Commit Graph

23 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Hans Petter Selasky
af3b2549c4 Pull in r267961 and r267973 again. Fix for issues reported will follow. 2014-06-28 03:56:17 +00:00
Glen Barber
37a107a407 Revert r267961, r267973:
These changes prevent sysctl(8) from returning proper output,
such as:

 1) no output from sysctl(8)
 2) erroneously returning ENOMEM with tools like truss(1)
    or uname(1)
 truss: can not get etype: Cannot allocate memory
2014-06-27 22:05:21 +00:00
Hans Petter Selasky
3da1cf1e88 Extend the meaning of the CTLFLAG_TUN flag to automatically check if
there is an environment variable which shall initialize the SYSCTL
during early boot. This works for all SYSCTL types both statically and
dynamically created ones, except for the SYSCTL NODE type and SYSCTLs
which belong to VNETs. A new flag, CTLFLAG_NOFETCH, has been added to
be used in the case a tunable sysctl has a custom initialisation
function allowing the sysctl to still be marked as a tunable. The
kernel SYSCTL API is mostly the same, with a few exceptions for some
special operations like iterating childrens of a static/extern SYSCTL
node. This operation should probably be made into a factored out
common macro, hence some device drivers use this. The reason for
changing the SYSCTL API was the need for a SYSCTL parent OID pointer
and not only the SYSCTL parent OID list pointer in order to quickly
generate the sysctl path. The motivation behind this patch is to avoid
parameter loading cludges inside the OFED driver subsystem. Instead of
adding special code to the OFED driver subsystem to post-load tunables
into dynamically created sysctls, we generalize this in the kernel.

Other changes:
- Corrected a possibly incorrect sysctl name from "hw.cbb.intr_mask"
to "hw.pcic.intr_mask".
- Removed redundant TUNABLE statements throughout the kernel.
- Some minor code rewrites in connection to removing not needed
TUNABLE statements.
- Added a missing SYSCTL_DECL().
- Wrapped two very long lines.
- Avoid malloc()/free() inside sysctl string handling, in case it is
called to initialize a sysctl from a tunable, hence malloc()/free() is
not ready when sysctls from the sysctl dataset are registered.
- Bumped FreeBSD version to indicate SYSCTL API change.

MFC after:	2 weeks
Sponsored by:	Mellanox Technologies
2014-06-27 16:33:43 +00:00
Gleb Smirnoff
76039bc84f The r48589 promised to remove implicit inclusion of if_var.h soon. Prepare
to this event, adding if_var.h to files that do need it. Also, include
all includes that now are included due to implicit pollution via if_var.h

Sponsored by:	Netflix
Sponsored by:	Nginx, Inc.
2013-10-26 17:58:36 +00:00
Ed Schouten
6472ac3d8a Mark all SYSCTL_NODEs static that have no corresponding SYSCTL_DECLs.
The SYSCTL_NODE macro defines a list that stores all child-elements of
that node. If there's no SYSCTL_DECL macro anywhere else, there's no
reason why it shouldn't be static.
2011-11-07 15:43:11 +00:00
Robert Watson
9162f64b58 Rather than having MAC policies explicitly declare what object types
they label, derive that information implicitly from the set of label
initializers in their policy operations set.  This avoids a possible
class of programmer errors, while retaining the structure that
allows us to avoid allocating labels for objects that don't need
them.  As before, we regenerate a global mask of labeled objects
each time a policy is loaded or unloaded, stored in mac_labeled.

Discussed with:   csjp
Suggested by:     Jacques Vidrine <nectar at apple.com>
Obtained from:    TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:     Apple, Inc.
2009-01-10 10:58:41 +00:00
Robert Watson
6356dba0b4 Introduce two related changes to the TrustedBSD MAC Framework:
(1) Abstract interpreter vnode labeling in execve(2) and mac_execve(2)
    so that the general exec code isn't aware of the details of
    allocating, copying, and freeing labels, rather, simply passes in
    a void pointer to start and stop functions that will be used by
    the framework.  This change will be MFC'd.

(2) Introduce a new flags field to the MAC_POLICY_SET(9) interface
    allowing policies to declare which types of objects require label
    allocation, initialization, and destruction, and define a set of
    flags covering various supported object types (MPC_OBJECT_PROC,
    MPC_OBJECT_VNODE, MPC_OBJECT_INPCB, ...).  This change reduces the
    overhead of compiling the MAC Framework into the kernel if policies
    aren't loaded, or if policies require labels on only a small number
    or even no object types.  Each time a policy is loaded or unloaded,
    we recalculate a mask of labeled object types across all policies
    present in the system.  Eliminate MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF option as it
    is no longer required.

MFC after:	1 week ((1) only)
Reviewed by:	csjp
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	Apple, Inc.
2008-08-23 15:26:36 +00:00
Robert Watson
eb320b0ee7 Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and
declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework
itself.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
Robert Watson
3f1a7a9086 Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather
than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code
a bit easier to read.

When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather
than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making
the code a little easier to read.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
Robert Watson
30d239bc4c Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes
from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to
the following general forms:

  mac_<object>_<method/action>
  mac_<object>_check_<method/action>

The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly
reversed from the new scheme.  Also, make object types more
consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain
multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical
parsing easier.  Introduce a new "netinet" object type for
certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods.  Also simplify, slightly,
some entry point names.

All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules
not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to
conform to the new KPI.

Sponsored by:	SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X)
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
Robert Watson
78007886c9 Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions
for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
Robert Watson
7405fcc338 More unnecessary include reduction. 2007-02-23 14:39:04 +00:00
Robert Watson
c96ae1968a Continue 7-CURRENT MAC Framework rearrangement and cleanup:
Don't perform a nested include of _label.h in mac.h, as mac.h now
describes only  the user API to MAC, and _label.h defines the in-kernel
representation of MAC labels.

Remove mac.h includes from policies and MAC framework components that do
not use userspace MAC API definitions.

Add _KERNEL inclusion checks to mac_internal.h and mac_policy.h, as these
are kernel-only include files

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-02-06 10:59:23 +00:00
Robert Watson
0efd6615cd Move src/sys/sys/mac_policy.h, the kernel interface between the MAC
Framework and security modules, to src/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h,
completing the removal of kernel-only MAC Framework include files from
src/sys/sys.  Update the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules.  Delete
the old mac_policy.h.

Third party policy modules will need similar updating.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-22 23:34:47 +00:00
Robert Watson
f6a4109212 Update my personal copyrights and NETA copyrights in the kernel
to use the "year1-year3" format, as opposed to "year1, year2, year3".
This seems to make lawyers more happy, but also prevents the
lines from getting excessively long as the years start to add up.

Suggested by:	imp
2004-02-22 00:33:12 +00:00
Robert Watson
a557af222b Introduce a MAC label reference in 'struct inpcb', which caches
the   MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and
IPv6-based protocols.  This permits MAC labels to be checked during
network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket
to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to
grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer.

This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the
MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points:
initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a
delivery access control check.

For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the
socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced,
pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label
has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding
appropriate locks.  Most protocols implement this using
pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use
the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the
MAC Framework to perform a cache update.

Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub
policy, and test policy.

Reviewed by:	sam, bms
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-11-18 00:39:07 +00:00
Robert Watson
de88922310 Remove trailing whitespace. 2003-07-05 01:24:36 +00:00
Robert Watson
535cf73341 Rather than check for M_PKTHDR and conditionally perform access control,
simply assert that M_PKTHDR is set using M_ASSERTPKTHDR().

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-04-18 20:22:23 +00:00
Robert Watson
78183ac2d2 Trim "trustedbsd_" from the front of the policy module "short names";
the vendor is only included in the long name currently, reducing
verbosity when modules are registered and unregistered.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-27 19:26:39 +00:00
Robert Watson
dc858fcabe License and wording updates: NAI has authorized the removal of clause
three from their BSD-style license.  Also, s/NAI Labs/Network Associates
Laboratories/.
2002-11-04 01:53:12 +00:00
Robert Watson
5c8dd34218 Move to C99 sparse structure initialization for the mac_policy_ops
structure definition, rather than using an operation vector
we translate into the structure.  Originally, we used a vector
for two reasons:

(1) We wanted to define the structure sparsely, which wasn't
    supported by the C compiler for structures.  For a policy
    with five entry points, you don't want to have to stick in
    a few hundred NULL function pointers.

(2) We thought it would improve ABI compatibility allowing modules
    to work with kernels that had a superset of the entry points
    defined in the module, even if the kernel had changed its
    entry point set.

Both of these no longer apply:

(1) C99 gives us a way to sparsely define a static structure.

(2) The ABI problems existed anyway, due to enumeration numbers,
    argument changes, and semantic mismatches.  Since the going
    rule for FreeBSD is that you really need your modules to
    pretty closely match your kernel, it's not worth the
    complexity.

This submit eliminates the operation vector, dynamic allocation
of the operation structure, copying of the vector to the
structure, and redoes the vectors in each policy to direct
structure definitions.  One enourmous benefit of this change
is that we now get decent type checking on policy entry point
implementation arguments.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-30 18:48:51 +00:00
Robert Watson
fb95b5d3c3 Rename mac_check_socket_receive() to mac_check_socket_deliver() so that
we can use the names _receive() and _send() for the receive() and send()
checks.  Rename related constants, policy implementations, etc.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-15 18:51:27 +00:00
Robert Watson
d8a7b7a3cd Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.

Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions.  These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed.  Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments.  Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.

mac_biba:	Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
		similar to those found in a number of commercial
		trusted operating systems.  All subjects and objects
		are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
		is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
		policy.  Currently, purely hierarchal.

mac_bsdextended:	Implementation of a "file system firewall",
		which allows the administrator to specify a series
		of rules limiting access by users and groups to
		objects owned by other users and groups.  This
		policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
		security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
		process credentials).

mac_ifoff:	Secure interface silencing.  Special-purpose module
		to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
		for silent monitoring scenarios.  Prevents the
		various network stacks from generating any output
		despite an interface being live for reception.

mac_mls:	Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
		confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
		a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
		All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
		levels, and information flow is controlled based on
		a write-up, read-down policy.  Currently, purely
		hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
		works.

mac_none:	Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
		points with empty stubs.  A good place to start if
		you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
		don't mind a bit of pruning.  Can be loaded, but
		has no access control impact.  Useful also for
		performance measurements.

mac_seeotheruids:	Policy module implementing a security service
		similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
		more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
		of specific groups, etc.  This policy is unlabeled,
		relying on existing system security labeling
		(process credentials).

mac_test:	Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
		label handling.  Attempts to ensure that labels are
		not freed multiple times, etc, etc.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00