebsd-audit
systems were repo-copied from sys/miscfs to sys/fs.
- Renamed the following file systems and their modules:
fdesc -> fdescfs, portal -> portalfs, union -> unionfs.
- Renamed corresponding kernel options:
FDESC -> FDESCFS, PORTAL -> PORTALFS, UNION -> UNIONFS.
- Install header files for the above file systems.
- Removed bogus -I${.CURDIR}/../../sys CFLAGS from userland
Makefiles.
other "system" header files.
Also help the deprecation of lockmgr.h by making it a sub-include of
sys/lock.h and removing sys/lockmgr.h form kernel .c files.
Sort sys/*.h includes where possible in affected files.
OK'ed by: bde (with reservations)
credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison).
o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence.
o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and
pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference
management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code.
o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead
of struct proc arguments.
o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed,
rather than directly checking pointers all over the place.
o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function.
o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h.
o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the
flag in the process flags field itself.
o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect
mutex use.
Notes:
o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required.
o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs
credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code.
o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is
required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the
structure.
Reviewed by: freebsd-arch
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes:
mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks)
mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized)
similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have:
mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN.
We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks
because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this
makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the
extra `type' argument.
The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea
that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind.
Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the
lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two:
MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH
The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed
to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers:
mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and
mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN
locks, respectively.
Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only
inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code
fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and
actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change
has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks
and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used
(i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce
function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we
inline recursion for this case.
Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using
the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared
if WITNESS is enabled.
Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the
"optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN
and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently
need those.
Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code.
Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused)
which allows specification of subject process, object process,
inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused
flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required
for the call to succeed. This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and
regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of
code. Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL,
and P_CAN_DEBUG. p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a
series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not
be invoked directly.
o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks.
o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead
of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and
kern.ps_showallprocs.
o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies
process flags due to the disabling of ASU.
o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead
of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not
be visible to other processes. Also introduce new access checks to
improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(),
procfs_readdir(). Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not
handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup(). Remove volatile flag in
procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by
bde).
o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access
control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should
probably be the same. Further discussion should happen on this topic.
Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others
Approved by: bde
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
p_trespass(struct proc *p1, struct proc *p2)
which returns zero or an errno depending on the legality of p1 trespassing
on p2.
Replace kern_sig.c:CANSIGNAL() with call to p_trespass() and one
extra signal related check.
Replace procfs.h:CHECKIO() macros with calls to p_trespass().
Only show command lines to process which can trespass on the target
process.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
is enough to satisfy things like StarOffice. This is a hack, but doing
it properly would be a LOT of work, and would require extensive grovelling
around in the user address space to find the argv[].
Obtained from: Mostly from Andrzej Bialecki <abial@nask.pl>.
changes, so don't expect to be able to run the kernel as-is (very well)
without the appropriate Lite/2 userland changes.
The system boots and can mount UFS filesystems.
Untested: ext2fs, msdosfs, NFS
Known problems: Incorrect Berkeley ID strings in some files.
Mount_std mounts will not work until the getfsent
library routine is changed.
Reviewed by: various people
Submitted by: Jeffery Hsu <hsu@freebsd.org>
This will make a number of things easier in the future, as well as (finally!)
avoiding the Id-smashing problem which has plagued developers for so long.
Boy, I'm glad we're not using sup anymore. This update would have been
insane otherwise.
