This reduces noise when kernel is compiled by newer GCC versions, such as one used by external toolchain ports. Reviewed by: kib, andrew(sys/arm and sys/arm64), emaste(partial), erj(partial) Reviewed by: jhb (sys/dev/pci/* sys/kern/vfs_aio.c and sys/kern/kern_synch.c) Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10385
1150 lines
28 KiB
C
1150 lines
28 KiB
C
/* $FreeBSD$ */
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/* $OpenBSD: ip_ah.c,v 1.63 2001/06/26 06:18:58 angelos Exp $ */
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/*-
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* The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org),
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* Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and
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* Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de).
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*
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* The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis
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* for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995.
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*
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* Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996,
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* by Angelos D. Keromytis.
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*
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* Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis
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* and Niels Provos.
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*
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* Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis and Niklas Hallqvist.
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*
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* Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis,
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* Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos.
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* Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist.
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* Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee
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* is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in
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* all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or
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* modification of this software.
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* You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please
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* contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license
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* so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to
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* all.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY
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* REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE
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* MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE.
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*/
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#include "opt_inet.h"
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#include "opt_inet6.h"
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/mbuf.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/syslog.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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#include <sys/lock.h>
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#include <sys/mutex.h>
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <net/if.h>
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#include <net/vnet.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
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#include <netinet/ip.h>
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#include <netinet/ip_ecn.h>
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#include <netinet/ip6.h>
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#include <netipsec/ipsec.h>
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#include <netipsec/ah.h>
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#include <netipsec/ah_var.h>
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#include <netipsec/xform.h>
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#ifdef INET6
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#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
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#include <netipsec/ipsec6.h>
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#include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h>
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#endif
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#include <netipsec/key.h>
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#include <netipsec/key_debug.h>
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#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
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/*
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* Return header size in bytes. The old protocol did not support
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* the replay counter; the new protocol always includes the counter.
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*/
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#define HDRSIZE(sav) \
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(((sav)->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? \
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sizeof (struct ah) : sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t))
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/*
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* Return authenticator size in bytes, based on a field in the
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* algorithm descriptor.
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*/
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#define AUTHSIZE(sav) ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 16 : \
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xform_ah_authsize((sav)->tdb_authalgxform))
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VNET_DEFINE(int, ah_enable) = 1; /* control flow of packets with AH */
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VNET_DEFINE(int, ah_cleartos) = 1; /* clear ip_tos when doing AH calc */
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VNET_PCPUSTAT_DEFINE(struct ahstat, ahstat);
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VNET_PCPUSTAT_SYSINIT(ahstat);
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#ifdef VIMAGE
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VNET_PCPUSTAT_SYSUNINIT(ahstat);
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#endif /* VIMAGE */
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#ifdef INET
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SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_ah);
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SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, ah_enable,
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CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW, &VNET_NAME(ah_enable), 0, "");
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SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, ah_cleartos,
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CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW, &VNET_NAME(ah_cleartos), 0, "");
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SYSCTL_VNET_PCPUSTAT(_net_inet_ah, IPSECCTL_STATS, stats, struct ahstat,
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ahstat, "AH statistics (struct ahstat, netipsec/ah_var.h)");
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#endif
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static unsigned char ipseczeroes[256]; /* larger than an ip6 extension hdr */
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static int ah_input_cb(struct cryptop*);
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static int ah_output_cb(struct cryptop*);
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int
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xform_ah_authsize(const struct auth_hash *esph)
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{
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int alen;
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if (esph == NULL)
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return 0;
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switch (esph->type) {
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case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
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case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
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case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
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alen = esph->hashsize / 2; /* RFC4868 2.3 */
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break;
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case CRYPTO_AES_128_NIST_GMAC:
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case CRYPTO_AES_192_NIST_GMAC:
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case CRYPTO_AES_256_NIST_GMAC:
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alen = esph->hashsize;
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break;
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default:
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alen = AH_HMAC_HASHLEN;
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break;
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}
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return alen;
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}
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size_t
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ah_hdrsiz(struct secasvar *sav)
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{
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size_t size;
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if (sav != NULL) {
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int authsize;
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IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, ("null xform"));
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/*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/
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authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
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size = roundup(authsize, sizeof (u_int32_t)) + HDRSIZE(sav);
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} else {
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/* default guess */
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size = sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t) + 16;
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}
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return size;
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}
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/*
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* NB: public for use by esp_init.
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*/
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int
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ah_init0(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp, struct cryptoini *cria)
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{
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const struct auth_hash *thash;
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int keylen;
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thash = auth_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth);
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if (thash == NULL) {
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DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported authentication algorithm %u\n",
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__func__, sav->alg_auth));
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return EINVAL;
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}
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/*
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* Verify the replay state block allocation is consistent with
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* the protocol type. We check here so we can make assumptions
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* later during protocol processing.
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*/
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/* NB: replay state is setup elsewhere (sigh) */
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if (((sav->flags&SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) ^ (sav->replay != NULL)) {
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DPRINTF(("%s: replay state block inconsistency, "
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"%s algorithm %s replay state\n", __func__,
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(sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? "old" : "new",
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sav->replay == NULL ? "without" : "with"));
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return EINVAL;
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}
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if (sav->key_auth == NULL) {
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DPRINTF(("%s: no authentication key for %s algorithm\n",
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__func__, thash->name));
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return EINVAL;
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}
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keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth);
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if (keylen > thash->keysize && thash->keysize != 0) {
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DPRINTF(("%s: invalid keylength %d, algorithm %s requires "
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"keysize less than %d\n", __func__,
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keylen, thash->name, thash->keysize));
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return EINVAL;
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}
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sav->tdb_xform = xsp;
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sav->tdb_authalgxform = thash;
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/* Initialize crypto session. */
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bzero(cria, sizeof (*cria));
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cria->cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type;
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cria->cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
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cria->cri_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
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cria->cri_mlen = AUTHSIZE(sav);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* ah_init() is called when an SPI is being set up.
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*/
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static int
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ah_init(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp)
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{
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struct cryptoini cria;
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int error;
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error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria);
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return error ? error :
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crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, &cria, V_crypto_support);
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}
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/*
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* Paranoia.
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*
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* NB: public for use by esp_zeroize (XXX).
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*/
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int
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ah_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav)
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{
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int err;
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if (sav->key_auth)
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bzero(sav->key_auth->key_data, _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth));
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err = crypto_freesession(sav->tdb_cryptoid);
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sav->tdb_cryptoid = 0;
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sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL;
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sav->tdb_xform = NULL;
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return err;
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}
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/*
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* Massage IPv4/IPv6 headers for AH processing.
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*/
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static int
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ah_massage_headers(struct mbuf **m0, int proto, int skip, int alg, int out)
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{
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struct mbuf *m = *m0;
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unsigned char *ptr;
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int off, count;
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#ifdef INET
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struct ip *ip;
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#endif /* INET */
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#ifdef INET6
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struct ip6_ext *ip6e;
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struct ip6_hdr ip6;
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int alloc, len, ad;
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#endif /* INET6 */
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switch (proto) {
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#ifdef INET
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case AF_INET:
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/*
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* This is the least painful way of dealing with IPv4 header
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* and option processing -- just make sure they're in
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* contiguous memory.
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*/
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*m0 = m = m_pullup(m, skip);
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if (m == NULL) {
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DPRINTF(("%s: m_pullup failed\n", __func__));
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return ENOBUFS;
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}
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/* Fix the IP header */
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ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
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if (V_ah_cleartos)
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ip->ip_tos = 0;
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ip->ip_ttl = 0;
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ip->ip_sum = 0;
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if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK)
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ip->ip_off &= htons(IP_DF);
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else
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ip->ip_off = htons(0);
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ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + sizeof(struct ip);
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/* IPv4 option processing */
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for (off = sizeof(struct ip); off < skip;) {
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if (ptr[off] == IPOPT_EOL || ptr[off] == IPOPT_NOP ||
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off + 1 < skip)
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;
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else {
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DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option length for "
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"option %d\n", __func__, ptr[off]));
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m_freem(m);
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return EINVAL;
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}
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switch (ptr[off]) {
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case IPOPT_EOL:
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off = skip; /* End the loop. */
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break;
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case IPOPT_NOP:
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off++;
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break;
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case IPOPT_SECURITY: /* 0x82 */
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case 0x85: /* Extended security. */
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case 0x86: /* Commercial security. */
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case 0x94: /* Router alert */
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case 0x95: /* RFC1770 */
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/* Sanity check for option length. */
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if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
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DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option "
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"length for option %d\n",
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__func__, ptr[off]));
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m_freem(m);
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return EINVAL;
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}
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off += ptr[off + 1];
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break;
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case IPOPT_LSRR:
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case IPOPT_SSRR:
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/* Sanity check for option length. */
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if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
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DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option "
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"length for option %d\n",
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__func__, ptr[off]));
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m_freem(m);
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return EINVAL;
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}
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/*
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* On output, if we have either of the
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* source routing options, we should
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* swap the destination address of the
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* IP header with the last address
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* specified in the option, as that is
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* what the destination's IP header
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* will look like.
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*/
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if (out)
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bcopy(ptr + off + ptr[off + 1] -
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sizeof(struct in_addr),
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&(ip->ip_dst), sizeof(struct in_addr));
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/* Fall through */
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default:
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/* Sanity check for option length. */
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if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
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DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option "
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"length for option %d\n",
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__func__, ptr[off]));
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m_freem(m);
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return EINVAL;
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}
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/* Zeroize all other options. */
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count = ptr[off + 1];
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bcopy(ipseczeroes, ptr, count);
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off += count;
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break;
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}
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/* Sanity check. */
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if (off > skip) {
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DPRINTF(("%s: malformed IPv4 options header\n",
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__func__));
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m_freem(m);
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return EINVAL;
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}
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}
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break;
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#endif /* INET */
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#ifdef INET6
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case AF_INET6: /* Ugly... */
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/* Copy and "cook" the IPv6 header. */
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m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), (caddr_t) &ip6);
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|
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/* We don't do IPv6 Jumbograms. */
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if (ip6.ip6_plen == 0) {
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DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported IPv6 jumbogram\n", __func__));
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m_freem(m);
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return EMSGSIZE;
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}
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ip6.ip6_flow = 0;
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ip6.ip6_hlim = 0;
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ip6.ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK;
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ip6.ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION;
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|
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/* Scoped address handling. */
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if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_src))
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ip6.ip6_src.s6_addr16[1] = 0;
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if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_dst))
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ip6.ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1] = 0;
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/* Done with IPv6 header. */
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m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), (caddr_t) &ip6);
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|
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/* Let's deal with the remaining headers (if any). */
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if (skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) > 0) {
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if (m->m_len <= skip) {
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ptr = (unsigned char *) malloc(
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skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
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M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT);
|
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if (ptr == NULL) {
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DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate memory"
|
|
"for IPv6 headers\n",__func__));
|
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m_freem(m);
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return ENOBUFS;
|
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}
|
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|
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/*
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* Copy all the protocol headers after
|
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* the IPv6 header.
|
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*/
|
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m_copydata(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
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skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr);
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alloc = 1;
|
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} else {
|
|
/* No need to allocate memory. */
|
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ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) +
|
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sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);
|
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alloc = 0;
|
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}
|
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} else
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break;
|
|
|
|
off = ip6.ip6_nxt & 0xff; /* Next header type. */
|
|
|
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for (len = 0; len < skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);)
|
|
switch (off) {
|
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case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS:
|
|
case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
|
|
ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Process the mutable/immutable
|
|
* options -- borrows heavily from the
|
|
* KAME code.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (count = len + sizeof(struct ip6_ext);
|
|
count < len + ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);) {
|
|
if (ptr[count] == IP6OPT_PAD1) {
|
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count++;
|
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continue; /* Skip padding. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity check. */
|
|
if (count > len +
|
|
((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3)) {
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
|
|
/* Free, if we allocated. */
|
|
if (alloc)
|
|
free(ptr, M_XDATA);
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ad = ptr[count + 1];
|
|
|
|
/* If mutable option, zeroize. */
|
|
if (ptr[count] & IP6OPT_MUTABLE)
|
|
bcopy(ipseczeroes, ptr + count,
|
|
ptr[count + 1]);
|
|
|
|
count += ad;
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity check. */
|
|
if (count >
|
|
skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) {
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
|
|
/* Free, if we allocated. */
|
|
if (alloc)
|
|
free(ptr, M_XDATA);
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Advance. */
|
|
len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);
|
|
off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case IPPROTO_ROUTING:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Always include routing headers in
|
|
* computation.
|
|
*/
|
|
ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len);
|
|
len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);
|
|
off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: unexpected IPv6 header type %d",
|
|
__func__, off));
|
|
if (alloc)
|
|
free(ptr, M_XDATA);
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Copyback and free, if we allocated. */
|
|
if (alloc) {
|
|
m_copyback(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
|
|
skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr);
|
|
free(ptr, M_XDATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* INET6 */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ah_input() gets called to verify that an input packet
|
|
* passes authentication.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
|
|
{
|
|
IPSEC_DEBUG_DECLARE(char buf[128]);
|
|
const struct auth_hash *ahx;
|
|
struct cryptodesc *crda;
|
|
struct cryptop *crp;
|
|
struct xform_data *xd;
|
|
struct newah *ah;
|
|
uint64_t cryptoid;
|
|
int hl, rplen, authsize, error;
|
|
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->key_auth != NULL, ("null authentication key"));
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL,
|
|
("null authentication xform"));
|
|
|
|
/* Figure out header size. */
|
|
rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
|
|
|
|
/* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */
|
|
IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct newah *, m, skip, rplen);
|
|
if (ah == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("ah_input: cannot pullup header\n"));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops); /*XXX*/
|
|
error = ENOBUFS;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check replay window, if applicable. */
|
|
SECASVAR_LOCK(sav);
|
|
if (sav->replay != NULL && sav->replay->wsize != 0 &&
|
|
ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(ah->ah_seq), sav) == 0) {
|
|
SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav);
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_replay);
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: packet replay failure: %s\n", __func__,
|
|
ipsec_sa2str(sav, buf, sizeof(buf))));
|
|
error = EACCES;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
cryptoid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
|
|
SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav);
|
|
|
|
/* Verify AH header length. */
|
|
hl = ah->ah_len * sizeof (u_int32_t);
|
|
ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
|
|
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
|
|
if (hl != authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: bad authenticator length %u (expecting %lu)"
|
|
" for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, hl,
|
|
(u_long) (authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)),
|
|
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_badauthl);
|
|
error = EACCES;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
AHSTAT_ADD(ahs_ibytes, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hl);
|
|
|
|
/* Get crypto descriptors. */
|
|
crp = crypto_getreq(1);
|
|
if (crp == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptor\n",
|
|
__func__));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto);
|
|
error = ENOBUFS;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crda = crp->crp_desc;
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("null crypto descriptor"));
|
|
|
|
crda->crd_skip = 0;
|
|
crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len;
|
|
crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen;
|
|
|
|
/* Authentication operation. */
|
|
crda->crd_alg = ahx->type;
|
|
crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
|
|
crda->crd_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */
|
|
xd = malloc(sizeof(*xd) + skip + rplen + authsize, M_XDATA,
|
|
M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
|
|
if (xd == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate xform_data\n", __func__));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto);
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
error = ENOBUFS;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Save the authenticator, the skipped portion of the packet,
|
|
* and the AH header.
|
|
*/
|
|
m_copydata(m, 0, skip + rplen + authsize, (caddr_t)(xd + 1));
|
|
|
|
/* Zeroize the authenticator on the packet. */
|
|
m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes);
|
|
|
|
/* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */
|
|
error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
|
|
skip, ahx->type, 0);
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
/* NB: mbuf is free'd by ah_massage_headers */
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops);
|
|
free(xd, M_XDATA);
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
key_freesav(&sav);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Crypto operation descriptor. */
|
|
crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */
|
|
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
|
|
if (V_async_crypto)
|
|
crp->crp_flags |= CRYPTO_F_ASYNC | CRYPTO_F_ASYNC_KEEPORDER;
|
|
crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
|
|
crp->crp_callback = ah_input_cb;
|
|
crp->crp_sid = cryptoid;
|
|
crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) xd;
|
|
|
|
/* These are passed as-is to the callback. */
|
|
xd->sav = sav;
|
|
xd->nxt = ah->ah_nxt;
|
|
xd->protoff = protoff;
|
|
xd->skip = skip;
|
|
xd->cryptoid = cryptoid;
|
|
return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
|
|
bad:
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
key_freesav(&sav);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* AH input callback from the crypto driver.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
|
|
{
|
|
IPSEC_DEBUG_DECLARE(char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN]);
|
|
unsigned char calc[AH_ALEN_MAX];
|
|
struct mbuf *m;
|
|
struct xform_data *xd;
|
|
struct secasvar *sav;
|
|
struct secasindex *saidx;
|
|
caddr_t ptr;
|
|
uint64_t cryptoid;
|
|
int authsize, rplen, error, skip, protoff;
|
|
uint8_t nxt;
|
|
|
|
m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
|
|
xd = (struct xform_data *) crp->crp_opaque;
|
|
sav = xd->sav;
|
|
skip = xd->skip;
|
|
nxt = xd->nxt;
|
|
protoff = xd->protoff;
|
|
cryptoid = xd->cryptoid;
|
|
saidx = &sav->sah->saidx;
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET ||
|
|
saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6,
|
|
("unexpected protocol family %u", saidx->dst.sa.sa_family));
|
|
|
|
/* Check for crypto errors. */
|
|
if (crp->crp_etype) {
|
|
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
|
|
/* Reset the session ID */
|
|
if (ipsec_updateid(sav, &crp->crp_sid, &cryptoid) != 0)
|
|
crypto_freesession(cryptoid);
|
|
xd->cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
|
|
return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
|
|
}
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_noxform);
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype));
|
|
error = crp->crp_etype;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
} else {
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]);
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp); /* No longer needed. */
|
|
crp = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen... */
|
|
if (m == NULL) {
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto);
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__));
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Figure out header size. */
|
|
rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
|
|
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
|
|
|
|
/* Copy authenticator off the packet. */
|
|
m_copydata(m, skip + rplen, authsize, calc);
|
|
|
|
/* Verify authenticator. */
|
|
ptr = (caddr_t) (xd + 1);
|
|
if (timingsafe_bcmp(ptr + skip + rplen, calc, authsize)) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: authentication hash mismatch for packet "
|
|
"in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
|
|
ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_badauth);
|
|
error = EACCES;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Fix the Next Protocol field. */
|
|
((uint8_t *) ptr)[protoff] = nxt;
|
|
|
|
/* Copyback the saved (uncooked) network headers. */
|
|
m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr);
|
|
free(xd, M_XDATA), xd = NULL; /* No longer needed */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Header is now authenticated.
|
|
*/
|
|
m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR|M_AUTHIPDGM;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Update replay sequence number, if appropriate.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sav->replay) {
|
|
u_int32_t seq;
|
|
|
|
m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newah, ah_seq),
|
|
sizeof (seq), (caddr_t) &seq);
|
|
SECASVAR_LOCK(sav);
|
|
if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) {
|
|
SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav);
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_replay);
|
|
error = EACCES;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Remove the AH header and authenticator from the mbuf.
|
|
*/
|
|
error = m_striphdr(m, skip, rplen + authsize);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: mangled mbuf chain for SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
|
|
ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops);
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family) {
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff);
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff);
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
default:
|
|
panic("%s: Unexpected address family: %d saidx=%p", __func__,
|
|
saidx->dst.sa.sa_family, saidx);
|
|
}
|
|
return error;
|
|
bad:
|
|
if (sav)
|
|
key_freesav(&sav);
|
|
if (m != NULL)
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
if (xd != NULL)
|
|
free(xd, M_XDATA);
|
|
if (crp != NULL)
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* AH output routine, called by ipsec[46]_perform_request().
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
ah_output(struct mbuf *m, struct secpolicy *sp, struct secasvar *sav,
|
|
u_int idx, int skip, int protoff)
|
|
{
|
|
IPSEC_DEBUG_DECLARE(char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN]);
|
|
const struct auth_hash *ahx;
|
|
struct cryptodesc *crda;
|
|
struct xform_data *xd;
|
|
struct mbuf *mi;
|
|
struct cryptop *crp;
|
|
struct newah *ah;
|
|
uint64_t cryptoid;
|
|
uint16_t iplen;
|
|
int error, rplen, authsize, maxpacketsize, roff;
|
|
uint8_t prot;
|
|
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
|
|
ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
|
|
IPSEC_ASSERT(ahx != NULL, ("null authentication xform"));
|
|
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_output);
|
|
|
|
/* Figure out header size. */
|
|
rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
|
|
|
|
/* Check for maximum packet size violations. */
|
|
switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) {
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* INET */
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* INET6 */
|
|
default:
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: unknown/unsupported protocol family %u, "
|
|
"SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
|
|
sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
|
|
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_nopf);
|
|
error = EPFNOSUPPORT;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
|
|
if (rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len > maxpacketsize) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big "
|
|
"(len %u, max len %u)\n", __func__,
|
|
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi),
|
|
rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len, maxpacketsize));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_toobig);
|
|
error = EMSGSIZE;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Update the counters. */
|
|
AHSTAT_ADD(ahs_obytes, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip);
|
|
|
|
m = m_unshare(m, M_NOWAIT);
|
|
if (m == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
|
|
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops);
|
|
error = ENOBUFS;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Inject AH header. */
|
|
mi = m_makespace(m, skip, rplen + authsize, &roff);
|
|
if (mi == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to inject %u byte AH header for SA "
|
|
"%s/%08lx\n", __func__,
|
|
rplen + authsize,
|
|
ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
|
|
(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops); /*XXX differs from openbsd */
|
|
error = ENOBUFS;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The AH header is guaranteed by m_makespace() to be in
|
|
* contiguous memory, at roff bytes offset into the returned mbuf.
|
|
*/
|
|
ah = (struct newah *)(mtod(mi, caddr_t) + roff);
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the AH header. */
|
|
m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (caddr_t) &ah->ah_nxt);
|
|
ah->ah_len = (rplen + authsize - sizeof(struct ah)) / sizeof(u_int32_t);
|
|
ah->ah_reserve = 0;
|
|
ah->ah_spi = sav->spi;
|
|
|
|
/* Zeroize authenticator. */
|
|
m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes);
|
|
|
|
/* Insert packet replay counter, as requested. */
|
|
SECASVAR_LOCK(sav);
|
|
if (sav->replay) {
|
|
if (sav->replay->count == ~0 &&
|
|
(sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) {
|
|
SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav);
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: replay counter wrapped for SA %s/%08lx\n",
|
|
__func__, ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf,
|
|
sizeof(buf)), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_wrap);
|
|
error = EACCES;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef REGRESSION
|
|
/* Emulate replay attack when ipsec_replay is TRUE. */
|
|
if (!V_ipsec_replay)
|
|
#endif
|
|
sav->replay->count++;
|
|
ah->ah_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count);
|
|
}
|
|
cryptoid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
|
|
SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav);
|
|
|
|
/* Get crypto descriptors. */
|
|
crp = crypto_getreq(1);
|
|
if (crp == NULL) {
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n",
|
|
__func__));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto);
|
|
error = ENOBUFS;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crda = crp->crp_desc;
|
|
crda->crd_skip = 0;
|
|
crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen;
|
|
crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len;
|
|
|
|
/* Authentication operation. */
|
|
crda->crd_alg = ahx->type;
|
|
crda->crd_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
|
|
crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */
|
|
xd = malloc(sizeof(struct xform_data) + skip, M_XDATA,
|
|
M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
|
|
if (xd == NULL) {
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate xform_data\n", __func__));
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto);
|
|
error = ENOBUFS;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Save the skipped portion of the packet. */
|
|
m_copydata(m, 0, skip, (caddr_t) (xd + 1));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fix IP header length on the header used for
|
|
* authentication. We don't need to fix the original
|
|
* header length as it will be fixed by our caller.
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) {
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
bcopy(((caddr_t)(xd + 1)) +
|
|
offsetof(struct ip, ip_len),
|
|
(caddr_t) &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t));
|
|
iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize);
|
|
m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip, ip_len),
|
|
sizeof(u_int16_t), (caddr_t) &iplen);
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* INET */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
bcopy(((caddr_t)(xd + 1)) +
|
|
offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen),
|
|
(caddr_t) &iplen, sizeof(uint16_t));
|
|
iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize);
|
|
m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen),
|
|
sizeof(uint16_t), (caddr_t) &iplen);
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* INET6 */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fix the Next Header field in saved header. */
|
|
((uint8_t *) (xd + 1))[protoff] = IPPROTO_AH;
|
|
|
|
/* Update the Next Protocol field in the IP header. */
|
|
prot = IPPROTO_AH;
|
|
m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(uint8_t), (caddr_t) &prot);
|
|
|
|
/* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */
|
|
error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
|
|
skip, ahx->type, 1);
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
m = NULL; /* mbuf was free'd by ah_massage_headers. */
|
|
free(xd, M_XDATA);
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Crypto operation descriptor. */
|
|
crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */
|
|
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
|
|
if (V_async_crypto)
|
|
crp->crp_flags |= CRYPTO_F_ASYNC | CRYPTO_F_ASYNC_KEEPORDER;
|
|
crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
|
|
crp->crp_callback = ah_output_cb;
|
|
crp->crp_sid = cryptoid;
|
|
crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) xd;
|
|
|
|
/* These are passed as-is to the callback. */
|
|
xd->sp = sp;
|
|
xd->sav = sav;
|
|
xd->skip = skip;
|
|
xd->idx = idx;
|
|
xd->cryptoid = cryptoid;
|
|
|
|
return crypto_dispatch(crp);
|
|
bad:
|
|
if (m)
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
key_freesav(&sav);
|
|
key_freesp(&sp);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* AH output callback from the crypto driver.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
ah_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct xform_data *xd;
|
|
struct secpolicy *sp;
|
|
struct secasvar *sav;
|
|
struct mbuf *m;
|
|
uint64_t cryptoid;
|
|
caddr_t ptr;
|
|
u_int idx;
|
|
int skip, error;
|
|
|
|
m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
|
|
xd = (struct xform_data *) crp->crp_opaque;
|
|
sp = xd->sp;
|
|
sav = xd->sav;
|
|
skip = xd->skip;
|
|
idx = xd->idx;
|
|
cryptoid = xd->cryptoid;
|
|
ptr = (caddr_t) (xd + 1);
|
|
|
|
/* Check for crypto errors. */
|
|
if (crp->crp_etype) {
|
|
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
|
|
/* Reset the session ID */
|
|
if (ipsec_updateid(sav, &crp->crp_sid, &cryptoid) != 0)
|
|
crypto_freesession(cryptoid);
|
|
xd->cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
|
|
return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
|
|
}
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_noxform);
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype));
|
|
error = crp->crp_etype;
|
|
m_freem(m);
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen... */
|
|
if (m == NULL) {
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto);
|
|
DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__));
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copy original headers (with the new protocol number) back
|
|
* in place.
|
|
*/
|
|
m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr);
|
|
|
|
free(xd, M_XDATA);
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]);
|
|
#ifdef REGRESSION
|
|
/* Emulate man-in-the-middle attack when ipsec_integrity is TRUE. */
|
|
if (V_ipsec_integrity) {
|
|
int alen;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Corrupt HMAC if we want to test integrity verification of
|
|
* the other side.
|
|
*/
|
|
alen = AUTHSIZE(sav);
|
|
m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, ipseczeroes);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */
|
|
error = ipsec_process_done(m, sp, sav, idx);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
bad:
|
|
free(xd, M_XDATA);
|
|
crypto_freereq(crp);
|
|
key_freesav(&sav);
|
|
key_freesp(&sp);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct xformsw ah_xformsw = {
|
|
.xf_type = XF_AH,
|
|
.xf_name = "IPsec AH",
|
|
.xf_init = ah_init,
|
|
.xf_zeroize = ah_zeroize,
|
|
.xf_input = ah_input,
|
|
.xf_output = ah_output,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
SYSINIT(ah_xform_init, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE,
|
|
xform_attach, &ah_xformsw);
|
|
SYSUNINIT(ah_xform_uninit, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE,
|
|
xform_detach, &ah_xformsw);
|