Since the previous algorithm, based on bit shifting, does not scale with large replay windows, the algorithm used here is based on RFC 6479: IPsec Anti-Replay Algorithm without Bit Shifting. The replay window will be fast to be updated, but will cost as many bits in RAM as its size. The previous implementation did not provide a lock on the replay window, which may lead to replay issues. Reviewed by: ae Obtained from: emeric.poupon@stormshield.eu Sponsored by: Stormshield Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8468
1205 lines
29 KiB
C
1205 lines
29 KiB
C
/* $FreeBSD$ */
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/* $OpenBSD: ip_ah.c,v 1.63 2001/06/26 06:18:58 angelos Exp $ */
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/*-
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* The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org),
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* Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and
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* Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de).
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*
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* The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis
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* for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995.
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*
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* Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996,
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* by Angelos D. Keromytis.
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*
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* Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis
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* and Niels Provos.
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*
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* Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis and Niklas Hallqvist.
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*
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* Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis,
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* Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos.
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* Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist.
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* Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee
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* is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in
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* all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or
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* modification of this software.
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* You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please
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* contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license
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* so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to
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* all.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY
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* REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE
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* MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE.
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*/
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#include "opt_inet.h"
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#include "opt_inet6.h"
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/mbuf.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/syslog.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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#include <sys/lock.h>
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#include <sys/rwlock.h>
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <net/if.h>
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#include <net/vnet.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
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#include <netinet/ip.h>
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#include <netinet/ip_ecn.h>
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#include <netinet/ip6.h>
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#include <netipsec/ipsec.h>
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#include <netipsec/ah.h>
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#include <netipsec/ah_var.h>
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#include <netipsec/xform.h>
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#ifdef INET6
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#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
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#include <netipsec/ipsec6.h>
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#include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h>
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#endif
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#include <netipsec/key.h>
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#include <netipsec/key_debug.h>
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#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
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/*
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* Return header size in bytes. The old protocol did not support
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* the replay counter; the new protocol always includes the counter.
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*/
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#define HDRSIZE(sav) \
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(((sav)->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? \
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sizeof (struct ah) : sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t))
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/*
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* Return authenticator size in bytes, based on a field in the
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* algorithm descriptor.
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*/
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#define AUTHSIZE(sav) ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 16 : \
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xform_ah_authsize((sav)->tdb_authalgxform))
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VNET_DEFINE(int, ah_enable) = 1; /* control flow of packets with AH */
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VNET_DEFINE(int, ah_cleartos) = 1; /* clear ip_tos when doing AH calc */
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VNET_PCPUSTAT_DEFINE(struct ahstat, ahstat);
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VNET_PCPUSTAT_SYSINIT(ahstat);
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#ifdef VIMAGE
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VNET_PCPUSTAT_SYSUNINIT(ahstat);
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#endif /* VIMAGE */
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#ifdef INET
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SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_ah);
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SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, ah_enable,
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CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW, &VNET_NAME(ah_enable), 0, "");
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SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, ah_cleartos,
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CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW, &VNET_NAME(ah_cleartos), 0, "");
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SYSCTL_VNET_PCPUSTAT(_net_inet_ah, IPSECCTL_STATS, stats, struct ahstat,
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ahstat, "AH statistics (struct ahstat, netipsec/ah_var.h)");
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#endif
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static unsigned char ipseczeroes[256]; /* larger than an ip6 extension hdr */
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static int ah_input_cb(struct cryptop*);
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static int ah_output_cb(struct cryptop*);
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int
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xform_ah_authsize(struct auth_hash *esph)
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{
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int alen;
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if (esph == NULL)
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return 0;
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switch (esph->type) {
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case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
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case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
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case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
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alen = esph->hashsize / 2; /* RFC4868 2.3 */
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break;
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case CRYPTO_AES_128_NIST_GMAC:
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case CRYPTO_AES_192_NIST_GMAC:
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case CRYPTO_AES_256_NIST_GMAC:
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alen = esph->hashsize;
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break;
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default:
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alen = AH_HMAC_HASHLEN;
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break;
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}
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return alen;
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}
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/*
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* NB: this is public for use by the PF_KEY support.
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*/
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struct auth_hash *
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ah_algorithm_lookup(int alg)
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{
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if (alg > SADB_AALG_MAX)
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return NULL;
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switch (alg) {
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case SADB_X_AALG_NULL:
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return &auth_hash_null;
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case SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC:
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return &auth_hash_hmac_md5;
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case SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC:
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return &auth_hash_hmac_sha1;
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case SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC:
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return &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160;
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case SADB_X_AALG_MD5:
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return &auth_hash_key_md5;
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case SADB_X_AALG_SHA:
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return &auth_hash_key_sha1;
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case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256:
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return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256;
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case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384:
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return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384;
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case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512:
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return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512;
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case SADB_X_AALG_AES128GMAC:
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return &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_128;
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case SADB_X_AALG_AES192GMAC:
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return &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_192;
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case SADB_X_AALG_AES256GMAC:
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return &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_256;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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size_t
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ah_hdrsiz(struct secasvar *sav)
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{
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size_t size;
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if (sav != NULL) {
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int authsize;
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IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, ("null xform"));
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/*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/
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authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
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size = roundup(authsize, sizeof (u_int32_t)) + HDRSIZE(sav);
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} else {
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/* default guess */
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size = sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t) + 16;
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}
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return size;
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}
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/*
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* NB: public for use by esp_init.
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*/
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int
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ah_init0(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp, struct cryptoini *cria)
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{
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struct auth_hash *thash;
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int keylen;
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thash = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth);
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if (thash == NULL) {
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DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported authentication algorithm %u\n",
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__func__, sav->alg_auth));
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return EINVAL;
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}
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/*
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* Verify the replay state block allocation is consistent with
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* the protocol type. We check here so we can make assumptions
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* later during protocol processing.
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*/
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/* NB: replay state is setup elsewhere (sigh) */
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if (((sav->flags&SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) ^ (sav->replay != NULL)) {
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DPRINTF(("%s: replay state block inconsistency, "
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"%s algorithm %s replay state\n", __func__,
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(sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? "old" : "new",
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sav->replay == NULL ? "without" : "with"));
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return EINVAL;
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}
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if (sav->key_auth == NULL) {
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DPRINTF(("%s: no authentication key for %s algorithm\n",
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__func__, thash->name));
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return EINVAL;
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}
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keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth);
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if (keylen != thash->keysize && thash->keysize != 0) {
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DPRINTF(("%s: invalid keylength %d, algorithm %s requires "
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"keysize %d\n", __func__,
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keylen, thash->name, thash->keysize));
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return EINVAL;
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}
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sav->tdb_xform = xsp;
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sav->tdb_authalgxform = thash;
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/* Initialize crypto session. */
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bzero(cria, sizeof (*cria));
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cria->cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type;
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cria->cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
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cria->cri_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
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cria->cri_mlen = AUTHSIZE(sav);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* ah_init() is called when an SPI is being set up.
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*/
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static int
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ah_init(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp)
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{
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struct cryptoini cria;
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int error;
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error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria);
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return error ? error :
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crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, &cria, V_crypto_support);
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}
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/*
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* Paranoia.
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*
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* NB: public for use by esp_zeroize (XXX).
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*/
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int
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ah_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav)
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{
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int err;
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if (sav->key_auth)
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bzero(sav->key_auth->key_data, _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth));
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err = crypto_freesession(sav->tdb_cryptoid);
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sav->tdb_cryptoid = 0;
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sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL;
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sav->tdb_xform = NULL;
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return err;
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}
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/*
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* Massage IPv4/IPv6 headers for AH processing.
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*/
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static int
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ah_massage_headers(struct mbuf **m0, int proto, int skip, int alg, int out)
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{
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struct mbuf *m = *m0;
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unsigned char *ptr;
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int off, count;
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#ifdef INET
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struct ip *ip;
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#endif /* INET */
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#ifdef INET6
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struct ip6_ext *ip6e;
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struct ip6_hdr ip6;
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int alloc, len, ad;
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#endif /* INET6 */
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switch (proto) {
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#ifdef INET
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case AF_INET:
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/*
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* This is the least painful way of dealing with IPv4 header
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* and option processing -- just make sure they're in
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* contiguous memory.
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*/
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*m0 = m = m_pullup(m, skip);
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if (m == NULL) {
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DPRINTF(("%s: m_pullup failed\n", __func__));
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return ENOBUFS;
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}
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/* Fix the IP header */
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ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
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if (V_ah_cleartos)
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ip->ip_tos = 0;
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ip->ip_ttl = 0;
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ip->ip_sum = 0;
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if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK)
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ip->ip_off &= htons(IP_DF);
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else
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ip->ip_off = htons(0);
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ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + sizeof(struct ip);
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/* IPv4 option processing */
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for (off = sizeof(struct ip); off < skip;) {
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if (ptr[off] == IPOPT_EOL || ptr[off] == IPOPT_NOP ||
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off + 1 < skip)
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;
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else {
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DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option length for "
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"option %d\n", __func__, ptr[off]));
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m_freem(m);
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return EINVAL;
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}
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switch (ptr[off]) {
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case IPOPT_EOL:
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off = skip; /* End the loop. */
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break;
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case IPOPT_NOP:
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off++;
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break;
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case IPOPT_SECURITY: /* 0x82 */
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case 0x85: /* Extended security. */
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case 0x86: /* Commercial security. */
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case 0x94: /* Router alert */
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case 0x95: /* RFC1770 */
|
|
/* Sanity check for option length. */
|
|
if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
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DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option "
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"length for option %d\n",
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__func__, ptr[off]));
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m_freem(m);
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return EINVAL;
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}
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off += ptr[off + 1];
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break;
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|
|
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case IPOPT_LSRR:
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case IPOPT_SSRR:
|
|
/* Sanity check for option length. */
|
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if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
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DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option "
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|
"length for option %d\n",
|
|
__func__, ptr[off]));
|
|
|
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m_freem(m);
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return EINVAL;
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}
|
|
|
|
/*
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|
* On output, if we have either of the
|
|
* source routing options, we should
|
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* swap the destination address of the
|
|
* IP header with the last address
|
|
* specified in the option, as that is
|
|
* what the destination's IP header
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* will look like.
|
|
*/
|
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if (out)
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bcopy(ptr + off + ptr[off + 1] -
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sizeof(struct in_addr),
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|
&(ip->ip_dst), sizeof(struct in_addr));
|
|
|
|
/* Fall through */
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Sanity check for option length. */
|
|
if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
|
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DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option "
|
|
"length for option %d\n",
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|
__func__, ptr[off]));
|
|
m_freem(m);
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|
return EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Zeroize all other options. */
|
|
count = ptr[off + 1];
|
|
bcopy(ipseczeroes, ptr, count);
|
|
off += count;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity check. */
|
|
if (off > skip) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: malformed IPv4 options header\n",
|
|
__func__));
|
|
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* INET */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
case AF_INET6: /* Ugly... */
|
|
/* Copy and "cook" the IPv6 header. */
|
|
m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), (caddr_t) &ip6);
|
|
|
|
/* We don't do IPv6 Jumbograms. */
|
|
if (ip6.ip6_plen == 0) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported IPv6 jumbogram\n", __func__));
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
return EMSGSIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ip6.ip6_flow = 0;
|
|
ip6.ip6_hlim = 0;
|
|
ip6.ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK;
|
|
ip6.ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION;
|
|
|
|
/* Scoped address handling. */
|
|
if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_src))
|
|
ip6.ip6_src.s6_addr16[1] = 0;
|
|
if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_dst))
|
|
ip6.ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1] = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Done with IPv6 header. */
|
|
m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), (caddr_t) &ip6);
|
|
|
|
/* Let's deal with the remaining headers (if any). */
|
|
if (skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) > 0) {
|
|
if (m->m_len <= skip) {
|
|
ptr = (unsigned char *) malloc(
|
|
skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
|
|
M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT);
|
|
if (ptr == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate memory"
|
|
"for IPv6 headers\n",__func__));
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
return ENOBUFS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copy all the protocol headers after
|
|
* the IPv6 header.
|
|
*/
|
|
m_copydata(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
|
|
skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr);
|
|
alloc = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* No need to allocate memory. */
|
|
ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) +
|
|
sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);
|
|
alloc = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
off = ip6.ip6_nxt & 0xff; /* Next header type. */
|
|
|
|
for (len = 0; len < skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);)
|
|
switch (off) {
|
|
case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS:
|
|
case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
|
|
ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Process the mutable/immutable
|
|
* options -- borrows heavily from the
|
|
* KAME code.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (count = len + sizeof(struct ip6_ext);
|
|
count < len + ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);) {
|
|
if (ptr[count] == IP6OPT_PAD1) {
|
|
count++;
|
|
continue; /* Skip padding. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity check. */
|
|
if (count > len +
|
|
((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3)) {
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
|
|
/* Free, if we allocated. */
|
|
if (alloc)
|
|
free(ptr, M_XDATA);
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ad = ptr[count + 1];
|
|
|
|
/* If mutable option, zeroize. */
|
|
if (ptr[count] & IP6OPT_MUTABLE)
|
|
bcopy(ipseczeroes, ptr + count,
|
|
ptr[count + 1]);
|
|
|
|
count += ad;
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity check. */
|
|
if (count >
|
|
skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) {
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
|
|
/* Free, if we allocated. */
|
|
if (alloc)
|
|
free(ptr, M_XDATA);
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Advance. */
|
|
len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);
|
|
off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_ROUTING:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Always include routing headers in
|
|
* computation.
|
|
*/
|
|
ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len);
|
|
len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);
|
|
off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: unexpected IPv6 header type %d",
|
|
__func__, off));
|
|
if (alloc)
|
|
free(ptr, M_XDATA);
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Copyback and free, if we allocated. */
|
|
if (alloc) {
|
|
m_copyback(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
|
|
skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr);
|
|
free(ptr, M_XDATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* INET6 */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ah_input() gets called to verify that an input packet
|
|
* passes authentication.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
|
|
{
|
|
char buf[128];
|
|
struct auth_hash *ahx;
|
|
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
|
|
struct newah *ah;
|
|
int hl, rplen, authsize, error;
|
|
|
|
struct cryptodesc *crda;
|
|
struct cryptop *crp;
|
|
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->key_auth != NULL, ("null authentication key"));
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL,
|
|
("null authentication xform"));
|
|
|
|
/* Figure out header size. */
|
|
rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
|
|
|
|
/* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */
|
|
IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct newah *, m, skip, rplen);
|
|
if (ah == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_input: cannot pullup header\n"));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops); /*XXX*/
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
return ENOBUFS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check replay window, if applicable. */
|
|
if (sav->replay && !ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(ah->ah_seq), sav)) {
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_replay);
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: packet replay failure: %s\n", __func__,
|
|
ipsec_logsastr(sav, buf, sizeof(buf))));
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
return ENOBUFS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Verify AH header length. */
|
|
hl = ah->ah_len * sizeof (u_int32_t);
|
|
ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
|
|
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
|
|
if (hl != authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: bad authenticator length %u (expecting %lu)"
|
|
" for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, hl,
|
|
(u_long) (authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)),
|
|
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_badauthl);
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
return EACCES;
|
|
}
|
|
AHSTAT_ADD(ahs_ibytes, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hl);
|
|
|
|
/* Get crypto descriptors. */
|
|
crp = crypto_getreq(1);
|
|
if (crp == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptor\n",__func__));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto);
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
return ENOBUFS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crda = crp->crp_desc;
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("null crypto descriptor"));
|
|
|
|
crda->crd_skip = 0;
|
|
crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len;
|
|
crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen;
|
|
|
|
/* Authentication operation. */
|
|
crda->crd_alg = ahx->type;
|
|
crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
|
|
crda->crd_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */
|
|
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto) +
|
|
skip + rplen + authsize, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
|
|
if (tc == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n", __func__));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto);
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
return ENOBUFS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Save the authenticator, the skipped portion of the packet,
|
|
* and the AH header.
|
|
*/
|
|
m_copydata(m, 0, skip + rplen + authsize, (caddr_t)(tc+1));
|
|
|
|
/* Zeroize the authenticator on the packet. */
|
|
m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes);
|
|
|
|
/* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */
|
|
error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
|
|
skip, ahx->type, 0);
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
/* NB: mbuf is free'd by ah_massage_headers */
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops);
|
|
free(tc, M_XDATA);
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Crypto operation descriptor. */
|
|
crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */
|
|
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
|
|
crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
|
|
crp->crp_callback = ah_input_cb;
|
|
crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
|
|
crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc;
|
|
|
|
/* These are passed as-is to the callback. */
|
|
tc->tc_spi = sav->spi;
|
|
tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst;
|
|
tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto;
|
|
tc->tc_nxt = ah->ah_nxt;
|
|
tc->tc_protoff = protoff;
|
|
tc->tc_skip = skip;
|
|
KEY_ADDREFSA(sav);
|
|
tc->tc_sav = sav;
|
|
return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* AH input callback from the crypto driver.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
|
|
{
|
|
char buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
|
|
int rplen, error, skip, protoff;
|
|
unsigned char calc[AH_ALEN_MAX];
|
|
struct mbuf *m;
|
|
struct cryptodesc *crd;
|
|
struct auth_hash *ahx;
|
|
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
|
|
struct secasvar *sav;
|
|
struct secasindex *saidx;
|
|
u_int8_t nxt;
|
|
caddr_t ptr;
|
|
int authsize;
|
|
|
|
crd = crp->crp_desc;
|
|
|
|
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque;
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("null opaque crypto data area!"));
|
|
skip = tc->tc_skip;
|
|
nxt = tc->tc_nxt;
|
|
protoff = tc->tc_protoff;
|
|
m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
|
|
|
|
sav = tc->tc_sav;
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA!"));
|
|
|
|
saidx = &sav->sah->saidx;
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET ||
|
|
saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6,
|
|
("unexpected protocol family %u", saidx->dst.sa.sa_family));
|
|
|
|
ahx = (struct auth_hash *) sav->tdb_authalgxform;
|
|
|
|
/* Check for crypto errors. */
|
|
if (crp->crp_etype) {
|
|
if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
|
|
sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
|
|
|
|
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN)
|
|
return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
|
|
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_noxform);
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype));
|
|
error = crp->crp_etype;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
} else {
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]);
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp); /* No longer needed. */
|
|
crp = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen... */
|
|
if (m == NULL) {
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto);
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__));
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Figure out header size. */
|
|
rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
|
|
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
|
|
|
|
/* Copy authenticator off the packet. */
|
|
m_copydata(m, skip + rplen, authsize, calc);
|
|
|
|
/* Verify authenticator. */
|
|
ptr = (caddr_t) (tc + 1);
|
|
if (timingsafe_bcmp(ptr + skip + rplen, calc, authsize)) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: authentication hash mismatch for packet "
|
|
"in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
|
|
ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_badauth);
|
|
error = EACCES;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Fix the Next Protocol field. */
|
|
((u_int8_t *) ptr)[protoff] = nxt;
|
|
|
|
/* Copyback the saved (uncooked) network headers. */
|
|
m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr);
|
|
free(tc, M_XDATA), tc = NULL; /* No longer needed */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Header is now authenticated.
|
|
*/
|
|
m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR|M_AUTHIPDGM;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Update replay sequence number, if appropriate.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sav->replay) {
|
|
u_int32_t seq;
|
|
|
|
m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newah, ah_seq),
|
|
sizeof (seq), (caddr_t) &seq);
|
|
if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) {
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_replay);
|
|
error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX as above*/
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Remove the AH header and authenticator from the mbuf.
|
|
*/
|
|
error = m_striphdr(m, skip, rplen + authsize);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: mangled mbuf chain for SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
|
|
ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops);
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family) {
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff);
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff);
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
default:
|
|
panic("%s: Unexpected address family: %d saidx=%p", __func__,
|
|
saidx->dst.sa.sa_family, saidx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
|
|
return error;
|
|
bad:
|
|
if (sav)
|
|
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
|
|
if (m != NULL)
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
if (tc != NULL)
|
|
free(tc, M_XDATA);
|
|
if (crp != NULL)
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* AH output routine, called by ipsec[46]_process_packet().
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
ah_output(struct mbuf *m, struct ipsecrequest *isr, struct mbuf **mp,
|
|
int skip, int protoff)
|
|
{
|
|
char buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
|
|
struct secasvar *sav;
|
|
struct auth_hash *ahx;
|
|
struct cryptodesc *crda;
|
|
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
|
|
struct mbuf *mi;
|
|
struct cryptop *crp;
|
|
u_int16_t iplen;
|
|
int error, rplen, authsize, maxpacketsize, roff;
|
|
u_int8_t prot;
|
|
struct newah *ah;
|
|
|
|
sav = isr->sav;
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
|
|
ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(ahx != NULL, ("null authentication xform"));
|
|
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_output);
|
|
|
|
/* Figure out header size. */
|
|
rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
|
|
|
|
/* Check for maximum packet size violations. */
|
|
switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) {
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* INET */
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* INET6 */
|
|
default:
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: unknown/unsupported protocol family %u, "
|
|
"SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
|
|
sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
|
|
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_nopf);
|
|
error = EPFNOSUPPORT;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
|
|
if (rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len > maxpacketsize) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big "
|
|
"(len %u, max len %u)\n", __func__,
|
|
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi),
|
|
rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len, maxpacketsize));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_toobig);
|
|
error = EMSGSIZE;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Update the counters. */
|
|
AHSTAT_ADD(ahs_obytes, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip);
|
|
|
|
m = m_unshare(m, M_NOWAIT);
|
|
if (m == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
|
|
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops);
|
|
error = ENOBUFS;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Inject AH header. */
|
|
mi = m_makespace(m, skip, rplen + authsize, &roff);
|
|
if (mi == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to inject %u byte AH header for SA "
|
|
"%s/%08lx\n", __func__,
|
|
rplen + authsize,
|
|
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops); /*XXX differs from openbsd */
|
|
error = ENOBUFS;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The AH header is guaranteed by m_makespace() to be in
|
|
* contiguous memory, at roff bytes offset into the returned mbuf.
|
|
*/
|
|
ah = (struct newah *)(mtod(mi, caddr_t) + roff);
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the AH header. */
|
|
m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (caddr_t) &ah->ah_nxt);
|
|
ah->ah_len = (rplen + authsize - sizeof(struct ah)) / sizeof(u_int32_t);
|
|
ah->ah_reserve = 0;
|
|
ah->ah_spi = sav->spi;
|
|
|
|
/* Zeroize authenticator. */
|
|
m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes);
|
|
|
|
/* Insert packet replay counter, as requested. */
|
|
if (sav->replay) {
|
|
SECASVAR_LOCK(sav);
|
|
|
|
if (sav->replay->count == ~0 &&
|
|
(sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) {
|
|
SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav);
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: replay counter wrapped for SA %s/%08lx\n",
|
|
__func__, ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf,
|
|
sizeof(buf)), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_wrap);
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef REGRESSION
|
|
/* Emulate replay attack when ipsec_replay is TRUE. */
|
|
if (!V_ipsec_replay)
|
|
#endif
|
|
sav->replay->count++;
|
|
ah->ah_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count);
|
|
|
|
SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get crypto descriptors. */
|
|
crp = crypto_getreq(1);
|
|
if (crp == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n",
|
|
__func__));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto);
|
|
error = ENOBUFS;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crda = crp->crp_desc;
|
|
|
|
crda->crd_skip = 0;
|
|
crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen;
|
|
crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len;
|
|
|
|
/* Authentication operation. */
|
|
crda->crd_alg = ahx->type;
|
|
crda->crd_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
|
|
crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */
|
|
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(
|
|
sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + skip, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
|
|
if (tc == NULL) {
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n", __func__));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto);
|
|
error = ENOBUFS;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Save the skipped portion of the packet. */
|
|
m_copydata(m, 0, skip, (caddr_t) (tc + 1));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fix IP header length on the header used for
|
|
* authentication. We don't need to fix the original
|
|
* header length as it will be fixed by our caller.
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) {
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
bcopy(((caddr_t)(tc + 1)) +
|
|
offsetof(struct ip, ip_len),
|
|
(caddr_t) &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t));
|
|
iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize);
|
|
m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip, ip_len),
|
|
sizeof(u_int16_t), (caddr_t) &iplen);
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* INET */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
bcopy(((caddr_t)(tc + 1)) +
|
|
offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen),
|
|
(caddr_t) &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t));
|
|
iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize);
|
|
m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen),
|
|
sizeof(u_int16_t), (caddr_t) &iplen);
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* INET6 */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fix the Next Header field in saved header. */
|
|
((u_int8_t *) (tc + 1))[protoff] = IPPROTO_AH;
|
|
|
|
/* Update the Next Protocol field in the IP header. */
|
|
prot = IPPROTO_AH;
|
|
m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (caddr_t) &prot);
|
|
|
|
/* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */
|
|
error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
|
|
skip, ahx->type, 1);
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
m = NULL; /* mbuf was free'd by ah_massage_headers. */
|
|
free(tc, M_XDATA);
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Crypto operation descriptor. */
|
|
crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */
|
|
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
|
|
crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
|
|
crp->crp_callback = ah_output_cb;
|
|
crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
|
|
crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc;
|
|
|
|
/* These are passed as-is to the callback. */
|
|
key_addref(isr->sp);
|
|
tc->tc_isr = isr;
|
|
KEY_ADDREFSA(sav);
|
|
tc->tc_sav = sav;
|
|
tc->tc_spi = sav->spi;
|
|
tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst;
|
|
tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto;
|
|
tc->tc_skip = skip;
|
|
tc->tc_protoff = protoff;
|
|
|
|
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
|
|
bad:
|
|
if (m)
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* AH output callback from the crypto driver.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
ah_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
|
|
{
|
|
int skip, protoff, error;
|
|
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
|
|
struct ipsecrequest *isr;
|
|
struct secasvar *sav;
|
|
struct mbuf *m;
|
|
caddr_t ptr;
|
|
|
|
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque;
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("null opaque data area!"));
|
|
skip = tc->tc_skip;
|
|
protoff = tc->tc_protoff;
|
|
ptr = (caddr_t) (tc + 1);
|
|
m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
|
|
|
|
isr = tc->tc_isr;
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(isr->sp != NULL, ("NULL isr->sp"));
|
|
IPSECREQUEST_LOCK(isr);
|
|
sav = tc->tc_sav;
|
|
/* With the isr lock released SA pointer can be updated. */
|
|
if (sav != isr->sav) {
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_notdb);
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: SA expired while in crypto\n", __func__));
|
|
error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check for crypto errors. */
|
|
if (crp->crp_etype) {
|
|
if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
|
|
sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
|
|
|
|
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
|
|
IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr);
|
|
return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_noxform);
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype));
|
|
error = crp->crp_etype;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen... */
|
|
if (m == NULL) {
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto);
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__));
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copy original headers (with the new protocol number) back
|
|
* in place.
|
|
*/
|
|
m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr);
|
|
|
|
/* No longer needed. */
|
|
free(tc, M_XDATA);
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef REGRESSION
|
|
/* Emulate man-in-the-middle attack when ipsec_integrity is TRUE. */
|
|
if (V_ipsec_integrity) {
|
|
int alen;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Corrupt HMAC if we want to test integrity verification of
|
|
* the other side.
|
|
*/
|
|
alen = AUTHSIZE(sav);
|
|
m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, ipseczeroes);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */
|
|
error = ipsec_process_done(m, isr);
|
|
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
|
|
IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr);
|
|
KEY_FREESP(&isr->sp);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
bad:
|
|
if (sav)
|
|
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
|
|
IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr);
|
|
KEY_FREESP(&isr->sp);
|
|
if (m)
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
free(tc, M_XDATA);
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct xformsw ah_xformsw = {
|
|
XF_AH, XFT_AUTH, "IPsec AH",
|
|
ah_init, ah_zeroize, ah_input, ah_output,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
ah_attach(void)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
xform_register(&ah_xformsw);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SYSINIT(ah_xform_init, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE, ah_attach, NULL);
|