freebsd-dev/sys/kern/uipc_shm.c
Jeff Roberson d6e13f3b4d Don't hold the object lock while calling getpages.
The vnode pager does not want the object lock held.  Moving this out allows
further object lock scope reduction in callers.  While here add some missing
paging in progress calls and an assert.  The object handle is now protected
explicitly with pip.

Reviewed by:	kib, markj
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23033
2020-01-19 23:47:32 +00:00

1552 lines
39 KiB
C

/*-
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD
*
* Copyright (c) 2006, 2011, 2016-2017 Robert N. M. Watson
* All rights reserved.
*
* Portions of this software were developed by BAE Systems, the University of
* Cambridge Computer Laboratory, and Memorial University under DARPA/AFRL
* contract FA8650-15-C-7558 ("CADETS"), as part of the DARPA Transparent
* Computing (TC) research program.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* Support for shared swap-backed anonymous memory objects via
* shm_open(2), shm_rename(2), and shm_unlink(2).
* While most of the implementation is here, vm_mmap.c contains
* mapping logic changes.
*
* posixshmcontrol(1) allows users to inspect the state of the memory
* objects. Per-uid swap resource limit controls total amount of
* memory that user can consume for anonymous objects, including
* shared.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "opt_capsicum.h"
#include "opt_ktrace.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/capsicum.h>
#include <sys/conf.h>
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/filedesc.h>
#include <sys/filio.h>
#include <sys/fnv_hash.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/limits.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/signal.h>
#include <sys/jail.h>
#include <sys/ktrace.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/priv.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/refcount.h>
#include <sys/resourcevar.h>
#include <sys/rwlock.h>
#include <sys/sbuf.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/syscallsubr.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/sx.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/unistd.h>
#include <sys/user.h>
#include <security/audit/audit.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
#include <vm/vm.h>
#include <vm/vm_param.h>
#include <vm/pmap.h>
#include <vm/vm_extern.h>
#include <vm/vm_map.h>
#include <vm/vm_kern.h>
#include <vm/vm_object.h>
#include <vm/vm_page.h>
#include <vm/vm_pageout.h>
#include <vm/vm_pager.h>
#include <vm/swap_pager.h>
struct shm_mapping {
char *sm_path;
Fnv32_t sm_fnv;
struct shmfd *sm_shmfd;
LIST_ENTRY(shm_mapping) sm_link;
};
static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_SHMFD, "shmfd", "shared memory file descriptor");
static LIST_HEAD(, shm_mapping) *shm_dictionary;
static struct sx shm_dict_lock;
static struct mtx shm_timestamp_lock;
static u_long shm_hash;
static struct unrhdr64 shm_ino_unr;
static dev_t shm_dev_ino;
#define SHM_HASH(fnv) (&shm_dictionary[(fnv) & shm_hash])
static void shm_init(void *arg);
static void shm_insert(char *path, Fnv32_t fnv, struct shmfd *shmfd);
static struct shmfd *shm_lookup(char *path, Fnv32_t fnv);
static int shm_remove(char *path, Fnv32_t fnv, struct ucred *ucred);
static int shm_dotruncate_locked(struct shmfd *shmfd, off_t length,
void *rl_cookie);
static int shm_copyin_path(struct thread *td, const char *userpath_in,
char **path_out);
static fo_rdwr_t shm_read;
static fo_rdwr_t shm_write;
static fo_truncate_t shm_truncate;
static fo_ioctl_t shm_ioctl;
static fo_stat_t shm_stat;
static fo_close_t shm_close;
static fo_chmod_t shm_chmod;
static fo_chown_t shm_chown;
static fo_seek_t shm_seek;
static fo_fill_kinfo_t shm_fill_kinfo;
static fo_mmap_t shm_mmap;
static fo_get_seals_t shm_get_seals;
static fo_add_seals_t shm_add_seals;
static fo_fallocate_t shm_fallocate;
/* File descriptor operations. */
struct fileops shm_ops = {
.fo_read = shm_read,
.fo_write = shm_write,
.fo_truncate = shm_truncate,
.fo_ioctl = shm_ioctl,
.fo_poll = invfo_poll,
.fo_kqfilter = invfo_kqfilter,
.fo_stat = shm_stat,
.fo_close = shm_close,
.fo_chmod = shm_chmod,
.fo_chown = shm_chown,
.fo_sendfile = vn_sendfile,
.fo_seek = shm_seek,
.fo_fill_kinfo = shm_fill_kinfo,
.fo_mmap = shm_mmap,
.fo_get_seals = shm_get_seals,
.fo_add_seals = shm_add_seals,
.fo_fallocate = shm_fallocate,
.fo_flags = DFLAG_PASSABLE | DFLAG_SEEKABLE
};
FEATURE(posix_shm, "POSIX shared memory");
static int
uiomove_object_page(vm_object_t obj, size_t len, struct uio *uio)
{
vm_page_t m;
vm_pindex_t idx;
size_t tlen;
int error, offset, rv;
idx = OFF_TO_IDX(uio->uio_offset);
offset = uio->uio_offset & PAGE_MASK;
tlen = MIN(PAGE_SIZE - offset, len);
VM_OBJECT_WLOCK(obj);
/*
* Read I/O without either a corresponding resident page or swap
* page: use zero_region. This is intended to avoid instantiating
* pages on read from a sparse region.
*/
if (uio->uio_rw == UIO_READ && vm_page_lookup(obj, idx) == NULL &&
!vm_pager_has_page(obj, idx, NULL, NULL)) {
VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK(obj);
return (uiomove(__DECONST(void *, zero_region), tlen, uio));
}
/*
* Parallel reads of the page content from disk are prevented
* by exclusive busy.
*
* Although the tmpfs vnode lock is held here, it is
* nonetheless safe to sleep waiting for a free page. The
* pageout daemon does not need to acquire the tmpfs vnode
* lock to page out tobj's pages because tobj is a OBJT_SWAP
* type object.
*/
rv = vm_page_grab_valid(&m, obj, idx,
VM_ALLOC_NORMAL | VM_ALLOC_SBUSY | VM_ALLOC_IGN_SBUSY);
if (rv != VM_PAGER_OK) {
VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK(obj);
printf("uiomove_object: vm_obj %p idx %jd pager error %d\n",
obj, idx, rv);
return (EIO);
}
VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK(obj);
error = uiomove_fromphys(&m, offset, tlen, uio);
if (uio->uio_rw == UIO_WRITE && error == 0)
vm_page_set_dirty(m);
vm_page_activate(m);
vm_page_sunbusy(m);
return (error);
}
int
uiomove_object(vm_object_t obj, off_t obj_size, struct uio *uio)
{
ssize_t resid;
size_t len;
int error;
error = 0;
while ((resid = uio->uio_resid) > 0) {
if (obj_size <= uio->uio_offset)
break;
len = MIN(obj_size - uio->uio_offset, resid);
if (len == 0)
break;
error = uiomove_object_page(obj, len, uio);
if (error != 0 || resid == uio->uio_resid)
break;
}
return (error);
}
static int
shm_seek(struct file *fp, off_t offset, int whence, struct thread *td)
{
struct shmfd *shmfd;
off_t foffset;
int error;
shmfd = fp->f_data;
foffset = foffset_lock(fp, 0);
error = 0;
switch (whence) {
case L_INCR:
if (foffset < 0 ||
(offset > 0 && foffset > OFF_MAX - offset)) {
error = EOVERFLOW;
break;
}
offset += foffset;
break;
case L_XTND:
if (offset > 0 && shmfd->shm_size > OFF_MAX - offset) {
error = EOVERFLOW;
break;
}
offset += shmfd->shm_size;
break;
case L_SET:
break;
default:
error = EINVAL;
}
if (error == 0) {
if (offset < 0 || offset > shmfd->shm_size)
error = EINVAL;
else
td->td_uretoff.tdu_off = offset;
}
foffset_unlock(fp, offset, error != 0 ? FOF_NOUPDATE : 0);
return (error);
}
static int
shm_read(struct file *fp, struct uio *uio, struct ucred *active_cred,
int flags, struct thread *td)
{
struct shmfd *shmfd;
void *rl_cookie;
int error;
shmfd = fp->f_data;
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_posixshm_check_read(active_cred, fp->f_cred, shmfd);
if (error)
return (error);
#endif
foffset_lock_uio(fp, uio, flags);
rl_cookie = rangelock_rlock(&shmfd->shm_rl, uio->uio_offset,
uio->uio_offset + uio->uio_resid, &shmfd->shm_mtx);
error = uiomove_object(shmfd->shm_object, shmfd->shm_size, uio);
rangelock_unlock(&shmfd->shm_rl, rl_cookie, &shmfd->shm_mtx);
foffset_unlock_uio(fp, uio, flags);
return (error);
}
static int
shm_write(struct file *fp, struct uio *uio, struct ucred *active_cred,
int flags, struct thread *td)
{
struct shmfd *shmfd;
void *rl_cookie;
int error;
shmfd = fp->f_data;
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_posixshm_check_write(active_cred, fp->f_cred, shmfd);
if (error)
return (error);
#endif
foffset_lock_uio(fp, uio, flags);
if ((flags & FOF_OFFSET) == 0) {
rl_cookie = rangelock_wlock(&shmfd->shm_rl, 0, OFF_MAX,
&shmfd->shm_mtx);
} else {
rl_cookie = rangelock_wlock(&shmfd->shm_rl, uio->uio_offset,
uio->uio_offset + uio->uio_resid, &shmfd->shm_mtx);
}
if ((shmfd->shm_seals & F_SEAL_WRITE) != 0)
error = EPERM;
else
error = uiomove_object(shmfd->shm_object, shmfd->shm_size, uio);
rangelock_unlock(&shmfd->shm_rl, rl_cookie, &shmfd->shm_mtx);
foffset_unlock_uio(fp, uio, flags);
return (error);
}
static int
shm_truncate(struct file *fp, off_t length, struct ucred *active_cred,
struct thread *td)
{
struct shmfd *shmfd;
#ifdef MAC
int error;
#endif
shmfd = fp->f_data;
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_posixshm_check_truncate(active_cred, fp->f_cred, shmfd);
if (error)
return (error);
#endif
return (shm_dotruncate(shmfd, length));
}
int
shm_ioctl(struct file *fp, u_long com, void *data, struct ucred *active_cred,
struct thread *td)
{
switch (com) {
case FIONBIO:
case FIOASYNC:
/*
* Allow fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) to work,
* just like it would on an unlinked regular file
*/
return (0);
default:
return (ENOTTY);
}
}
static int
shm_stat(struct file *fp, struct stat *sb, struct ucred *active_cred,
struct thread *td)
{
struct shmfd *shmfd;
#ifdef MAC
int error;
#endif
shmfd = fp->f_data;
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_posixshm_check_stat(active_cred, fp->f_cred, shmfd);
if (error)
return (error);
#endif
/*
* Attempt to return sanish values for fstat() on a memory file
* descriptor.
*/
bzero(sb, sizeof(*sb));
sb->st_blksize = PAGE_SIZE;
sb->st_size = shmfd->shm_size;
sb->st_blocks = howmany(sb->st_size, sb->st_blksize);
mtx_lock(&shm_timestamp_lock);
sb->st_atim = shmfd->shm_atime;
sb->st_ctim = shmfd->shm_ctime;
sb->st_mtim = shmfd->shm_mtime;
sb->st_birthtim = shmfd->shm_birthtime;
sb->st_mode = S_IFREG | shmfd->shm_mode; /* XXX */
sb->st_uid = shmfd->shm_uid;
sb->st_gid = shmfd->shm_gid;
mtx_unlock(&shm_timestamp_lock);
sb->st_dev = shm_dev_ino;
sb->st_ino = shmfd->shm_ino;
sb->st_nlink = shmfd->shm_object->ref_count;
return (0);
}
static int
shm_close(struct file *fp, struct thread *td)
{
struct shmfd *shmfd;
shmfd = fp->f_data;
fp->f_data = NULL;
shm_drop(shmfd);
return (0);
}
static int
shm_copyin_path(struct thread *td, const char *userpath_in, char **path_out) {
int error;
char *path;
const char *pr_path;
size_t pr_pathlen;
path = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_SHMFD, M_WAITOK);
pr_path = td->td_ucred->cr_prison->pr_path;
/* Construct a full pathname for jailed callers. */
pr_pathlen = strcmp(pr_path, "/") ==
0 ? 0 : strlcpy(path, pr_path, MAXPATHLEN);
error = copyinstr(userpath_in, path + pr_pathlen,
MAXPATHLEN - pr_pathlen, NULL);
if (error != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef KTRACE
if (KTRPOINT(curthread, KTR_NAMEI))
ktrnamei(path);
#endif
/* Require paths to start with a '/' character. */
if (path[pr_pathlen] != '/') {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
*path_out = path;
out:
if (error != 0)
free(path, M_SHMFD);
return (error);
}
static int
shm_dotruncate_locked(struct shmfd *shmfd, off_t length, void *rl_cookie)
{
vm_object_t object;
vm_page_t m;
vm_pindex_t idx, nobjsize;
vm_ooffset_t delta;
int base, rv;
KASSERT(length >= 0, ("shm_dotruncate: length < 0"));
object = shmfd->shm_object;
VM_OBJECT_ASSERT_WLOCKED(object);
rangelock_cookie_assert(rl_cookie, RA_WLOCKED);
if (length == shmfd->shm_size)
return (0);
nobjsize = OFF_TO_IDX(length + PAGE_MASK);
/* Are we shrinking? If so, trim the end. */
if (length < shmfd->shm_size) {
if ((shmfd->shm_seals & F_SEAL_SHRINK) != 0)
return (EPERM);
/*
* Disallow any requests to shrink the size if this
* object is mapped into the kernel.
*/
if (shmfd->shm_kmappings > 0)
return (EBUSY);
/*
* Zero the truncated part of the last page.
*/
base = length & PAGE_MASK;
if (base != 0) {
idx = OFF_TO_IDX(length);
retry:
m = vm_page_grab(object, idx, VM_ALLOC_NOCREAT);
if (m != NULL) {
MPASS(vm_page_all_valid(m));
} else if (vm_pager_has_page(object, idx, NULL, NULL)) {
m = vm_page_alloc(object, idx,
VM_ALLOC_NORMAL | VM_ALLOC_WAITFAIL);
if (m == NULL)
goto retry;
vm_object_pip_add(object, 1);
VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK(object);
rv = vm_pager_get_pages(object, &m, 1, NULL,
NULL);
VM_OBJECT_WLOCK(object);
vm_object_pip_wakeup(object);
if (rv == VM_PAGER_OK) {
/*
* Since the page was not resident,
* and therefore not recently
* accessed, immediately enqueue it
* for asynchronous laundering. The
* current operation is not regarded
* as an access.
*/
vm_page_launder(m);
} else {
vm_page_free(m);
VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK(object);
return (EIO);
}
}
if (m != NULL) {
pmap_zero_page_area(m, base, PAGE_SIZE - base);
KASSERT(vm_page_all_valid(m),
("shm_dotruncate: page %p is invalid", m));
vm_page_set_dirty(m);
vm_page_xunbusy(m);
}
}
delta = IDX_TO_OFF(object->size - nobjsize);
/* Toss in memory pages. */
if (nobjsize < object->size)
vm_object_page_remove(object, nobjsize, object->size,
0);
/* Toss pages from swap. */
if (object->type == OBJT_SWAP)
swap_pager_freespace(object, nobjsize, delta);
/* Free the swap accounted for shm */
swap_release_by_cred(delta, object->cred);
object->charge -= delta;
} else {
if ((shmfd->shm_seals & F_SEAL_GROW) != 0)
return (EPERM);
/* Try to reserve additional swap space. */
delta = IDX_TO_OFF(nobjsize - object->size);
if (!swap_reserve_by_cred(delta, object->cred))
return (ENOMEM);
object->charge += delta;
}
shmfd->shm_size = length;
mtx_lock(&shm_timestamp_lock);
vfs_timestamp(&shmfd->shm_ctime);
shmfd->shm_mtime = shmfd->shm_ctime;
mtx_unlock(&shm_timestamp_lock);
object->size = nobjsize;
return (0);
}
int
shm_dotruncate(struct shmfd *shmfd, off_t length)
{
void *rl_cookie;
int error;
rl_cookie = rangelock_wlock(&shmfd->shm_rl, 0, OFF_MAX,
&shmfd->shm_mtx);
VM_OBJECT_WLOCK(shmfd->shm_object);
error = shm_dotruncate_locked(shmfd, length, rl_cookie);
VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK(shmfd->shm_object);
rangelock_unlock(&shmfd->shm_rl, rl_cookie, &shmfd->shm_mtx);
return (error);
}
/*
* shmfd object management including creation and reference counting
* routines.
*/
struct shmfd *
shm_alloc(struct ucred *ucred, mode_t mode)
{
struct shmfd *shmfd;
shmfd = malloc(sizeof(*shmfd), M_SHMFD, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
shmfd->shm_size = 0;
shmfd->shm_uid = ucred->cr_uid;
shmfd->shm_gid = ucred->cr_gid;
shmfd->shm_mode = mode;
shmfd->shm_object = vm_pager_allocate(OBJT_SWAP, NULL,
shmfd->shm_size, VM_PROT_DEFAULT, 0, ucred);
KASSERT(shmfd->shm_object != NULL, ("shm_create: vm_pager_allocate"));
vfs_timestamp(&shmfd->shm_birthtime);
shmfd->shm_atime = shmfd->shm_mtime = shmfd->shm_ctime =
shmfd->shm_birthtime;
shmfd->shm_ino = alloc_unr64(&shm_ino_unr);
refcount_init(&shmfd->shm_refs, 1);
mtx_init(&shmfd->shm_mtx, "shmrl", NULL, MTX_DEF);
rangelock_init(&shmfd->shm_rl);
#ifdef MAC
mac_posixshm_init(shmfd);
mac_posixshm_create(ucred, shmfd);
#endif
return (shmfd);
}
struct shmfd *
shm_hold(struct shmfd *shmfd)
{
refcount_acquire(&shmfd->shm_refs);
return (shmfd);
}
void
shm_drop(struct shmfd *shmfd)
{
if (refcount_release(&shmfd->shm_refs)) {
#ifdef MAC
mac_posixshm_destroy(shmfd);
#endif
rangelock_destroy(&shmfd->shm_rl);
mtx_destroy(&shmfd->shm_mtx);
vm_object_deallocate(shmfd->shm_object);
free(shmfd, M_SHMFD);
}
}
/*
* Determine if the credentials have sufficient permissions for a
* specified combination of FREAD and FWRITE.
*/
int
shm_access(struct shmfd *shmfd, struct ucred *ucred, int flags)
{
accmode_t accmode;
int error;
accmode = 0;
if (flags & FREAD)
accmode |= VREAD;
if (flags & FWRITE)
accmode |= VWRITE;
mtx_lock(&shm_timestamp_lock);
error = vaccess(VREG, shmfd->shm_mode, shmfd->shm_uid, shmfd->shm_gid,
accmode, ucred, NULL);
mtx_unlock(&shm_timestamp_lock);
return (error);
}
/*
* Dictionary management. We maintain an in-kernel dictionary to map
* paths to shmfd objects. We use the FNV hash on the path to store
* the mappings in a hash table.
*/
static void
shm_init(void *arg)
{
mtx_init(&shm_timestamp_lock, "shm timestamps", NULL, MTX_DEF);
sx_init(&shm_dict_lock, "shm dictionary");
shm_dictionary = hashinit(1024, M_SHMFD, &shm_hash);
new_unrhdr64(&shm_ino_unr, 1);
shm_dev_ino = devfs_alloc_cdp_inode();
KASSERT(shm_dev_ino > 0, ("shm dev inode not initialized"));
}
SYSINIT(shm_init, SI_SUB_SYSV_SHM, SI_ORDER_ANY, shm_init, NULL);
static struct shmfd *
shm_lookup(char *path, Fnv32_t fnv)
{
struct shm_mapping *map;
LIST_FOREACH(map, SHM_HASH(fnv), sm_link) {
if (map->sm_fnv != fnv)
continue;
if (strcmp(map->sm_path, path) == 0)
return (map->sm_shmfd);
}
return (NULL);
}
static void
shm_insert(char *path, Fnv32_t fnv, struct shmfd *shmfd)
{
struct shm_mapping *map;
map = malloc(sizeof(struct shm_mapping), M_SHMFD, M_WAITOK);
map->sm_path = path;
map->sm_fnv = fnv;
map->sm_shmfd = shm_hold(shmfd);
shmfd->shm_path = path;
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(SHM_HASH(fnv), map, sm_link);
}
static int
shm_remove(char *path, Fnv32_t fnv, struct ucred *ucred)
{
struct shm_mapping *map;
int error;
LIST_FOREACH(map, SHM_HASH(fnv), sm_link) {
if (map->sm_fnv != fnv)
continue;
if (strcmp(map->sm_path, path) == 0) {
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_posixshm_check_unlink(ucred, map->sm_shmfd);
if (error)
return (error);
#endif
error = shm_access(map->sm_shmfd, ucred,
FREAD | FWRITE);
if (error)
return (error);
map->sm_shmfd->shm_path = NULL;
LIST_REMOVE(map, sm_link);
shm_drop(map->sm_shmfd);
free(map->sm_path, M_SHMFD);
free(map, M_SHMFD);
return (0);
}
}
return (ENOENT);
}
int
kern_shm_open2(struct thread *td, const char *userpath, int flags, mode_t mode,
int shmflags, struct filecaps *fcaps, const char *name __unused)
{
struct filedesc *fdp;
struct shmfd *shmfd;
struct file *fp;
char *path;
void *rl_cookie;
Fnv32_t fnv;
mode_t cmode;
int error, fd, initial_seals;
if ((shmflags & ~SHM_ALLOW_SEALING) != 0)
return (EINVAL);
initial_seals = F_SEAL_SEAL;
if ((shmflags & SHM_ALLOW_SEALING) != 0)
initial_seals &= ~F_SEAL_SEAL;
#ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE
/*
* shm_open(2) is only allowed for anonymous objects.
*/
if (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td) && (userpath != SHM_ANON))
return (ECAPMODE);
#endif
AUDIT_ARG_FFLAGS(flags);
AUDIT_ARG_MODE(mode);
if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY && (flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDWR)
return (EINVAL);
if ((flags & ~(O_ACCMODE | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_TRUNC | O_CLOEXEC)) != 0)
return (EINVAL);
/*
* Currently only F_SEAL_SEAL may be set when creating or opening shmfd.
* If the decision is made later to allow additional seals, care must be
* taken below to ensure that the seals are properly set if the shmfd
* already existed -- this currently assumes that only F_SEAL_SEAL can
* be set and doesn't take further precautions to ensure the validity of
* the seals being added with respect to current mappings.
*/
if ((initial_seals & ~F_SEAL_SEAL) != 0)
return (EINVAL);
fdp = td->td_proc->p_fd;
cmode = (mode & ~fdp->fd_cmask) & ACCESSPERMS;
/*
* shm_open(2) created shm should always have O_CLOEXEC set, as mandated
* by POSIX. We allow it to be unset here so that an in-kernel
* interface may be written as a thin layer around shm, optionally not
* setting CLOEXEC. For shm_open(2), O_CLOEXEC is set unconditionally
* in sys_shm_open() to keep this implementation compliant.
*/
error = falloc_caps(td, &fp, &fd, flags & O_CLOEXEC, fcaps);
if (error)
return (error);
/* A SHM_ANON path pointer creates an anonymous object. */
if (userpath == SHM_ANON) {
/* A read-only anonymous object is pointless. */
if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) {
fdclose(td, fp, fd);
fdrop(fp, td);
return (EINVAL);
}
shmfd = shm_alloc(td->td_ucred, cmode);
shmfd->shm_seals = initial_seals;
} else {
error = shm_copyin_path(td, userpath, &path);
if (error != 0) {
fdclose(td, fp, fd);
fdrop(fp, td);
return (error);
}
AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1_CANON(path);
fnv = fnv_32_str(path, FNV1_32_INIT);
sx_xlock(&shm_dict_lock);
shmfd = shm_lookup(path, fnv);
if (shmfd == NULL) {
/* Object does not yet exist, create it if requested. */
if (flags & O_CREAT) {
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_posixshm_check_create(td->td_ucred,
path);
if (error == 0) {
#endif
shmfd = shm_alloc(td->td_ucred, cmode);
shmfd->shm_seals = initial_seals;
shm_insert(path, fnv, shmfd);
#ifdef MAC
}
#endif
} else {
free(path, M_SHMFD);
error = ENOENT;
}
} else {
rl_cookie = rangelock_wlock(&shmfd->shm_rl, 0, OFF_MAX,
&shmfd->shm_mtx);
/*
* kern_shm_open() likely shouldn't ever error out on
* trying to set a seal that already exists, unlike
* F_ADD_SEALS. This would break terribly as
* shm_open(2) actually sets F_SEAL_SEAL to maintain
* historical behavior where the underlying file could
* not be sealed.
*/
initial_seals &= ~shmfd->shm_seals;
/*
* Object already exists, obtain a new
* reference if requested and permitted.
*/
free(path, M_SHMFD);
/*
* initial_seals can't set additional seals if we've
* already been set F_SEAL_SEAL. If F_SEAL_SEAL is set,
* then we've already removed that one from
* initial_seals. This is currently redundant as we
* only allow setting F_SEAL_SEAL at creation time, but
* it's cheap to check and decreases the effort required
* to allow additional seals.
*/
if ((shmfd->shm_seals & F_SEAL_SEAL) != 0 &&
initial_seals != 0)
error = EPERM;
else if ((flags & (O_CREAT | O_EXCL)) ==
(O_CREAT | O_EXCL))
error = EEXIST;
else {
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_posixshm_check_open(td->td_ucred,
shmfd, FFLAGS(flags & O_ACCMODE));
if (error == 0)
#endif
error = shm_access(shmfd, td->td_ucred,
FFLAGS(flags & O_ACCMODE));
}
/*
* Truncate the file back to zero length if
* O_TRUNC was specified and the object was
* opened with read/write.
*/
if (error == 0 &&
(flags & (O_ACCMODE | O_TRUNC)) ==
(O_RDWR | O_TRUNC)) {
VM_OBJECT_WLOCK(shmfd->shm_object);
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_posixshm_check_truncate(
td->td_ucred, fp->f_cred, shmfd);
if (error == 0)
#endif
error = shm_dotruncate_locked(shmfd, 0,
rl_cookie);
VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK(shmfd->shm_object);
}
if (error == 0) {
/*
* Currently we only allow F_SEAL_SEAL to be
* set initially. As noted above, this would
* need to be reworked should that change.
*/
shmfd->shm_seals |= initial_seals;
shm_hold(shmfd);
}
rangelock_unlock(&shmfd->shm_rl, rl_cookie,
&shmfd->shm_mtx);
}
sx_xunlock(&shm_dict_lock);
if (error) {
fdclose(td, fp, fd);
fdrop(fp, td);
return (error);
}
}
finit(fp, FFLAGS(flags & O_ACCMODE), DTYPE_SHM, shmfd, &shm_ops);
td->td_retval[0] = fd;
fdrop(fp, td);
return (0);
}
/* System calls. */
#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD12
int
freebsd12_shm_open(struct thread *td, struct freebsd12_shm_open_args *uap)
{
return (kern_shm_open(td, uap->path, uap->flags | O_CLOEXEC,
uap->mode, NULL));
}
#endif
int
sys_shm_unlink(struct thread *td, struct shm_unlink_args *uap)
{
char *path;
Fnv32_t fnv;
int error;
error = shm_copyin_path(td, uap->path, &path);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1_CANON(path);
fnv = fnv_32_str(path, FNV1_32_INIT);
sx_xlock(&shm_dict_lock);
error = shm_remove(path, fnv, td->td_ucred);
sx_xunlock(&shm_dict_lock);
free(path, M_TEMP);
return (error);
}
int
sys_shm_rename(struct thread *td, struct shm_rename_args *uap)
{
char *path_from = NULL, *path_to = NULL;
Fnv32_t fnv_from, fnv_to;
struct shmfd *fd_from;
struct shmfd *fd_to;
int error;
int flags;
flags = uap->flags;
AUDIT_ARG_FFLAGS(flags);
/*
* Make sure the user passed only valid flags.
* If you add a new flag, please add a new term here.
*/
if ((flags & ~(
SHM_RENAME_NOREPLACE |
SHM_RENAME_EXCHANGE
)) != 0) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/*
* EXCHANGE and NOREPLACE don't quite make sense together. Let's
* force the user to choose one or the other.
*/
if ((flags & SHM_RENAME_NOREPLACE) != 0 &&
(flags & SHM_RENAME_EXCHANGE) != 0) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Renaming to or from anonymous makes no sense */
if (uap->path_from == SHM_ANON || uap->path_to == SHM_ANON) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
error = shm_copyin_path(td, uap->path_from, &path_from);
if (error != 0)
goto out;
error = shm_copyin_path(td, uap->path_to, &path_to);
if (error != 0)
goto out;
AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1_CANON(path_from);
AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2_CANON(path_to);
/* Rename with from/to equal is a no-op */
if (strcmp(path_from, path_to) == 0)
goto out;
fnv_from = fnv_32_str(path_from, FNV1_32_INIT);
fnv_to = fnv_32_str(path_to, FNV1_32_INIT);
sx_xlock(&shm_dict_lock);
fd_from = shm_lookup(path_from, fnv_from);
if (fd_from == NULL) {
error = ENOENT;
goto out_locked;
}
fd_to = shm_lookup(path_to, fnv_to);
if ((flags & SHM_RENAME_NOREPLACE) != 0 && fd_to != NULL) {
error = EEXIST;
goto out_locked;
}
/*
* Unconditionally prevents shm_remove from invalidating the 'from'
* shm's state.
*/
shm_hold(fd_from);
error = shm_remove(path_from, fnv_from, td->td_ucred);
/*
* One of my assumptions failed if ENOENT (e.g. locking didn't
* protect us)
*/
KASSERT(error != ENOENT, ("Our shm disappeared during shm_rename: %s",
path_from));
if (error != 0) {
shm_drop(fd_from);
goto out_locked;
}
/*
* If we are exchanging, we need to ensure the shm_remove below
* doesn't invalidate the dest shm's state.
*/
if ((flags & SHM_RENAME_EXCHANGE) != 0 && fd_to != NULL)
shm_hold(fd_to);
/*
* NOTE: if path_to is not already in the hash, c'est la vie;
* it simply means we have nothing already at path_to to unlink.
* That is the ENOENT case.
*
* If we somehow don't have access to unlink this guy, but
* did for the shm at path_from, then relink the shm to path_from
* and abort with EACCES.
*
* All other errors: that is weird; let's relink and abort the
* operation.
*/
error = shm_remove(path_to, fnv_to, td->td_ucred);
if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT) {
shm_insert(path_from, fnv_from, fd_from);
shm_drop(fd_from);
/* Don't free path_from now, since the hash references it */
path_from = NULL;
goto out_locked;
}
error = 0;
shm_insert(path_to, fnv_to, fd_from);
/* Don't free path_to now, since the hash references it */
path_to = NULL;
/* We kept a ref when we removed, and incremented again in insert */
shm_drop(fd_from);
KASSERT(fd_from->shm_refs > 0, ("Expected >0 refs; got: %d\n",
fd_from->shm_refs));
if ((flags & SHM_RENAME_EXCHANGE) != 0 && fd_to != NULL) {
shm_insert(path_from, fnv_from, fd_to);
path_from = NULL;
shm_drop(fd_to);
KASSERT(fd_to->shm_refs > 0, ("Expected >0 refs; got: %d\n",
fd_to->shm_refs));
}
out_locked:
sx_xunlock(&shm_dict_lock);
out:
free(path_from, M_SHMFD);
free(path_to, M_SHMFD);
return (error);
}
int
shm_mmap(struct file *fp, vm_map_t map, vm_offset_t *addr, vm_size_t objsize,
vm_prot_t prot, vm_prot_t cap_maxprot, int flags,
vm_ooffset_t foff, struct thread *td)
{
struct shmfd *shmfd;
vm_prot_t maxprot;
int error;
bool writecnt;
void *rl_cookie;
shmfd = fp->f_data;
maxprot = VM_PROT_NONE;
rl_cookie = rangelock_rlock(&shmfd->shm_rl, 0, objsize,
&shmfd->shm_mtx);
/* FREAD should always be set. */
if ((fp->f_flag & FREAD) != 0)
maxprot |= VM_PROT_EXECUTE | VM_PROT_READ;
/*
* If FWRITE's set, we can allow VM_PROT_WRITE unless it's a shared
* mapping with a write seal applied.
*/
if ((fp->f_flag & FWRITE) != 0 && ((flags & MAP_SHARED) == 0 ||
(shmfd->shm_seals & F_SEAL_WRITE) == 0))
maxprot |= VM_PROT_WRITE;
writecnt = (flags & MAP_SHARED) != 0 && (prot & VM_PROT_WRITE) != 0;
if (writecnt && (shmfd->shm_seals & F_SEAL_WRITE) != 0) {
error = EPERM;
goto out;
}
/* Don't permit shared writable mappings on read-only descriptors. */
if (writecnt && (maxprot & VM_PROT_WRITE) == 0) {
error = EACCES;
goto out;
}
maxprot &= cap_maxprot;
/* See comment in vn_mmap(). */
if (
#ifdef _LP64
objsize > OFF_MAX ||
#endif
foff < 0 || foff > OFF_MAX - objsize) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_posixshm_check_mmap(td->td_ucred, shmfd, prot, flags);
if (error != 0)
goto out;
#endif
mtx_lock(&shm_timestamp_lock);
vfs_timestamp(&shmfd->shm_atime);
mtx_unlock(&shm_timestamp_lock);
vm_object_reference(shmfd->shm_object);
if (writecnt)
vm_pager_update_writecount(shmfd->shm_object, 0, objsize);
error = vm_mmap_object(map, addr, objsize, prot, maxprot, flags,
shmfd->shm_object, foff, writecnt, td);
if (error != 0) {
if (writecnt)
vm_pager_release_writecount(shmfd->shm_object, 0,
objsize);
vm_object_deallocate(shmfd->shm_object);
}
out:
rangelock_unlock(&shmfd->shm_rl, rl_cookie, &shmfd->shm_mtx);
return (error);
}
static int
shm_chmod(struct file *fp, mode_t mode, struct ucred *active_cred,
struct thread *td)
{
struct shmfd *shmfd;
int error;
error = 0;
shmfd = fp->f_data;
mtx_lock(&shm_timestamp_lock);
/*
* SUSv4 says that x bits of permission need not be affected.
* Be consistent with our shm_open there.
*/
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_posixshm_check_setmode(active_cred, shmfd, mode);
if (error != 0)
goto out;
#endif
error = vaccess(VREG, shmfd->shm_mode, shmfd->shm_uid,
shmfd->shm_gid, VADMIN, active_cred, NULL);
if (error != 0)
goto out;
shmfd->shm_mode = mode & ACCESSPERMS;
out:
mtx_unlock(&shm_timestamp_lock);
return (error);
}
static int
shm_chown(struct file *fp, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, struct ucred *active_cred,
struct thread *td)
{
struct shmfd *shmfd;
int error;
error = 0;
shmfd = fp->f_data;
mtx_lock(&shm_timestamp_lock);
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_posixshm_check_setowner(active_cred, shmfd, uid, gid);
if (error != 0)
goto out;
#endif
if (uid == (uid_t)-1)
uid = shmfd->shm_uid;
if (gid == (gid_t)-1)
gid = shmfd->shm_gid;
if (((uid != shmfd->shm_uid && uid != active_cred->cr_uid) ||
(gid != shmfd->shm_gid && !groupmember(gid, active_cred))) &&
(error = priv_check_cred(active_cred, PRIV_VFS_CHOWN)))
goto out;
shmfd->shm_uid = uid;
shmfd->shm_gid = gid;
out:
mtx_unlock(&shm_timestamp_lock);
return (error);
}
/*
* Helper routines to allow the backing object of a shared memory file
* descriptor to be mapped in the kernel.
*/
int
shm_map(struct file *fp, size_t size, off_t offset, void **memp)
{
struct shmfd *shmfd;
vm_offset_t kva, ofs;
vm_object_t obj;
int rv;
if (fp->f_type != DTYPE_SHM)
return (EINVAL);
shmfd = fp->f_data;
obj = shmfd->shm_object;
VM_OBJECT_WLOCK(obj);
/*
* XXXRW: This validation is probably insufficient, and subject to
* sign errors. It should be fixed.
*/
if (offset >= shmfd->shm_size ||
offset + size > round_page(shmfd->shm_size)) {
VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK(obj);
return (EINVAL);
}
shmfd->shm_kmappings++;
vm_object_reference_locked(obj);
VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK(obj);
/* Map the object into the kernel_map and wire it. */
kva = vm_map_min(kernel_map);
ofs = offset & PAGE_MASK;
offset = trunc_page(offset);
size = round_page(size + ofs);
rv = vm_map_find(kernel_map, obj, offset, &kva, size, 0,
VMFS_OPTIMAL_SPACE, VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE,
VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE, 0);
if (rv == KERN_SUCCESS) {
rv = vm_map_wire(kernel_map, kva, kva + size,
VM_MAP_WIRE_SYSTEM | VM_MAP_WIRE_NOHOLES);
if (rv == KERN_SUCCESS) {
*memp = (void *)(kva + ofs);
return (0);
}
vm_map_remove(kernel_map, kva, kva + size);
} else
vm_object_deallocate(obj);
/* On failure, drop our mapping reference. */
VM_OBJECT_WLOCK(obj);
shmfd->shm_kmappings--;
VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK(obj);
return (vm_mmap_to_errno(rv));
}
/*
* We require the caller to unmap the entire entry. This allows us to
* safely decrement shm_kmappings when a mapping is removed.
*/
int
shm_unmap(struct file *fp, void *mem, size_t size)
{
struct shmfd *shmfd;
vm_map_entry_t entry;
vm_offset_t kva, ofs;
vm_object_t obj;
vm_pindex_t pindex;
vm_prot_t prot;
boolean_t wired;
vm_map_t map;
int rv;
if (fp->f_type != DTYPE_SHM)
return (EINVAL);
shmfd = fp->f_data;
kva = (vm_offset_t)mem;
ofs = kva & PAGE_MASK;
kva = trunc_page(kva);
size = round_page(size + ofs);
map = kernel_map;
rv = vm_map_lookup(&map, kva, VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE, &entry,
&obj, &pindex, &prot, &wired);
if (rv != KERN_SUCCESS)
return (EINVAL);
if (entry->start != kva || entry->end != kva + size) {
vm_map_lookup_done(map, entry);
return (EINVAL);
}
vm_map_lookup_done(map, entry);
if (obj != shmfd->shm_object)
return (EINVAL);
vm_map_remove(map, kva, kva + size);
VM_OBJECT_WLOCK(obj);
KASSERT(shmfd->shm_kmappings > 0, ("shm_unmap: object not mapped"));
shmfd->shm_kmappings--;
VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK(obj);
return (0);
}
static int
shm_fill_kinfo_locked(struct shmfd *shmfd, struct kinfo_file *kif, bool list)
{
const char *path, *pr_path;
size_t pr_pathlen;
bool visible;
sx_assert(&shm_dict_lock, SA_LOCKED);
kif->kf_type = KF_TYPE_SHM;
kif->kf_un.kf_file.kf_file_mode = S_IFREG | shmfd->shm_mode;
kif->kf_un.kf_file.kf_file_size = shmfd->shm_size;
if (shmfd->shm_path != NULL) {
if (shmfd->shm_path != NULL) {
path = shmfd->shm_path;
pr_path = curthread->td_ucred->cr_prison->pr_path;
if (strcmp(pr_path, "/") != 0) {
/* Return the jail-rooted pathname. */
pr_pathlen = strlen(pr_path);
visible = strncmp(path, pr_path, pr_pathlen)
== 0 && path[pr_pathlen] == '/';
if (list && !visible)
return (EPERM);
if (visible)
path += pr_pathlen;
}
strlcpy(kif->kf_path, path, sizeof(kif->kf_path));
}
}
return (0);
}
static int
shm_fill_kinfo(struct file *fp, struct kinfo_file *kif,
struct filedesc *fdp __unused)
{
int res;
sx_slock(&shm_dict_lock);
res = shm_fill_kinfo_locked(fp->f_data, kif, false);
sx_sunlock(&shm_dict_lock);
return (res);
}
static int
shm_add_seals(struct file *fp, int seals)
{
struct shmfd *shmfd;
void *rl_cookie;
vm_ooffset_t writemappings;
int error, nseals;
error = 0;
shmfd = fp->f_data;
rl_cookie = rangelock_wlock(&shmfd->shm_rl, 0, OFF_MAX,
&shmfd->shm_mtx);
/* Even already-set seals should result in EPERM. */
if ((shmfd->shm_seals & F_SEAL_SEAL) != 0) {
error = EPERM;
goto out;
}
nseals = seals & ~shmfd->shm_seals;
if ((nseals & F_SEAL_WRITE) != 0) {
/*
* The rangelock above prevents writable mappings from being
* added after we've started applying seals. The RLOCK here
* is to avoid torn reads on ILP32 arches as unmapping/reducing
* writemappings will be done without a rangelock.
*/
VM_OBJECT_RLOCK(shmfd->shm_object);
writemappings = shmfd->shm_object->un_pager.swp.writemappings;
VM_OBJECT_RUNLOCK(shmfd->shm_object);
/* kmappings are also writable */
if (writemappings > 0) {
error = EBUSY;
goto out;
}
}
shmfd->shm_seals |= nseals;
out:
rangelock_unlock(&shmfd->shm_rl, rl_cookie, &shmfd->shm_mtx);
return (error);
}
static int
shm_get_seals(struct file *fp, int *seals)
{
struct shmfd *shmfd;
shmfd = fp->f_data;
*seals = shmfd->shm_seals;
return (0);
}
static int
shm_fallocate(struct file *fp, off_t offset, off_t len, struct thread *td)
{
void *rl_cookie;
struct shmfd *shmfd;
size_t size;
int error;
/* This assumes that the caller already checked for overflow. */
error = 0;
shmfd = fp->f_data;
size = offset + len;
/*
* Just grab the rangelock for the range that we may be attempting to
* grow, rather than blocking read/write for regions we won't be
* touching while this (potential) resize is in progress. Other
* attempts to resize the shmfd will have to take a write lock from 0 to
* OFF_MAX, so this being potentially beyond the current usable range of
* the shmfd is not necessarily a concern. If other mechanisms are
* added to grow a shmfd, this may need to be re-evaluated.
*/
rl_cookie = rangelock_wlock(&shmfd->shm_rl, offset, size,
&shmfd->shm_mtx);
if (size > shmfd->shm_size) {
VM_OBJECT_WLOCK(shmfd->shm_object);
error = shm_dotruncate_locked(shmfd, size, rl_cookie);
VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK(shmfd->shm_object);
}
rangelock_unlock(&shmfd->shm_rl, rl_cookie, &shmfd->shm_mtx);
/* Translate to posix_fallocate(2) return value as needed. */
if (error == ENOMEM)
error = ENOSPC;
return (error);
}
static int
sysctl_posix_shm_list(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
struct shm_mapping *shmm;
struct sbuf sb;
struct kinfo_file kif;
u_long i;
ssize_t curlen;
int error, error2;
sbuf_new_for_sysctl(&sb, NULL, sizeof(struct kinfo_file) * 5, req);
sbuf_clear_flags(&sb, SBUF_INCLUDENUL);
curlen = 0;
error = 0;
sx_slock(&shm_dict_lock);
for (i = 0; i < shm_hash + 1; i++) {
LIST_FOREACH(shmm, &shm_dictionary[i], sm_link) {
error = shm_fill_kinfo_locked(shmm->sm_shmfd,
&kif, true);
if (error == EPERM)
continue;
if (error != 0)
break;
pack_kinfo(&kif);
if (req->oldptr != NULL &&
kif.kf_structsize + curlen > req->oldlen)
break;
error = sbuf_bcat(&sb, &kif, kif.kf_structsize) == 0 ?
0 : ENOMEM;
if (error != 0)
break;
curlen += kif.kf_structsize;
}
}
sx_sunlock(&shm_dict_lock);
error2 = sbuf_finish(&sb);
sbuf_delete(&sb);
return (error != 0 ? error : error2);
}
SYSCTL_PROC(_kern_ipc, OID_AUTO, posix_shm_list,
CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE | CTLTYPE_OPAQUE,
NULL, 0, sysctl_posix_shm_list, "",
"POSIX SHM list");
int
kern_shm_open(struct thread *td, const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode,
struct filecaps *caps)
{
return (kern_shm_open2(td, path, flags, mode, 0, caps, NULL));
}
/*
* This version of the shm_open() interface leaves CLOEXEC behavior up to the
* caller, and libc will enforce it for the traditional shm_open() call. This
* allows other consumers, like memfd_create(), to opt-in for CLOEXEC. This
* interface also includes a 'name' argument that is currently unused, but could
* potentially be exported later via some interface for debugging purposes.
* From the kernel's perspective, it is optional. Individual consumers like
* memfd_create() may require it in order to be compatible with other systems
* implementing the same function.
*/
int
sys_shm_open2(struct thread *td, struct shm_open2_args *uap)
{
return (kern_shm_open2(td, uap->path, uap->flags, uap->mode,
uap->shmflags, NULL, uap->name));
}