argument is an expression you can end up casting part of it to void *.
This resulted in bogus warnings about pointer arith using void *'s for
the ep(4) driver.
from being MI in any fashion. It currently "assumes" that it can get
a kernel virtual address for a phyiscal address by adding KERNBASE to the
physical address. It also tries to read values out of a the PC BIOS on
all archs. It also uses "manual" inb() and outb()'s to talk to the mcclock
device which just happens to be at that location on both i386 and alpha.
This driver should likely be i386-only.
not look like the prerequisites to fill it in properly will be in the tree
for the upcoming release, but it's mostly done, so there is no need for these
to stay around to remind us.
manipulated directly (rather than using sballoc()/sbfree()); update them
to tweak the new sb_ctl field too.
Sponsored by: NTT Multimedia Communications Labs
(1) Permit userland applications to request a change of label atomic
with an execve() via mac_execve(). This is required for the
SEBSD port of SELinux/FLASK. Attempts to invoke this without
MAC compiled in result in ENOSYS, as with all other MAC system
calls. Complexity, if desired, is present in policy modules,
rather than the framework.
(2) Permit policies to have access to both the label of the vnode
being executed as well as the interpreter if it's a shell
script or related UNIX nonsense. Because we can't hold both
vnode locks at the same time, cache the interpreter label.
SEBSD relies on this because it supports secure transitioning
via shell script executables. Other policies might want to
take both labels into account during an integrity or
confidentiality decision at execve()-time.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
Allow transitioning to be twiddled off using the process and fs enforcement
flags, although at some point this should probably be its own flag.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
entrypoints, #ifdef MAC. The supporting logic already existed in
kern_mac.c, so no change there. This permits MAC policies to cause
a process label change as the result of executing a binary --
typically, as a result of executing a specially labeled binary.
For example, the SEBSD port of SELinux/FLASK uses this functionality
to implement TE type transitions on processes using transitioning
binaries, in a manner similar to setuid. Policies not implementing
a notion of transition (all the ones in the tree right now) require
no changes, since the old label data is copied to the new label
via mac_create_cred() even if a transition does occur.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
with them in non-C cases, outside of the kernel.
Include <sys/cdefs.h> for __BEGIN_DECLS/__END_DECLS as other headers seem
to do in this area.
Requested by: Patrick Hartling <patrick@137.org>
