perform authorization checks during swapon() events; policies
might choose to enforce protections based on the credential
requesting the swap configuration, the target of the swap operation,
or other factors such as internal policy state.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
to use a modified notion of 'struct mac', and flesh out the new variation
system calls (almost identical to existing ones except that they permit
a pid to be specified for process label retrieval, and don't follow
symlinks). This generalizes the label API so that the framework is
now almost entirely policy-agnostic.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
on all label parsing occuring in userland, and knowledge of the loaded
policies in the user libraries. This revision of the API pushes that
parsing into the kernel, avoiding the need for shared library support
of policies in userland, permitting statically linked binaries (such
as ls, ps, and ifconfig) to use MAC labels. In these API revisions,
high level parsing of the MAC label is done in the MAC Framework,
and interpretation of label elements is delegated to the MAC policy
modules. This permits modules to export zero or more label elements
to user space if desired, and support them in the manner they want
and with the semantics they want. This is believed to be the final
revision of this interface: from the perspective of user applications,
the API has actually not changed, although the ABI has.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
policies remains the same: subjects and objects are labeled for
integrity or sensitivity, and a dominance operator determines whether
or not subject/object accesses are permitted to limit inappropriate
information flow. Compartments are a non-hierarchal component to
the label, so add a bitfield to the label element for each, and a
set check as part of the dominance operator. This permits the
implementation of "need to know" elements of MLS.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
compile fail. MAC_MAX_POLICIES should always be defined, or we have
bigger problems at hand.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
unregister. Under some obscure (perhaps demented) circumstances,
this can result in a panic if a policy is unregistered, and then someone
foolishly unregisters it again.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
checks from the MAC tree: allow policies to perform access control
for the ability of a process to send and receive data via a socket.
At some point, we might also pass in additional address information
if an explicit address is requested on send.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
seperate entry points for each occasion:
mac_check_vnode_mmap() Check at initial mapping
mac_check_vnode_mprotect() Check at mapping protection change
mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade() Determine if a mapping downgrade
should take place following
subject relabel.
Implement mmap() and mprotect() entry points for labeled vnode
policies. These entry points are currently not hooked up to the
VM system in the base tree. These changes improve the consistency
of the access control interface and offer more flexibility regarding
limiting access to vnode mmaping.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
flags so that we can call malloc with M_NOWAIT if necessary, avoiding
potential sleeps while holding mutexes in the TCP syncache code.
Similar to the existing support for mbuf label allocation: if we can't
allocate all the necessary label store in each policy, we back out
the label allocation and fail the socket creation. Sync from MAC tree.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
devfs VOP symlink creation by introducing a new entry point to determine
the label of the devfs_dirent prior to allocation of a vnode for the
symlink.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
point that instruments the creation of hard links. Policy implementations
to follow.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
to mbuf label initialization, that functionality was never merged to
the main tree. Go ahead and merge that functionality now. Note that
this requires policy modules to accept the case where the label
element may be destroyed even if init has not succeeded on it (in
the event that policy failed the init). This will shortly also
apply to sockets.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
order used in mac_policy.h and elsewhere. Sort order is basically
"by operation category", then "alphabetically by object". Sync to
MAC tree.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
externalization, and cred label life cycle events to entirely above
devfs and vnode events. Sync from MAC tree.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
entry points to better match the entry point ordering in mac_policy.h.
Big diff, no functional change; merge from the MAC tree.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
- If a policy isn't registered when a policy module unloads, silently
succeed.
- Hold the policy list lock across more of the validity tests to avoid
races.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
- Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy
entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and
mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same
entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during
internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes.
- Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and
mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket
main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels.
- Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost
all entry points, implement these entry points using common
implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of
almost identical looking functions.
This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the
merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
modules to perform MAC-related events when a thread returns to user
space. This is required for policies that have floating process labels,
as it's not always possible to acquire the process lock at arbitrary
points in the stack during system call processing; process labels might
represent traditional authentication data, process history information,
or other data.
LOMAC will use this entry point to perform the process label update
prior to the thread returning to userspace, when plugged into the MAC
framework.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
(1) Where previously the pipe mutex was selectively grabbed during
pipe_ioctl(), now always grab it and then release if if not
needed. This protects the call to mac_check_pipe_ioctl() to
make sure the label remains consistent. (Note: it looks
like sigio locking may be incorrect for fgetown() since we
call it not-by-reference and sigio locking assumes call by
reference).
(2) In pipe_stat(), lock the pipe if MAC is compiled in so that
the call to mac_check_pipe_stat() gets a locked pipe to
protect label consistency. We still release the lock before
returning actual stat() data, risking inconsistency, but
apparently our pipe locking model accepts that risk.
(3) In various pipe MAC authorization checks, assert that the pipe
lock is held.
(4) Grab the lock when performing a pipe relabel operation, and
assert it a little deeper in the stack.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
v_tag is now const char * and should only be used for debugging.
Additionally:
1. All users of VT_NTS now check vfsconf->vf_type VFCF_NETWORK
2. The user of VT_PROCFS now checks for the new flag VV_PROCDEP, which
is propagated by pseudofs to all child vnodes if the fs sets PFS_PROCDEP.
Suggested by: phk
Reviewed by: bde, rwatson (earlier version)
layers deep in <sys/proc.h> or <sys/vnode.h>.
Removed unused includes.
Fixed some printf format errors (1 fatal on i386's; 1 fatal on alphas;
1 not fatal on any supported machine).
proc locking when revoking access to mmaps. Instead, perform this
later once we've changed the process label (hold onto a reference
to the new cred so that we don't lose it when we release the
process lock if another thread changes the credential).
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
for mac_check_vnode_{poll,read,stat,write}(). Pass in fp->f_cred
when calling these checks with a struct file available. Otherwise,
pass NOCRED. All currently MAC policies use active_cred, but
could now offer the cached credential semantic used for the base
system security model.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
can offer new services without reserving system call numbers, or
augmented versions of existing services. User code requests a
target policy by name, and specifies the policy-specific API plus
target. This is required in particular for our port of SELinux/FLASK
to the MAC framework since it offers additional security services.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
mac_check_pipe_poll(), mac_check_pipe_read(), mac_check_pipe_stat(),
and mac_check_pipe_write(). This is improves consistency with other
access control entry points and permits security modules to only
control the object methods that they are interested in, avoiding
switch statements.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
mac_check_vnode_poll(), mac_check_vnode_read(), mac_check_vnode_write().
This improves the consistency with other existing vnode checks, and
allows policies to avoid implementing switch statements to determine
what operations they do and do not want to authorize.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
can avoid the cost of a large number of atomic operations if we're not
interested in the object count statistics.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
we can use the names _receive() and _send() for the receive() and send()
checks. Rename related constants, policy implementations, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
we can use the names _receive() and _send() for the receive() and send()
checks. Rename related constants, policy implementations, etc.
PR:
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
Approved by:
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
MFC after:
during a label change resulting in an mmap removal. This is "fail stop"
behavior, which is preferred, although it offers slightly less
transparency.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
us to reduce namespace pollution by doing a nested include of _label.h
rather than mac.h. mac.h contains lots of baggage, whereas _label.h
contains much less. A follow-up sweep to change nested inclusion will
follow. The problem regarding exporting 'struct label' to userland
due to excessive exporting of kernel structures to userland still
needs to be resolved.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
Suggested by: bde
enabled and the kernel provides the MAC registration and entry point
service. Declare a dependency on that module service for any
MAC module registered using mac_policy.h. For now, hard code the
version as 1, but once we've come up with a versioning policy, we'll
move to a #define of some sort. In the mean time, this will prevent
loading a MAC module when 'options MAC' isn't present, which (due to
a bug in the kernel linker) can result if the MAC module is preloaded
via loader.conf.
This particular evil recommended by: peter
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI LAbs
- v_vflag is protected by the vnode lock and is used when synchronization
with VOP calls is needed.
- v_iflag is protected by interlock and is used for dealing with vnode
management issues. These flags include X/O LOCK, FREE, DOOMED, etc.
- All accesses to v_iflag and v_vflag have either been locked or marked with
mp_fixme's.
- Many ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED calls have been added where the locking was not
clear.
- Many functions in vfs_subr.c were restructured to provide for stronger
locking.
Idea stolen from: BSD/OS
structure. This prevents a boatload of warnings in the MAC modules,
so we can hook them up to the build.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
the number of policy slots to 4.
(Having run a quick errand, time to start on phase 2 of the MAC
integration)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
kern_mac.c contains the body of the MAC framework. Kernel and
user APIs defined in mac.h are implemented here, providing a front end
to loaded security modules. This code implements a module registration
service, state (label) management, security configuration and policy
composition.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
