freebsd-dev/sys/geom/eli/pkcs5v2.c
Allan Jude 85c15ab853 improve PBKDF2 performance
The PBKDF2 in sys/geom/eli/pkcs5v2.c is around half the speed it could be

GELI's PBKDF2 uses a simple benchmark to determine a number of iterations
that will takes approximately 2 seconds. The security provided is actually
half what is expected, because an attacker could use the optimized
algorithm to brute force the key in half the expected time.

With this change, all newly generated GELI keys will be approximately 2x
as strong. Previously generated keys will talk half as long to calculate,
resulting in faster mounting of encrypted volumes. Users may choose to
rekey, to generate a new key with the larger default number of iterations
using the geli(8) setkey command.

Security of existing data is not compromised, as ~1 second per brute force
attempt is still a very high threshold.

PR:		202365
Original Research:	https://jbp.io/2015/08/11/pbkdf2-performance-matters/
Submitted by:	Joe Pixton <jpixton@gmail.com> (Original Version), jmg (Later Version)
Reviewed by:	ed, pjd, delphij
Approved by:	secteam, pjd (maintainer)
MFC after:	2 weeks
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8236
2017-02-19 19:30:31 +00:00

130 lines
3.7 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 2005 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#ifdef _KERNEL
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#else
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <strings.h>
#endif
#include <geom/eli/g_eli.h>
#include <geom/eli/pkcs5v2.h>
static __inline void
xor(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src, size_t size)
{
for (; size > 0; size--)
*dst++ ^= *src++;
}
void
pkcs5v2_genkey(uint8_t *key, unsigned keylen, const uint8_t *salt,
size_t saltsize, const char *passphrase, u_int iterations)
{
uint8_t md[SHA512_MDLEN], saltcount[saltsize + sizeof(uint32_t)];
uint8_t *counter, *keyp;
u_int i, bsize, passlen;
uint32_t count;
struct hmac_ctx startpoint, ctx;
passlen = strlen(passphrase);
bzero(key, keylen);
bcopy(salt, saltcount, saltsize);
counter = saltcount + saltsize;
keyp = key;
for (count = 1; keylen > 0; count++, keylen -= bsize, keyp += bsize) {
bsize = MIN(keylen, sizeof(md));
be32enc(counter, count);
g_eli_crypto_hmac_init(&startpoint, passphrase, passlen);
ctx = startpoint;
g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(&ctx, saltcount, sizeof(saltcount));
g_eli_crypto_hmac_final(&ctx, md, sizeof(md));
xor(keyp, md, bsize);
for(i = 1; i < iterations; i++) {
ctx = startpoint;
g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(&ctx, md, sizeof(md));
g_eli_crypto_hmac_final(&ctx, md, sizeof(md));
xor(keyp, md, bsize);
}
}
explicit_bzero(&startpoint, sizeof(startpoint));
explicit_bzero(&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
}
#ifndef _KERNEL
#ifndef _STAND
/*
* Return the number of microseconds needed for 'interations' iterations.
*/
static int
pkcs5v2_probe(int iterations)
{
uint8_t key[G_ELI_USERKEYLEN], salt[G_ELI_SALTLEN];
uint8_t passphrase[] = "passphrase";
struct rusage start, end;
int usecs;
getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &start);
pkcs5v2_genkey(key, sizeof(key), salt, sizeof(salt), passphrase,
iterations);
getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &end);
usecs = end.ru_utime.tv_sec - start.ru_utime.tv_sec;
usecs *= 1000000;
usecs += end.ru_utime.tv_usec - start.ru_utime.tv_usec;
return (usecs);
}
/*
* Return the number of iterations which takes 'usecs' microseconds.
*/
int
pkcs5v2_calculate(int usecs)
{
int iterations, v;
for (iterations = 1; ; iterations <<= 1) {
v = pkcs5v2_probe(iterations);
if (v > 2000000)
break;
}
return (((intmax_t)iterations * (intmax_t)usecs) / v);
}
#endif /* !_STAND */
#endif /* !_KERNEL */