freebsd-dev/sys/netsmb/smb_crypt.c
Yaroslav Tykhiy 8d96e45531 Retire NETSMBCRYPTO as a kernel option and make its functionality
enabled by default in NETSMB and smbfs.ko.

With the most of modern SMB providers requiring encryption by
default, there is little sense left in keeping the crypto part
of NETSMB optional at the build time.

This will also return smbfs.ko to its former properties users
are rather accustomed to.

Discussed with:		freebsd-stable, re (scottl)
Not objected by:	bp, tjr (silence)
MFC after:		5 days
2006-03-05 22:52:17 +00:00

310 lines
8.4 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Boris Popov
* All rights reserved.
*
* Copyright (c) 2003, 2004 Tim J. Robbins.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* This product includes software developed by Boris Popov.
* 4. Neither the name of the author nor the names of any co-contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/conf.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/endian.h>
#include <sys/mbuf.h>
#include <sys/mchain.h>
#include <sys/md4.h>
#include <sys/md5.h>
#include <sys/iconv.h>
#include <netsmb/smb.h>
#include <netsmb/smb_conn.h>
#include <netsmb/smb_subr.h>
#include <netsmb/smb_rq.h>
#include <netsmb/smb_dev.h>
#include <crypto/des/des.h>
#include "opt_netsmb.h"
static u_char N8[] = {0x4b, 0x47, 0x53, 0x21, 0x40, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25};
static void
smb_E(const u_char *key, u_char *data, u_char *dest)
{
des_key_schedule *ksp;
u_char kk[8];
kk[0] = key[0] & 0xfe;
kk[1] = key[0] << 7 | (key[1] >> 1 & 0xfe);
kk[2] = key[1] << 6 | (key[2] >> 2 & 0xfe);
kk[3] = key[2] << 5 | (key[3] >> 3 & 0xfe);
kk[4] = key[3] << 4 | (key[4] >> 4 & 0xfe);
kk[5] = key[4] << 3 | (key[5] >> 5 & 0xfe);
kk[6] = key[5] << 2 | (key[6] >> 6 & 0xfe);
kk[7] = key[6] << 1;
ksp = malloc(sizeof(des_key_schedule), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
des_set_key((des_cblock *)kk, *ksp);
des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)data, (des_cblock *)dest, *ksp, 1);
free(ksp, M_SMBTEMP);
}
int
smb_encrypt(const u_char *apwd, u_char *C8, u_char *RN)
{
u_char *p, *P14, *S21;
p = malloc(14 + 21, M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
bzero(p, 14 + 21);
P14 = p;
S21 = p + 14;
bcopy(apwd, P14, min(14, strlen(apwd)));
/*
* S21 = concat(Ex(P14, N8), zeros(5));
*/
smb_E(P14, N8, S21);
smb_E(P14 + 7, N8, S21 + 8);
smb_E(S21, C8, RN);
smb_E(S21 + 7, C8, RN + 8);
smb_E(S21 + 14, C8, RN + 16);
free(p, M_SMBTEMP);
return 0;
}
int
smb_ntencrypt(const u_char *apwd, u_char *C8, u_char *RN)
{
u_char S21[21];
u_int16_t *unipwd;
MD4_CTX *ctxp;
int len;
len = strlen(apwd);
unipwd = malloc((len + 1) * sizeof(u_int16_t), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
/*
* S21 = concat(MD4(U(apwd)), zeros(5));
*/
smb_strtouni(unipwd, apwd);
ctxp = malloc(sizeof(MD4_CTX), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
MD4Init(ctxp);
MD4Update(ctxp, (u_char*)unipwd, len * sizeof(u_int16_t));
free(unipwd, M_SMBTEMP);
bzero(S21, 21);
MD4Final(S21, ctxp);
free(ctxp, M_SMBTEMP);
smb_E(S21, C8, RN);
smb_E(S21 + 7, C8, RN + 8);
smb_E(S21 + 14, C8, RN + 16);
return 0;
}
/*
* Calculate message authentication code (MAC) key for virtual circuit.
*/
int
smb_calcmackey(struct smb_vc *vcp)
{
const char *pwd;
u_int16_t *unipwd;
int len;
MD4_CTX md4;
u_char S16[16], S21[21];
KASSERT(vcp->vc_hflags2 & SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE,
("signatures not enabled"));
if (vcp->vc_mackey != NULL) {
free(vcp->vc_mackey, M_SMBTEMP);
vcp->vc_mackey = NULL;
vcp->vc_mackeylen = 0;
vcp->vc_seqno = 0;
}
/*
* The partial MAC key is the concatenation of the 16 byte session
* key and the 24 byte challenge response.
*/
vcp->vc_mackeylen = 16 + 24;
vcp->vc_mackey = malloc(vcp->vc_mackeylen, M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
/*
* Calculate session key:
* MD4(MD4(U(PN)))
*/
pwd = smb_vc_getpass(vcp);
len = strlen(pwd);
unipwd = malloc((len + 1) * sizeof(u_int16_t), M_SMBTEMP, M_WAITOK);
smb_strtouni(unipwd, pwd);
MD4Init(&md4);
MD4Update(&md4, (u_char *)unipwd, len * sizeof(u_int16_t));
MD4Final(S16, &md4);
MD4Init(&md4);
MD4Update(&md4, S16, 16);
MD4Final(vcp->vc_mackey, &md4);
free(unipwd, M_SMBTEMP);
/*
* Calculate response to challenge:
* Ex(concat(MD4(U(pass)), zeros(5)), C8)
*/
bzero(S21, 21);
bcopy(S16, S21, 16);
smb_E(S21, vcp->vc_ch, vcp->vc_mackey + 16);
smb_E(S21 + 7, vcp->vc_ch, vcp->vc_mackey + 24);
smb_E(S21 + 14, vcp->vc_ch, vcp->vc_mackey + 32);
return (0);
}
/*
* Sign request with MAC.
*/
int
smb_rq_sign(struct smb_rq *rqp)
{
struct smb_vc *vcp = rqp->sr_vc;
struct mbchain *mbp;
struct mbuf *mb;
MD5_CTX md5;
u_char digest[16];
KASSERT(vcp->vc_hflags2 & SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE,
("signatures not enabled"));
if (vcp->vc_mackey == NULL)
/* XXX Should assert that cmd == SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE. */
return (0);
/*
* This is a bit of a kludge. If the request is non-TRANSACTION,
* or it is the first request of a transaction, give it the next
* sequence number, and expect the reply to have the sequence number
* following that one. Otherwise, it is a secondary request in
* a transaction, and it gets the same sequence numbers as the
* primary request.
*/
if (rqp->sr_t2 == NULL ||
(rqp->sr_t2->t2_flags & SMBT2_SECONDARY) == 0) {
rqp->sr_seqno = vcp->vc_seqno++;
rqp->sr_rseqno = vcp->vc_seqno++;
} else {
/*
* Sequence numbers are already in the struct because
* smb_t2_request_int() uses the same one for all the
* requests in the transaction.
* (At least we hope so.)
*/
KASSERT(rqp->sr_t2 == NULL ||
(rqp->sr_t2->t2_flags & SMBT2_SECONDARY) == 0 ||
rqp->sr_t2->t2_rq == rqp,
("sec t2 rq not using same smb_rq"));
}
/* Initialize sec. signature field to sequence number + zeros. */
*(u_int32_t *)rqp->sr_rqsig = htole32(rqp->sr_seqno);
*(u_int32_t *)(rqp->sr_rqsig + 4) = 0;
/*
* Compute HMAC-MD5 of packet data, keyed by MAC key.
* Store the first 8 bytes in the sec. signature field.
*/
smb_rq_getrequest(rqp, &mbp);
MD5Init(&md5);
MD5Update(&md5, vcp->vc_mackey, vcp->vc_mackeylen);
for (mb = mbp->mb_top; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next)
MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, void *), mb->m_len);
MD5Final(digest, &md5);
bcopy(digest, rqp->sr_rqsig, 8);
return (0);
}
/*
* Verify reply signature.
*/
int
smb_rq_verify(struct smb_rq *rqp)
{
struct smb_vc *vcp = rqp->sr_vc;
struct mdchain *mdp;
u_char sigbuf[8];
MD5_CTX md5;
u_char digest[16];
struct mbuf *mb;
KASSERT(vcp->vc_hflags2 & SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE,
("signatures not enabled"));
if (vcp->vc_mackey == NULL)
/* XXX Should check that this is a SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE reply. */
return (0);
/*
* Compute HMAC-MD5 of packet data, keyed by MAC key.
* We play games to pretend the security signature field
* contains their sequence number, to avoid modifying
* the packet itself.
*/
smb_rq_getreply(rqp, &mdp);
mb = mdp->md_top;
KASSERT(mb->m_len >= SMB_HDRLEN, ("forgot to m_pullup"));
MD5Init(&md5);
MD5Update(&md5, vcp->vc_mackey, vcp->vc_mackeylen);
MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, void *), 14);
*(u_int32_t *)sigbuf = htole32(rqp->sr_rseqno);
*(u_int32_t *)(sigbuf + 4) = 0;
MD5Update(&md5, sigbuf, 8);
MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, u_char *) + 22, mb->m_len - 22);
for (mb = mb->m_next; mb != NULL; mb = mb->m_next)
MD5Update(&md5, mtod(mb, void *), mb->m_len);
MD5Final(digest, &md5);
/*
* Now verify the signature.
*/
if (bcmp(mtod(mdp->md_top, u_char *) + 14, digest, 8) != 0)
return (EAUTH);
return (0);
}