This completely removes client-side support for the SSH 1 protocol, which was already disabled in 12 but is still enabled in 11. For that reason, we will not be able to merge 7.6p1 or newer back to 11.
458 lines
16 KiB
Plaintext
458 lines
16 KiB
Plaintext
This documents OpenSSH's deviations and extensions to the published SSH
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protocol.
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Note that OpenSSH's sftp and sftp-server implement revision 3 of the SSH
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filexfer protocol described in:
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https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
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Newer versions of the draft will not be supported, though some features
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are individually implemented as extensions described below.
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The protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent is described in the file
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PROTOCOL.agent
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1. Transport protocol changes
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1.1. transport: Protocol 2 MAC algorithm "umac-64@openssh.com"
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This is a new transport-layer MAC method using the UMAC algorithm
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(rfc4418). This method is identical to the "umac-64" method documented
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in:
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https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-umac-01.txt
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1.2. transport: Protocol 2 compression algorithm "zlib@openssh.com"
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This transport-layer compression method uses the zlib compression
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algorithm (identical to the "zlib" method in rfc4253), but delays the
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start of compression until after authentication has completed. This
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avoids exposing compression code to attacks from unauthenticated users.
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The method is documented in:
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https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00.txt
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1.3. transport: New public key algorithms "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com",
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"ssh-dsa-cert-v01@openssh.com",
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"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
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"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
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"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
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OpenSSH introduces new public key algorithms to support certificate
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authentication for users and host keys. These methods are documented
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in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys
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1.4. transport: Elliptic Curve cryptography
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OpenSSH supports ECC key exchange and public key authentication as
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specified in RFC5656. Only the ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
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and ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 curves over GF(p) are supported. Elliptic
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curve points encoded using point compression are NOT accepted or
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generated.
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1.5 transport: Protocol 2 Encrypt-then-MAC MAC algorithms
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OpenSSH supports MAC algorithms, whose names contain "-etm", that
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perform the calculations in a different order to that defined in RFC
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4253. These variants use the so-called "encrypt then MAC" ordering,
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calculating the MAC over the packet ciphertext rather than the
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plaintext. This ordering closes a security flaw in the SSH transport
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protocol, where decryption of unauthenticated ciphertext provided a
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"decryption oracle" that could, in conjunction with cipher flaws, reveal
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session plaintext.
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Specifically, the "-etm" MAC algorithms modify the transport protocol
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to calculate the MAC over the packet ciphertext and to send the packet
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length unencrypted. This is necessary for the transport to obtain the
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length of the packet and location of the MAC tag so that it may be
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verified without decrypting unauthenticated data.
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As such, the MAC covers:
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mac = MAC(key, sequence_number || packet_length || encrypted_packet)
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where "packet_length" is encoded as a uint32 and "encrypted_packet"
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contains:
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byte padding_length
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byte[n1] payload; n1 = packet_length - padding_length - 1
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byte[n2] random padding; n2 = padding_length
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1.6 transport: AES-GCM
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OpenSSH supports the AES-GCM algorithm as specified in RFC 5647.
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Because of problems with the specification of the key exchange
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the behaviour of OpenSSH differs from the RFC as follows:
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AES-GCM is only negotiated as the cipher algorithms
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"aes128-gcm@openssh.com" or "aes256-gcm@openssh.com" and never as
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an MAC algorithm. Additionally, if AES-GCM is selected as the cipher
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the exchanged MAC algorithms are ignored and there doesn't have to be
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a matching MAC.
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1.7 transport: chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com authenticated encryption
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OpenSSH supports authenticated encryption using ChaCha20 and Poly1305
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as described in PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305.
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1.8 transport: curve25519-sha256@libssh.org key exchange algorithm
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OpenSSH supports the use of ECDH in Curve25519 for key exchange as
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described at:
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http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
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2. Connection protocol changes
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2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
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The SSH connection protocol (rfc4254) provides the SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
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message to allow an endpoint to signal its peer that it will send no
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more data over a channel. Unfortunately, there is no symmetric way for
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an endpoint to request that its peer should cease sending data to it
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while still keeping the channel open for the endpoint to send data to
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the peer.
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This is desirable, since it saves the transmission of data that would
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otherwise need to be discarded and it allows an endpoint to signal local
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processes of the condition, e.g. by closing the corresponding file
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descriptor.
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OpenSSH implements a channel extension message to perform this
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signalling: "eow@openssh.com" (End Of Write). This message is sent by
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an endpoint when the local output of a session channel is closed or
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experiences a write error. The message is formatted as follows:
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byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
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uint32 recipient channel
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string "eow@openssh.com"
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boolean FALSE
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On receiving this message, the peer SHOULD cease sending data of
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the channel and MAY signal the process from which the channel data
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originates (e.g. by closing its read file descriptor).
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As with the symmetric SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF message, the channel does
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remain open after a "eow@openssh.com" has been sent and more data may
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still be sent in the other direction. This message does not consume
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window space and may be sent even if no window space is available.
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NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
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of this message (in contravention of RFC4254 section 5.4), this
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message is only sent to OpenSSH peers (identified by banner).
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Other SSH implementations may be whitelisted to receive this message
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upon request.
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2.2. connection: disallow additional sessions extension
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"no-more-sessions@openssh.com"
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Most SSH connections will only ever request a single session, but a
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attacker may abuse a running ssh client to surreptitiously open
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additional sessions under their control. OpenSSH provides a global
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request "no-more-sessions@openssh.com" to mitigate this attack.
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When an OpenSSH client expects that it will never open another session
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(i.e. it has been started with connection multiplexing disabled), it
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will send the following global request:
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byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
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string "no-more-sessions@openssh.com"
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char want-reply
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On receipt of such a message, an OpenSSH server will refuse to open
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future channels of type "session" and instead immediately abort the
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connection.
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Note that this is not a general defence against compromised clients
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(that is impossible), but it thwarts a simple attack.
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NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
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of this message, the no-more-sessions request is only sent to OpenSSH
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servers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be
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whitelisted to receive this message upon request.
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2.3. connection: Tunnel forward extension "tun@openssh.com"
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OpenSSH supports layer 2 and layer 3 tunnelling via the "tun@openssh.com"
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channel type. This channel type supports forwarding of network packets
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with datagram boundaries intact between endpoints equipped with
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interfaces like the BSD tun(4) device. Tunnel forwarding channels are
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requested by the client with the following packet:
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byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
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string "tun@openssh.com"
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uint32 sender channel
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uint32 initial window size
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uint32 maximum packet size
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uint32 tunnel mode
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uint32 remote unit number
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The "tunnel mode" parameter specifies whether the tunnel should forward
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layer 2 frames or layer 3 packets. It may take one of the following values:
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SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT 1 /* layer 3 packets */
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SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET 2 /* layer 2 frames */
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The "tunnel unit number" specifies the remote interface number, or may
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be 0x7fffffff to allow the server to automatically chose an interface. A
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server that is not willing to open a client-specified unit should refuse
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the request with a SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE error. On successful
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open, the server should reply with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_SUCCESS.
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Once established the client and server may exchange packet or frames
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over the tunnel channel by encapsulating them in SSH protocol strings
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and sending them as channel data. This ensures that packet boundaries
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are kept intact. Specifically, packets are transmitted using normal
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SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA packets:
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byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
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uint32 recipient channel
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string data
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The contents of the "data" field for layer 3 packets is:
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uint32 packet length
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uint32 address family
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byte[packet length - 4] packet data
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The "address family" field identifies the type of packet in the message.
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It may be one of:
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SSH_TUN_AF_INET 2 /* IPv4 */
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SSH_TUN_AF_INET6 24 /* IPv6 */
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The "packet data" field consists of the IPv4/IPv6 datagram itself
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without any link layer header.
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The contents of the "data" field for layer 2 packets is:
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uint32 packet length
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byte[packet length] frame
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The "frame" field contains an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet frame, including
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header.
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2.4. connection: Unix domain socket forwarding
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OpenSSH supports local and remote Unix domain socket forwarding
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using the "streamlocal" extension. Forwarding is initiated as per
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TCP sockets but with a single path instead of a host and port.
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Similar to direct-tcpip, direct-streamlocal is sent by the client
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to request that the server make a connection to a Unix domain socket.
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byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
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string "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com"
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uint32 sender channel
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uint32 initial window size
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uint32 maximum packet size
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string socket path
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string reserved
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uint32 reserved
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Similar to forwarded-tcpip, forwarded-streamlocal is sent by the
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server when the client has previously send the server a streamlocal-forward
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GLOBAL_REQUEST.
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byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
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string "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"
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uint32 sender channel
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uint32 initial window size
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uint32 maximum packet size
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string socket path
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string reserved for future use
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The reserved field is not currently defined and is ignored on the
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remote end. It is intended to be used in the future to pass
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information about the socket file, such as ownership and mode.
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The client currently sends the empty string for this field.
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Similar to tcpip-forward, streamlocal-forward is sent by the client
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to request remote forwarding of a Unix domain socket.
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byte SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
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string "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"
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boolean TRUE
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string socket path
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Similar to cancel-tcpip-forward, cancel-streamlocal-forward is sent
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by the client cancel the forwarding of a Unix domain socket.
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byte SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
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string "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"
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boolean FALSE
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string socket path
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2.5. connection: hostkey update and rotation "hostkeys-00@openssh.com"
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and "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
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OpenSSH supports a protocol extension allowing a server to inform
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a client of all its protocol v.2 host keys after user-authentication
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has completed.
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byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
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string "hostkeys-00@openssh.com"
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string[] hostkeys
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Upon receiving this message, a client should check which of the
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supplied host keys are present in known_hosts. For keys that are
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not present, it should send a "hostkeys-prove@openssh.com" message
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to request the server prove ownership of the private half of the
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key.
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byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
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string "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
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char 1 /* want-reply */
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string[] hostkeys
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When a server receives this message, it should generate a signature
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using each requested key over the following:
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string "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
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string session identifier
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string hostkey
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These signatures should be included in the reply, in the order matching
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the hostkeys in the request:
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byte SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
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string[] signatures
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When the client receives this reply (and not a failure), it should
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validate the signatures and may update its known_hosts file, adding keys
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that it has not seen before and deleting keys for the server host that
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are no longer offered.
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These extensions let a client learn key types that it had not previously
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encountered, thereby allowing it to potentially upgrade from weaker
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key algorithms to better ones. It also supports graceful key rotation:
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a server may offer multiple keys of the same type for a period (to
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give clients an opportunity to learn them using this extension) before
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removing the deprecated key from those offered.
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3. SFTP protocol changes
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3.1. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK
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When OpenSSH's sftp-server was implemented, the order of the arguments
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to the SSH_FXP_SYMLINK method was inadvertently reversed. Unfortunately,
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the reversal was not noticed until the server was widely deployed. Since
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fixing this to follow the specification would cause incompatibility, the
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current order was retained. For correct operation, clients should send
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SSH_FXP_SYMLINK as follows:
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uint32 id
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string targetpath
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string linkpath
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3.2. sftp: Server extension announcement in SSH_FXP_VERSION
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OpenSSH's sftp-server lists the extensions it supports using the
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standard extension announcement mechanism in the SSH_FXP_VERSION server
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hello packet:
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uint32 3 /* protocol version */
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string ext1-name
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string ext1-version
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string ext2-name
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string ext2-version
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...
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string extN-name
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string extN-version
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Each extension reports its integer version number as an ASCII encoded
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string, e.g. "1". The version will be incremented if the extension is
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ever changed in an incompatible way. The server MAY advertise the same
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extension with multiple versions (though this is unlikely). Clients MUST
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check the version number before attempting to use the extension.
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3.3. sftp: Extension request "posix-rename@openssh.com"
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This operation provides a rename operation with POSIX semantics, which
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are different to those provided by the standard SSH_FXP_RENAME in
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draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt. This request is implemented as a
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SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following format:
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uint32 id
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string "posix-rename@openssh.com"
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string oldpath
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string newpath
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On receiving this request the server will perform the POSIX operation
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rename(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
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This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
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"1".
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3.4. sftp: Extension requests "statvfs@openssh.com" and
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"fstatvfs@openssh.com"
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These requests correspond to the statvfs and fstatvfs POSIX system
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interfaces. The "statvfs@openssh.com" request operates on an explicit
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pathname, and is formatted as follows:
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uint32 id
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string "statvfs@openssh.com"
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string path
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The "fstatvfs@openssh.com" operates on an open file handle:
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uint32 id
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string "fstatvfs@openssh.com"
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string handle
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These requests return a SSH_FXP_STATUS reply on failure. On success they
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return the following SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY reply:
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uint32 id
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uint64 f_bsize /* file system block size */
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uint64 f_frsize /* fundamental fs block size */
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uint64 f_blocks /* number of blocks (unit f_frsize) */
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uint64 f_bfree /* free blocks in file system */
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uint64 f_bavail /* free blocks for non-root */
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uint64 f_files /* total file inodes */
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uint64 f_ffree /* free file inodes */
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uint64 f_favail /* free file inodes for to non-root */
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uint64 f_fsid /* file system id */
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uint64 f_flag /* bit mask of f_flag values */
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uint64 f_namemax /* maximum filename length */
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The values of the f_flag bitmask are as follows:
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#define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY 0x1 /* read-only */
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#define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID 0x2 /* no setuid */
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Both the "statvfs@openssh.com" and "fstatvfs@openssh.com" extensions are
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advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "2".
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10. sftp: Extension request "hardlink@openssh.com"
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This request is for creating a hard link to a regular file. This
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request is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the
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following format:
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uint32 id
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string "hardlink@openssh.com"
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string oldpath
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string newpath
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On receiving this request the server will perform the operation
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link(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
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This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
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"1".
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10. sftp: Extension request "fsync@openssh.com"
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This request asks the server to call fsync(2) on an open file handle.
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uint32 id
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string "fsync@openssh.com"
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string handle
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One receiving this request, a server will call fsync(handle_fd) and will
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respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
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This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
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"1".
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$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.31 2017/05/26 01:40:07 djm Exp $
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