VOP wrapper is called from within file systems so can result in odd
loopback effects when MAC enforcement is use with the active (as
opposed to saved) credential. These checks will be moved elsewhere.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
I'm not sure what happenned to the original setting of the P_CONTINUED
flag. it appears to have been lost in the paper shuffling...
Submitted by: David Xu <bsddiy@yahoo.com>
argument, not the 'type' argument. As a result of the buf, the
MAC label on some packet header mbufs might not be set in mbufs
allocated using m_getcl(), resulting in a page fault.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
vnode operations. This permits the rights of the user (typically root)
used to turn on accounting to be used when writing out accounting entries,
rather than the credentials of the process generating the accounting
record. This fixes accounting in a number of environments, including
file systems that offer revocation support, MAC environments, some
securelevel scenarios, and in some NFS environments.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
the initproc credential from the proc0 credential. Otherwise, the
proc0 credential is used instead of initproc's credentil when authorizing
start_init() activities prior to initproc hitting userland for the
first time. This could result in the incorrect credential being used
to authorize mounting of the root file system, which could in turn cause
problems for NFS when used in combination with uid/gid ipfw rules, or
with MAC.
Discussed with: julian
to the address of the user's aiocb rather than the kernel's aiocb. (In other
words, prior to this change, the ident field returned by kevent(2) on
completion of an AIO was effectively garbage.)
Submitted by: Romer Gil <rgil@cs.rice.edu>
cninit. This allows a console driver to replace the existing console
by calling cninit again, eg during the device probe. Otherwise the
multiple console code sends output to both, which is unfortunate if
they're using the same hardware.
about calls to SYSCTL_OUT() made with locks held if the buffer has not
been pre-wired. SYSCTL_OUT() should not be called while holding locks,
but if this is not possible, the buffer should be wired by calling
sysctl_wire_old_buffer() before grabbing any locks.
that LIO_READ and LIO_WRITE were requests for kevent()-based
notification of completion. Modify _aio_aqueue() to recognize LIO_READ
and LIO_WRITE.
Notes: (1) The patch provided by the PR perpetuates a second bug in this
code, a direct access to user-space memory. This change fixes that bug
as well. (2) This change is to code that implements a deprecated interface.
It should probably be removed after an MFC.
PR: kern/39556
investigate the problem described below.
I am seeing some strange livelock on recent -current sources with
a slow box under heavy load, which disappears with this change.
This might suggest some kind of problem (either insufficient locking,
or mishandling of priorities) in the poll_idle thread.
- v_vflag is protected by the vnode lock and is used when synchronization
with VOP calls is needed.
- v_iflag is protected by interlock and is used for dealing with vnode
management issues. These flags include X/O LOCK, FREE, DOOMED, etc.
- All accesses to v_iflag and v_vflag have either been locked or marked with
mp_fixme's.
- Many ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED calls have been added where the locking was not
clear.
- Many functions in vfs_subr.c were restructured to provide for stronger
locking.
Idea stolen from: BSD/OS
linker_load_module() instead.
This fixes a bug where the kernel was unable to properly locate and
load a kernel module in vfs_mount() (and probably in the netgraph
code as well since it was using the same function). This is because
the linker_load_file() does not properly search the module path.
Problem found by: peter
Reviewed by: peter
Thanks to: peter
kernel access control.
Invoke appropriate MAC framework entry points to authorize readdir()
operations in the native ABI.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
Make idle process state more consistant.
Add an assert on thread state.
Clean up idleproc/mi_switch() interaction.
Use a local instead of referencing curthread 7 times in a row
(I've been told curthread can be expensive on some architectures)
Remove some commented out code.
Add a little commented out code (completion coming soon)
Reviewed by: jhb@freebsd.org
kernel access control
Invoke appropriate MAC framework entry points to authorize a number
of vnode operations, including read, write, stat, poll. This permits
MAC policies to revoke access to files following label changes,
and to limit information spread about the file to user processes.
Note: currently the file cached credential is used for some of
these authorization check. We will need to expand some of the
MAC entry point APIs to permit multiple creds to be passed to
the access control check to allow diverse policy behavior.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Restructure the vn_open_cred() access control checks to invoke
the MAC entry point for open authorization. Note that MAC can
reject open requests where existing DAC code skips the open
authorization check due to O_CREAT. However, the failure mode
here is the same as other failure modes following creation,
wherein an empty file may be left behind.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke an appropriate MAC entry point to authorize execution of
a file by a process. The check is placed slightly differently
than it appears in the trustedbsd_mac tree so that it prevents
a little more information leakage about the target of the execve()
operation.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
the inits/destroys are done without the cache locks held even in the
persistent-lock calls. I may be cheating a little by using the MAC
"already initialized" flag for now.
other references to that vnode as a trace vnode in other processes as well
as in any pending requests on the todo list. Thus, it is possible for a
ktrace request structure to have a NULL ktr_vp when it is destroyed in
ktr_freerequest(). We shouldn't call vrele() on the vnode in that case.
Reported by: bde
kernel access control.
Instrument chdir() and chroot()-related system calls to invoke
appropriate MAC entry points to authorize the two operations.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Implement two IOCTLs at the socket level to retrieve the primary
and peer labels from a socket. Note that this user process interface
will be changing to improve multi-policy support.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Authorize vop_readlink() and vop_lookup() activities during recursive
path lookup via namei() via calls to appropriate MAC entry points.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Authorize the creation of UNIX domain sockets in the file system
namespace via an appropriate invocation a MAC framework entry
point.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Instrument ctty driver invocations of various vnode operations on the
terminal controlling tty to perform appropriate MAC framework
authorization checks.
Note: VOP_IOCTL() on the ctty appears to be authorized using NOCRED in
the existing code rather than td->td_ucred. Why?
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Instrument the ktrace write operation so that it invokes the MAC
framework's vnode write authorization check.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Instrument the kernel ACL retrieval and modification system calls
to invoke MAC framework entry points to authorize these operations.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Instrument connect(), listen(), and bind() system calls to invoke
MAC framework entry points to permit policies to authorize these
requests. This can be useful for policies that want to limit
the activity of processes involving particular types of IPC and
network activity.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
