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freebsd-dev/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
Jung-uk Kim 8180e704ac Merge OpenSSL 1.0.2f. 
Relnotes:	yes
2016-01-28 20:15:22 +00:00

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/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license provided above.
*
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE.
*/
#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "kssl_lcl.h"
#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
# include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
# include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return (SSLv3_server_method());
else
return (NULL);
}
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
ssl3_accept,
ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
{
int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
(s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
/*
* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
* login name
*/
ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
*al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
} else {
ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
}
}
return ret;
}
#endif
int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
int ret = -1;
int new_state, state, skip = 0;
RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
/* init things to blank */
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
SSL_clear(s);
if (s->cert == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
return (-1);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/*
* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
* don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
* handshakes anyway.
*/
if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
}
#endif
for (;;) {
state = s->state;
switch (s->state) {
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->renegotiate = 1;
/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
s->server = 1;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf = buf;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
s->init_num = 0;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/*
* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
*/
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
/*
* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
* output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
*/
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
} else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
!(s->options &
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
/*
* Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
* support secure renegotiation.
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
} else {
/*
* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
* HelloRequest
*/
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
s->shutdown = 0;
ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num = 0;
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
s->shutdown = 0;
ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
{
int al;
if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
/*
* callback indicates firther work to be done
*/
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
goto end;
}
if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
/*
* This is not really an error but the only means to for
* a client to detect whether srp is supported.
*/
if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
}
#endif
s->renegotiate = 2;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->hit) {
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
}
#else
if (s->hit)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
#endif
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
/* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
if (!
(s->s3->tmp.
new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
SSL_aSRP))
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
} else {
skip = 1;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
#else
} else
skip = 1;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
#endif
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/*
* clear this, it may get reset by
* send_server_key_exchange
*/
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
/*
* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
* sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
* ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
* the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
* the server certificate contains the server's public key for
* key exchange.
*/
if (0
/*
* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
* provided
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
|| (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
#endif
|| (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
|| (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
)
)
)
) {
ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
} else
skip = 1;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
/*
* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
* during re-negotiation:
*/
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
/*
* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
* section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
* RFC 2246):
*/
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
/*
* ... except when the application insists on
* verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
* this for SSL 3)
*/
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
/*
* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
*/
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
/*
* With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
* are omitted
*/
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
/* no cert request */
skip = 1;
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
}
} else {
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
#else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
#endif
s->init_num = 0;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
/*
* This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
* using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
* documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
* resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
* BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
* unconditionally.
*/
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
}
s->init_num = 0;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (ret == 2) {
/*
* For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
* pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
* not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
* its key from the certificate for key exchange.
*/
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
s->init_num = 0;
} else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num = 0;
if (!s->session->peer)
break;
/*
* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
* digest cached records.
*/
if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
} else {
int offset = 0;
int dgst_num;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num = 0;
/*
* We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
* it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
* CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
* step
*/
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
}
for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
int dgst_size;
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
EVP_MD_CTX_type
(s->
s3->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num]),
&(s->s3->
tmp.cert_verify_md
[offset]));
dgst_size =
EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
if (dgst_size < 0) {
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
offset += dgst_size;
}
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
s->init_num = 0;
break;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
/*
* Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
* sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
* first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
* cautious.
* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
* processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
* the client's Finished message is read.
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->init_num = 0;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
/*
* Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
* already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
* sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
* processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
* the client's Finished message is read.
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (s->hit)
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
#endif
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num = 0;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
{
ret = -1;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
s->method->
ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
s->method->
ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
if (s->hit) {
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
} else
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
} else
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf = NULL;
/* remove buffering on output */
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num = 0;
if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
* HelloRequest */
s->renegotiate = 0;
s->new_session = 0;
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
/* s->server=1; */
s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
}
ret = 1;
goto end;
/* break; */
case SSL_ST_ERR:
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret = -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
if (s->debug) {
if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
new_state = s->state;
s->state = state;
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
s->state = new_state;
}
}
skip = 0;
}
end:
/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
s->in_handshake--;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
return (ret);
}
int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
{
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
}
int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0;
unsigned int cookie_len;
long n;
unsigned long id;
unsigned char *p, *d;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
unsigned char *q;
SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
#endif
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
goto retry_cert;
/*
* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
* TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
* switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
* will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
*/
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
s->first_packet = 1;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
s->first_packet = 0;
d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/*
* 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
* for session id length
*/
if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
* differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
*/
s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
p += 2;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
: (s->client_version < s->version)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
/*
* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
* number
*/
s->version = s->client_version;
}
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
/*
* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
* return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
* cookie length...
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
if (cookie_length == 0)
return 1;
}
/* load the client random */
memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* get the session-id */
j = *(p++);
if (p + j > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
if ((j < 0) || (j > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->hit = 0;
/*
* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
* renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
* ignore resumption requests with flag
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
* than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
* for security won't even compile against older library versions).
* 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
* request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
* unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
*/
if ((s->new_session
&& (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
} else {
i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
/*
* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
* version.
* RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
* with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
* the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
* In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
* will abort the handshake with an error.
*/
if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
* session */
s->hit = 1;
} else if (i == -1)
goto err;
else { /* i == 0 */
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
}
}
p += j;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* cookie stuff */
if (p + 1 > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_len = *(p++);
if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
* HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
* does not cause an overflow.
*/
if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
/* too much data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
cookie_len) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* else cookie verification succeeded */
}
/* default verification */
else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_valid = 1;
}
p += cookie_len;
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
/* Select version to use */
if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
} else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
s->version = s->client_version;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
} else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
s->version = s->client_version;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
}
}
if (p + 2 > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
/* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
/* not enough data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
p += i;
/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
if (s->hit) {
j = 0;
id = s->session->cipher->id;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
#endif
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
#endif
if (c->id == id) {
j = 1;
break;
}
}
/*
* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
* CVE-2010-4180.
*/
#if 0
if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
&& (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
/*
* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
* cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
* might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
* chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
* connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
*/
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
s->session->cipher = c;
j = 1;
}
}
#endif
if (j == 0) {
/*
* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
* to reuse it
*/
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
}
/* compression */
i = *(p++);
if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
/* not enough data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
q = p;
#endif
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
if (p[j] == 0)
break;
}
p += i;
if (j >= i) {
/* no compress */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
/*
* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
* for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
* calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
* processing to use it in key derivation.
*/
{
unsigned char *pos;
pos = s->s3->server_random;
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
goto f_err;
}
}
if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
&pref_cipher,
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
s->hit = 1;
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
ciphers = NULL;
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
pref_cipher =
pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
s->
session->ciphers,
SSL_get_ciphers
(s));
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
if (s->cipher_list)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
}
}
#endif
/*
* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
* options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q.
*/
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
/* Can't disable compression */
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed compression method */
for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
if (comp_id == comp->id) {
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
break;
}
}
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
if (q[m] == comp_id)
break;
}
if (m >= i) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
} else if (s->hit)
comp = NULL;
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
/* See if we have a match */
int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
v = comp->id;
for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
if (v == q[o]) {
done = 1;
break;
}
}
if (done)
break;
}
if (done)
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
else
comp = NULL;
}
#else
/*
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
/*
* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
*/
if (!s->hit) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
#else
s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
#endif
if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
if (ciphers == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
ciphers = NULL;
if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
retry_cert:
if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (rv == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (rv < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return -1;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (c == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
} else {
/* Session-id reuse */
#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
sk = s->session->ciphers;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
nc = c;
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
ec = c;
}
if (nc != NULL)
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
else if (ec != NULL)
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
else
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
} else
#endif
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
}
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto f_err;
}
/*-
* we now have the following setup.
* client_random
* cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
* ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
* compression - basically ignored right now
* ssl version is set - sslv3
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
* s->hit - session reuse flag
* s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
*/
/* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1;
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
}
if (ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
return ret;
}
int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p, *d;
int i, sl;
int al = 0;
unsigned long l;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
p = s->s3->server_random;
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
#endif
/* Do the message type and length last */
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
*(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
/* Random stuff */
memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/*-
* There are several cases for the session ID to send
* back in the server hello:
* - For session reuse from the session cache,
* we send back the old session ID.
* - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
* is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
* (which doesn't actually identify the session).
* - If it is a new session, we send back the new
* session ID.
* - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
* we send back a 0-length session ID.
* s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
* so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
* to send back.
*/
if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
&& !s->hit)
s->session->session_id_length = 0;
sl = s->session->session_id_length;
if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
*(p++) = sl;
memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
p += sl;
/* put the cipher */
i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
p += i;
/* put the compression method */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
*(p++) = 0;
#else
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
*(p++) = 0;
else
*(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
if ((p =
ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
&al)) == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
#endif
/* do the header */
l = (p - d);
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
}
int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
{
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
}
int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
int j, num;
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned int u;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encodedlen = 0;
int curve_id = 0;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
unsigned char *p, *d;
int al, i;
unsigned long type;
int n;
CERT *cert;
BIGNUM *r[4];
int nr[4], kn;
BUF_MEM *buf;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
cert = s->cert;
buf = s->init_buf;
r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
n = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
tmp.new_cipher));
if (rsa == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
}
if (rsa == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
r[0] = rsa->n;
r[1] = rsa->e;
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
tmp.new_cipher));
if (dhp == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
r[0] = dh->p;
r[1] = dh->g;
r[2] = dh->pub_key;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
const EC_GROUP *group;
ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
/* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
if (nid != NID_undef)
ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
} else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
s3->tmp.new_cipher));
}
if (ecdhp == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
if (ecdhp == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
ecdh = ecdhp;
else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
/*
* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
* (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
* non-zero.
*/
if ((curve_id =
tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
== 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
goto err;
}
/*
* Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
* allocate memory accordingly.
*/
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, 0, NULL);
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
if (encodedlen == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
bn_ctx = NULL;
/*
* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
* ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
* additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
* structure.
*/
n = 4 + encodedlen;
/*
* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
* can set these to NULLs
*/
r[0] = NULL;
r[1] = NULL;
r[2] = NULL;
r[3] = NULL;
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
/*
* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
*/
n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
(s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
(s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
goto err;
}
r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
} else
#endif
{
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
n += 1 + nr[i];
else
#endif
n += 2 + nr[i];
}
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
== NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
} else {
pkey = NULL;
kn = 0;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
goto err;
}
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
*p = nr[i];
p++;
} else
#endif
s2n(nr[i], p);
BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
p += nr[i];
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
/*
* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
* this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
* CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
* point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
*/
*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
p += 1;
*p = 0;
p += 1;
*p = curve_id;
p += 1;
*p = encodedlen;
p += 1;
memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
(unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
encodedPoint = NULL;
p += encodedlen;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
/* copy PSK identity hint */
s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
}
#endif
/* not anonymous */
if (pkey != NULL) {
/*
* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
* points to the space at the end.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
q = md_buf;
j = 0;
for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
(num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5
: s->ctx->sha1,
NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q,
(unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_LIB_EVP);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
q += i;
j += i;
}
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
goto err;
}
s2n(u, p);
n += u + 2;
} else
#endif
if (md) {
/* send signature algorithm */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
/* Should never happen */
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
p += 2;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
|| EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
s2n(i, p);
n += i + 2;
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
n += 2;
} else {
/* Is this error check actually needed? */
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
}
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return ssl_do_write(s);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (encodedPoint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p, *d;
int i, j, nl, off, n;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
X509_NAME *name;
BUF_MEM *buf;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
buf = s->init_buf;
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
p++;
n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
d[0] = n;
p += n;
n++;
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
const unsigned char *psigs;
nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
s2n(nl, p);
memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
p += nl;
n += nl + 2;
}
off = n;
p += 2;
n += 2;
sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
nl = 0;
if (sk != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
s2n(j, p);
i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
n += 2 + j;
nl += 2 + j;
} else {
d = p;
i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
j -= 2;
s2n(j, d);
j += 2;
n += j;
nl += j;
}
}
}
/* else no CA names */
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
s2n(nl, p);
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
/* do the header */
*(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
*(p++) = 0;
*(p++) = 0;
*(p++) = 0;
s->init_num += 4;
}
#endif
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
int i, al, ok;
long n;
unsigned long alg_k;
unsigned char *p;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
int decrypt_len;
unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
size_t j;
/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
/*
* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
*/
if (rsa == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
goto f_err;
}
} else {
pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
if ((pkey == NULL) ||
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
goto f_err;
}
rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
}
/* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
n2s(p, i);
if (n != i + 2) {
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto f_err;
} else
p -= 2;
} else
n = i;
}
/*
* Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
* that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
* size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
* actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
* bound is sufficient to be safe.
*/
if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
* Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
* section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
* generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
* fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
*/
/*
* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
*/
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
goto err;
decrypt_len =
RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
ERR_clear_error();
/*
* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
* be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
*/
decrypt_good =
constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
/*
* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
* version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
* Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
* (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
* check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
* constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
*/
version_good =
constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
version_good &=
constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
/*
* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
* ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
* protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
* However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
* version instead if the server does not support the requested
* protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
* clients.
*/
if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
unsigned char workaround_good;
workaround_good =
constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
workaround_good &=
constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
version_good |= workaround_good;
}
/*
* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
* remain non-zero (0xff).
*/
decrypt_good &= version_good;
/*
* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
* decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
* contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
* it is still sufficiently large to read from.
*/
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
rand_premaster_secret[j]);
}
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
p,
sizeof
(rand_premaster_secret));
OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
int idx = -1;
EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
if (n > 1) {
n2s(p, i);
} else {
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto f_err;
}
i = 0;
}
if (n && n != i + 2) {
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto err;
} else {
p -= 2;
i = (int)n;
}
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
if (idx >= 0) {
skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
if ((skey == NULL) ||
(skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
goto f_err;
}
dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
} else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
} else
dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
if (n == 0L) {
/* Get pubkey from cert */
EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (clkey) {
if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
}
if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
} else
pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
if (pub == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
if (i <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
BN_clear_free(pub);
goto err;
}
DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
if (dh_clnt)
DH_free(dh_clnt);
else
BN_clear_free(pub);
pub = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
p, i);
OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
if (dh_clnt)
return 2;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
krb5_data enc_ticket;
krb5_data authenticator;
krb5_data enc_pms;
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
int padl, outl;
krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
int kerr = 0;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
if (!kssl_ctx)
kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
n2s(p, i);
enc_ticket.length = i;
if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
p += enc_ticket.length;
n2s(p, i);
authenticator.length = i;
if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
authenticator.data = (char *)p;
p += authenticator.length;
n2s(p, i);
enc_pms.length = i;
enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
p += enc_pms.length;
/*
* Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
*/
if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
enc_pms.length + 6)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
&kssl_err)) != 0) {
# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
if (kssl_err.text)
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
/*
* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
* return authtime == 0.
*/
if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
&authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
if (kssl_err.text)
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
goto err;
}
# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
if (enc == NULL)
goto err;
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
(unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
kerr = 1;
goto kclean;
}
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
kerr = 1;
goto kclean;
}
if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
kerr = 1;
goto kclean;
}
outl += padl;
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
kerr = 1;
goto kclean;
}
if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
&& (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
/*
* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
* the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
* the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
* ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
* bytes instead of the protocol version. If
* SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
* (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
* cipher)
*/
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
kerr = 1;
goto kclean;
}
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
pms, outl);
if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
len);
}
}
/*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
* but it caused problems for apache.
* kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
* if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
*/
kclean:
OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms));
if (kerr)
goto err;
} else
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
int ret = 1;
int field_size = 0;
const EC_KEY *tkey;
const EC_GROUP *group;
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
/* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Let's get server private key and group information */
if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
/* use the certificate */
tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
} else {
/*
* use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
* ServerKeyExchange msg.
*/
tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
}
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
!EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Let's get client's public key */
if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (n == 0L) {
/* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
== NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
/*
* XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
* using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
* code is never executed. When that support is added, we
* ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
* authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
* checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
*/
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
goto f_err;
}
if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
pkey.ec)) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
} else {
/*
* Get client's public key from encoded point in the
* ClientKeyExchange message.
*/
if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Get encoded point length */
i = *p;
p += 1;
if (n != 1 + i) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
/*
* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
* to the start
*/
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
}
/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
if (field_size <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
NULL);
if (i <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
/* Compute the master secret */
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
p, i);
OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
return (ret);
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
unsigned char *t = NULL;
unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
int psk_err = 1;
char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
n2s(p, i);
if (n != i + 2) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto psk_err;
}
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto psk_err;
}
if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
goto psk_err;
}
/*
* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
*/
memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
psk_or_pre_ms,
sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
} else if (psk_len == 0) {
/*
* PSK related to the given identity not found
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
goto psk_err;
}
/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
t = psk_or_pre_ms;
memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
s2n(psk_len, t);
memset(t, 0, psk_len);
t += psk_len;
s2n(psk_len, t);
if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto psk_err;
}
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto psk_err;
}
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
psk_or_pre_ms,
pre_ms_len);
psk_err = 0;
psk_err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
if (psk_err != 0)
goto f_err;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
int param_len;
n2s(p, i);
param_len = i + 2;
if (param_len > n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
|| BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if ((s->session->master_key_length =
SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += i;
} else
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
int ret = 0;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
unsigned long alg_a;
int Ttag, Tclass;
long Tlen;
/* Get our certificate private key */
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto gerr;
}
/*
* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
* use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
* EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
* client certificate for authorization only.
*/
client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (client_pub_pkey) {
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
ERR_clear_error();
}
/* Decrypt session key */
if (ASN1_get_object
((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
|| Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto gerr;
}
start = p;
inlen = Tlen;
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto gerr;
}
/* Generate master secret */
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->
session->master_key,
premaster_secret, 32);
OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
ret = 2;
else
ret = 1;
gerr:
EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
else
goto err;
} else {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
return (1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
err:
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
unsigned char *p;
int al, ok, ret = 0;
long n;
int type = 0, i, j;
X509 *peer;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
/*
* We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
* a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
* NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
* if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
* DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
* CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
*/
if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
ret = 1;
goto end;
}
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
peer = s->session->peer;
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto f_err;
}
/* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
/*
* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
* length field
*/
if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
i = 64;
} else {
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
if (rv == -1) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
} else if (rv == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
p += 2;
n -= 2;
}
n2s(p, i);
n -= 2;
if (i > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
long hdatalen = 0;
void *hdata;
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
|| !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
} else
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
if (i == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
if (j <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
if (j <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
} else
#endif
if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
|| pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
unsigned char signature[64];
int idx;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
if (pctx == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) {
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (i != 64) {
fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
}
for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
}
j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
32);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
if (j <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
goto f_err;
}
ret = 1;
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
}
end:
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return (ret);
}
int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
X509 *x = NULL;
unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
const unsigned char *p, *q;
unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
/*
* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
*/
if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
n2l3(p, llen);
if (llen + 3 != n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
n2l3(p, l);
if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
q = p;
x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
if (x == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (p != (q + l)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x = NULL;
nc += l + 3;
}
if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
} else {
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
if (i <= 0) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
}
if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
/*
* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
* arrive here.
*/
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
* certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
*/
sk = NULL;
ret = 1;
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
}
if (x != NULL)
X509_free(x);
if (sk != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
return (ret);
}
int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
if (cpk == NULL) {
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (0);
}
}
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (0);
}
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *senc = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
HMAC_CTX hctx;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
unsigned char *p, *macstart;
const unsigned char *const_p;
int len, slen_full, slen;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned int hlen;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[16];
/* get session encoding length */
slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
/*
* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
* long
*/
if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
if (!senc) {
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
p = senc;
if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
goto err;
/*
* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
*/
const_p = senc;
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
if (sess == NULL)
goto err;
sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
goto err;
}
p = senc;
if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
goto err;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
/*-
* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
* follows handshake_header_length +
* 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
* 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
* session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
* length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
*/
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
goto err;
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
/*
* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
* all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
*/
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
&hctx, 1) < 0)
goto err;
} else {
if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
goto err;
if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
goto err;
memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
}
/*
* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
* for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
* new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
*/
l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
/* Skip ticket length for now */
p += 2;
/* Output key name */
macstart = p;
memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
p += 16;
/* output IV */
memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
/* Encrypt session data */
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
goto err;
p += len;
if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
goto err;
p += len;
if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
goto err;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
p += hlen;
/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
/* Total length */
len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
/* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
s2n(len - 6, p);
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
OPENSSL_free(senc);
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
if (senc)
OPENSSL_free(senc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
unsigned char *p;
/*-
* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
* follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
* 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
* + (ocsp response)
*/
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* do the header */
*(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
/* message length */
l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
/* status type */
*(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
/* length of OCSP response */
l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
/* actual response */
memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
s->init_off = 0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
* It sets the next_proto member in s if found
*/
int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
{
int ok;
int proto_len, padding_len;
long n;
const unsigned char *p;
/*
* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
* extension in their ClientHello
*/
if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
/* See the payload format below */
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
/*
* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
* this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
* ssl3_get_finished).
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
if (n < 2) {
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
}
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/*-
* The payload looks like:
* uint8 proto_len;
* uint8 proto[proto_len];
* uint8 padding_len;
* uint8 padding[padding_len];
*/
proto_len = p[0];
if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0;
}
padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0;
}
s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
return 1;
}
# endif
#endif
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