These are probably machine independent, but
there is no way for the developers to test them other than on x86.
They will become MD as testing becomes possible.
special files it was treated like -l. This commit adds the -x option
in for special files as well.
PR: bin/46249
Submitted by: Colin Percival <cperciva@sfu.ca>
properly, clean up quota(1). quota(1) has the ability to query
quotas either directly from the kernel, or if that fails, by reading
the quota.user or quota.group files specified for the file system
in /etc/fstab. The setuid bit existed solely (apparently) to let
non-operator users query their quotas and consumption when quotas
weren't enabled for the file system.
o Remove the setuid bit from quota(1).
o Remove the logic used by quota(1) when running setuid to prevent
users from querying the quotas of other users or groups. Note
that this papered over previously broken kernel access control;
if you queried directly using the system call, you could access
some of the data "restricted" by quota(1).
In the new world order, the ability to inspect the (live) quotas of
other uids and gids via the kernel is controlled by the privilege
requirement sysctl. The ability to query via the file is controlled
by the file permissions on the quota database backing files
(root:operator, group readable by default).
properly, clean up quota(1). quota(1) has the ability to query
quotas either directly from the kernel, or if that fails, by reading
the quota.user or quota.group files specified for the file system
in /etc/fstab. The setuid bit existed solely (apparently) to let
non-operator users query their quotas and consumption when quotas
weren't enabled for the file system.
o Remove the setuid bit from quota(1).
o Remove the logic used by quota(1) when running setuid to prevent
users from querying the quotas of other users or groups. Note
that this papered over previously broken kernel access control.
read at least 1 byte from the input file without problems. This
fixes a bug in uncompress(1) that causes the accidental removal
of files that happen to have the same name as the output file,
even when the uncompression fails and is aborted, i.e.:
$ echo hello world > hello
$ touch hello.Z
$ ls -l hello*
-rw-rw-r-- 1 giorgos giorgos 12 Jun 14 13:33 hello
-rw-rw-r-- 1 giorgos giorgos 0 Jun 14 13:33 hello.Z
$ ./uncompress -f hello
uncompress: hello.Z: Inappropriate file type or format
$ ls -l hello*
-rw-rw-r-- 1 giorgos giorgos 0 Jun 14 13:33 hello.Z
$
PR: 46787
Submitted by: keramida
- Don't fail if we can't open /dev/null since this can happen if
xargs is jail'ed or chroot'ed.
These fixes were submitted by Todd Miller from the OpenBSD project.
There was one problem in those fixes that broke -o, which is corrected
here and should be committed to the OpenBSD repo by Todd soon.
MFC in: 3 days
This is a style bug. err() is declared is non-returning so that every
use of it doesn't need to be encrufted with NOTREACHED. It's too bad
that only gcc understands the declaration.
Asked by: bde@
userland, and the kernel. In the kernel by way of the 'ident[]' variable
akin to all the other stuff generated by newvers.sh. In userland it is
available to sysctl consumers via KERN_IDENT or 'kern.ident'. It is exported
by uname(1) by the -i flag.
Reviewed by: hackers@
Alan Eldridge
Born December 15, 1961 in Iowa
Died June 6, 2003 in Denver, Colorado
Thank you for your contributions, you
will be greatly missed.
http://freebsd.kde.org/memoriam/alane.php
(This change suggested by ru@ - thanks).
