collision. This avouds an out-of-bounce access in case the peer can
break the cookie signature. Thanks to Felix Wilhelm from Google for
reporting the issue.
MFC after: 1 week
a restart.
This fixes a use-after-free scenario, which was reported by Felix
Wilhelm from Google in case a peer is able to modify the cookie.
However, this can also be triggered by an assciation restart under
some specific conditions.
MFC after: 1 week
The staleness reported in an error cause is in us, not ms.
Enforce limits on the life time via sysct; and socket options
consistently. Update the description of the sysctl variable to
use the right unit. Also do some minor cleanups.
This also fixes an interger overflow issue if the peer can
modify the cookie. This was reported by Felix Weinrank by fuzz testing
the userland stack and in
https://oss-fuzz.com/testcase-detail/4800394024452096
MFC after: 3 days
This avoids setting the association in an inconsistent
state, which could result in a use-after-free situation.
This can be triggered by a malicious peer, if the peer
can modify the cookie without the local endpoint recognizing
it.
Thanks to Ned Williamson for reporting the issue.
MFC after: 3 days
In case of errors, the cleanup was not consistent.
Thanks to Felix Weinrank for fuzzing the userland stack and making
me aware of the issue.
MFC after: 1 week
This was intended to test the locking used in the MacOS X kernel on a
FreeBSD system, to make use of WITNESS and other debugging infrastructure.
This hasn't been used for ages, to take it out to reduce the #ifdef
complexity.
MFC after: 1 week
cem noted that on FreeBSD snprintf() can not fail and code should not
check for that.
A followup commit will replace the usage of snprintf() in the SCTP
sources with a variadic macro SCTP_SNPRINTF, which will simply map to
snprintf() on FreeBSD and do a checking similar to r361209 on
other platforms.
Thanks to Natalie Silvanovich from Google for finding and reporting the
issue found by her in the SCTP userland stack.
MFC after: 3 days
X-MFC with: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/360193
One leak happens when there is not enough memory to allocate the
the resources for streams. The other leak happens if the are
unknown parameters in the received INIT-ACK chunk which require
reporting and the INIT-ACK requires sending an ABORT due to illegal
parameter combinations.
Hopefully this fixes
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=19083
MFC after: 1 week
This avoids a double lock bug in the NAT colliding state processing
of SCTP. Thanks to Felix Weinrank for finding and reporting this issue in
https://github.com/sctplab/usrsctp/issues/374
He found this bug using fuzz testing.
MFC after: 3 days
before computing the RTO.
This should fix an overflow issue reported by Felix Weinrank in
https://github.com/sctplab/usrsctp/issues/375
for the userland stack and found by running a fuzz tester.
MFC after: 3 days
This fixes problem with parameters indicating a zero length or partial
parameters after an unknown parameter indicating to stop processing. It
also fixes a problem with state cookie parameters after unknown
parametes indicating to stop porcessing.
Thanks to Mark Wodrich from Google for finding two of these issues
by fuzz testing the userland stack and reporting them in
https://github.com/sctplab/usrsctp/issues/355
and
https://github.com/sctplab/usrsctp/issues/352
MFC after: 3 days
SCTP. They are based on what is specified in the Solaris DTrace manual
for Solaris 11.4.
Reviewed by: 0mp, dteske, markj
Relnotes: yes
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D16839
This is not a functional change but a preperation for the upcoming
DTrace support. It is necessary to change the state in one
logical operation, even if it involves clearing the sub state
SHUTDOWN_PENDING.
MFC after: 1 month
Silently dicard SCTP chunks which have been requested to be
authenticated but are received unauthenticated no matter if support
for SCTP authentication has been negotiated. This improves compliance
with RFC 4895.
When the application uses the SCTP_AUTH_CHUNK socket option to
request a chunk to be received in an authenticated way, enable
the SCTP authentication extension for the end-point. This improves
compliance with RFC 6458.
Discussed with: Peter Lei
MFC after: 3 days
