f391d6bc1d
ntp 4.2.8p9. Approved by: so
2568 lines
117 KiB
Plaintext
2568 lines
117 KiB
Plaintext
---
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NTP 4.2.8p9 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2016/11/21)
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Focus: Security, Bug fixes, enhancements.
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Severity: HIGH
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In addition to bug fixes and enhancements, this release fixes the
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following 1 high- (Windows only), 2 medium-, 2 medium-/low, and
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5 low-severity vulnerabilities, and provides 28 other non-security
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fixes and improvements:
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* Trap crash
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Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
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References: Sec 3119 / CVE-2016-9311 / VU#633847
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Affects: ntp-4.0.90 (21 July 1999), possibly earlier, up to but not
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including 4.2.8p9, and ntp-4.3.0 up to but not including ntp-4.3.94.
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CVSS2: MED 4.9 (AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C)
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CVSS3: MED 4.4 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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Summary:
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ntpd does not enable trap service by default. If trap service
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has been explicitly enabled, an attacker can send a specially
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crafted packet to cause a null pointer dereference that will
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crash ntpd, resulting in a denial of service.
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Mitigation:
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Implement BCP-38.
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Use "restrict default noquery ..." in your ntp.conf file. Only
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allow mode 6 queries from trusted networks and hosts.
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Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
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or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
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Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
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(without -g) if it stops running.
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Credit: This weakness was discovered by Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco.
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* Mode 6 information disclosure and DDoS vector
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Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
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References: Sec 3118 / CVE-2016-9310 / VU#633847
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Affects: ntp-4.0.90 (21 July 1999), possibly earlier, up to but not
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including 4.2.8p9, and ntp-4.3.0 up to but not including ntp-4.3.94.
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CVSS2: MED 6.4 (AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P)
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CVSS3: MED 6.5 CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
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Summary:
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An exploitable configuration modification vulnerability exists
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in the control mode (mode 6) functionality of ntpd. If, against
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long-standing BCP recommendations, "restrict default noquery ..."
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is not specified, a specially crafted control mode packet can set
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ntpd traps, providing information disclosure and DDoS
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amplification, and unset ntpd traps, disabling legitimate
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monitoring. A remote, unauthenticated, network attacker can
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trigger this vulnerability.
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Mitigation:
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Implement BCP-38.
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Use "restrict default noquery ..." in your ntp.conf file.
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Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
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or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
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Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
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(without -g) if it stops running.
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Credit: This weakness was discovered by Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco.
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* Broadcast Mode Replay Prevention DoS
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Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
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References: Sec 3114 / CVE-2016-7427 / VU#633847
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Affects: ntp-4.2.8p6, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9, and
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ntp-4.3.90 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94.
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CVSS2: LOW 3.3 (AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P)
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CVSS3: MED 4.3 CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
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Summary:
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The broadcast mode of NTP is expected to only be used in a
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trusted network. If the broadcast network is accessible to an
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attacker, a potentially exploitable denial of service
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vulnerability in ntpd's broadcast mode replay prevention
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functionality can be abused. An attacker with access to the NTP
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broadcast domain can periodically inject specially crafted
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broadcast mode NTP packets into the broadcast domain which,
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while being logged by ntpd, can cause ntpd to reject broadcast
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mode packets from legitimate NTP broadcast servers.
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Mitigation:
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Implement BCP-38.
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Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
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or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
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Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
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(without -g) if it stops running.
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Credit: This weakness was discovered by Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco.
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* Broadcast Mode Poll Interval Enforcement DoS
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Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
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References: Sec 3113 / CVE-2016-7428 / VU#633847
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Affects: ntp-4.2.8p6, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9, and
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ntp-4.3.90 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94
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CVSS2: LOW 3.3 (AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P)
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CVSS3: MED 4.3 CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
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Summary:
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The broadcast mode of NTP is expected to only be used in a
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trusted network. If the broadcast network is accessible to an
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attacker, a potentially exploitable denial of service
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vulnerability in ntpd's broadcast mode poll interval enforcement
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functionality can be abused. To limit abuse, ntpd restricts the
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rate at which each broadcast association will process incoming
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packets. ntpd will reject broadcast mode packets that arrive
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before the poll interval specified in the preceding broadcast
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packet expires. An attacker with access to the NTP broadcast
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domain can send specially crafted broadcast mode NTP packets to
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the broadcast domain which, while being logged by ntpd, will
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cause ntpd to reject broadcast mode packets from legitimate NTP
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broadcast servers.
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Mitigation:
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Implement BCP-38.
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Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
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or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
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Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
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(without -g) if it stops running.
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Credit: This weakness was discovered by Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco.
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* Windows: ntpd DoS by oversized UDP packet
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Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
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References: Sec 3110 / CVE-2016-9312 / VU#633847
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Affects Windows only: ntp-4.?.?, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9,
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and ntp-4.3.0 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94.
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CVSS2: HIGH 7.8 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C)
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CVSS3: HIGH 7.5 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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Summary:
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If a vulnerable instance of ntpd on Windows receives a crafted
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malicious packet that is "too big", ntpd will stop working.
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Mitigation:
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Implement BCP-38.
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Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
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or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
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Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
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(without -g) if it stops running.
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Credit: This weakness was discovered by Robert Pajak of ABB.
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* 0rigin (zero origin) issues
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Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
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References: Sec 3102 / CVE-2016-7431 / VU#633847
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Affects: ntp-4.2.8p8, and ntp-4.3.93.
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CVSS2: MED 5.0 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N)
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CVSS3: MED 5.3 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
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Summary:
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Zero Origin timestamp problems were fixed by Bug 2945 in
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ntp-4.2.8p6. However, subsequent timestamp validation checks
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introduced a regression in the handling of some Zero origin
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timestamp checks.
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Mitigation:
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Implement BCP-38.
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Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
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or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
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Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
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(without -g) if it stops running.
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Credit: This weakness was discovered by Sharon Goldberg and Aanchal
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Malhotra of Boston University.
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* read_mru_list() does inadequate incoming packet checks
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Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
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References: Sec 3082 / CVE-2016-7434 / VU#633847
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Affects: ntp-4.2.7p22, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9, and
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ntp-4.3.0 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94.
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CVSS2: LOW 3.8 (AV:L/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C)
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CVSS3: LOW 3.8 CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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Summary:
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If ntpd is configured to allow mrulist query requests from a
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server that sends a crafted malicious packet, ntpd will crash
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on receipt of that crafted malicious mrulist query packet.
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Mitigation:
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Only allow mrulist query packets from trusted hosts.
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Implement BCP-38.
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Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
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or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
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Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
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(without -g) if it stops running.
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Credit: This weakness was discovered by Magnus Stubman.
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* Attack on interface selection
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Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
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References: Sec 3072 / CVE-2016-7429 / VU#633847
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Affects: ntp-4.2.7p385, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9, and
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ntp-4.3.0 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94
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CVSS2: LOW 1.0 (AV:L/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P)
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CVSS3: LOW 1.6 CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
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Summary:
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When ntpd receives a server response on a socket that corresponds
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to a different interface than was used for the request, the peer
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structure is updated to use the interface for new requests. If
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ntpd is running on a host with multiple interfaces in separate
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networks and the operating system doesn't check source address in
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received packets (e.g. rp_filter on Linux is set to 0), an
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attacker that knows the address of the source can send a packet
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with spoofed source address which will cause ntpd to select wrong
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interface for the source and prevent it from sending new requests
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until the list of interfaces is refreshed, which happens on
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routing changes or every 5 minutes by default. If the attack is
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repeated often enough (once per second), ntpd will not be able to
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synchronize with the source.
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Mitigation:
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Implement BCP-38.
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Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
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or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
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If you are going to configure your OS to disable source address
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checks, also configure your firewall configuration to control
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what interfaces can receive packets from what networks.
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Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
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(without -g) if it stops running.
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Credit: This weakness was discovered by Miroslav Lichvar of Red Hat.
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* Client rate limiting and server responses
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Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
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References: Sec 3071 / CVE-2016-7426 / VU#633847
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Affects: ntp-4.2.5p203, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9, and
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ntp-4.3.0 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94
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CVSS2: LOW 1.0 (AV:L/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P)
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CVSS3: LOW 1.6 CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
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Summary:
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When ntpd is configured with rate limiting for all associations
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(restrict default limited in ntp.conf), the limits are applied
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also to responses received from its configured sources. An
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attacker who knows the sources (e.g., from an IPv4 refid in
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server response) and knows the system is (mis)configured in this
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way can periodically send packets with spoofed source address to
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keep the rate limiting activated and prevent ntpd from accepting
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valid responses from its sources.
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While this blanket rate limiting can be useful to prevent
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brute-force attacks on the origin timestamp, it allows this DoS
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attack. Similarly, it allows the attacker to prevent mobilization
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of ephemeral associations.
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Mitigation:
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Implement BCP-38.
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Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
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or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
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Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
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(without -g) if it stops running.
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Credit: This weakness was discovered by Miroslav Lichvar of Red Hat.
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* Fix for bug 2085 broke initial sync calculations
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Date Resolved: 21 November 2016; Dev (4.3.94) 21 November 2016
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References: Sec 3067 / CVE-2016-7433 / VU#633847
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Affects: ntp-4.2.7p385, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p9, and
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ntp-4.3.0 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.94. But the
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root-distance calculation in general is incorrect in all versions
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of ntp-4 until this release.
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CVSS2: LOW 1.2 (AV:L/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P)
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CVSS3: LOW 1.6 CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
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Summary:
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Bug 2085 described a condition where the root delay was included
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twice, causing the jitter value to be higher than expected. Due
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to a misinterpretation of a small-print variable in The Book, the
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fix for this problem was incorrect, resulting in a root distance
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that did not include the peer dispersion. The calculations and
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formulae have been reviewed and reconciled, and the code has been
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updated accordingly.
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Mitigation:
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Upgrade to 4.2.8p9, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
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or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
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Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
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(without -g) if it stops running.
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Credit: This weakness was discovered independently by Brian Utterback of
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Oracle, and Sharon Goldberg and Aanchal Malhotra of Boston University.
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Other fixes:
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* [Bug 3142] bug in netmask prefix length detection <perlinger@ntp.org>
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* [Bug 3138] gpsdjson refclock should honor fudgetime1. stenn@ntp.org
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* [Bug 3129] Unknown hosts can put resolver thread into a hard loop
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- moved retry decision where it belongs. <perlinger@ntp.org>
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* [Bug 3125] NTPD doesn't fully start when ntp.conf entries are out of order
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using the loopback-ppsapi-provider.dll <perlinger@ntp.org>
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* [Bug 3116] unit tests for NTP time stamp expansion. <perlinger@ntp.org>
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* [Bug 3100] ntpq can't retrieve daemon_version <perlinger@ntp.org>
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- fixed extended sysvar lookup (bug introduced with bug 3008 fix)
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* [Bug 3095] Compatibility with openssl 1.1 <perlinger@ntp.org>
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- applied patches by Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> to source
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- added shim layer for SSL API calls with issues (both directions)
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* [Bug 3089] Serial Parser does not work anymore for hopfser like device
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- simplified / refactored hex-decoding in driver. <perlinger@ntp.org>
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* [Bug 3084] update-leap mis-parses the leapfile name. HStenn.
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* [Bug 3068] Linker warnings when building on Solaris. perlinger@ntp.org
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- applied patch thanks to Andrew Stormont <andyjstormont@gmail.com>
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* [Bug 3067] Root distance calculation needs improvement. HStenn
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* [Bug 3066] NMEA clock ignores pps. perlinger@ntp.org
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- PPS-HACK works again.
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* [Bug 3059] Potential buffer overrun from oversized hash <perlinger@ntp.org>
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- applied patch by Brian Utterback <brian.utterback@oracle.com>
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* [Bug 3053] ntp_loopfilter.c frequency calc precedence error. Sarah White.
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* [Bug 3050] Fix for bug #2960 causes [...] spurious error message.
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<perlinger@ntp.org>
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- patches by Reinhard Max <max@suse.com> and Havard Eidnes <he@uninett.no>
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* [Bug 3047] Fix refclock_jjy C-DEX JST2000. abe@ntp.org
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- Patch provided by Kuramatsu.
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* [Bug 3021] unity_fixture.c needs pragma weak <perlinger@ntp.org>
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- removed unnecessary & harmful decls of 'setUp()' & 'tearDown()'
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* [Bug 3019] Windows: ERROR_HOST_UNREACHABLE block packet processing. DMayer
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* [Bug 2998] sntp/tests/packetProcessing.c broken without openssl. JPerlinger
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* [Bug 2961] sntp/tests/packetProcessing.c assumes AUTOKEY. HStenn.
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* [Bug 2959] refclock_jupiter: gps week correction <perlinger@ntp.org>
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- fixed GPS week expansion to work based on build date. Special thanks
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to Craig Leres for initial patch and testing.
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* [Bug 2951] ntpd tests fail: multiple definition of `send_via_ntp_signd'
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- fixed Makefile.am <perlinger@ntp.org>
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* [Bug 2689] ATOM driver processes last PPS pulse at startup,
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even if it is very old <perlinger@ntp.org>
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- make sure PPS source is alive before processing samples
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- improve stability close to the 500ms phase jump (phase gate)
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* Fix typos in include/ntp.h.
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* Shim X509_get_signature_nid() if needed
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* git author attribution cleanup
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* bk ignore file cleanup
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* remove locks in Windows IO, use rpc-like thread synchronisation instead
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---
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NTP 4.2.8p8 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2016/06/02)
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Focus: Security, Bug fixes, enhancements.
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Severity: HIGH
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In addition to bug fixes and enhancements, this release fixes the
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following 1 high- and 4 low-severity vulnerabilities:
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* CRYPTO_NAK crash
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Date Resolved: 02 June 2016; Dev (4.3.93) 02 June 2016
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References: Sec 3046 / CVE-2016-4957 / VU#321640
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Affects: ntp-4.2.8p7, and ntp-4.3.92.
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CVSS2: HIGH 7.8 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C)
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CVSS3: HIGH 7.5 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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Summary: The fix for Sec 3007 in ntp-4.2.8p7 contained a bug that
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could cause ntpd to crash.
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Mitigation:
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Implement BCP-38.
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Upgrade to 4.2.8p8, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
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or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
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If you cannot upgrade from 4.2.8p7, the only other alternatives
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are to patch your code or filter CRYPTO_NAK packets.
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Properly monitor your ntpd instances, and auto-restart ntpd
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(without -g) if it stops running.
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Credit: This weakness was discovered by Nicolas Edet of Cisco.
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* Bad authentication demobilizes ephemeral associations
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Date Resolved: 02 June 2016; Dev (4.3.93) 02 June 2016
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References: Sec 3045 / CVE-2016-4953 / VU#321640
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Affects: ntp-4, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p8, and
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ntp-4.3.0 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.93.
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CVSS2: LOW 2.6 (AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P)
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CVSS3: LOW 3.7 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
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Summary: An attacker who knows the origin timestamp and can send a
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spoofed packet containing a CRYPTO-NAK to an ephemeral peer
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target before any other response is sent can demobilize that
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association.
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Mitigation:
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Implement BCP-38.
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Upgrade to 4.2.8p8, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
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or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
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Properly monitor your ntpd instances.
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Credit: This weakness was discovered by Miroslav Lichvar of Red Hat.
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* Processing spoofed server packets
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Date Resolved: 02 June 2016; Dev (4.3.93) 02 June 2016
|
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References: Sec 3044 / CVE-2016-4954 / VU#321640
|
|
Affects: ntp-4, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p8, and
|
|
ntp-4.3.0 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.93.
|
|
CVSS2: LOW 2.6 (AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P)
|
|
CVSS3: LOW 3.7 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
|
|
Summary: An attacker who is able to spoof packets with correct origin
|
|
timestamps from enough servers before the expected response
|
|
packets arrive at the target machine can affect some peer
|
|
variables and, for example, cause a false leap indication to be set.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p8, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
|
|
Properly monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Jakub Prokes of Red Hat.
|
|
|
|
* Autokey association reset
|
|
Date Resolved: 02 June 2016; Dev (4.3.93) 02 June 2016
|
|
References: Sec 3043 / CVE-2016-4955 / VU#321640
|
|
Affects: ntp-4, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p8, and
|
|
ntp-4.3.0 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.93.
|
|
CVSS2: LOW 2.6 (AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P)
|
|
CVSS3: LOW 3.7 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
|
|
Summary: An attacker who is able to spoof a packet with a correct
|
|
origin timestamp before the expected response packet arrives at
|
|
the target machine can send a CRYPTO_NAK or a bad MAC and cause
|
|
the association's peer variables to be cleared. If this can be
|
|
done often enough, it will prevent that association from working.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p8, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
|
|
Properly monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Miroslav Lichvar of Red Hat.
|
|
|
|
* Broadcast interleave
|
|
Date Resolved: 02 June 2016; Dev (4.3.93) 02 June 2016
|
|
References: Sec 3042 / CVE-2016-4956 / VU#321640
|
|
Affects: ntp-4, up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p8, and
|
|
ntp-4.3.0 up to, but not including ntp-4.3.93.
|
|
CVSS2: LOW 2.6 (AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P)
|
|
CVSS3: LOW 3.7 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
|
|
Summary: The fix for NtpBug2978 does not cover broadcast associations,
|
|
so broadcast clients can be triggered to flip into interleave mode.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p8, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
|
|
Properly monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Miroslav Lichvar of Red Hat.
|
|
|
|
Other fixes:
|
|
* [Bug 3038] NTP fails to build in VS2015. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
- provide build environment
|
|
- 'wint_t' and 'struct timespec' defined by VS2015
|
|
- fixed print()/scanf() format issues
|
|
* [Bug 3052] Add a .gitignore file. Edmund Wong.
|
|
* [Bug 3054] miscopt.html documents the allan intercept in seconds. SWhite.
|
|
* [Bug 3058] fetch_timestamp() mishandles 64-bit alignment. Brian Utterback,
|
|
JPerlinger, HStenn.
|
|
* Fix typo in ntp-wait and plot_summary. HStenn.
|
|
* Make sure we have an "author" file for git imports. HStenn.
|
|
* Update the sntp problem tests for MacOS. HStenn.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.8p7 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2016/04/26)
|
|
|
|
Focus: Security, Bug fixes, enhancements.
|
|
|
|
Severity: MEDIUM
|
|
|
|
When building NTP from source, there is a new configure option
|
|
available, --enable-dynamic-interleave. More information on this below.
|
|
|
|
Also note that ntp-4.2.8p7 logs more "unexpected events" than previous
|
|
versions of ntp. These events have almost certainly happened in the
|
|
past, it's just that they were silently counted and not logged. With
|
|
the increasing awareness around security, we feel it's better to clearly
|
|
log these events to help detect abusive behavior. This increased
|
|
logging can also help detect other problems, too.
|
|
|
|
In addition to bug fixes and enhancements, this release fixes the
|
|
following 9 low- and medium-severity vulnerabilities:
|
|
|
|
* Improve NTP security against buffer comparison timing attacks,
|
|
AKA: authdecrypt-timing
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p7) 26 Apr 2016; Dev (4.3.92) 26 Apr 2016
|
|
References: Sec 2879 / CVE-2016-1550
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p7, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.92
|
|
CVSSv2: LOW 2.6 - (AV:L/AC:H/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N)
|
|
CVSSv3: MED 4.0 - CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
|
|
Summary: Packet authentication tests have been performed using
|
|
memcmp() or possibly bcmp(), and it is potentially possible
|
|
for a local or perhaps LAN-based attacker to send a packet with
|
|
an authentication payload and indirectly observe how much of
|
|
the digest has matched.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p7, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
|
|
Properly monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered independently by Loganaden
|
|
Velvindron, and Matthew Van Gundy and Stephen Gray of Cisco ASIG.
|
|
|
|
* Zero origin timestamp bypass: Additional KoD checks.
|
|
References: Sec 2945 / Sec 2901 / CVE-2015-8138
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p7,
|
|
Summary: Improvements to the fixes incorporated in t 4.2.8p6 and 4.3.92.
|
|
|
|
* peer associations were broken by the fix for NtpBug2899
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p7) 26 Apr 2016; Dev (4.3.92) 26 Apr 2016
|
|
References: Sec 2952 / CVE-2015-7704
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p7, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.92
|
|
CVSSv2: MED 4.3 - (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P)
|
|
Summary: The fix for NtpBug2952 in ntp-4.2.8p5 to address broken peer
|
|
associations did not address all of the issues.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p7, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
|
|
If you can't upgrade, use "server" associations instead of
|
|
"peer" associations.
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This problem was discovered by Michael Tatarinov.
|
|
|
|
* Validate crypto-NAKs, AKA: CRYPTO-NAK DoS
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p7) 26 Apr 2016; Dev (4.3.92) 26 Apr 2016
|
|
References: Sec 3007 / CVE-2016-1547 / VU#718152
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p7, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.92
|
|
CVSS2: MED 4.3 - (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P)
|
|
CVSS3: MED 3.7 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
|
|
Summary: For ntp-4 versions up to but not including ntp-4.2.8p7, an
|
|
off-path attacker can cause a preemptable client association to
|
|
be demobilized by sending a crypto NAK packet to a victim client
|
|
with a spoofed source address of an existing associated peer.
|
|
This is true even if authentication is enabled.
|
|
|
|
Furthermore, if the attacker keeps sending crypto NAK packets,
|
|
for example one every second, the victim never has a chance to
|
|
reestablish the association and synchronize time with that
|
|
legitimate server.
|
|
|
|
For ntp-4.2.8 thru ntp-4.2.8p6 there is less risk because more
|
|
stringent checks are performed on incoming packets, but there
|
|
are still ways to exploit this vulnerability in versions before
|
|
ntp-4.2.8p7.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p7, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
|
|
Properly monitor your =ntpd= instances
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Stephen Gray and
|
|
Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco ASIG.
|
|
|
|
* ctl_getitem() return value not always checked
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p7) 26 Apr 2016; Dev (4.3.92) 26 Apr 2016
|
|
References: Sec 3008 / CVE-2016-2519
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p7, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.92
|
|
CVSSv2: MED 4.9 - (AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C)
|
|
CVSSv3: MED 4.2 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
|
|
Summary: ntpq and ntpdc can be used to store and retrieve information
|
|
in ntpd. It is possible to store a data value that is larger
|
|
than the size of the buffer that the ctl_getitem() function of
|
|
ntpd uses to report the return value. If the length of the
|
|
requested data value returned by ctl_getitem() is too large,
|
|
the value NULL is returned instead. There are 2 cases where the
|
|
return value from ctl_getitem() was not directly checked to make
|
|
sure it's not NULL, but there are subsequent INSIST() checks
|
|
that make sure the return value is not NULL. There are no data
|
|
values ordinarily stored in ntpd that would exceed this buffer
|
|
length. But if one has permission to store values and one stores
|
|
a value that is "too large", then ntpd will abort if an attempt
|
|
is made to read that oversized value.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p7, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
|
|
Properly monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Yihan Lian of the Cloud
|
|
Security Team, Qihoo 360.
|
|
|
|
* Crafted addpeer with hmode > 7 causes array wraparound with MATCH_ASSOC
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p7) 26 Apr 2016; Dev (4.3.92) 26 Apr 2016
|
|
References: Sec 3009 / CVE-2016-2518 / VU#718152
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p7, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.92
|
|
CVSS2: LOW 2.1 - (AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P)
|
|
CVSS3: LOW 2.0 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
|
|
Summary: Using a crafted packet to create a peer association with
|
|
hmode > 7 causes the MATCH_ASSOC() lookup to make an
|
|
out-of-bounds reference.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p7, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
|
|
Properly monitor your ntpd instances
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Yihan Lian of the Cloud
|
|
Security Team, Qihoo 360.
|
|
|
|
* remote configuration trustedkey/requestkey/controlkey values are not
|
|
properly validated
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p7) 26 Apr 2016; Dev (4.3.92) 26 Apr 2016
|
|
References: Sec 3010 / CVE-2016-2517 / VU#718152
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p7, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.92
|
|
CVSS2: MED 4.9 - (AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C)
|
|
CVSS3: MED 4.2 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
|
|
Summary: If ntpd was expressly configured to allow for remote
|
|
configuration, a malicious user who knows the controlkey for
|
|
ntpq or the requestkey for ntpdc (if mode7 is expressly enabled)
|
|
can create a session with ntpd and then send a crafted packet to
|
|
ntpd that will change the value of the trustedkey, controlkey,
|
|
or requestkey to a value that will prevent any subsequent
|
|
authentication with ntpd until ntpd is restarted.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p7, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
|
|
Properly monitor your =ntpd= instances
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Yihan Lian of the Cloud
|
|
Security Team, Qihoo 360.
|
|
|
|
* Duplicate IPs on unconfig directives will cause an assertion botch in ntpd
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p7) 26 Apr 2016; Dev (4.3.92) 26 Apr 2016
|
|
References: Sec 3011 / CVE-2016-2516 / VU#718152
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p7, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.92
|
|
CVSS2: MED 6.3 - (AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C)
|
|
CVSS3: MED 4.2 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
|
|
Summary: If ntpd was expressly configured to allow for remote
|
|
configuration, a malicious user who knows the controlkey for
|
|
ntpq or the requestkey for ntpdc (if mode7 is expressly enabled)
|
|
can create a session with ntpd and if an existing association is
|
|
unconfigured using the same IP twice on the unconfig directive
|
|
line, ntpd will abort.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p7, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
|
|
Properly monitor your ntpd instances
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Yihan Lian of the Cloud
|
|
Security Team, Qihoo 360.
|
|
|
|
* Refclock impersonation vulnerability
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p7) 26 Apr 2016; Dev (4.3.92) 26 Apr 2016
|
|
References: Sec 3020 / CVE-2016-1551
|
|
Affects: On a very limited number of OSes, all NTP releases up to but
|
|
not including 4.2.8p7, and 4.3.0 up to but not including 4.3.92.
|
|
By "very limited number of OSes" we mean no general-purpose OSes
|
|
have yet been identified that have this vulnerability.
|
|
CVSSv2: LOW 2.6 - (AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N)
|
|
CVSSv3: LOW 3.7 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
|
|
Summary: While most OSes implement martian packet filtering in their
|
|
network stack, at least regarding 127.0.0.0/8, some will allow
|
|
packets claiming to be from 127.0.0.0/8 that arrive over a
|
|
physical network. On these OSes, if ntpd is configured to use a
|
|
reference clock an attacker can inject packets over the network
|
|
that look like they are coming from that reference clock.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement martian packet filtering and BCP-38.
|
|
Configure ntpd to use an adequate number of time sources.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p7, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
|
|
If you are unable to upgrade and if you are running an OS that
|
|
has this vulnerability, implement martian packet filters and
|
|
lobby your OS vendor to fix this problem, or run your
|
|
refclocks on computers that use OSes that are not vulnerable
|
|
to these attacks and have your vulnerable machines get their
|
|
time from protected resources.
|
|
Properly monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Matt Street and others of
|
|
Cisco ASIG.
|
|
|
|
The following issues were fixed in earlier releases and contain
|
|
improvements in 4.2.8p7:
|
|
|
|
* Clients that receive a KoD should validate the origin timestamp field.
|
|
References: Sec 2901 / CVE-2015-7704, CVE-2015-7705
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p7,
|
|
Summary: Improvements to the fixes incorporated into 4.2.8p4 and 4.3.77.
|
|
|
|
* Skeleton key: passive server with trusted key can serve time.
|
|
References: Sec 2936 / CVE-2015-7974
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p7,
|
|
Summary: Improvements to the fixes incorporated in t 4.2.8p6 and 4.3.90.
|
|
|
|
Two other vulnerabilities have been reported, and the mitigations
|
|
for these are as follows:
|
|
|
|
* Interleave-pivot
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p7) 26 Apr 2016; Dev (4.3.92) 26 Apr 2016
|
|
References: Sec 2978 / CVE-2016-1548
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases.
|
|
CVSSv2: MED 6.4 - (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:P)
|
|
CVSSv3: MED 7.2 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L
|
|
Summary: It is possible to change the time of an ntpd client or deny
|
|
service to an ntpd client by forcing it to change from basic
|
|
client/server mode to interleaved symmetric mode. An attacker
|
|
can spoof a packet from a legitimate ntpd server with an origin
|
|
timestamp that matches the peer->dst timestamp recorded for that
|
|
server. After making this switch, the client will reject all
|
|
future legitimate server responses. It is possible to force the
|
|
victim client to move time after the mode has been changed.
|
|
ntpq gives no indication that the mode has been switched.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p7, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page. These
|
|
versions will not dynamically "flip" into interleave mode
|
|
unless configured to do so.
|
|
Properly monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Miroslav Lichvar of RedHat
|
|
and separately by Jonathan Gardner of Cisco ASIG.
|
|
|
|
* Sybil vulnerability: ephemeral association attack
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p7) 26 Apr 2016; Dev (4.3.92) 26 Apr 2016
|
|
References: Sec 3012 / CVE-2016-1549
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p7, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.92
|
|
CVSSv2: LOW 3.5 - (AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:P/A:N)
|
|
CVSS3v: MED 5.3 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
|
|
Summary: ntpd can be vulnerable to Sybil attacks. If one is not using
|
|
the feature introduced in ntp-4.2.8p6 allowing an optional 4th
|
|
field in the ntp.keys file to specify which IPs can serve time,
|
|
a malicious authenticated peer can create arbitrarily-many
|
|
ephemeral associations in order to win the clock selection of
|
|
ntpd and modify a victim's clock.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Use the 4th field in the ntp.keys file to specify which IPs
|
|
can be time servers.
|
|
Properly monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco ASIG.
|
|
|
|
Other fixes:
|
|
|
|
* [Bug 2831] Segmentation Fault in DNS lookup during startup. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
- fixed yet another race condition in the threaded resolver code.
|
|
* [Bug 2858] bool support. Use stdbool.h when available. HStenn.
|
|
* [Bug 2879] Improve NTP security against timing attacks. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
- integrated patches by Loganaden Velvidron <logan@ntp.org>
|
|
with some modifications & unit tests
|
|
* [Bug 2960] async name resolution fixes for chroot() environments.
|
|
Reinhard Max.
|
|
* [Bug 2994] Systems with HAVE_SIGNALED_IO fail to compile. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
* [Bug 2995] Fixes to compile on Windows
|
|
* [Bug 2999] out-of-bounds access in 'is_safe_filename()'. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
* [Bug 3013] Fix for ssl_init.c SHA1 test. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
- Patch provided by Ch. Weisgerber
|
|
* [Bug 3015] ntpq: config-from-file: "request contains an unprintable character"
|
|
- A change related to [Bug 2853] forbids trailing white space in
|
|
remote config commands. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
* [Bug 3019] NTPD stops processing packets after ERROR_HOST_UNREACHABLE
|
|
- report and patch from Aleksandr Kostikov.
|
|
- Overhaul of Windows IO completion port handling. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
* [Bug 3022] authkeys.c should be refactored. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
- fixed memory leak in access list (auth[read]keys.c)
|
|
- refactored handling of key access lists (auth[read]keys.c)
|
|
- reduced number of error branches (authreadkeys.c)
|
|
* [Bug 3023] ntpdate cannot correct dates in the future. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
* [Bug 3030] ntpq needs a general way to specify refid output format. HStenn.
|
|
* [Bug 3031] ntp broadcastclient unable to synchronize to an server
|
|
when the time of server changed. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
- Check the initial delay calculation and reject/unpeer the broadcast
|
|
server if the delay exceeds 50ms. Retry again after the next
|
|
broadcast packet.
|
|
* [Bug 3036] autokey trips an INSIST in authistrustedip(). Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Document ntp.key's optional IP list in authenetic.html. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Update html/xleave.html documentation. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Update ntp.conf documentation. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Fix some Credit: attributions in the NEWS file. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Fix typo in html/monopt.html. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Add README.pullrequests. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Cleanup to include/ntp.h. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
|
|
New option to 'configure':
|
|
|
|
While looking in to the issues around Bug 2978, the "interleave pivot"
|
|
issue, it became clear that there are some intricate and unresolved
|
|
issues with interleave operations. We also realized that the interleave
|
|
protocol was never added to the NTPv4 Standard, and it should have been.
|
|
|
|
Interleave mode was first released in July of 2008, and can be engaged
|
|
in two ways. Any 'peer' and 'broadcast' lines in the ntp.conf file may
|
|
contain the 'xleave' option, which will expressly enable interlave mode
|
|
for that association. Additionally, if a time packet arrives and is
|
|
found inconsistent with normal protocol behavior but has certain
|
|
characteristics that are compatible with interleave mode, NTP will
|
|
dynamically switch to interleave mode. With sufficient knowledge, an
|
|
attacker can send a crafted forged packet to an NTP instance that
|
|
triggers only one side to enter interleaved mode.
|
|
|
|
To prevent this attack until we can thoroughly document, describe,
|
|
fix, and test the dynamic interleave mode, we've added a new
|
|
'configure' option to the build process:
|
|
|
|
--enable-dynamic-interleave
|
|
|
|
This option controls whether or not NTP will, if conditions are right,
|
|
engage dynamic interleave mode. Dynamic interleave mode is disabled by
|
|
default in ntp-4.2.8p7.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.8p6 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2016/01/20)
|
|
|
|
Focus: Security, Bug fixes, enhancements.
|
|
|
|
Severity: MEDIUM
|
|
|
|
In addition to bug fixes and enhancements, this release fixes the
|
|
following 1 low- and 8 medium-severity vulnerabilities:
|
|
|
|
* Potential Infinite Loop in 'ntpq'
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p6) 19 Jan 2016; Dev (4.3.90) 19 Jan 2016
|
|
References: Sec 2548 / CVE-2015-8158
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p6, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.90
|
|
CVSS2: (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) Base Score: 4.3 - MEDIUM
|
|
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N Base Score: 5.3 - MEDIUM
|
|
Summary: 'ntpq' processes incoming packets in a loop in 'getresponse()'.
|
|
The loop's only stopping conditions are receiving a complete and
|
|
correct response or hitting a small number of error conditions.
|
|
If the packet contains incorrect values that don't trigger one of
|
|
the error conditions, the loop continues to receive new packets.
|
|
Note well, this is an attack against an instance of 'ntpq', not
|
|
'ntpd', and this attack requires the attacker to do one of the
|
|
following:
|
|
* Own a malicious NTP server that the client trusts
|
|
* Prevent a legitimate NTP server from sending packets to
|
|
the 'ntpq' client
|
|
* MITM the 'ntpq' communications between the 'ntpq' client
|
|
and the NTP server
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p6, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Jonathan Gardner of Cisco ASIG.
|
|
|
|
* 0rigin: Zero Origin Timestamp Bypass
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p6) 19 Jan 2016; Dev (4.3.90) 19 Jan 2016
|
|
References: Sec 2945 / CVE-2015-8138
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p6, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.90
|
|
CVSS2: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N) Base Score: 5.0 - MEDIUM
|
|
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N Base Score: 5.3 - MEDIUM
|
|
(3.7 - LOW if you score AC:L)
|
|
Summary: To distinguish legitimate peer responses from forgeries, a
|
|
client attempts to verify a response packet by ensuring that the
|
|
origin timestamp in the packet matches the origin timestamp it
|
|
transmitted in its last request. A logic error exists that
|
|
allows packets with an origin timestamp of zero to bypass this
|
|
check whenever there is not an outstanding request to the server.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Configure 'ntpd' to get time from multiple sources.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p6, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
|
|
Monitor your 'ntpd= instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Matthey Van Gundy and
|
|
Jonathan Gardner of Cisco ASIG.
|
|
|
|
* Stack exhaustion in recursive traversal of restriction list
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p6) 19 Jan 2016
|
|
References: Sec 2940 / CVE-2015-7978
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p6, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.90
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) Base Score: 4.3 - MEDIUM
|
|
Summary: An unauthenticated 'ntpdc reslist' command can cause a
|
|
segmentation fault in ntpd by exhausting the call stack.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p6, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
|
|
If you are unable to upgrade:
|
|
In ntp-4.2.8, mode 7 is disabled by default. Don't enable it.
|
|
If you must enable mode 7:
|
|
configure the use of a 'requestkey' to control who can
|
|
issue mode 7 requests.
|
|
configure 'restrict noquery' to further limit mode 7
|
|
requests to trusted sources.
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Stephen Gray at Cisco ASIG.
|
|
|
|
* Off-path Denial of Service (!DoS) attack on authenticated broadcast mode
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p6) 19 Jan 2016; Dev (4.3.90) 19 Jan 2016
|
|
References: Sec 2942 / CVE-2015-7979
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p6, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.90
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 5.8
|
|
Summary: An off-path attacker can send broadcast packets with bad
|
|
authentication (wrong key, mismatched key, incorrect MAC, etc)
|
|
to broadcast clients. It is observed that the broadcast client
|
|
tears down the association with the broadcast server upon
|
|
receiving just one bad packet.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p6, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
|
|
Monitor your 'ntpd' instances.
|
|
If this sort of attack is an active problem for you, you have
|
|
deeper problems to investigate. In this case also consider
|
|
having smaller NTP broadcast domains.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Aanchal Malhotra of Boston
|
|
University.
|
|
|
|
* reslist NULL pointer dereference
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p6) 19 Jan 2016; Dev (4.3.90) 19 Jan 2016
|
|
References: Sec 2939 / CVE-2015-7977
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p6, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.90
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) Base Score: 4.3 - MEDIUM
|
|
Summary: An unauthenticated 'ntpdc reslist' command can cause a
|
|
segmentation fault in ntpd by causing a NULL pointer dereference.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p6, or later, from NTP Project Download Page or
|
|
the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
|
|
If you are unable to upgrade:
|
|
mode 7 is disabled by default. Don't enable it.
|
|
If you must enable mode 7:
|
|
configure the use of a 'requestkey' to control who can
|
|
issue mode 7 requests.
|
|
configure 'restrict noquery' to further limit mode 7
|
|
requests to trusted sources.
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Stephen Gray of Cisco ASIG.
|
|
|
|
* 'ntpq saveconfig' command allows dangerous characters in filenames.
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p6) 19 Jan 2016; Dev (4.3.90) 19 Jan 2016
|
|
References: Sec 2938 / CVE-2015-7976
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p6, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.90
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:P/A:N) Base Score: 4.0 - MEDIUM
|
|
Summary: The ntpq saveconfig command does not do adequate filtering
|
|
of special characters from the supplied filename.
|
|
Note well: The ability to use the saveconfig command is controlled
|
|
by the 'restrict nomodify' directive, and the recommended default
|
|
configuration is to disable this capability. If the ability to
|
|
execute a 'saveconfig' is required, it can easily (and should) be
|
|
limited and restricted to a known small number of IP addresses.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
use 'restrict default nomodify' in your 'ntp.conf' file.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p6, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page.
|
|
If you are unable to upgrade:
|
|
build NTP with 'configure --disable-saveconfig' if you will
|
|
never need this capability, or
|
|
use 'restrict default nomodify' in your 'ntp.conf' file. Be
|
|
careful about what IPs have the ability to send 'modify'
|
|
requests to 'ntpd'.
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
'saveconfig' requests are logged to syslog - monitor your syslog files.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Jonathan Gardner of Cisco ASIG.
|
|
|
|
* nextvar() missing length check in ntpq
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p6) 19 Jan 2016; Dev (4.3.90) 19 Jan 2016
|
|
References: Sec 2937 / CVE-2015-7975
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p6, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.90
|
|
CVSS: (AV:L/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) Base Score: 1.2 - LOW
|
|
If you score A:C, this becomes 4.0.
|
|
CVSSv3: (CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L) Base Score 2.9, LOW
|
|
Summary: ntpq may call nextvar() which executes a memcpy() into the
|
|
name buffer without a proper length check against its maximum
|
|
length of 256 bytes. Note well that we're taking about ntpq here.
|
|
The usual worst-case effect of this vulnerability is that the
|
|
specific instance of ntpq will crash and the person or process
|
|
that did this will have stopped themselves.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p6, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
|
|
If you are unable to upgrade:
|
|
If you have scripts that feed input to ntpq make sure there are
|
|
some sanity checks on the input received from the "outside".
|
|
This is potentially more dangerous if ntpq is run as root.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Jonathan Gardner at Cisco ASIG.
|
|
|
|
* Skeleton Key: Any trusted key system can serve time
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p6) 19 Jan 2016; Dev (4.3.90) 19 Jan 2016
|
|
References: Sec 2936 / CVE-2015-7974
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p6, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.90
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:C/A:N) Base Score: 4.9
|
|
Summary: Symmetric key encryption uses a shared trusted key. The
|
|
reported title for this issue was "Missing key check allows
|
|
impersonation between authenticated peers" and the report claimed
|
|
"A key specified only for one server should only work to
|
|
authenticate that server, other trusted keys should be refused."
|
|
Except there has never been any correlation between this trusted
|
|
key and server v. clients machines and there has never been any
|
|
way to specify a key only for one server. We have treated this as
|
|
an enhancement request, and ntp-4.2.8p6 includes other checks and
|
|
tests to strengthen clients against attacks coming from broadcast
|
|
servers.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
If this scenario represents a real or a potential issue for you,
|
|
upgrade to 4.2.8p6, or later, from the NTP Project Download
|
|
Page or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page, and
|
|
use the new field in the ntp.keys file that specifies the list
|
|
of IPs that are allowed to serve time. Note that this alone
|
|
will not protect against time packets with forged source IP
|
|
addresses, however other changes in ntp-4.2.8p6 provide
|
|
significant mitigation against broadcast attacks. MITM attacks
|
|
are a different story.
|
|
If you are unable to upgrade:
|
|
Don't use broadcast mode if you cannot monitor your client
|
|
servers.
|
|
If you choose to use symmetric keys to authenticate time
|
|
packets in a hostile environment where ephemeral time
|
|
servers can be created, or if it is expected that malicious
|
|
time servers will participate in an NTP broadcast domain,
|
|
limit the number of participating systems that participate
|
|
in the shared-key group.
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Matt Street of Cisco ASIG.
|
|
|
|
* Deja Vu: Replay attack on authenticated broadcast mode
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p6) 19 Jan 2016; Dev (4.3.90) 19 Jan 2016
|
|
References: Sec 2935 / CVE-2015-7973
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p6, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.90
|
|
CVSS: (AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 4.3 - MEDIUM
|
|
Summary: If an NTP network is configured for broadcast operations then
|
|
either a man-in-the-middle attacker or a malicious participant
|
|
that has the same trusted keys as the victim can replay time packets.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p6, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
|
|
If you are unable to upgrade:
|
|
Don't use broadcast mode if you cannot monitor your client servers.
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Aanchal Malhotra of Boston
|
|
University.
|
|
|
|
Other fixes:
|
|
|
|
* [Bug 2772] adj_systime overflows tv_usec. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
* [Bug 2814] msyslog deadlock when signaled. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
- applied patch by shenpeng11@huawei.com with minor adjustments
|
|
* [Bug 2882] Look at ntp_request.c:list_peers_sum(). perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
* [Bug 2891] Deadlock in deferred DNS lookup framework. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
* [Bug 2892] Several test cases assume IPv6 capabilities even when
|
|
IPv6 is disabled in the build. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
- Found this already fixed, but validation led to cleanup actions.
|
|
* [Bug 2905] DNS lookups broken. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
- added limits to stack consumption, fixed some return code handling
|
|
* [Bug 2971] ntpq bails on ^C: select fails: Interrupted system call
|
|
- changed stacked/nested handling of CTRL-C. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
- make CTRL-C work for retrieval and printing od MRU list. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
* [Bug 2980] reduce number of warnings. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
- integrated several patches from Havard Eidnes (he@uninett.no)
|
|
* [Bug 2985] bogus calculation in authkeys.c perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
- implement 'auth_log2()' using integer bithack instead of float calculation
|
|
* Make leapsec_query debug messages less verbose. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.8p5 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2016/01/07)
|
|
|
|
Focus: Security, Bug fixes, enhancements.
|
|
|
|
Severity: MEDIUM
|
|
|
|
In addition to bug fixes and enhancements, this release fixes the
|
|
following medium-severity vulnerability:
|
|
|
|
* Small-step/big-step. Close the panic gate earlier.
|
|
References: Sec 2956, CVE-2015-5300
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p5, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.78
|
|
CVSS3: (AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L) Base Score: 4.0, MEDIUM
|
|
Summary: If ntpd is always started with the -g option, which is
|
|
common and against long-standing recommendation, and if at the
|
|
moment ntpd is restarted an attacker can immediately respond to
|
|
enough requests from enough sources trusted by the target, which
|
|
is difficult and not common, there is a window of opportunity
|
|
where the attacker can cause ntpd to set the time to an
|
|
arbitrary value. Similarly, if an attacker is able to respond
|
|
to enough requests from enough sources trusted by the target,
|
|
the attacker can cause ntpd to abort and restart, at which
|
|
point it can tell the target to set the time to an arbitrary
|
|
value if and only if ntpd was re-started against long-standing
|
|
recommendation with the -g flag, or if ntpd was not given the
|
|
-g flag, the attacker can move the target system's time by at
|
|
most 900 seconds' time per attack.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Configure ntpd to get time from multiple sources.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p5, or later, from the NTP Project Download
|
|
Page or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
|
|
As we've long documented, only use the -g option to ntpd in
|
|
cold-start situations.
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Aanchal Malhotra,
|
|
Isaac E. Cohen, and Sharon Goldberg at Boston University.
|
|
|
|
NOTE WELL: The -g flag disables the limit check on the panic_gate
|
|
in ntpd, which is 900 seconds by default. The bug identified by
|
|
the researchers at Boston University is that the panic_gate
|
|
check was only re-enabled after the first change to the system
|
|
clock that was greater than 128 milliseconds, by default. The
|
|
correct behavior is that the panic_gate check should be
|
|
re-enabled after any initial time correction.
|
|
|
|
If an attacker is able to inject consistent but erroneous time
|
|
responses to your systems via the network or "over the air",
|
|
perhaps by spoofing radio, cellphone, or navigation satellite
|
|
transmissions, they are in a great position to affect your
|
|
system's clock. There comes a point where your very best
|
|
defenses include:
|
|
|
|
Configure ntpd to get time from multiple sources.
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
|
|
Other fixes:
|
|
|
|
* Coverity submission process updated from Coverity 5 to Coverity 7.
|
|
The NTP codebase has been undergoing regular Coverity scans on an
|
|
ongoing basis since 2006. As part of our recent upgrade from
|
|
Coverity 5 to Coverity 7, Coverity identified 16 nits in some of
|
|
the newly-written Unity test programs. These were fixed.
|
|
* [Bug 2829] Clean up pipe_fds in ntpd.c perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
* [Bug 2887] stratum -1 config results as showing value 99
|
|
- fudge stratum should only accept values [0..16]. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
* [Bug 2932] Update leapsecond file info in miscopt.html. CWoodbury, HStenn.
|
|
* [Bug 2934] tests/ntpd/t-ntp_scanner.c has a magic constant wired in. HMurray
|
|
* [Bug 2944] errno is not preserved properly in ntpdate after sendto call.
|
|
- applied patch by Christos Zoulas. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
* [Bug 2952] Peer associations broken by fix for Bug 2901/CVE-2015-7704.
|
|
* [Bug 2954] Version 4.2.8p4 crashes on startup on some OSes.
|
|
- fixed data race conditions in threaded DNS worker. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
- limit threading warm-up to linux; FreeBSD bombs on it. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
* [Bug 2957] 'unsigned int' vs 'size_t' format clash. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
- accept key file only if there are no parsing errors
|
|
- fixed size_t/u_int format clash
|
|
- fixed wrong use of 'strlcpy'
|
|
* [Bug 2958] ntpq: fatal error messages need a final newline. Craig Leres.
|
|
* [Bug 2962] truncation of size_t/ptrdiff_t on 64bit targets. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
- fixed several other warnings (cast-alignment, missing const, missing prototypes)
|
|
- promote use of 'size_t' for values that express a size
|
|
- use ptr-to-const for read-only arguments
|
|
- make sure SOCKET values are not truncated (win32-specific)
|
|
- format string fixes
|
|
* [Bug 2965] Local clock didn't work since 4.2.8p4. Martin Burnicki.
|
|
* [Bug 2967] ntpdate command suffers an assertion failure
|
|
- fixed ntp_rfc2553.c to return proper address length. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
* [Bug 2969] Seg fault from ntpq/mrulist when looking at server with
|
|
lots of clients. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
* [Bug 2971] ntpq bails on ^C: select fails: Interrupted system call
|
|
- changed stacked/nested handling of CTRL-C. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
* Unity cleanup for FreeBSD-6.4. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Unity test cleanup. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Libevent autoconf pthread fixes for FreeBSD-10. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Header cleanup in tests/sandbox/uglydate.c. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Header cleanup in tests/libntp/sfptostr.c. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Quiet a warning from clang. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.8p4 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2015/10/21)
|
|
|
|
Focus: Security, Bug fixes, enhancements.
|
|
|
|
Severity: MEDIUM
|
|
|
|
In addition to bug fixes and enhancements, this release fixes the
|
|
following 13 low- and medium-severity vulnerabilities:
|
|
|
|
* Incomplete vallen (value length) checks in ntp_crypto.c, leading
|
|
to potential crashes or potential code injection/information leakage.
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2899, Sec 2671, CVE-2015-7691, CVE-2015-7692, CVE-2015-7702
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p4,
|
|
and 4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.77
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:H/Au:M/C:N/I:N/A:C) Base Score: 4.6
|
|
Summary: The fix for CVE-2014-9750 was incomplete in that there were
|
|
certain code paths where a packet with particular autokey operations
|
|
that contained malicious data was not always being completely
|
|
validated. Receipt of these packets can cause ntpd to crash.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Don't use autokey.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p4, or later, from the NTP Project Download
|
|
Page or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Tenable Network Security.
|
|
|
|
* Clients that receive a KoD should validate the origin timestamp field.
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2901 / CVE-2015-7704, CVE-2015-7705
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p4,
|
|
and 4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.77
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) Base Score: 4.3-5.0 at worst
|
|
Summary: An ntpd client that honors Kiss-of-Death responses will honor
|
|
KoD messages that have been forged by an attacker, causing it to
|
|
delay or stop querying its servers for time updates. Also, an
|
|
attacker can forge packets that claim to be from the target and
|
|
send them to servers often enough that a server that implements
|
|
KoD rate limiting will send the target machine a KoD response to
|
|
attempt to reduce the rate of incoming packets, or it may also
|
|
trigger a firewall block at the server for packets from the target
|
|
machine. For either of these attacks to succeed, the attacker must
|
|
know what servers the target is communicating with. An attacker
|
|
can be anywhere on the Internet and can frequently learn the
|
|
identity of the target's time source by sending the target a
|
|
time query.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p4, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
|
|
If you can't upgrade, restrict who can query ntpd to learn who
|
|
its servers are, and what IPs are allowed to ask your system
|
|
for the time. This mitigation is heavy-handed.
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Note:
|
|
4.2.8p4 protects against the first attack. For the second attack,
|
|
all we can do is warn when it is happening, which we do in 4.2.8p4.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Aanchal Malhotra,
|
|
Issac E. Cohen, and Sharon Goldberg of Boston University.
|
|
|
|
* configuration directives to change "pidfile" and "driftfile" should
|
|
only be allowed locally.
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2902 / CVE-2015-5196
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p4,
|
|
and 4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.77
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:H/Au:M/C:N/I:C/A:C) Base Score: 6.2 worst case
|
|
Summary: If ntpd is configured to allow for remote configuration,
|
|
and if the (possibly spoofed) source IP address is allowed to
|
|
send remote configuration requests, and if the attacker knows
|
|
the remote configuration password, it's possible for an attacker
|
|
to use the "pidfile" or "driftfile" directives to potentially
|
|
overwrite other files.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p4, or later, from the NTP Project Download
|
|
Page or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
|
|
If you cannot upgrade, don't enable remote configuration.
|
|
If you must enable remote configuration and cannot upgrade,
|
|
remote configuration of NTF's ntpd requires:
|
|
- an explicitly configured trustedkey, and you should also
|
|
configure a controlkey.
|
|
- access from a permitted IP. You choose the IPs.
|
|
- authentication. Don't disable it. Practice secure key safety.
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Miroslav Lichvar of Red Hat.
|
|
|
|
* Slow memory leak in CRYPTO_ASSOC
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2909 / CVE-2015-7701
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases that use autokey up to, but not
|
|
including 4.2.8p4, and 4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.77
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:H/Au:M/C:N/I:N/A:C) Base Score: 0.0 best/usual case,
|
|
4.6 otherwise
|
|
Summary: If ntpd is configured to use autokey, then an attacker can
|
|
send packets to ntpd that will, after several days of ongoing
|
|
attack, cause it to run out of memory.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Don't use autokey.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p4, or later, from the NTP Project Download
|
|
Page or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Tenable Network Security.
|
|
|
|
* mode 7 loop counter underrun
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2913 / CVE-2015-7848 / TALOS-CAN-0052
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p4,
|
|
and 4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.77
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:H/Au:M/C:N/I:N/A:C) Base Score: 4.6
|
|
Summary: If ntpd is configured to enable mode 7 packets, and if the
|
|
use of mode 7 packets is not properly protected thru the use of
|
|
the available mode 7 authentication and restriction mechanisms,
|
|
and if the (possibly spoofed) source IP address is allowed to
|
|
send mode 7 queries, then an attacker can send a crafted packet
|
|
to ntpd that will cause it to crash.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p4, or later, from the NTP Project Download
|
|
Page or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
|
|
If you are unable to upgrade:
|
|
In ntp-4.2.8, mode 7 is disabled by default. Don't enable it.
|
|
If you must enable mode 7:
|
|
configure the use of a requestkey to control who can issue
|
|
mode 7 requests.
|
|
configure restrict noquery to further limit mode 7 requests
|
|
to trusted sources.
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Aleksandar Nikolic of Cisco Talos.
|
|
|
|
* memory corruption in password store
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2916 / CVE-2015-7849 / TALOS-CAN-0054
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p4, and 4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.77
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:H/Au:M/C:N/I:C/A:C) Base Score: 6.8, worst case
|
|
Summary: If ntpd is configured to allow remote configuration, and if
|
|
the (possibly spoofed) source IP address is allowed to send
|
|
remote configuration requests, and if the attacker knows the
|
|
remote configuration password or if ntpd was configured to
|
|
disable authentication, then an attacker can send a set of
|
|
packets to ntpd that may cause a crash or theoretically
|
|
perform a code injection attack.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p4, or later, from the NTP Project Download
|
|
Page or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
|
|
If you are unable to upgrade, remote configuration of NTF's
|
|
ntpd requires:
|
|
an explicitly configured "trusted" key. Only configure
|
|
this if you need it.
|
|
access from a permitted IP address. You choose the IPs.
|
|
authentication. Don't disable it. Practice secure key safety.
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Yves Younan of Cisco Talos.
|
|
|
|
* Infinite loop if extended logging enabled and the logfile and
|
|
keyfile are the same.
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2917 / CVE-2015-7850 / TALOS-CAN-0055
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p4,
|
|
and 4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.77
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:H/Au:M/C:N/I:N/A:C) Base Score: 4.6, worst case
|
|
Summary: If ntpd is configured to allow remote configuration, and if
|
|
the (possibly spoofed) source IP address is allowed to send
|
|
remote configuration requests, and if the attacker knows the
|
|
remote configuration password or if ntpd was configured to
|
|
disable authentication, then an attacker can send a set of
|
|
packets to ntpd that will cause it to crash and/or create a
|
|
potentially huge log file. Specifically, the attacker could
|
|
enable extended logging, point the key file at the log file,
|
|
and cause what amounts to an infinite loop.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p4, or later, from the NTP Project Download
|
|
Page or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
|
|
If you are unable to upgrade, remote configuration of NTF's ntpd
|
|
requires:
|
|
an explicitly configured "trusted" key. Only configure this
|
|
if you need it.
|
|
access from a permitted IP address. You choose the IPs.
|
|
authentication. Don't disable it. Practice secure key safety.
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Yves Younan of Cisco Talos.
|
|
|
|
* Potential path traversal vulnerability in the config file saving of
|
|
ntpd on VMS.
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2918 / CVE-2015-7851 / TALOS-CAN-0062
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases running under VMS up to, but not
|
|
including 4.2.8p4, and 4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.77
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:H/Au:M/C:N/I:P/A:C) Base Score: 5.2, worst case
|
|
Summary: If ntpd is configured to allow remote configuration, and if
|
|
the (possibly spoofed) IP address is allowed to send remote
|
|
configuration requests, and if the attacker knows the remote
|
|
configuration password or if ntpd was configured to disable
|
|
authentication, then an attacker can send a set of packets to
|
|
ntpd that may cause ntpd to overwrite files.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p4, or later, from the NTP Project Download
|
|
Page or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
|
|
If you are unable to upgrade, remote configuration of NTF's ntpd
|
|
requires:
|
|
an explicitly configured "trusted" key. Only configure
|
|
this if you need it.
|
|
access from permitted IP addresses. You choose the IPs.
|
|
authentication. Don't disable it. Practice key security safety.
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Yves Younan of Cisco Talos.
|
|
|
|
* ntpq atoascii() potential memory corruption
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2919 / CVE-2015-7852 / TALOS-CAN-0063
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases running up to, but not including 4.2.8p4,
|
|
and 4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.77
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 4.0, worst case
|
|
Summary: If an attacker can figure out the precise moment that ntpq
|
|
is listening for data and the port number it is listening on or
|
|
if the attacker can provide a malicious instance ntpd that
|
|
victims will connect to then an attacker can send a set of
|
|
crafted mode 6 response packets that, if received by ntpq,
|
|
can cause ntpq to crash.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p4, or later, from the NTP Project Download
|
|
Page or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
|
|
If you are unable to upgrade and you run ntpq against a server
|
|
and ntpq crashes, try again using raw mode. Build or get a
|
|
patched ntpq and see if that fixes the problem. Report new
|
|
bugs in ntpq or abusive servers appropriately.
|
|
If you use ntpq in scripts, make sure ntpq does what you expect
|
|
in your scripts.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Yves Younan and
|
|
Aleksander Nikolich of Cisco Talos.
|
|
|
|
* Invalid length data provided by a custom refclock driver could cause
|
|
a buffer overflow.
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2920 / CVE-2015-7853 / TALOS-CAN-0064
|
|
Affects: Potentially all ntp-4 releases running up to, but not
|
|
including 4.2.8p4, and 4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.77
|
|
that have custom refclocks
|
|
CVSS: (AV:L/AC:H/Au:M/C:C/I:C/A:C) Base Score: 0.0 usual case,
|
|
5.9 unusual worst case
|
|
Summary: A negative value for the datalen parameter will overflow a
|
|
data buffer. NTF's ntpd driver implementations always set this
|
|
value to 0 and are therefore not vulnerable to this weakness.
|
|
If you are running a custom refclock driver in ntpd and that
|
|
driver supplies a negative value for datalen (no custom driver
|
|
of even minimal competence would do this) then ntpd would
|
|
overflow a data buffer. It is even hypothetically possible
|
|
in this case that instead of simply crashing ntpd the attacker
|
|
could effect a code injection attack.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p4, or later, from the NTP Project Download
|
|
Page or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
|
|
If you are unable to upgrade:
|
|
If you are running custom refclock drivers, make sure
|
|
the signed datalen value is either zero or positive.
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Yves Younan of Cisco Talos.
|
|
|
|
* Password Length Memory Corruption Vulnerability
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2921 / CVE-2015-7854 / TALOS-CAN-0065
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p4, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.77
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:H/Au:M/C:C/I:C/A:C) Base Score: 0.0 best case,
|
|
1.7 usual case, 6.8, worst case
|
|
Summary: If ntpd is configured to allow remote configuration, and if
|
|
the (possibly spoofed) source IP address is allowed to send
|
|
remote configuration requests, and if the attacker knows the
|
|
remote configuration password or if ntpd was (foolishly)
|
|
configured to disable authentication, then an attacker can
|
|
send a set of packets to ntpd that may cause it to crash,
|
|
with the hypothetical possibility of a small code injection.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p4, or later, from the NTP Project Download
|
|
Page or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
|
|
If you are unable to upgrade, remote configuration of NTF's
|
|
ntpd requires:
|
|
an explicitly configured "trusted" key. Only configure
|
|
this if you need it.
|
|
access from a permitted IP address. You choose the IPs.
|
|
authentication. Don't disable it. Practice secure key safety.
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Yves Younan and
|
|
Aleksander Nikolich of Cisco Talos.
|
|
|
|
* decodenetnum() will ASSERT botch instead of returning FAIL on some
|
|
bogus values.
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2922 / CVE-2015-7855
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases up to, but not including 4.2.8p4, and
|
|
4.3.0 up to, but not including 4.3.77
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:H/Au:M/C:N/I:N/A:C) Base Score: 4.6, worst case
|
|
Summary: If ntpd is fed a crafted mode 6 or mode 7 packet containing
|
|
an unusually long data value where a network address is expected,
|
|
the decodenetnum() function will abort with an assertion failure
|
|
instead of simply returning a failure condition.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p4, or later, from the NTP Project Download
|
|
Page or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
|
|
If you are unable to upgrade:
|
|
mode 7 is disabled by default. Don't enable it.
|
|
Use restrict noquery to limit who can send mode 6
|
|
and mode 7 requests.
|
|
Configure and use the controlkey and requestkey
|
|
authentication directives to limit who can
|
|
send mode 6 and mode 7 requests.
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by John D "Doug" Birdwell of IDA.org.
|
|
|
|
* NAK to the Future: Symmetric association authentication bypass via
|
|
crypto-NAK.
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2941 / CVE-2015-7871
|
|
Affects: All ntp-4 releases between 4.2.5p186 up to but not including
|
|
4.2.8p4, and 4.3.0 up to but not including 4.3.77
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 6.4
|
|
Summary: Crypto-NAK packets can be used to cause ntpd to accept time
|
|
from unauthenticated ephemeral symmetric peers by bypassing the
|
|
authentication required to mobilize peer associations. This
|
|
vulnerability appears to have been introduced in ntp-4.2.5p186
|
|
when the code handling mobilization of new passive symmetric
|
|
associations (lines 1103-1165) was refactored.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Implement BCP-38.
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p4, or later, from the NTP Project Download
|
|
Page or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
|
|
If you are unable to upgrade:
|
|
Apply the patch to the bottom of the "authentic" check
|
|
block around line 1136 of ntp_proto.c.
|
|
Monitor your ntpd instances.
|
|
Credit: This weakness was discovered by Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco ASIG.
|
|
|
|
Backward-Incompatible changes:
|
|
* [Bug 2817] Default on Linux is now "rlimit memlock -1".
|
|
While the general default of 32M is still the case, under Linux
|
|
the default value has been changed to -1 (do not lock ntpd into
|
|
memory). A value of 0 means "lock ntpd into memory with whatever
|
|
memory it needs." If your ntp.conf file has an explicit "rlimit memlock"
|
|
value in it, that value will continue to be used.
|
|
|
|
* [Bug 2886] Misspelling: "outlyer" should be "outlier".
|
|
If you've written a script that looks for this case in, say, the
|
|
output of ntpq, you probably want to change your regex matches
|
|
from 'outlyer' to 'outl[iy]er'.
|
|
|
|
New features in this release:
|
|
* 'rlimit memlock' now has finer-grained control. A value of -1 means
|
|
"don't lock ntpd into memore". This is the default for Linux boxes.
|
|
A value of 0 means "lock ntpd into memory" with no limits. Otherwise
|
|
the value is the number of megabytes of memory to lock. The default
|
|
is 32 megabytes.
|
|
|
|
* The old Google Test framework has been replaced with a new framework,
|
|
based on http://www.throwtheswitch.org/unity/ .
|
|
|
|
Bug Fixes and Improvements:
|
|
* [Bug 2332] (reopened) Exercise thread cancellation once before dropping
|
|
privileges and limiting resources in NTPD removes the need to link
|
|
forcefully against 'libgcc_s' which does not always work. J.Perlinger
|
|
* [Bug 2595] ntpdate man page quirks. Hal Murray, Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* [Bug 2625] Deprecate flag1 in local refclock. Hal Murray, Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* [Bug 2817] Stop locking ntpd into memory by default under Linux. H.Stenn.
|
|
* [Bug 2821] minor build issues: fixed refclock_gpsdjson.c. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
* [Bug 2823] ntpsweep with recursive peers option doesn't work. H.Stenn.
|
|
* [Bug 2849] Systems with more than one default route may never
|
|
synchronize. Brian Utterback. Note that this patch might need to
|
|
be reverted once Bug 2043 has been fixed.
|
|
* [Bug 2864] 4.2.8p3 fails to compile on Windows. Juergen Perlinger
|
|
* [Bug 2866] segmentation fault at initgroups(). Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* [Bug 2867] ntpd with autokey active crashed by 'ntpq -crv'. J.Perlinger
|
|
* [Bug 2873] libevent should not include .deps/ in the tarball. H.Stenn
|
|
* [Bug 2874] Don't distribute generated sntp/tests/fileHandlingTest.h. H.Stenn
|
|
* [Bug 2875] sntp/Makefile.am: Get rid of DIST_SUBDIRS. libevent must
|
|
be configured for the distribution targets. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* [Bug 2883] ntpd crashes on exit with empty driftfile. Miroslav Lichvar.
|
|
* [Bug 2886] Mis-spelling: "outlyer" should be "outlier". dave@horsfall.org
|
|
* [Bug 2888] streamline calendar functions. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
* [Bug 2889] ntp-dev-4.3.67 does not build on Windows. perlinger@ntp.org
|
|
* [Bug 2890] Ignore ENOBUFS on routing netlink socket. Konstantin Khlebnikov.
|
|
* [Bug 2906] make check needs better support for pthreads. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* [Bug 2907] dist* build targets require our libevent/ to be enabled. HStenn.
|
|
* [Bug 2912] no munlockall() under Windows. David Taylor, Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* libntp/emalloc.c: Remove explicit include of stdint.h. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Put Unity CPPFLAGS items in unity_config.h. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* tests/ntpd/g_leapsec.cpp typo fix. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Phase 1 deprecation of google test in sntp/tests/. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* On some versions of HP-UX, inttypes.h does not include stdint.h. H.Stenn.
|
|
* top_srcdir can change based on ntp v. sntp. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* sntp/tests/ function parameter list cleanup. Damir Tomić.
|
|
* tests/libntp/ function parameter list cleanup. Damir Tomić.
|
|
* tests/ntpd/ function parameter list cleanup. Damir Tomić.
|
|
* sntp/unity/unity_config.h: handle stdint.h. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* sntp/unity/unity_internals.h: handle *INTPTR_MAX on old Solaris. H.Stenn.
|
|
* tests/libntp/timevalops.c and timespecops.c fixed error printing. D.Tomić.
|
|
* tests/libntp/ improvements in code and fixed error printing. Damir Tomić.
|
|
* tests/libntp: a_md5encrypt.c, authkeys.c, buftvtots.c, calendar.c, caljulian.c,
|
|
caltontp.c, clocktime.c, humandate.c, hextolfp.c, decodenetnum.c - fixed
|
|
formatting; first declaration, then code (C90); deleted unnecessary comments;
|
|
changed from sprintf to snprintf; fixed order of includes. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* tests/libntp/lfpfunc.c remove unnecessary include, remove old comments,
|
|
fix formatting, cleanup. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* tests/libntp/lfptostr.c remove unnecessary include, add consts, fix formatting.
|
|
Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* tests/libntp/statestr.c remove empty functions, remove unnecessary include,
|
|
fix formatting. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* tests/libntp/modetoa.c fixed formatting. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* tests/libntp/msyslog.c fixed formatting. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* tests/libntp/numtoa.c deleted unnecessary empty functions, fixed formatting.
|
|
Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* tests/libntp/numtohost.c added const, fixed formatting. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* tests/libntp/refnumtoa.c fixed formatting. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* tests/libntp/ssl_init.c fixed formatting. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* tests/libntp/tvtots.c fixed a bug, fixed formatting. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* tests/libntp/uglydate.c removed an unnecessary include. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* tests/libntp/vi64ops.c removed an unnecessary comment, fixed formatting.
|
|
* tests/libntp/ymd3yd.c removed an empty function and an unnecessary include,
|
|
fixed formatting. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* tests/libntp/timespecops.c fixed formatting, fixed the order of includes,
|
|
removed unnecessary comments, cleanup. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* tests/libntp/timevalops.c fixed the order of includes, deleted unnecessary
|
|
comments, cleanup. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* tests/libntp/sockaddrtest.h making it agree to NTP's conventions of formatting.
|
|
Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* tests/libntp/lfptest.h cleanup. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* tests/libntp/test-libntp.c fix formatting. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* sntp/tests/crypto.c is now using proper Unity's assertions, fixed formatting.
|
|
Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* sntp/tests/kodDatabase.c added consts, deleted empty function,
|
|
fixed formatting. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* sntp/tests/kodFile.c cleanup, fixed formatting. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* sntp/tests/packetHandling.c is now using proper Unity's assertions,
|
|
fixed formatting, deleted unused variable. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* sntp/tests/keyFile.c is now using proper Unity's assertions, fixed formatting.
|
|
Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* sntp/tests/packetProcessing.c changed from sprintf to snprintf,
|
|
fixed formatting. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* sntp/tests/utilities.c is now using proper Unity's assertions, changed
|
|
the order of includes, fixed formatting, removed unnecessary comments.
|
|
Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* sntp/tests/sntptest.h fixed formatting. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* sntp/tests/fileHandlingTest.h.in fixed a possible buffer overflow problem,
|
|
made one function do its job, deleted unnecessary prints, fixed formatting.
|
|
Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* sntp/unity/Makefile.am added a missing header. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* sntp/unity/unity_config.h: Distribute it. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* sntp/libevent/evconfig-private.h: remove generated filefrom SCM. H.Stenn.
|
|
* sntp/unity/Makefile.am: fix some broken paths. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* sntp/unity/unity.c: Clean up a printf(). Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Phase 1 deprecation of google test in tests/libntp/. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Don't build sntp/libevent/sample/. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* tests/libntp/test_caltontp needs -lpthread. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* br-flock: --enable-local-libevent. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Wrote tests for ntpd/ntp_prio_q.c. Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* scripts/lib/NTP/Util.pm: stratum output is version-dependent. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Get rid of the NTP_ prefix on our assertion macros. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Code cleanup. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* libntp/icom.c: Typo fix. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* util/ntptime.c: initialization nit. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* ntpd/ntp_peer.c:newpeer(): added a DEBUG_REQUIRE(srcadr). Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Add std_unity_tests to various Makefile.am files. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* ntpd/ntp_restrict.c: added a few assertions, created tests for this file.
|
|
Tomasz Flendrich
|
|
* Changed progname to be const in many files - now it's consistent. Tomasz
|
|
Flendrich
|
|
* Typo fix for GCC warning suppression. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Added tests/ntpd/ntp_scanner.c test. Damir Tomić.
|
|
* Added declarations to all Unity tests, and did minor fixes to them.
|
|
Reduced the number of warnings by half. Damir Tomić.
|
|
* Updated generate_test_runner.rb and updated the sntp/unity/auto directory
|
|
with the latest Unity updates from Mark. Damir Tomić.
|
|
* Retire google test - phase I. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Unity test cleanup: move declaration of 'initializing'. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Update the NEWS file. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Autoconf cleanup. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Unit test dist cleanup. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Cleanup various test Makefile.am files. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Pthread autoconf macro cleanup. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Fix progname definition in unity runner scripts. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Clean trailing whitespace in tests/ntpd/Makefile.am. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Update the patch for bug 2817. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* More updates for bug 2817. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Fix bugs in tests/ntpd/ntp_prio_q.c. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* gcc on older HPUX may need +allowdups. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Adding missing MCAST protection. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Disable certain test programs on certain platforms. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Implement --enable-problem-tests (on by default). Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* build system tweaks. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.8p3 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2015/06/29)
|
|
|
|
Focus: 1 Security fix. Bug fixes and enhancements. Leap-second improvements.
|
|
|
|
Severity: MEDIUM
|
|
|
|
Security Fix:
|
|
|
|
* [Sec 2853] Crafted remote config packet can crash some versions of
|
|
ntpd. Aleksis Kauppinen, Juergen Perlinger, Harlan Stenn.
|
|
|
|
Under specific circumstances an attacker can send a crafted packet to
|
|
cause a vulnerable ntpd instance to crash. This requires each of the
|
|
following to be true:
|
|
|
|
1) ntpd set up to allow remote configuration (not allowed by default), and
|
|
2) knowledge of the configuration password, and
|
|
3) access to a computer entrusted to perform remote configuration.
|
|
|
|
This vulnerability is considered low-risk.
|
|
|
|
New features in this release:
|
|
|
|
Optional (disabled by default) support to have ntpd provide smeared
|
|
leap second time. A specially built and configured ntpd will only
|
|
offer smeared time in response to client packets. These response
|
|
packets will also contain a "refid" of 254.a.b.c, where the 24 bits
|
|
of a, b, and c encode the amount of smear in a 2:22 integer:fraction
|
|
format. See README.leapsmear and http://bugs.ntp.org/2855 for more
|
|
information.
|
|
|
|
*IF YOU CHOOSE TO CONFIGURE NTPD TO PROVIDE LEAP SMEAR TIME*
|
|
*BE SURE YOU DO NOT OFFER THAT TIME ON PUBLIC TIMESERVERS.*
|
|
|
|
We've imported the Unity test framework, and have begun converting
|
|
the existing google-test items to this new framework. If you want
|
|
to write new tests or change old ones, you'll need to have ruby
|
|
installed. You don't need ruby to run the test suite.
|
|
|
|
Bug Fixes and Improvements:
|
|
|
|
* CID 739725: Fix a rare resource leak in libevent/listener.c.
|
|
* CID 1295478: Quiet a pedantic potential error from the fix for Bug 2776.
|
|
* CID 1296235: Fix refclock_jjy.c and correcting type of the driver40-ja.html
|
|
* CID 1269537: Clean up a line of dead code in getShmTime().
|
|
* [Bug 1060] Buffer overruns in libparse/clk_rawdcf.c. Helge Oldach.
|
|
* [Bug 2590] autogen-5.18.5.
|
|
* [Bug 2612] restrict: Warn when 'monitor' can't be disabled because
|
|
of 'limited'.
|
|
* [Bug 2650] fix includefile processing.
|
|
* [Bug 2745] ntpd -x steps clock on leap second
|
|
Fixed an initial-value problem that caused misbehaviour in absence of
|
|
any leapsecond information.
|
|
Do leap second stepping only of the step adjustment is beyond the
|
|
proper jump distance limit and step correction is allowed at all.
|
|
* [Bug 2750] build for Win64
|
|
Building for 32bit of loopback ppsapi needs def file
|
|
* [Bug 2776] Improve ntpq's 'help keytype'.
|
|
* [Bug 2778] Implement "apeers" ntpq command to include associd.
|
|
* [Bug 2782] Refactor refclock_shm.c, add memory barrier protection.
|
|
* [Bug 2792] If the IFF_RUNNING interface flag is supported then an
|
|
interface is ignored as long as this flag is not set since the
|
|
interface is not usable (e.g., no link).
|
|
* [Bug 2794] Clean up kernel clock status reports.
|
|
* [Bug 2800] refclock_true.c true_debug() can't open debug log because
|
|
of incompatible open/fdopen parameters.
|
|
* [Bug 2804] install-local-data assumes GNU 'find' semantics.
|
|
* [Bug 2805] ntpd fails to join multicast group.
|
|
* [Bug 2806] refclock_jjy.c supports the Telephone JJY.
|
|
* [Bug 2808] GPSD_JSON driver enhancements, step 1.
|
|
Fix crash during cleanup if GPS device not present and char device.
|
|
Increase internal token buffer to parse all JSON data, even SKY.
|
|
Defer logging of errors during driver init until the first unit is
|
|
started, so the syslog is not cluttered when the driver is not used.
|
|
Various improvements, see http://bugs.ntp.org/2808 for details.
|
|
Changed libjsmn to a more recent version.
|
|
* [Bug 2810] refclock_shm.c memory barrier code needs tweaks for QNX.
|
|
* [Bug 2813] HP-UX needs -D__STDC_VERSION__=199901L and limits.h.
|
|
* [Bug 2815] net-snmp before v5.4 has circular library dependencies.
|
|
* [Bug 2821] Add a missing NTP_PRINTF and a missing const.
|
|
* [Bug 2822] New leap column in sntp broke NTP::Util.pm.
|
|
* [Bug 2824] Convert update-leap to perl. (also see 2769)
|
|
* [Bug 2825] Quiet file installation in html/ .
|
|
* [Bug 2830] ntpd doesn't always transfer the correct TAI offset via autokey
|
|
NTPD transfers the current TAI (instead of an announcement) now.
|
|
This might still needed improvement.
|
|
Update autokey data ASAP when 'sys_tai' changes.
|
|
Fix unit test that was broken by changes for autokey update.
|
|
Avoid potential signature length issue and use DPRINTF where possible
|
|
in ntp_crypto.c.
|
|
* [Bug 2832] refclock_jjy.c supports the TDC-300.
|
|
* [Bug 2834] Correct a broken html tag in html/refclock.html
|
|
* [Bug 2836] DFC77 patches from Frank Kardel to make decoding more
|
|
robust, and require 2 consecutive timestamps to be consistent.
|
|
* [Bug 2837] Allow a configurable DSCP value.
|
|
* [Bug 2837] add test for DSCP to ntpd/complete.conf.in
|
|
* [Bug 2842] Glitch in ntp.conf.def documentation stanza.
|
|
* [Bug 2842] Bug in mdoc2man.
|
|
* [Bug 2843] make check fails on 4.3.36
|
|
Fixed compiler warnings about numeric range overflow
|
|
(The original topic was fixed in a byplay to bug#2830)
|
|
* [Bug 2845] Harden memory allocation in ntpd.
|
|
* [Bug 2852] 'make check' can't find unity.h. Hal Murray.
|
|
* [Bug 2854] Missing brace in libntp/strdup.c. Masanari Iida.
|
|
* [Bug 2855] Parser fix for conditional leap smear code. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* [Bug 2855] Report leap smear in the REFID. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* [Bug 2855] Implement conditional leap smear code. Martin Burnicki.
|
|
* [Bug 2856] ntpd should wait() on terminated child processes. Paul Green.
|
|
* [Bug 2857] Stratus VOS does not support SIGIO. Paul Green.
|
|
* [Bug 2859] Improve raw DCF77 robustness deconding. Frank Kardel.
|
|
* [Bug 2860] ntpq ifstats sanity check is too stringent. Frank Kardel.
|
|
* html/drivers/driver22.html: typo fix. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* refidsmear test cleanup. Tomasz Flendrich.
|
|
* refidsmear function support and tests. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* sntp/tests/Makefile.am: remove g_nameresolution.cpp as it tested
|
|
something that was only in the 4.2.6 sntp. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Modified tests/bug-2803/Makefile.am so it builds Unity framework tests.
|
|
Damir Tomić
|
|
* Modified tests/libtnp/Makefile.am so it builds Unity framework tests.
|
|
Damir Tomić
|
|
* Modified sntp/tests/Makefile.am so it builds Unity framework tests.
|
|
Damir Tomić
|
|
* tests/sandbox/smeartest.c: Harlan Stenn, Damir Tomic, Juergen Perlinger.
|
|
* Converted from gtest to Unity: tests/bug-2803/. Damir Tomić
|
|
* Converted from gtest to Unity: tests/libntp/ a_md5encrypt, atoint.c,
|
|
atouint.c, authkeys.c, buftvtots.c, calendar.c, caljulian.c,
|
|
calyearstart.c, clocktime.c, hextoint.c, lfpfunc.c, modetoa.c,
|
|
numtoa.c, numtohost.c, refnumtoa.c, ssl_init.c, statestr.c,
|
|
timespecops.c, timevalops.c, uglydate.c, vi64ops.c, ymd2yd.c.
|
|
Damir Tomić
|
|
* Converted from gtest to Unity: sntp/tests/ kodDatabase.c, kodFile.c,
|
|
networking.c, keyFile.c, utilities.cpp, sntptest.h,
|
|
fileHandlingTest.h. Damir Tomić
|
|
* Initial support for experimental leap smear code. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Fixes to sntp/tests/fileHandlingTest.h.in. Harlan Stenn.
|
|
* Report select() debug messages at debug level 3 now.
|
|
* sntp/scripts/genLocInfo: treat raspbian as debian.
|
|
* Unity test framework fixes.
|
|
** Requires ruby for changes to tests.
|
|
* Initial support for PACKAGE_VERSION tests.
|
|
* sntp/libpkgver belongs in EXTRA_DIST, not DIST_SUBDIRS.
|
|
* tests/bug-2803/Makefile.am must distribute bug-2803.h.
|
|
* Add an assert to the ntpq ifstats code.
|
|
* Clean up the RLIMIT_STACK code.
|
|
* Improve the ntpq documentation around the controlkey keyid.
|
|
* ntpq.c cleanup.
|
|
* Windows port build cleanup.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.8p2 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2015/04/07)
|
|
|
|
Focus: Security and Bug fixes, enhancements.
|
|
|
|
Severity: MEDIUM
|
|
|
|
In addition to bug fixes and enhancements, this release fixes the
|
|
following medium-severity vulnerabilities involving private key
|
|
authentication:
|
|
|
|
* [Sec 2779] ntpd accepts unauthenticated packets with symmetric key crypto.
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2779 / CVE-2015-1798 / VU#374268
|
|
Affects: All NTP4 releases starting with ntp-4.2.5p99 up to but not
|
|
including ntp-4.2.8p2 where the installation uses symmetric keys
|
|
to authenticate remote associations.
|
|
CVSS: (AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 5.4
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p2) 07 Apr 2015
|
|
Summary: When ntpd is configured to use a symmetric key to authenticate
|
|
a remote NTP server/peer, it checks if the NTP message
|
|
authentication code (MAC) in received packets is valid, but not if
|
|
there actually is any MAC included. Packets without a MAC are
|
|
accepted as if they had a valid MAC. This allows a MITM attacker to
|
|
send false packets that are accepted by the client/peer without
|
|
having to know the symmetric key. The attacker needs to know the
|
|
transmit timestamp of the client to match it in the forged reply
|
|
and the false reply needs to reach the client before the genuine
|
|
reply from the server. The attacker doesn't necessarily need to be
|
|
relaying the packets between the client and the server.
|
|
|
|
Authentication using autokey doesn't have this problem as there is
|
|
a check that requires the key ID to be larger than NTP_MAXKEY,
|
|
which fails for packets without a MAC.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p2, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
|
|
Configure ntpd with enough time sources and monitor it properly.
|
|
Credit: This issue was discovered by Miroslav Lichvar, of Red Hat.
|
|
|
|
* [Sec 2781] Authentication doesn't protect symmetric associations against
|
|
DoS attacks.
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2781 / CVE-2015-1799 / VU#374268
|
|
Affects: All NTP releases starting with at least xntp3.3wy up to but
|
|
not including ntp-4.2.8p2 where the installation uses symmetric
|
|
key authentication.
|
|
CVSS: (AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 5.4
|
|
Note: the CVSS base Score for this issue could be 4.3 or lower, and
|
|
it could be higher than 5.4.
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p2) 07 Apr 2015
|
|
Summary: An attacker knowing that NTP hosts A and B are peering with
|
|
each other (symmetric association) can send a packet to host A
|
|
with source address of B which will set the NTP state variables
|
|
on A to the values sent by the attacker. Host A will then send
|
|
on its next poll to B a packet with originate timestamp that
|
|
doesn't match the transmit timestamp of B and the packet will
|
|
be dropped. If the attacker does this periodically for both
|
|
hosts, they won't be able to synchronize to each other. This is
|
|
a known denial-of-service attack, described at
|
|
https://www.eecis.udel.edu/~mills/onwire.html .
|
|
|
|
According to the document the NTP authentication is supposed to
|
|
protect symmetric associations against this attack, but that
|
|
doesn't seem to be the case. The state variables are updated even
|
|
when authentication fails and the peers are sending packets with
|
|
originate timestamps that don't match the transmit timestamps on
|
|
the receiving side.
|
|
|
|
This seems to be a very old problem, dating back to at least
|
|
xntp3.3wy. It's also in the NTPv3 (RFC 1305) and NTPv4 (RFC 5905)
|
|
specifications, so other NTP implementations with support for
|
|
symmetric associations and authentication may be vulnerable too.
|
|
An update to the NTP RFC to correct this error is in-process.
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p2, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
|
|
Note that for users of autokey, this specific style of MITM attack
|
|
is simply a long-known potential problem.
|
|
Configure ntpd with appropriate time sources and monitor ntpd.
|
|
Alert your staff if problems are detected.
|
|
Credit: This issue was discovered by Miroslav Lichvar, of Red Hat.
|
|
|
|
* New script: update-leap
|
|
The update-leap script will verify and if necessary, update the
|
|
leap-second definition file.
|
|
It requires the following commands in order to work:
|
|
|
|
wget logger tr sed shasum
|
|
|
|
Some may choose to run this from cron. It needs more portability testing.
|
|
|
|
Bug Fixes and Improvements:
|
|
|
|
* [Bug 1787] DCF77's formerly "antenna" bit is "call bit" since 2003.
|
|
* [Bug 1960] setsockopt IPV6_MULTICAST_IF: Invalid argument.
|
|
* [Bug 2346] "graceful termination" signals do not do peer cleanup.
|
|
* [Bug 2728] See if C99-style structure initialization works.
|
|
* [Bug 2747] Upgrade libevent to 2.1.5-beta.
|
|
* [Bug 2749] ntp/lib/NTP/Util.pm needs update for ntpq -w, IPv6, .POOL. .
|
|
* [Bug 2751] jitter.h has stale copies of l_fp macros.
|
|
* [Bug 2756] ntpd hangs in startup with gcc 3.3.5 on ARM.
|
|
* [Bug 2757] Quiet compiler warnings.
|
|
* [Bug 2759] Expose nonvolatile/clk_wander_threshold to ntpq.
|
|
* [Bug 2763] Allow different thresholds for forward and backward steps.
|
|
* [Bug 2766] ntp-keygen output files should not be world-readable.
|
|
* [Bug 2767] ntp-keygen -M should symlink to ntp.keys.
|
|
* [Bug 2771] nonvolatile value is documented in wrong units.
|
|
* [Bug 2773] Early leap announcement from Palisade/Thunderbolt
|
|
* [Bug 2774] Unreasonably verbose printout - leap pending/warning
|
|
* [Bug 2775] ntp-keygen.c fails to compile under Windows.
|
|
* [Bug 2777] Fixed loops and decoding of Meinberg GPS satellite info.
|
|
Removed non-ASCII characters from some copyright comments.
|
|
Removed trailing whitespace.
|
|
Updated definitions for Meinberg clocks from current Meinberg header files.
|
|
Now use C99 fixed-width types and avoid non-ASCII characters in comments.
|
|
Account for updated definitions pulled from Meinberg header files.
|
|
Updated comments on Meinberg GPS receivers which are not only called GPS16x.
|
|
Replaced some constant numbers by defines from ntp_calendar.h
|
|
Modified creation of parse-specific variables for Meinberg devices
|
|
in gps16x_message().
|
|
Reworked mk_utcinfo() to avoid printing of ambiguous leap second dates.
|
|
Modified mbg_tm_str() which now expexts an additional parameter controlling
|
|
if the time status shall be printed.
|
|
* [Sec 2779] ntpd accepts unauthenticated packets with symmetric key crypto.
|
|
* [Sec 2781] Authentication doesn't protect symmetric associations against
|
|
DoS attacks.
|
|
* [Bug 2783] Quiet autoconf warnings about missing AC_LANG_SOURCE.
|
|
* [Bug 2789] Quiet compiler warnings from libevent.
|
|
* [Bug 2790] If ntpd sets the Windows MM timer highest resolution
|
|
pause briefly before measuring system clock precision to yield
|
|
correct results.
|
|
* Comment from Juergen Perlinger in ntp_calendar.c to make the code clearer.
|
|
* Use predefined function types for parse driver functions
|
|
used to set up function pointers.
|
|
Account for changed prototype of parse_inp_fnc_t functions.
|
|
Cast parse conversion results to appropriate types to avoid
|
|
compiler warnings.
|
|
Let ioctl() for Windows accept a (void *) to avoid compiler warnings
|
|
when called with pointers to different types.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.8p1 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2015/02/04)
|
|
|
|
Focus: Security and Bug fixes, enhancements.
|
|
|
|
Severity: HIGH
|
|
|
|
In addition to bug fixes and enhancements, this release fixes the
|
|
following high-severity vulnerabilities:
|
|
|
|
* vallen is not validated in several places in ntp_crypto.c, leading
|
|
to a potential information leak or possibly a crash
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2671 / CVE-2014-9297 / VU#852879
|
|
Affects: All NTP4 releases before 4.2.8p1 that are running autokey.
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 7.5
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p1) 04 Feb 2015
|
|
Summary: The vallen packet value is not validated in several code
|
|
paths in ntp_crypto.c which can lead to information leakage
|
|
or perhaps a crash of the ntpd process.
|
|
Mitigation - any of:
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p1, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page.
|
|
Disable Autokey Authentication by removing, or commenting out,
|
|
all configuration directives beginning with the "crypto"
|
|
keyword in your ntp.conf file.
|
|
Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by Stephen Roettger of the
|
|
Google Security Team, with additional cases found by Sebastian
|
|
Krahmer of the SUSE Security Team and Harlan Stenn of Network
|
|
Time Foundation.
|
|
|
|
* ::1 can be spoofed on some OSes, so ACLs based on IPv6 ::1 addresses
|
|
can be bypassed.
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2672 / CVE-2014-9298 / VU#852879
|
|
Affects: All NTP4 releases before 4.2.8p1, under at least some
|
|
versions of MacOS and Linux. *BSD has not been seen to be vulnerable.
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:C) Base Score: 9
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p1) 04 Feb 2014
|
|
Summary: While available kernels will prevent 127.0.0.1 addresses
|
|
from "appearing" on non-localhost IPv4 interfaces, some kernels
|
|
do not offer the same protection for ::1 source addresses on
|
|
IPv6 interfaces. Since NTP's access control is based on source
|
|
address and localhost addresses generally have no restrictions,
|
|
an attacker can send malicious control and configuration packets
|
|
by spoofing ::1 addresses from the outside. Note Well: This is
|
|
not really a bug in NTP, it's a problem with some OSes. If you
|
|
have one of these OSes where ::1 can be spoofed, ALL ::1 -based
|
|
ACL restrictions on any application can be bypassed!
|
|
Mitigation:
|
|
Upgrade to 4.2.8p1, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
|
|
or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
|
|
Install firewall rules to block packets claiming to come from
|
|
::1 from inappropriate network interfaces.
|
|
Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by Stephen Roettger of
|
|
the Google Security Team.
|
|
|
|
Additionally, over 30 bugfixes and improvements were made to the codebase.
|
|
See the ChangeLog for more information.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.8 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2014/12/18)
|
|
|
|
Focus: Security and Bug fixes, enhancements.
|
|
|
|
Severity: HIGH
|
|
|
|
In addition to bug fixes and enhancements, this release fixes the
|
|
following high-severity vulnerabilities:
|
|
|
|
************************** vv NOTE WELL vv *****************************
|
|
|
|
The vulnerabilities listed below can be significantly mitigated by
|
|
following the BCP of putting
|
|
|
|
restrict default ... noquery
|
|
|
|
in the ntp.conf file. With the exception of:
|
|
|
|
receive(): missing return on error
|
|
References: Sec 2670 / CVE-2014-9296 / VU#852879
|
|
|
|
below (which is a limited-risk vulnerability), none of the recent
|
|
vulnerabilities listed below can be exploited if the source IP is
|
|
restricted from sending a 'query'-class packet by your ntp.conf file.
|
|
|
|
************************** ^^ NOTE WELL ^^ *****************************
|
|
|
|
* Weak default key in config_auth().
|
|
|
|
References: [Sec 2665] / CVE-2014-9293 / VU#852879
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:M/C:P/I:P/A:C) Base Score: 7.3
|
|
Vulnerable Versions: all releases prior to 4.2.7p11
|
|
Date Resolved: 28 Jan 2010
|
|
|
|
Summary: If no 'auth' key is set in the configuration file, ntpd
|
|
would generate a random key on the fly. There were two
|
|
problems with this: 1) the generated key was 31 bits in size,
|
|
and 2) it used the (now weak) ntp_random() function, which was
|
|
seeded with a 32-bit value and could only provide 32 bits of
|
|
entropy. This was sufficient back in the late 1990s when the
|
|
code was written. Not today.
|
|
|
|
Mitigation - any of:
|
|
- Upgrade to 4.2.7p11 or later.
|
|
- Follow BCP and put 'restrict ... noquery' in your ntp.conf file.
|
|
|
|
Credit: This vulnerability was noticed in ntp-4.2.6 by Neel Mehta
|
|
of the Google Security Team.
|
|
|
|
* Non-cryptographic random number generator with weak seed used by
|
|
ntp-keygen to generate symmetric keys.
|
|
|
|
References: [Sec 2666] / CVE-2014-9294 / VU#852879
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:M/C:P/I:P/A:C) Base Score: 7.3
|
|
Vulnerable Versions: All NTP4 releases before 4.2.7p230
|
|
Date Resolved: Dev (4.2.7p230) 01 Nov 2011
|
|
|
|
Summary: Prior to ntp-4.2.7p230 ntp-keygen used a weak seed to
|
|
prepare a random number generator that was of good quality back
|
|
in the late 1990s. The random numbers produced was then used to
|
|
generate symmetric keys. In ntp-4.2.8 we use a current-technology
|
|
cryptographic random number generator, either RAND_bytes from
|
|
OpenSSL, or arc4random().
|
|
|
|
Mitigation - any of:
|
|
- Upgrade to 4.2.7p230 or later.
|
|
- Follow BCP and put 'restrict ... noquery' in your ntp.conf file.
|
|
|
|
Credit: This vulnerability was discovered in ntp-4.2.6 by
|
|
Stephen Roettger of the Google Security Team.
|
|
|
|
* Buffer overflow in crypto_recv()
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2667 / CVE-2014-9295 / VU#852879
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 7.5
|
|
Versions: All releases before 4.2.8
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8) 18 Dec 2014
|
|
|
|
Summary: When Autokey Authentication is enabled (i.e. the ntp.conf
|
|
file contains a 'crypto pw ...' directive) a remote attacker
|
|
can send a carefully crafted packet that can overflow a stack
|
|
buffer and potentially allow malicious code to be executed
|
|
with the privilege level of the ntpd process.
|
|
|
|
Mitigation - any of:
|
|
- Upgrade to 4.2.8, or later, or
|
|
- Disable Autokey Authentication by removing, or commenting out,
|
|
all configuration directives beginning with the crypto keyword
|
|
in your ntp.conf file.
|
|
|
|
Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by Stephen Roettger of the
|
|
Google Security Team.
|
|
|
|
* Buffer overflow in ctl_putdata()
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2668 / CVE-2014-9295 / VU#852879
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 7.5
|
|
Versions: All NTP4 releases before 4.2.8
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8) 18 Dec 2014
|
|
|
|
Summary: A remote attacker can send a carefully crafted packet that
|
|
can overflow a stack buffer and potentially allow malicious
|
|
code to be executed with the privilege level of the ntpd process.
|
|
|
|
Mitigation - any of:
|
|
- Upgrade to 4.2.8, or later.
|
|
- Follow BCP and put 'restrict ... noquery' in your ntp.conf file.
|
|
|
|
Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by Stephen Roettger of the
|
|
Google Security Team.
|
|
|
|
* Buffer overflow in configure()
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2669 / CVE-2014-9295 / VU#852879
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 7.5
|
|
Versions: All NTP4 releases before 4.2.8
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8) 18 Dec 2014
|
|
|
|
Summary: A remote attacker can send a carefully crafted packet that
|
|
can overflow a stack buffer and potentially allow malicious
|
|
code to be executed with the privilege level of the ntpd process.
|
|
|
|
Mitigation - any of:
|
|
- Upgrade to 4.2.8, or later.
|
|
- Follow BCP and put 'restrict ... noquery' in your ntp.conf file.
|
|
|
|
Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by Stephen Roettger of the
|
|
Google Security Team.
|
|
|
|
* receive(): missing return on error
|
|
|
|
References: Sec 2670 / CVE-2014-9296 / VU#852879
|
|
CVSS: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) Base Score: 5.0
|
|
Versions: All NTP4 releases before 4.2.8
|
|
Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8) 18 Dec 2014
|
|
|
|
Summary: Code in ntp_proto.c:receive() was missing a 'return;' in
|
|
the code path where an error was detected, which meant
|
|
processing did not stop when a specific rare error occurred.
|
|
We haven't found a way for this bug to affect system integrity.
|
|
If there is no way to affect system integrity the base CVSS
|
|
score for this bug is 0. If there is one avenue through which
|
|
system integrity can be partially affected, the base score
|
|
becomes a 5. If system integrity can be partially affected
|
|
via all three integrity metrics, the CVSS base score become 7.5.
|
|
|
|
Mitigation - any of:
|
|
- Upgrade to 4.2.8, or later,
|
|
- Remove or comment out all configuration directives
|
|
beginning with the crypto keyword in your ntp.conf file.
|
|
|
|
Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by Stephen Roettger of the
|
|
Google Security Team.
|
|
|
|
See http://support.ntp.org/security for more information.
|
|
|
|
New features / changes in this release:
|
|
|
|
Important Changes
|
|
|
|
* Internal NTP Era counters
|
|
|
|
The internal counters that track the "era" (range of years) we are in
|
|
rolls over every 136 years'. The current "era" started at the stroke of
|
|
midnight on 1 Jan 1900, and ends just before the stroke of midnight on
|
|
1 Jan 2036.
|
|
In the past, we have used the "midpoint" of the range to decide which
|
|
era we were in. Given the longevity of some products, it became clear
|
|
that it would be more functional to "look back" less, and "look forward"
|
|
more. We now compile a timestamp into the ntpd executable and when we
|
|
get a timestamp we us the "built-on" to tell us what era we are in.
|
|
This check "looks back" 10 years, and "looks forward" 126 years.
|
|
|
|
* ntpdc responses disabled by default
|
|
|
|
Dave Hart writes:
|
|
|
|
For a long time, ntpq and its mostly text-based mode 6 (control)
|
|
protocol have been preferred over ntpdc and its mode 7 (private
|
|
request) protocol for runtime queries and configuration. There has
|
|
been a goal of deprecating ntpdc, previously held back by numerous
|
|
capabilities exposed by ntpdc with no ntpq equivalent. I have been
|
|
adding commands to ntpq to cover these cases, and I believe I've
|
|
covered them all, though I've not compared command-by-command
|
|
recently.
|
|
|
|
As I've said previously, the binary mode 7 protocol involves a lot of
|
|
hand-rolled structure layout and byte-swapping code in both ntpd and
|
|
ntpdc which is hard to get right. As ntpd grows and changes, the
|
|
changes are difficult to expose via ntpdc while maintaining forward
|
|
and backward compatibility between ntpdc and ntpd. In contrast,
|
|
ntpq's text-based, label=value approach involves more code reuse and
|
|
allows compatible changes without extra work in most cases.
|
|
|
|
Mode 7 has always been defined as vendor/implementation-specific while
|
|
mode 6 is described in RFC 1305 and intended to be open to interoperate
|
|
with other implementations. There is an early draft of an updated
|
|
mode 6 description that likely will join the other NTPv4 RFCs
|
|
eventually. (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-odonoghue-ntpv4-control-01)
|
|
|
|
For these reasons, ntpd 4.2.7p230 by default disables processing of
|
|
ntpdc queries, reducing ntpd's attack surface and functionally
|
|
deprecating ntpdc. If you are in the habit of using ntpdc for certain
|
|
operations, please try the ntpq equivalent. If there's no equivalent,
|
|
please open a bug report at http://bugs.ntp.org./
|
|
|
|
In addition to the above, over 1100 issues have been resolved between
|
|
the 4.2.6 branch and 4.2.8. The ChangeLog file in the distribution
|
|
lists these.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.6p5 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2011/12/24)
|
|
|
|
Focus: Bug fixes
|
|
|
|
Severity: Medium
|
|
|
|
This is a recommended upgrade.
|
|
|
|
This release updates sys_rootdisp and sys_jitter calculations to match the
|
|
RFC specification, fixes a potential IPv6 address matching error for the
|
|
"nic" and "interface" configuration directives, suppresses the creation of
|
|
extraneous ephemeral associations for certain broadcastclient and
|
|
multicastclient configurations, cleans up some ntpq display issues, and
|
|
includes improvements to orphan mode, minor bugs fixes and code clean-ups.
|
|
|
|
New features / changes in this release:
|
|
|
|
ntpd
|
|
|
|
* Updated "nic" and "interface" IPv6 address handling to prevent
|
|
mismatches with localhost [::1] and wildcard [::] which resulted from
|
|
using the address/prefix format (e.g. fe80::/64)
|
|
* Fix orphan mode stratum incorrectly counting to infinity
|
|
* Orphan parent selection metric updated to includes missing ntohl()
|
|
* Non-printable stratum 16 refid no longer sent to ntp
|
|
* Duplicate ephemeral associations suppressed for broadcastclient and
|
|
multicastclient without broadcastdelay
|
|
* Exclude undetermined sys_refid from use in loopback TEST12
|
|
* Exclude MODE_SERVER responses from KoD rate limiting
|
|
* Include root delay in clock_update() sys_rootdisp calculations
|
|
* get_systime() updated to exclude sys_residual offset (which only
|
|
affected bits "below" sys_tick, the precision threshold)
|
|
* sys.peer jitter weighting corrected in sys_jitter calculation
|
|
|
|
ntpq
|
|
|
|
* -n option extended to include the billboard "server" column
|
|
* IPv6 addresses in the local column truncated to prevent overruns
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.6p4 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2011/09/22)
|
|
|
|
Focus: Bug fixes and portability improvements
|
|
|
|
Severity: Medium
|
|
|
|
This is a recommended upgrade.
|
|
|
|
This release includes build infrastructure updates, code
|
|
clean-ups, minor bug fixes, fixes for a number of minor
|
|
ref-clock issues, and documentation revisions.
|
|
|
|
Portability improvements affect AIX, HP-UX, Linux, OS X and 64-bit time_t.
|
|
|
|
New features / changes in this release:
|
|
|
|
Build system
|
|
|
|
* Fix checking for struct rtattr
|
|
* Update config.guess and config.sub for AIX
|
|
* Upgrade required version of autogen and libopts for building
|
|
from our source code repository
|
|
|
|
ntpd
|
|
|
|
* Back-ported several fixes for Coverity warnings from ntp-dev
|
|
* Fix a rare boundary condition in UNLINK_EXPR_SLIST()
|
|
* Allow "logconfig =allall" configuration directive
|
|
* Bind tentative IPv6 addresses on Linux
|
|
* Correct WWVB/Spectracom driver to timestamp CR instead of LF
|
|
* Improved tally bit handling to prevent incorrect ntpq peer status reports
|
|
* Exclude the Undisciplined Local Clock and ACTS drivers from the initial
|
|
candidate list unless they are designated a "prefer peer"
|
|
* Prevent the consideration of Undisciplined Local Clock or ACTS drivers for
|
|
selection during the 'tos orphanwait' period
|
|
* Prefer an Orphan Mode Parent over the Undisciplined Local Clock or ACTS
|
|
drivers
|
|
* Improved support of the Parse Refclock trusttime flag in Meinberg mode
|
|
* Back-port utility routines from ntp-dev: mprintf(), emalloc_zero()
|
|
* Added the NTPD_TICKADJ_PPM environment variable for specifying baseline
|
|
clock slew on Microsoft Windows
|
|
* Code cleanup in libntpq
|
|
|
|
ntpdc
|
|
|
|
* Fix timerstats reporting
|
|
|
|
ntpdate
|
|
|
|
* Reduce time required to set clock
|
|
* Allow a timeout greater than 2 seconds
|
|
|
|
sntp
|
|
|
|
* Backward incompatible command-line option change:
|
|
-l/--filelog changed -l/--logfile (to be consistent with ntpd)
|
|
|
|
Documentation
|
|
|
|
* Update html2man. Fix some tags in the .html files
|
|
* Distribute ntp-wait.html
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.6p3 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2011/01/03)
|
|
|
|
Focus: Bug fixes and portability improvements
|
|
|
|
Severity: Medium
|
|
|
|
This is a recommended upgrade.
|
|
|
|
This release includes build infrastructure updates, code
|
|
clean-ups, minor bug fixes, fixes for a number of minor
|
|
ref-clock issues, and documentation revisions.
|
|
|
|
Portability improvements in this release affect AIX, Atari FreeMiNT,
|
|
FreeBSD4, Linux and Microsoft Windows.
|
|
|
|
New features / changes in this release:
|
|
|
|
Build system
|
|
* Use lsb_release to get information about Linux distributions.
|
|
* 'test' is in /usr/bin (instead of /bin) on some systems.
|
|
* Basic sanity checks for the ChangeLog file.
|
|
* Source certain build files with ./filename for systems without . in PATH.
|
|
* IRIX portability fix.
|
|
* Use a single copy of the "libopts" code.
|
|
* autogen/libopts upgrade.
|
|
* configure.ac m4 quoting cleanup.
|
|
|
|
ntpd
|
|
* Do not bind to IN6_IFF_ANYCAST addresses.
|
|
* Log the reason for exiting under Windows.
|
|
* Multicast fixes for Windows.
|
|
* Interpolation fixes for Windows.
|
|
* IPv4 and IPv6 Multicast fixes.
|
|
* Manycast solicitation fixes and general repairs.
|
|
* JJY refclock cleanup.
|
|
* NMEA refclock improvements.
|
|
* Oncore debug message cleanup.
|
|
* Palisade refclock now builds under Linux.
|
|
* Give RAWDCF more baud rates.
|
|
* Support Truetime Satellite clocks under Windows.
|
|
* Support Arbiter 1093C Satellite clocks under Windows.
|
|
* Make sure that the "filegen" configuration command defaults to "enable".
|
|
* Range-check the status codes (plus other cleanup) in the RIPE-NCC driver.
|
|
* Prohibit 'includefile' directive in remote configuration command.
|
|
* Fix 'nic' interface bindings.
|
|
* Fix the way we link with openssl if openssl is installed in the base
|
|
system.
|
|
|
|
ntp-keygen
|
|
* Fix -V coredump.
|
|
* OpenSSL version display cleanup.
|
|
|
|
ntpdc
|
|
* Many counters should be treated as unsigned.
|
|
|
|
ntpdate
|
|
* Do not ignore replies with equal receive and transmit timestamps.
|
|
|
|
ntpq
|
|
* libntpq warning cleanup.
|
|
|
|
ntpsnmpd
|
|
* Correct SNMP type for "precision" and "resolution".
|
|
* Update the MIB from the draft version to RFC-5907.
|
|
|
|
sntp
|
|
* Display timezone offset when showing time for sntp in the local
|
|
timezone.
|
|
* Pay proper attention to RATE KoD packets.
|
|
* Fix a miscalculation of the offset.
|
|
* Properly parse empty lines in the key file.
|
|
* Logging cleanup.
|
|
* Use tv_usec correctly in set_time().
|
|
* Documentation cleanup.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.6p2 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2010/07/08)
|
|
|
|
Focus: Bug fixes and portability improvements
|
|
|
|
Severity: Medium
|
|
|
|
This is a recommended upgrade.
|
|
|
|
This release includes build infrastructure updates, code
|
|
clean-ups, minor bug fixes, fixes for a number of minor
|
|
ref-clock issues, improved KOD handling, OpenSSL related
|
|
updates and documentation revisions.
|
|
|
|
Portability improvements in this release affect Irix, Linux,
|
|
Mac OS, Microsoft Windows, OpenBSD and QNX6
|
|
|
|
New features / changes in this release:
|
|
|
|
ntpd
|
|
* Range syntax for the trustedkey configuration directive
|
|
* Unified IPv4 and IPv6 restrict lists
|
|
|
|
ntpdate
|
|
* Rate limiting and KOD handling
|
|
|
|
ntpsnmpd
|
|
* default connection to net-snmpd via a unix-domain socket
|
|
* command-line 'socket name' option
|
|
|
|
ntpq / ntpdc
|
|
* support for the "passwd ..." syntax
|
|
* key-type specific password prompts
|
|
|
|
sntp
|
|
* MD5 authentication of an ntpd
|
|
* Broadcast and crypto
|
|
* OpenSSL support
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.6p1 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2010/04/09)
|
|
|
|
Focus: Bug fixes, portability fixes, and documentation improvements
|
|
|
|
Severity: Medium
|
|
|
|
This is a recommended upgrade.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.6 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2009/12/08)
|
|
|
|
Focus: enhancements and bug fixes.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.4p8 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2009/12/08)
|
|
|
|
Focus: Security Fixes
|
|
|
|
Severity: HIGH
|
|
|
|
This release fixes the following high-severity vulnerability:
|
|
|
|
* [Sec 1331] DoS with mode 7 packets - CVE-2009-3563.
|
|
|
|
See http://support.ntp.org/security for more information.
|
|
|
|
NTP mode 7 (MODE_PRIVATE) is used by the ntpdc query and control utility.
|
|
In contrast, ntpq uses NTP mode 6 (MODE_CONTROL), while routine NTP time
|
|
transfers use modes 1 through 5. Upon receipt of an incorrect mode 7
|
|
request or a mode 7 error response from an address which is not listed
|
|
in a "restrict ... noquery" or "restrict ... ignore" statement, ntpd will
|
|
reply with a mode 7 error response (and log a message). In this case:
|
|
|
|
* If an attacker spoofs the source address of ntpd host A in a
|
|
mode 7 response packet sent to ntpd host B, both A and B will
|
|
continuously send each other error responses, for as long as
|
|
those packets get through.
|
|
|
|
* If an attacker spoofs an address of ntpd host A in a mode 7
|
|
response packet sent to ntpd host A, A will respond to itself
|
|
endlessly, consuming CPU and logging excessively.
|
|
|
|
Credit for finding this vulnerability goes to Robin Park and Dmitri
|
|
Vinokurov of Alcatel-Lucent.
|
|
|
|
THIS IS A STRONGLY RECOMMENDED UPGRADE.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
ntpd now syncs to refclocks right away.
|
|
|
|
Backward-Incompatible changes:
|
|
|
|
ntpd no longer accepts '-v name' or '-V name' to define internal variables.
|
|
Use '--var name' or '--dvar name' instead. (Bug 817)
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.4p7 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2009/05/04)
|
|
|
|
Focus: Security and Bug Fixes
|
|
|
|
Severity: HIGH
|
|
|
|
This release fixes the following high-severity vulnerability:
|
|
|
|
* [Sec 1151] Remote exploit if autokey is enabled. CVE-2009-1252
|
|
|
|
See http://support.ntp.org/security for more information.
|
|
|
|
If autokey is enabled (if ntp.conf contains a "crypto pw whatever"
|
|
line) then a carefully crafted packet sent to the machine will cause
|
|
a buffer overflow and possible execution of injected code, running
|
|
with the privileges of the ntpd process (often root).
|
|
|
|
Credit for finding this vulnerability goes to Chris Ries of CMU.
|
|
|
|
This release fixes the following low-severity vulnerabilities:
|
|
|
|
* [Sec 1144] limited (two byte) buffer overflow in ntpq. CVE-2009-0159
|
|
Credit for finding this vulnerability goes to Geoff Keating of Apple.
|
|
|
|
* [Sec 1149] use SO_EXCLUSIVEADDRUSE on Windows
|
|
Credit for finding this issue goes to Dave Hart.
|
|
|
|
This release fixes a number of bugs and adds some improvements:
|
|
|
|
* Improved logging
|
|
* Fix many compiler warnings
|
|
* Many fixes and improvements for Windows
|
|
* Adds support for AIX 6.1
|
|
* Resolves some issues under MacOS X and Solaris
|
|
|
|
THIS IS A STRONGLY RECOMMENDED UPGRADE.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.4p6 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2009/01/07)
|
|
|
|
Focus: Security Fix
|
|
|
|
Severity: Low
|
|
|
|
This release fixes oCERT.org's CVE-2009-0021, a vulnerability affecting
|
|
the OpenSSL library relating to the incorrect checking of the return
|
|
value of EVP_VerifyFinal function.
|
|
|
|
Credit for finding this issue goes to the Google Security Team for
|
|
finding the original issue with OpenSSL, and to ocert.org for finding
|
|
the problem in NTP and telling us about it.
|
|
|
|
This is a recommended upgrade.
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.4p5 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2008/08/17)
|
|
|
|
Focus: Minor Bugfixes
|
|
|
|
This release fixes a number of Windows-specific ntpd bugs and
|
|
platform-independent ntpdate bugs. A logging bugfix has been applied
|
|
to the ONCORE driver.
|
|
|
|
The "dynamic" keyword and is now obsolete and deferred binding to local
|
|
interfaces is the new default. The minimum time restriction for the
|
|
interface update interval has been dropped.
|
|
|
|
A number of minor build system and documentation fixes are included.
|
|
|
|
This is a recommended upgrade for Windows.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.4p4 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2007/09/10)
|
|
|
|
Focus: Minor Bugfixes
|
|
|
|
This release updates certain copyright information, fixes several display
|
|
bugs in ntpdc, avoids SIGIO interrupting malloc(), cleans up file descriptor
|
|
shutdown in the parse refclock driver, removes some lint from the code,
|
|
stops accessing certain buffers immediately after they were freed, fixes
|
|
a problem with non-command-line specification of -6, and allows the loopback
|
|
interface to share addresses with other interfaces.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.4p3 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2007/06/29)
|
|
|
|
Focus: Minor Bugfixes
|
|
|
|
This release fixes a bug in Windows that made it difficult to
|
|
terminate ntpd under windows.
|
|
This is a recommended upgrade for Windows.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.4p2 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2007/06/19)
|
|
|
|
Focus: Minor Bugfixes
|
|
|
|
This release fixes a multicast mode authentication problem,
|
|
an error in NTP packet handling on Windows that could lead to
|
|
ntpd crashing, and several other minor bugs. Handling of
|
|
multicast interfaces and logging configuration were improved.
|
|
The required versions of autogen and libopts were incremented.
|
|
This is a recommended upgrade for Windows and multicast users.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.4 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2006/12/31)
|
|
|
|
Focus: enhancements and bug fixes.
|
|
|
|
Dynamic interface rescanning was added to simplify the use of ntpd in
|
|
conjunction with DHCP. GNU AutoGen is used for its command-line options
|
|
processing. Separate PPS devices are supported for PARSE refclocks, MD5
|
|
signatures are now provided for the release files. Drivers have been
|
|
added for some new ref-clocks and have been removed for some older
|
|
ref-clocks. This release also includes other improvements, documentation
|
|
and bug fixes.
|
|
|
|
K&R C is no longer supported as of NTP-4.2.4. We are now aiming for ANSI
|
|
C support.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
NTP 4.2.0 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2003/10/15)
|
|
|
|
Focus: enhancements and bug fixes.
|