d/freebsd-dev
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
1a125d6d85
freebsd-dev/sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c
Gleb Smirnoff 8ad458a471 Do not reduce ip_len by size of IP header in the ip_input() 
before passing a packet to protocol input routines.
  For several protocols this mean that now protocol needs to
do subtraction itself, and for another half this means that
we do not need to add header length back to the packet.

  Make ip_stripoptions() to adjust ip_len, since now we enter
this function with a packet header whose ip_len does represent
length of entire packet, not payload only.
2012-10-23 08:33:13 +00:00

1222 lines
30 KiB
C
Raw Blame History

/* $FreeBSD$ */
/* $OpenBSD: ip_ah.c,v 1.63 2001/06/26 06:18:58 angelos Exp $ */
/*-
* The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org),
* Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and
* Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de).
*
* The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis
* for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995.
*
* Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996,
* by Angelos D. Keromytis.
*
* Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis
* and Niels Provos.
*
* Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis and Niklas Hallqvist.
*
* Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis,
* Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos.
* Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist.
* Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis.
*
* Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee
* is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in
* all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or
* modification of this software.
* You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please
* contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license
* so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to
* all.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY
* REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE
* MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE.
*/
#include "opt_inet.h"
#include "opt_inet6.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/mbuf.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/syslog.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <net/vnet.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <netinet/ip_ecn.h>
#include <netinet/ip6.h>
#include <net/route.h>
#include <netipsec/ipsec.h>
#include <netipsec/ah.h>
#include <netipsec/ah_var.h>
#include <netipsec/xform.h>
#ifdef INET6
#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
#include <netipsec/ipsec6.h>
#include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h>
#endif
#include <netipsec/key.h>
#include <netipsec/key_debug.h>
#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
/*
* Return header size in bytes. The old protocol did not support
* the replay counter; the new protocol always includes the counter.
*/
#define HDRSIZE(sav) \
(((sav)->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? \
sizeof (struct ah) : sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t))
/*
* Return authenticator size in bytes. The old protocol is known
* to use a fixed 16-byte authenticator. The new algorithm use 12-byte
* authenticator.
*/
#define AUTHSIZE(sav) ah_authsize(sav)
VNET_DEFINE(int, ah_enable) = 1; /* control flow of packets with AH */
VNET_DEFINE(int, ah_cleartos) = 1; /* clear ip_tos when doing AH calc */
VNET_DEFINE(struct ahstat, ahstat);
#ifdef INET
SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_ah);
SYSCTL_VNET_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO,
ah_enable, CTLFLAG_RW, &VNET_NAME(ah_enable), 0, "");
SYSCTL_VNET_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO,
ah_cleartos, CTLFLAG_RW, &VNET_NAME(ah_cleartos), 0, "");
SYSCTL_VNET_STRUCT(_net_inet_ah, IPSECCTL_STATS,
stats, CTLFLAG_RD, &VNET_NAME(ahstat), ahstat, "");
#endif
static unsigned char ipseczeroes[256]; /* larger than an ip6 extension hdr */
static int ah_input_cb(struct cryptop*);
static int ah_output_cb(struct cryptop*);
static int
ah_authsize(struct secasvar *sav)
{
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("%s: sav == NULL", __func__));
if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD)
return 16;
switch (sav->alg_auth) {
case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256:
return 16;
case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384:
return 24;
case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512:
return 32;
default:
return AH_HMAC_HASHLEN;
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
/*
* NB: this is public for use by the PF_KEY support.
*/
struct auth_hash *
ah_algorithm_lookup(int alg)
{
if (alg > SADB_AALG_MAX)
return NULL;
switch (alg) {
case SADB_X_AALG_NULL:
return &auth_hash_null;
case SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC:
return &auth_hash_hmac_md5;
case SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC:
return &auth_hash_hmac_sha1;
case SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC:
return &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160;
case SADB_X_AALG_MD5:
return &auth_hash_key_md5;
case SADB_X_AALG_SHA:
return &auth_hash_key_sha1;
case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256:
return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256;
case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384:
return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384;
case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512:
return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512;
}
return NULL;
}
size_t
ah_hdrsiz(struct secasvar *sav)
{
size_t size;
if (sav != NULL) {
int authsize;
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, ("null xform"));
/*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
size = roundup(authsize, sizeof (u_int32_t)) + HDRSIZE(sav);
} else {
/* default guess */
size = sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t) + 16;
}
return size;
}
/*
* NB: public for use by esp_init.
*/
int
ah_init0(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp, struct cryptoini *cria)
{
struct auth_hash *thash;
int keylen;
thash = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth);
if (thash == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported authentication algorithm %u\n",
__func__, sav->alg_auth));
return EINVAL;
}
/*
* Verify the replay state block allocation is consistent with
* the protocol type. We check here so we can make assumptions
* later during protocol processing.
*/
/* NB: replay state is setup elsewhere (sigh) */
if (((sav->flags&SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) ^ (sav->replay != NULL)) {
DPRINTF(("%s: replay state block inconsistency, "
"%s algorithm %s replay state\n", __func__,
(sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? "old" : "new",
sav->replay == NULL ? "without" : "with"));
return EINVAL;
}
if (sav->key_auth == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("%s: no authentication key for %s algorithm\n",
__func__, thash->name));
return EINVAL;
}
keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth);
if (keylen != thash->keysize && thash->keysize != 0) {
DPRINTF(("%s: invalid keylength %d, algorithm %s requires "
"keysize %d\n", __func__,
keylen, thash->name, thash->keysize));
return EINVAL;
}
sav->tdb_xform = xsp;
sav->tdb_authalgxform = thash;
/* Initialize crypto session. */
bzero(cria, sizeof (*cria));
cria->cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type;
cria->cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
cria->cri_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
cria->cri_mlen = AUTHSIZE(sav);
return 0;
}
/*
* ah_init() is called when an SPI is being set up.
*/
static int
ah_init(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp)
{
struct cryptoini cria;
int error;
error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria);
return error ? error :
crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, &cria, V_crypto_support);
}
/*
* Paranoia.
*
* NB: public for use by esp_zeroize (XXX).
*/
int
ah_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav)
{
int err;
if (sav->key_auth)
bzero(sav->key_auth->key_data, _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth));
err = crypto_freesession(sav->tdb_cryptoid);
sav->tdb_cryptoid = 0;
sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL;
sav->tdb_xform = NULL;
return err;
}
/*
* Massage IPv4/IPv6 headers for AH processing.
*/
static int
ah_massage_headers(struct mbuf **m0, int proto, int skip, int alg, int out)
{
struct mbuf *m = *m0;
unsigned char *ptr;
int off, count;
#ifdef INET
struct ip *ip;
#endif /* INET */
#ifdef INET6
struct ip6_ext *ip6e;
struct ip6_hdr ip6;
int alloc, len, ad;
#endif /* INET6 */
switch (proto) {
#ifdef INET
case AF_INET:
/*
* This is the least painful way of dealing with IPv4 header
* and option processing -- just make sure they're in
* contiguous memory.
*/
*m0 = m = m_pullup(m, skip);
if (m == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("%s: m_pullup failed\n", __func__));
return ENOBUFS;
}
/* Fix the IP header */
ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
if (V_ah_cleartos)
ip->ip_tos = 0;
ip->ip_ttl = 0;
ip->ip_sum = 0;
if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK)
ip->ip_off &= htons(IP_DF);
else
ip->ip_off = htons(0);
ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + sizeof(struct ip);
/* IPv4 option processing */
for (off = sizeof(struct ip); off < skip;) {
if (ptr[off] == IPOPT_EOL || ptr[off] == IPOPT_NOP ||
off + 1 < skip)
;
else {
DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option length for "
"option %d\n", __func__, ptr[off]));
m_freem(m);
return EINVAL;
}
switch (ptr[off]) {
case IPOPT_EOL:
off = skip; /* End the loop. */
break;
case IPOPT_NOP:
off++;
break;
case IPOPT_SECURITY: /* 0x82 */
case 0x85: /* Extended security. */
case 0x86: /* Commercial security. */
case 0x94: /* Router alert */
case 0x95: /* RFC1770 */
/* Sanity check for option length. */
if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option "
"length for option %d\n",
__func__, ptr[off]));
m_freem(m);
return EINVAL;
}
off += ptr[off + 1];
break;
case IPOPT_LSRR:
case IPOPT_SSRR:
/* Sanity check for option length. */
if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option "
"length for option %d\n",
__func__, ptr[off]));
m_freem(m);
return EINVAL;
}
/*
* On output, if we have either of the
* source routing options, we should
* swap the destination address of the
* IP header with the last address
* specified in the option, as that is
* what the destination's IP header
* will look like.
*/
if (out)
bcopy(ptr + off + ptr[off + 1] -
sizeof(struct in_addr),
&(ip->ip_dst), sizeof(struct in_addr));
/* Fall through */
default:
/* Sanity check for option length. */
if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option "
"length for option %d\n",
__func__, ptr[off]));
m_freem(m);
return EINVAL;
}
/* Zeroize all other options. */
count = ptr[off + 1];
bcopy(ipseczeroes, ptr, count);
off += count;
break;
}
/* Sanity check. */
if (off > skip) {
DPRINTF(("%s: malformed IPv4 options header\n",
__func__));
m_freem(m);
return EINVAL;
}
}
break;
#endif /* INET */
#ifdef INET6
case AF_INET6: /* Ugly... */
/* Copy and "cook" the IPv6 header. */
m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), (caddr_t) &ip6);
/* We don't do IPv6 Jumbograms. */
if (ip6.ip6_plen == 0) {
DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported IPv6 jumbogram\n", __func__));
m_freem(m);
return EMSGSIZE;
}
ip6.ip6_flow = 0;
ip6.ip6_hlim = 0;
ip6.ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK;
ip6.ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION;
/* Scoped address handling. */
if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_src))
ip6.ip6_src.s6_addr16[1] = 0;
if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_dst))
ip6.ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1] = 0;
/* Done with IPv6 header. */
m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), (caddr_t) &ip6);
/* Let's deal with the remaining headers (if any). */
if (skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) > 0) {
if (m->m_len <= skip) {
ptr = (unsigned char *) malloc(
skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT);
if (ptr == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate memory"
"for IPv6 headers\n",__func__));
m_freem(m);
return ENOBUFS;
}
/*
* Copy all the protocol headers after
* the IPv6 header.
*/
m_copydata(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr);
alloc = 1;
} else {
/* No need to allocate memory. */
ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) +
sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);
alloc = 0;
}
} else
break;
off = ip6.ip6_nxt & 0xff; /* Next header type. */
for (len = 0; len < skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);)
switch (off) {
case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS:
case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len);
/*
* Process the mutable/immutable
* options -- borrows heavily from the
* KAME code.
*/
for (count = len + sizeof(struct ip6_ext);
count < len + ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);) {
if (ptr[count] == IP6OPT_PAD1) {
count++;
continue; /* Skip padding. */
}
/* Sanity check. */
if (count > len +
((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3)) {
m_freem(m);
/* Free, if we allocated. */
if (alloc)
free(ptr, M_XDATA);
return EINVAL;
}
ad = ptr[count + 1];
/* If mutable option, zeroize. */
if (ptr[count] & IP6OPT_MUTABLE)
bcopy(ipseczeroes, ptr + count,
ptr[count + 1]);
count += ad;
/* Sanity check. */
if (count >
skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) {
m_freem(m);
/* Free, if we allocated. */
if (alloc)
free(ptr, M_XDATA);
return EINVAL;
}
}
/* Advance. */
len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);
off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt;
break;
case IPPROTO_ROUTING:
/*
* Always include routing headers in
* computation.
*/
ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len);
len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);
off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt;
break;
default:
DPRINTF(("%s: unexpected IPv6 header type %d",
__func__, off));
if (alloc)
free(ptr, M_XDATA);
m_freem(m);
return EINVAL;
}
/* Copyback and free, if we allocated. */
if (alloc) {
m_copyback(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr);
free(ptr, M_XDATA);
}
break;
#endif /* INET6 */
}
return 0;
}
/*
* ah_input() gets called to verify that an input packet
* passes authentication.
*/
static int
ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
{
struct auth_hash *ahx;
struct tdb_ident *tdbi;
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
struct m_tag *mtag;
struct newah *ah;
int hl, rplen, authsize;
struct cryptodesc *crda;
struct cryptop *crp;
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->key_auth != NULL, ("null authentication key"));
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL,
("null authentication xform"));
/* Figure out header size. */
rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
/* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */
IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct newah *, m, skip, rplen);
if (ah == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("ah_input: cannot pullup header\n"));
V_ahstat.ahs_hdrops++; /*XXX*/
m_freem(m);
return ENOBUFS;
}
/* Check replay window, if applicable. */
if (sav->replay && !ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(ah->ah_seq), sav)) {
V_ahstat.ahs_replay++;
DPRINTF(("%s: packet replay failure: %s\n", __func__,
ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
m_freem(m);
return ENOBUFS;
}
/* Verify AH header length. */
hl = ah->ah_len * sizeof (u_int32_t);
ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
if (hl != authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)) {
DPRINTF(("%s: bad authenticator length %u (expecting %lu)"
" for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
hl, (u_long) (authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)),
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
V_ahstat.ahs_badauthl++;
m_freem(m);
return EACCES;
}
V_ahstat.ahs_ibytes += m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hl;
/* Get crypto descriptors. */
crp = crypto_getreq(1);
if (crp == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptor\n",__func__));
V_ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
m_freem(m);
return ENOBUFS;
}
crda = crp->crp_desc;
IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("null crypto descriptor"));
crda->crd_skip = 0;
crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len;
crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen;
/* Authentication operation. */
crda->crd_alg = ahx->type;
crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
crda->crd_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
/* Find out if we've already done crypto. */
for (mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, NULL);
mtag != NULL;
mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, mtag)) {
tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *) (mtag + 1);
if (tdbi->proto == sav->sah->saidx.proto &&
tdbi->spi == sav->spi &&
!bcmp(&tdbi->dst, &sav->sah->saidx.dst,
sizeof (union sockaddr_union)))
break;
}
/* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */
if (mtag == NULL) {
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto) +
skip + rplen + authsize, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
} else {
/* Hash verification has already been done successfully. */
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto),
M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
}
if (tc == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n", __func__));
V_ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
crypto_freereq(crp);
m_freem(m);
return ENOBUFS;
}
/* Only save information if crypto processing is needed. */
if (mtag == NULL) {
int error;
/*
* Save the authenticator, the skipped portion of the packet,
* and the AH header.
*/
m_copydata(m, 0, skip + rplen + authsize, (caddr_t)(tc+1));
/* Zeroize the authenticator on the packet. */
m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes);
/* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */
error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
skip, ahx->type, 0);
if (error != 0) {
/* NB: mbuf is free'd by ah_massage_headers */
V_ahstat.ahs_hdrops++;
free(tc, M_XDATA);
crypto_freereq(crp);
return error;
}
}
/* Crypto operation descriptor. */
crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
crp->crp_callback = ah_input_cb;
crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc;
/* These are passed as-is to the callback. */
tc->tc_spi = sav->spi;
tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst;
tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto;
tc->tc_nxt = ah->ah_nxt;
tc->tc_protoff = protoff;
tc->tc_skip = skip;
tc->tc_ptr = (caddr_t) mtag; /* Save the mtag we've identified. */
KEY_ADDREFSA(sav);
tc->tc_sav = sav;
if (mtag == NULL)
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
else
return ah_input_cb(crp);
}
/*
* AH input callback from the crypto driver.
*/
static int
ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
{
int rplen, error, skip, protoff;
unsigned char calc[AH_ALEN_MAX];
struct mbuf *m;
struct cryptodesc *crd;
struct auth_hash *ahx;
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
struct m_tag *mtag;
struct secasvar *sav;
struct secasindex *saidx;
u_int8_t nxt;
caddr_t ptr;
int authsize;
crd = crp->crp_desc;
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque;
IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("null opaque crypto data area!"));
skip = tc->tc_skip;
nxt = tc->tc_nxt;
protoff = tc->tc_protoff;
mtag = (struct m_tag *) tc->tc_ptr;
m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
sav = tc->tc_sav;
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA!"));
saidx = &sav->sah->saidx;
IPSEC_ASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET ||
saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6,
("unexpected protocol family %u", saidx->dst.sa.sa_family));
ahx = (struct auth_hash *) sav->tdb_authalgxform;
/* Check for crypto errors. */
if (crp->crp_etype) {
if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN)
return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
V_ahstat.ahs_noxform++;
DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype));
error = crp->crp_etype;
goto bad;
} else {
V_ahstat.ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]++;
crypto_freereq(crp); /* No longer needed. */
crp = NULL;
}
/* Shouldn't happen... */
if (m == NULL) {
V_ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__));
error = EINVAL;
goto bad;
}
/* Figure out header size. */
rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
/* Copy authenticator off the packet. */
m_copydata(m, skip + rplen, authsize, calc);
/*
* If we have an mtag, we don't need to verify the authenticator --
* it has been verified by an IPsec-aware NIC.
*/
if (mtag == NULL) {
ptr = (caddr_t) (tc + 1);
/* Verify authenticator. */
if (bcmp(ptr + skip + rplen, calc, authsize)) {
DPRINTF(("%s: authentication hash mismatch for packet "
"in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
ipsec_address(&saidx->dst),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
V_ahstat.ahs_badauth++;
error = EACCES;
goto bad;
}
/* Fix the Next Protocol field. */
((u_int8_t *) ptr)[protoff] = nxt;
/* Copyback the saved (uncooked) network headers. */
m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr);
} else {
/* Fix the Next Protocol field. */
m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &nxt);
}
free(tc, M_XDATA), tc = NULL; /* No longer needed */
/*
* Header is now authenticated.
*/
m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR|M_AUTHIPDGM;
/*
* Update replay sequence number, if appropriate.
*/
if (sav->replay) {
u_int32_t seq;
m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newah, ah_seq),
sizeof (seq), (caddr_t) &seq);
if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) {
V_ahstat.ahs_replay++;
error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX as above*/
goto bad;
}
}
/*
* Remove the AH header and authenticator from the mbuf.
*/
error = m_striphdr(m, skip, rplen + authsize);
if (error) {
DPRINTF(("%s: mangled mbuf chain for SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
V_ahstat.ahs_hdrops++;
goto bad;
}
switch (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family) {
#ifdef INET6
case AF_INET6:
error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag);
break;
#endif
#ifdef INET
case AF_INET:
error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag);
break;
#endif
default:
panic("%s: Unexpected address family: %d saidx=%p", __func__,
saidx->dst.sa.sa_family, saidx);
}
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
return error;
bad:
if (sav)
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
if (m != NULL)
m_freem(m);
if (tc != NULL)
free(tc, M_XDATA);
if (crp != NULL)
crypto_freereq(crp);
return error;
}
/*
* AH output routine, called by ipsec[46]_process_packet().
*/
static int
ah_output(
struct mbuf *m,
struct ipsecrequest *isr,
struct mbuf **mp,
int skip,
int protoff)
{
struct secasvar *sav;
struct auth_hash *ahx;
struct cryptodesc *crda;
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
struct mbuf *mi;
struct cryptop *crp;
u_int16_t iplen;
int error, rplen, authsize, maxpacketsize, roff;
u_int8_t prot;
struct newah *ah;
sav = isr->sav;
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
IPSEC_ASSERT(ahx != NULL, ("null authentication xform"));
V_ahstat.ahs_output++;
/* Figure out header size. */
rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
/* Check for maximum packet size violations. */
switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) {
#ifdef INET
case AF_INET:
maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET;
break;
#endif /* INET */
#ifdef INET6
case AF_INET6:
maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET;
break;
#endif /* INET6 */
default:
DPRINTF(("%s: unknown/unsupported protocol family %u, "
"SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
V_ahstat.ahs_nopf++;
error = EPFNOSUPPORT;
goto bad;
}
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
if (rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len > maxpacketsize) {
DPRINTF(("%s: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big "
"(len %u, max len %u)\n", __func__,
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi),
rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len, maxpacketsize));
V_ahstat.ahs_toobig++;
error = EMSGSIZE;
goto bad;
}
/* Update the counters. */
V_ahstat.ahs_obytes += m->m_pkthdr.len - skip;
m = m_unshare(m, M_NOWAIT);
if (m == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("%s: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
V_ahstat.ahs_hdrops++;
error = ENOBUFS;
goto bad;
}
/* Inject AH header. */
mi = m_makespace(m, skip, rplen + authsize, &roff);
if (mi == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to inject %u byte AH header for SA "
"%s/%08lx\n", __func__,
rplen + authsize,
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
V_ahstat.ahs_hdrops++; /*XXX differs from openbsd */
error = ENOBUFS;
goto bad;
}
/*
* The AH header is guaranteed by m_makespace() to be in
* contiguous memory, at roff bytes offset into the returned mbuf.
*/
ah = (struct newah *)(mtod(mi, caddr_t) + roff);
/* Initialize the AH header. */
m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (caddr_t) &ah->ah_nxt);
ah->ah_len = (rplen + authsize - sizeof(struct ah)) / sizeof(u_int32_t);
ah->ah_reserve = 0;
ah->ah_spi = sav->spi;
/* Zeroize authenticator. */
m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes);
/* Insert packet replay counter, as requested. */
if (sav->replay) {
if (sav->replay->count == ~0 &&
(sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) {
DPRINTF(("%s: replay counter wrapped for SA %s/%08lx\n",
__func__,
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
V_ahstat.ahs_wrap++;
error = EINVAL;
goto bad;
}
#ifdef REGRESSION
/* Emulate replay attack when ipsec_replay is TRUE. */
if (!V_ipsec_replay)
#endif
sav->replay->count++;
ah->ah_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count);
}
/* Get crypto descriptors. */
crp = crypto_getreq(1);
if (crp == NULL) {
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n",
__func__));
V_ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
error = ENOBUFS;
goto bad;
}
crda = crp->crp_desc;
crda->crd_skip = 0;
crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen;
crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len;
/* Authentication operation. */
crda->crd_alg = ahx->type;
crda->crd_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
/* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(
sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + skip, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
if (tc == NULL) {
crypto_freereq(crp);
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n", __func__));
V_ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
error = ENOBUFS;
goto bad;
}
/* Save the skipped portion of the packet. */
m_copydata(m, 0, skip, (caddr_t) (tc + 1));
/*
* Fix IP header length on the header used for
* authentication. We don't need to fix the original
* header length as it will be fixed by our caller.
*/
switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) {
#ifdef INET
case AF_INET:
bcopy(((caddr_t)(tc + 1)) +
offsetof(struct ip, ip_len),
(caddr_t) &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t));
iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize);
m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip, ip_len),
sizeof(u_int16_t), (caddr_t) &iplen);
break;
#endif /* INET */
#ifdef INET6
case AF_INET6:
bcopy(((caddr_t)(tc + 1)) +
offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen),
(caddr_t) &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t));
iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize);
m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen),
sizeof(u_int16_t), (caddr_t) &iplen);
break;
#endif /* INET6 */
}
/* Fix the Next Header field in saved header. */
((u_int8_t *) (tc + 1))[protoff] = IPPROTO_AH;
/* Update the Next Protocol field in the IP header. */
prot = IPPROTO_AH;
m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (caddr_t) &prot);
/* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */
error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
skip, ahx->type, 1);
if (error != 0) {
m = NULL; /* mbuf was free'd by ah_massage_headers. */
free(tc, M_XDATA);
crypto_freereq(crp);
goto bad;
}
/* Crypto operation descriptor. */
crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
crp->crp_callback = ah_output_cb;
crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc;
/* These are passed as-is to the callback. */
tc->tc_isr = isr;
KEY_ADDREFSA(sav);
tc->tc_sav = sav;
tc->tc_spi = sav->spi;
tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst;
tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto;
tc->tc_skip = skip;
tc->tc_protoff = protoff;
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
bad:
if (m)
m_freem(m);
return (error);
}
/*
* AH output callback from the crypto driver.
*/
static int
ah_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
{
int skip, protoff, error;
struct tdb_crypto *tc;
struct ipsecrequest *isr;
struct secasvar *sav;
struct mbuf *m;
caddr_t ptr;
tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque;
IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("null opaque data area!"));
skip = tc->tc_skip;
protoff = tc->tc_protoff;
ptr = (caddr_t) (tc + 1);
m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
isr = tc->tc_isr;
IPSECREQUEST_LOCK(isr);
sav = tc->tc_sav;
/* With the isr lock released SA pointer can be updated. */
if (sav != isr->sav) {
V_ahstat.ahs_notdb++;
DPRINTF(("%s: SA expired while in crypto\n", __func__));
error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/
goto bad;
}
/* Check for crypto errors. */
if (crp->crp_etype) {
if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr);
return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
}
V_ahstat.ahs_noxform++;
DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype));
error = crp->crp_etype;
goto bad;
}
/* Shouldn't happen... */
if (m == NULL) {
V_ahstat.ahs_crypto++;
DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__));
error = EINVAL;
goto bad;
}
V_ahstat.ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]++;
/*
* Copy original headers (with the new protocol number) back
* in place.
*/
m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr);
/* No longer needed. */
free(tc, M_XDATA);
crypto_freereq(crp);
#ifdef REGRESSION
/* Emulate man-in-the-middle attack when ipsec_integrity is TRUE. */
if (V_ipsec_integrity) {
int alen;
/*
* Corrupt HMAC if we want to test integrity verification of
* the other side.
*/
alen = AUTHSIZE(sav);
m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, ipseczeroes);
}
#endif
/* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */
error = ipsec_process_done(m, isr);
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr);
return error;
bad:
if (sav)
KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr);
if (m)
m_freem(m);
free(tc, M_XDATA);
crypto_freereq(crp);
return error;
}
static struct xformsw ah_xformsw = {
XF_AH, XFT_AUTH, "IPsec AH",
ah_init, ah_zeroize, ah_input, ah_output,
};
static void
ah_attach(void)
{
xform_register(&ah_xformsw);
}
SYSINIT(ah_xform_init, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE, ah_attach, NULL);
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink