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freebsd-dev/contrib/bind9/doc/draft/draft-ietf-ipseckey-rr-09.txt
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IPSECKEY WG M. Richardson
Internet-Draft SSW
|Expires: August 1, 2004 February 2004
A Method for Storing IPsec Keying Material in DNS
| draft-ietf-ipseckey-rr-09.txt
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
| This Internet-Draft will expire on August 1, 2004.
Copyright Notice
| Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
| This document describes a new resource record for Domain Name System
| (DNS). This record may be used to store public keys for use in IP
| security (IPsec) systems. The record also includes provisions for
| indicating what system should be contacted when establishing an IPsec
| tunnel with the entity in question.
This record replaces the functionality of the sub-type #1 of the KEY
Resource Record, which has been obsoleted by RFC3445.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
| 1.2 Use of reverse (in-addr.arpa) map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
| 1.3 Usage Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
| 2. Storage formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
| 2.1 IPSECKEY RDATA format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
| 2.2 RDATA format - precedence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
| 2.3 RDATA format - gateway type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
| 2.4 RDATA format - algorithm type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
| 2.5 RDATA format - gateway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
| 2.6 RDATA format - public keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
| 3. Presentation formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
| 3.1 Representation of IPSECKEY RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
| 3.2 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
| 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
| 4.1 Active attacks against unsecured IPSECKEY resource records . . 10
| 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
| 6. Intellectual Property Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
| 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
| Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
| Non-normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
| Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
| Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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1. Introduction
It postulated that there is an end system desiring to establish an
IPsec tunnel with some remote entity on the network. This system,
having only a DNS name of some kind (forward, reverse or even
user@FQDN) needs a public key to authenticate the remote entity. It
also desires some guidance about whether to contact the entity
directly, or whether to contact another entity, as the gateway to
that desired entity.
The IPSECKEY RR provides a storage mechanism for such items as the
public key, and the gateway information.
The type number for the IPSECKEY RR is TBD.
1.1 Overview
The IPSECKEY resource record (RR) is used to publish a public key
that is to be associated with a Domain Name System (DNS) name for use
with the IPsec protocol suite. This can be the public key of a
host, network, or application (in the case of per-port keying).
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [7].
|1.2 Use of reverse (in-addr.arpa) map
| Often a security gateway will only have access to the IP address to
| which communication is desired. It will not know the forward name.
| As such, it will frequently be the case that the IP address will be
| used an index into the reverse map.
| The lookup is done in the usual fashion as for PTR records. The IP
| address' octets (IPv4) or nibbles (IPv6) are reversed and looked up
| under the .arpa. zone. Any CNAMEs or DNAMEs found SHOULD be
| followed.
| Note: even when the IPsec function is the end-host, often only the
| application will know the forward name used. While the case where
| the application knows the forward name is common, the user could
| easily have typed in a literal IP address. This storage mechanism
| does not preclude using the forward name when it is available, but
| does not require it.
|1.3 Usage Criteria
An IPSECKEY resource record SHOULD be used in combination with DNSSEC
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unless some other means of authenticating the IPSECKEY resource
record is available.
It is expected that there will often be multiple IPSECKEY resource
records at the same name. This will be due to the presence of
multiple gateways and the need to rollover keys.
This resource record is class independent.
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2. Storage formats
2.1 IPSECKEY RDATA format
The RDATA for an IPSECKEY RR consists of a precedence value, a
gateway type, a public key, algorithm type, and an optional gateway
address.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| precedence | gateway type | algorithm | gateway |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-------------+ +
~ gateway ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| /
/ public key /
/ /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|
2.2 RDATA format - precedence
This is an 8-bit precedence for this record. This is interpreted in
the same way as the PREFERENCE field described in section 3.3.9 of
RFC1035 [2].
Gateways listed in IPSECKEY records with lower precedence are to be
attempted first. Where there is a tie in precedence, the order
should be non-deterministic.
2.3 RDATA format - gateway type
The gateway type field indicates the format of the information that
is stored in the gateway field.
The following values are defined:
0 No gateway is present
1 A 4-byte IPv4 address is present
2 A 16-byte IPv6 address is present
3 A wire-encoded domain name is present. The wire-encoded format is
self-describing, so the length is implicit. The domain name MUST
NOT be compressed. (see section 3.3 of RFC1035 [2]).
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2.4 RDATA format - algorithm type
The algorithm type field identifies the public key's cryptographic
algorithm and determines the format of the public key field.
A value of 0 indicates that no key is present.
The following values are defined:
1 A DSA key is present, in the format defined in RFC2536 [10]
2 A RSA key is present, in the format defined in RFC3110 [11]
2.5 RDATA format - gateway
The gateway field indicates a gateway to which an IPsec tunnel may be
created in order to reach the entity named by this resource record.
There are three formats:
A 32-bit IPv4 address is present in the gateway field. The data
portion is an IPv4 address as described in section 3.4.1 of RFC1035
[2]. This is a 32-bit number in network byte order.
A 128-bit IPv6 address is present in the gateway field. The data
portion is an IPv6 address as described in section 2.2 of RFC3596
[13]. This is a 128-bit number in network byte order.
The gateway field is a normal wire-encoded domain name, as described
in section 3.3 of RFC1035 [2]. Compression MUST NOT be used.
2.6 RDATA format - public keys
Both of the public key types defined in this document (RSA and DSA)
inherit their public key formats from the corresponding KEY RR
formats. Specifically, the public key field contains the algorithm-
specific portion of the KEY RR RDATA, which is all of the KEY RR DATA
after the first four octets. This is the same portion of the KEY RR
that must be specified by documents that define a DNSSEC algorithm.
Those documents also specify a message digest to be used for
generation of SIG RRs; that specification is not relevant for
IPSECKEY RR.
Future algorithms, if they are to be used by both DNSSEC (in the KEY
RR) and IPSECKEY, are likely to use the same public key encodings in
both records. Unless otherwise specified, the IPSECKEY public key
field will contain the algorithm-specific portion of the KEY RR RDATA
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for the corresponding algorithm. The algorithm must still be
designated for use by IPSECKEY, and an IPSECKEY algorithm type number
(which might be different than the DNSSEC algorithm number) must be
assigned to it.
The DSA key format is defined in RFC2536 [10]
The RSA key format is defined in RFC3110 [11], with the following
changes:
The earlier definition of RSA/MD5 in RFC2065 limited the exponent and
modulus to 2552 bits in length. RFC3110 extended that limit to 4096
bits for RSA/SHA1 keys. The IPSECKEY RR imposes no length limit on
RSA public keys, other than the 65535 octet limit imposed by the two-
octet length encoding. This length extension is applicable only to
IPSECKEY and not to KEY RRs.
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3. Presentation formats
3.1 Representation of IPSECKEY RRs
IPSECKEY RRs may appear in a zone data master file. The precedence,
gateway type and algorithm and gateway fields are REQUIRED. The
base64 encoded public key block is OPTIONAL; if not present, then the
public key field of the resource record MUST be construed as being
zero octets in length.
The algorithm field is an unsigned integer. No mnemonics are
defined.
If no gateway is to be indicated, then the gateway type field MUST be
zero, and the gateway field MUST be "."
The Public Key field is represented as a Base64 encoding of the
Public Key. Whitespace is allowed within the Base64 text. For a
definition of Base64 encoding, see RFC3548 [6] Section 5.2.
The general presentation for the record as as follows:
IN IPSECKEY ( precedence gateway-type algorithm
gateway base64-encoded-public-key )
3.2 Examples
An example of a node 192.0.2.38 that will accept IPsec tunnels on its
own behalf.
38.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 1 2
192.0.2.38
AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== )
An example of a node, 192.0.2.38 that has published its key only.
38.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 0 2
.
AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== )
An example of a node, 192.0.2.38 that has delegated authority to the
node 192.0.2.3.
38.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 1 2
192.0.2.3
AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== )
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An example of a node, 192.0.1.38 that has delegated authority to the
node with the identity "mygateway.example.com".
38.1.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 3 2
mygateway.example.com.
AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== )
An example of a node, 2001:0DB8:0200:1:210:f3ff:fe03:4d0 that has
delegated authority to the node 2001:0DB8:c000:0200:2::1
$ORIGIN 1.0.0.0.0.0.2.8.B.D.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.
0.d.4.0.3.0.e.f.f.f.3.f.0.1.2.0 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 2 2
2001:0DB8:0:8002::2000:1
AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== )
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4. Security Considerations
This entire memo pertains to the provision of public keying material
for use by key management protocols such as ISAKMP/IKE (RFC2407) [8].
The IPSECKEY resource record contains information that SHOULD be
communicated to the end client in an integral fashion - i.e. free
from modification. The form of this channel is up to the consumer of
the data - there must be a trust relationship between the end
consumer of this resource record and the server. This relationship
may be end-to-end DNSSEC validation, a TSIG or SIG(0) channel to
another secure source, a secure local channel on the host, or some
combination of the above.
The keying material provided by the IPSECKEY resource record is not
sensitive to passive attacks. The keying material may be freely
disclosed to any party without any impact on the security properties
of the resulting IPsec session: IPsec and IKE provide for defense
against both active and passive attacks.
Any derivative standard that makes use of this resource record MUST
carefully document their trust model, and why the trust model of
DNSSEC is appropriate, if that is the secure channel used.
4.1 Active attacks against unsecured IPSECKEY resource records
This section deals with active attacks against the DNS. These
attacks require that DNS requests and responses be intercepted and
changed. DNSSEC is designed to defend against attacks of this kind.
The first kind of active attack is when the attacker replaces the
keying material with either a key under its control or with garbage.
If the attacker is not able to mount a subsequent man-in-the-middle
attack on the IKE negotiation after replacing the public key, then
this will result in a denial of service, as the authenticator used by
IKE would fail.
If the attacker is able to both to mount active attacks against DNS
and is also in a position to perform a man-in-the-middle attack on
IKE and IPsec negotiations, then the attacker will be in a position
to compromise the resulting IPsec channel. Note that an attacker
must be able to perform active DNS attacks on both sides of the IKE
negotiation in order for this to succeed.
The second kind of active attack is one in which the attacker
replaces the the gateway address to point to a node under the
attacker's control. The attacker can then either replace the public
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key or remove it, thus providing an IPSECKEY record of its own to
match the gateway address.
This later form creates a simple man-in-the-middle since the attacker
can then create a second tunnel to the real destination. Note that,
as before, this requires that the attacker also mount an active
attack against the responder.
Note that the man-in-the-middle can not just forward cleartext
packets to the original destination. While the destination may be
willing to speak in the clear, replying to the original sender, the
sender will have already created a policy expecting ciphertext.
Thus, the attacker will need to intercept traffic from both sides.
In some cases, the attacker may be able to accomplish the full
intercept by use of Network Addresss/Port Translation (NAT/NAPT)
technology.
| Note that risk of a man-in-the-middle attack mediated by the IPSECKEY
| RR only applies to cases where the gateway field of the IPSECKEY RR
| indicates a different entity than the owner name of the IPSECKEY RR.
| An active attack on the DNS that caused the wrong IP address to be
| retrieved (via forged A RR), and therefore the wrong QNAME to be
| queried would also result in a man-in-the-middle attack. This
| situation exists independantly of whether or not the IPSECKEY RR is
| used.
| In cases where the end-to-end integrity of the IPSECKEY RR is
| suspect, the end client MUST restrict its use of the IPSECKEY RR to
| cases where the RR owner name matches the content of the gateway
| field.
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5. IANA Considerations
This document updates the IANA Registry for DNS Resource Record Types
by assigning type X to the IPSECKEY record.
This document creates two new IANA registries, both specific to the
IPSECKEY Resource Record:
This document creates an IANA registry for the algorithm type field.
Values 0, 1 and 2 are defined in Section 2.4. Algorithm numbers 3
through 255 can be assigned by IETF Consensus (see RFC2434 [5]).
This document creates an IANA registry for the gateway type field.
Values 0, 1, 2 and 3 are defined in Section 2.3. Gateway type
numbers 4 through 255 can be assigned by Standards Action (see
RFC2434 [5]).
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6. Intellectual Property Claims
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of
claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive
Director.
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7. Acknowledgments
My thanks to Paul Hoffman, Sam Weiler, Jean-Jacques Puig, Rob
Austein, and Olafur Gurmundsson who reviewed this document carefully.
Additional thanks to Olafur Gurmundsson for a reference
implementation.
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Normative references
[1] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD
13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[2] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[3] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP
9, RFC 2026, October 1996.
[4] Eastlake, D. and C. Kaufman, "Domain Name System Security
Extensions", RFC 2065, January 1997.
[5] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998.
[6] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings",
RFC 3548, July 2003.
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Non-normative references
[7] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[8] Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation
for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998.
[9] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC
2535, March 1999.
[10] Eastlake, D., "DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System
(DNS)", RFC 2536, March 1999.
[11] Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name
System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001.
[12] Massey, D. and S. Rose, "Limiting the Scope of the KEY Resource
Record (RR)", RFC 3445, December 2002.
[13] Thomson, S., Huitema, C., Ksinant, V. and M. Souissi, "DNS
Extensions to Support IP Version 6", RFC 3596, October 2003.
Author's Address
Michael C. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
470 Dawson Avenue
Ottawa, ON K1Z 5V7
CA
EMail: mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca
URI: http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/
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Full Copyright Statement
| Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
|Richardson Expires August 1, 2004 [Page 17]
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