before replacing them (using pkgname to make this hopefully unique).
Delete also moves them back, if they exist, resulting in a package
which can be "backed out" with reasonable safety.
Catch SIGUSR1 to re-init listening socket.
Document signal behaviour.
Add missing '\n's to LogPrintf(LogWARN,...)
Main() returns int not void.
AF_LOCAL ideal suggested a long time ago by: joerg
unless defined out - including while a telnet
session with a -auto ppp is in effect. If you
don't create ppp.secrets, you deserve what you
get.
telnet connection capabilities will be configurable
per system soon.
Suggested by: Terry Dwyer <tdwyer@omen.net.au>
Updated README file with additional helpful information from Steve Passe
and added patches from Robert Sexton to eliminate case sensitivity of
the xten command.
o Style police
o Make hangup abort the current connection, not
necessarily exiting (-auto/-ddial).
o Trap HUP and INT during DoChat and abort the
connection attempt. This means you can now
type "dial" and change your mind with ^C, or
HUP the process to stop it dialing.
Slapped into doing it by: Chuck Robey <chuckr@glue.umd.edu>
Add a system command to script mechanism (so you can call things like
tzsetup from scripts).
Add noError variable for causing script errors to be ignored.
The way Secure RPC is set up, the ecb_crypt() routine is expected to
be able to encrypt a buffer of any size up to 8192 bytes. However, the
des_ecb_encrypt() routine in libdes only encrypts 8 bytes (64 bits) at a
time. The rpc_enc.c module should compensate for this by calling
des_ecb_encrypt() repeatedly until it has encrypted the entire supplied
buffer, but it does not do this.
As a workaround, keyserv now handles this itself: if we're using DES
encryption, and the caller requested ECB mode, keyserv will do the right
thing.
Also changed all references to 'rc4' into 'arcfour' just in case some
litigious bastard from RSA is watching.
Note that I discovered and fixed this problem while trying to get
a part of NIS+ working: rpc.nisd signs directory objects with a 16-byte
MD5 digest that is encrypted with ecb_crypt(). Previously, only the
first 8 bytes of the digest were being properly encrypted, which caused
the Sun nis_cachemgr to reject the signatures as invalid. I failed to
notice this before since Secure RPC usually never has to encrypt more
than 8 bytes of data during normal operations.
