freebsd-dev/lib/libutil/login_auth.c
David Nugent 56c0434453 Summary of login.conf support changes:
o Incorporated BSDI code and enhancements, better logging for error
  checking (which has been shown to be a problem, and is therefore
  justified, imho); also some minor things we were missing, including
  better quad_t math, which checks for under/overflows.

o setusercontext() now allows user resource limit overrides, but
  does this AFTER dropping root privs, to restrict the user to
  droping hard limits and set soft limits within the kernel's
  allowed user limits.

o umask() only set once, and only if requested.

o add _secure_path(), and use in login.conf to guard against
  symlinks etc. and non-root owned or non-user owned files being
  used. Derived from BSDI contributed code.

o revamped authentication code to BSDI's latest api, which
  includes deleting authenticate() and adding auth_check()
  and a few other functions. This is still marked as depecated
  in BSDI, but is included for completeness. No other source
  in the tree uses this anyway, so it is now bracketed with
  #ifdef LOGIN_CAP_AUTH which is by default not defined. Only
  auth_checknologin() and auth_cat() are actually used in
  module login_auth.c.

o AUTH_NONE definition removed (collided with other includes
  in the tree). [bde]

o BSDI's login_getclass() now accepts a char *classname
  parameter rather than struct passwd *pwd. We now do likewise,
  but added login_getpwclass() for (sort of) backwards
  compatiblity, namely because we handle root as a special
  case for the default class. This will require quite a few
  changes elsewhere in the source tree.

o We no longer pretend to support rlim_t as a long type.

o Revised code formatting to be more bsd-ish style.
1997-05-10 18:55:38 +00:00

671 lines
14 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 1996 by
* Sean Eric Fagan <sef@kithrup.com>
* David Nugent <davidn@blaze.net.au>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Portions copyright (c) 1995,1997 by
* Berkeley Software Design, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, is permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice immediately at the beginning of the file, without modification,
* this list of conditions, and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. This work was done expressly for inclusion into FreeBSD. Other use
* is permitted provided this notation is included.
* 4. Absolutely no warranty of function or purpose is made by the authors.
* 5. Modifications may be freely made to this file providing the above
* conditions are met.
*
* Low-level routines relating to the user capabilities database
*
* $Id: login_auth.c,v 1.6 1997/02/22 15:08:18 peter Exp $
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <login_cap.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <paths.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <libutil.h>
#ifdef LOGIN_CAP_AUTH
/*
* Comment from BSDI's authenticate.c module:
* NOTE: THIS MODULE IS TO BE DEPRECATED. FUTURE VERSIONS OF BSD/OS WILL
* HAVE AN UPDATED API, THOUGH THESE FUNCTIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE AVAILABLE
* FOR BACKWARDS COMPATABILITY
*/
#define AUTHMAXSPOOL (8 * 1024) /* Max size of authentication data */
#define AUTHCOMM_FD 3 /* Handle used to read/write auth data */
struct rmfiles {
struct rmfiles *next;
char file[1];
};
struct authopts {
struct authopts *next;
char opt[1];
};
static char *spoolbuf = NULL;
static int spoolidx = 0;
static struct rmfiles *rmfirst = NULL;
static struct authopts *optfirst = NULL;
/*
* Setup a known environment for all authentication scripts.
*/
static char *auth_environ[] = {
"PATH=" _PATH_DEFPATH,
"SHELL=" _PATH_BSHELL,
NULL,
};
/*
* nextline()
* Get the next line from the data buffer collected from
* the authentication program. This function relies on the
* fact that lines are nul terminated.
*/
static char *
nextline(int *idx)
{
char *ptr = NULL;
if (spoolbuf != NULL && *idx < spoolidx) {
ptr = spoolbuf + *idx;
*idx += strlen(ptr) + 1;
}
return ptr;
}
/*
* spooldata()
* Read data returned on authentication backchannel and
* stuff it into our spool buffer. We also replace \n with nul
* to make parsing easier later.
*/
static int
spooldata(int fd)
{
if (spoolbuf)
free(spoolbuf);
spoolidx = 0;
if (spoolbuf == NULL && (spoolbuf = malloc(AUTHMAXSPOOL)) == NULL)
syslog(LOG_ERR, "authbuffer malloc: %m");
else while (spoolidx < sizeof(spoolbuf) - 1) {
int r = read(fd, spoolbuf + spoolidx, sizeof(spoolbuf)-spoolidx);
char *b;
if (r <= 0) {
spoolbuf[spoolidx] = '\0';
return 0;
}
/*
* Convert newlines into NULs to allow
* easier scanning of the file.
*/
while ((b = memchr(spoolbuf + spoolidx, '\n', r)) != NULL)
*b = '\0';
spoolidx += r;
}
return -1;
}
/*
* auth_check()
* Starts an auth_script() for the given <user>, with a class <class>,
* style <style>, and service <service>. <style> is necessary,
* as are <user> and <class>, but <service> is optional -- it defaults
* to "login".
* Since auth_script() expects an execl'able program name, authenticate()
* also concatenates <style> to _PATH_AUTHPROG.
* Lastly, calls auth_scan(0) to see if there are any "reject" statements,
* or lack of "auth" statements.
* Returns -1 on error, 0 on rejection, and >0 on success.
* (See AUTH_* for the return values.)
*
*/
int
auth_check(const char *name, const char *clss, const char *style,
const char *service, int *status)
{
int _status;
if (status == NULL)
status = &_status;
*status = 0;
if (style != NULL) {
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
if (service == NULL)
service = LOGIN_DEFSERVICE;
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), _PATH_AUTHPROG "%s", style);
if (auth_script(path, style, "-s", service, name, clss, 0))
status = 0;
else
*status = auth_scan(0);
return *status & AUTH_ALLOW;
}
return -1;
}
int
auth_response(const char *name, const char *class, const char *style,
const char *service, int *status,
const char *challenge, const char *response)
{
int _status;
if (status == NULL)
status = &_status;
*status = 0;
if (style != NULL) {
int datalen;
char *data;
if (service == NULL)
service = LOGIN_DEFSERVICE;
datalen = strlen(challenge) + strlen(response) + 2;
if ((data = malloc(datalen)) == NULL) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "auth_response: %m");
warnx("internal resource failure");
} else {
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
snprintf(data, datalen, "%s%c%s", challenge, 0, response);
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), _PATH_AUTHPROG "%s", style);
if (auth_script_data(data, datalen, path, style, "-s", service,
name, class, 0))
*status = 0;
else
*status = auth_scan(0);
free(data);
return (*status & AUTH_ALLOW);
}
}
return -1;
}
int
auth_approve(login_cap_t *lc, const char *name, const char *service)
{
int r = -1;
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
if (lc == NULL) {
if (strlen(name) > MAXPATHLEN) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: username too long", name);
warnx("username too long");
} else {
struct passwd *pwd;
char *p;
pwd = getpwnam(name);
if (pwd == NULL && (p = strchr(name, '.')) != NULL) {
int i = p - name;
if (i >= MAXPATHLEN)
i = MAXPATHLEN - 1;
strncpy(path, name, i);
path[i] = '\0';
pwd = getpwnam(path); /* Fixed bug in BSDI code... */
}
if ((lc = login_getpwclass(pwd ? pwd->pw_class : NULL)) == NULL)
warnx("unable to classify user '%s'", name);
}
}
if (lc != NULL) {
char *approve;
char *s;
if (service != NULL)
service = LOGIN_DEFSERVICE;
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "approve-%s", service);
if ((approve = login_getcapstr(lc, s = path, NULL, NULL)) == NULL &&
(approve = login_getcapstr(lc, s = "approve", NULL, NULL)) == NULL)
r = AUTH_OKAY;
else {
if (approve[0] != '/') {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Invalid %s script: %s", s, approve);
warnx("invalid path to approval script");
} else {
char *s;
s = strrchr(approve, '/') + 1;
if (auth_script(approve, s, name,
lc->lc_class, service, 0) == 0 &&
(r = auth_scan(AUTH_OKAY) & AUTH_ALLOW) != 0)
auth_env();
}
}
}
return r;
}
void
auth_env(void)
{
int idx = 0;
char *line;
while ((line = nextline(&idx)) != NULL) {
if (!strncasecmp(line, BI_SETENV, sizeof(BI_SETENV)-1)) {
line += sizeof(BI_SETENV) - 1;
if (*line && isspace(*line)) {
char *name;
char ch, *p;
while (*line && isspace(*line))
++line;
name = line;
while (*line && !isspace(*line))
++line;
ch = *(p = line);
if (*line)
++line;
if (setenv(name, line, 1))
warn("setenv(%s, %s)", name, line);
*p = ch;
}
}
}
}
char *
auth_value(const char *what)
{
int idx = 0;
char *line;
while ((line = nextline(&idx)) != NULL) {
if (!strncasecmp(line, BI_VALUE, sizeof(BI_VALUE)-1)) {
char *name;
line += sizeof(BI_VALUE) - 1;
while (*line && isspace(*line))
++line;
name = line;
if (*line) {
int i;
char ch, *p;
ch = *(p = line);
*line++ = '\0';
i = strcmp(name, what);
*p = ch;
if (i == 0)
return auth_mkvalue(line);
}
}
}
return NULL;
}
char *
auth_mkvalue(const char *value)
{
char *big, *p;
big = malloc(strlen(value) * 4 + 1);
if (big != NULL) {
for (p = big; *value; ++value) {
switch (*value) {
case '\r':
*p++ = '\\';
*p++ = 'r';
break;
case '\n':
*p++ = '\\';
*p++ = 'n';
break;
case '\\':
*p++ = '\\';
*p++ = *value;
break;
case '\t':
case ' ':
if (p == big)
*p++ = '\\';
*p++ = *value;
break;
default:
if (!isprint(*value)) {
*p++ = '\\';
*p++ = ((*value >> 6) & 0x3) + '0';
*p++ = ((*value >> 3) & 0x7) + '0';
*p++ = ((*value ) & 0x7) + '0';
} else
*p++ = *value;
break;
}
}
*p = '\0';
big = realloc(big, strlen(big) + 1);
}
return big;
}
#define NARGC 63
static int
_auth_script(const char *data, int nbytes, const char *path, va_list ap)
{
int r, argc, status;
int pfd[2];
pid_t pid;
struct authopts *e;
char *argv[NARGC+1];
r = -1;
argc = 0;
for (e = optfirst; argc < (NARGC - 1) && e != NULL; e = e->next) {
argv[argc++] = "-v";
argv[argc++] = e->opt;
}
while (argc < NARGC && (argv[argc] = va_arg(ap, char *)) != NULL)
++argc;
argv[argc] = NULL;
if (argc >= NARGC && va_arg(ap, char *))
syslog(LOG_ERR, "too many arguments");
else if (_secure_path(path, 0, 0) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: path not secure", path);
warnx("invalid script: %s", path);
} else if (socketpair(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pfd) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "unable to create backchannel %m");
warnx("internal resource failure");
} else switch (pid = fork()) {
case -1: /* fork() failure */
close(pfd[0]);
close(pfd[1]);
syslog(LOG_ERR, "fork %s: %m", path);
warnx("internal resource failure");
break;
case 0: /* child process */
close(pfd[0]);
if (pfd[1] != AUTHCOMM_FD) {
if (dup2(pfd[1], AUTHCOMM_FD) < 0)
err(1, "dup backchannel");
close(pfd[1]);
}
for (r = getdtablesize(); --r > AUTHCOMM_FD; )
close(r);
execve(path, argv, auth_environ);
syslog(LOG_ERR, "exec %s: %m", path);
err(1, path);
default: /* parent */
close(pfd[1]);
if (data && nbytes)
write(pfd[0], data, nbytes);
r = spooldata(pfd[0]);
close(pfd[0]);
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: waitpid: %m", path);
warnx("internal failure");
r = -1;
} else {
if (r != 0 || !WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
r = -1;
}
/* kill the buffer if it is of no use */
if (r != 0) {
free(spoolbuf);
spoolbuf = NULL;
spoolidx = 0;
}
break;
}
return r;
}
/*
* auth_script()
* Runs an authentication program with specified arguments.
* It sets up file descriptor 3 for the program to write to;
* it stashes the output somewhere. The output of the program
* consists of statements:
* reject [challenge|silent]
* authorize [root|secure]
* setenv <name> [<value>]
* remove <file>
*
* Terribly exciting, isn't it?
* Output cannot exceed AUTHMAXSPOOL characters.
*/
int
auth_script(const char *path, ...)
{
int r;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, path);
r = _auth_script(NULL, 0, path, ap);
va_end(ap);
return r;
}
int
auth_script_data(const char *data, int nbytes, const char *path, ...)
{
int r;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, path);
r = _auth_script(data, nbytes, path, ap);
va_end(ap);
return r;
}
static void
add_rmlist(const char *file)
{
struct rmfiles *rm;
if ((rm = malloc(sizeof(struct rmfiles) + strlen(file) + 1)) == NULL)
syslog(LOG_ERR, "add_rmfile malloc: %m");
else {
strcpy(rm->file, file);
rm->next = rmfirst;
rmfirst = rm;
}
}
int
auth_scan(int okay)
{
int idx = 0;
char *line;
while ((line = nextline(&idx)) != NULL) {
if (!strncasecmp(line, BI_REJECT, sizeof(BI_REJECT)-1)) {
line += sizeof(BI_REJECT) - 1;
while (*line && isspace(*line))
++line;
if (*line) {
if (!strcasecmp(line, "silent"))
return AUTH_SILENT;
if (!strcasecmp(line, "challenge"))
return AUTH_CHALLENGE;
}
return 0;
} else if (!strncasecmp(line, BI_AUTH, sizeof(BI_AUTH)-1)) {
line += sizeof(BI_AUTH) - 1;
while (*line && isspace(*line))
++line;
if (*line == '\0')
okay |= AUTH_OKAY;
else if (!strcasecmp(line, "root"))
okay |= AUTH_ROOTOKAY;
else if (!strcasecmp(line, "secure"))
okay |= AUTH_SECURE;
}
else if (!strncasecmp(line, BI_REMOVE, sizeof(BI_REMOVE)-1)) {
line += sizeof(BI_REMOVE) - 1;
while (*line && isspace(*line))
++line;
if (*line)
add_rmlist(line);
}
}
return okay;
}
int
auth_setopt(const char *n, const char *v)
{
int r;
struct authopts *e;
if ((e = malloc(sizeof(*e) + strlen(n) + strlen(v) + 1)) == NULL)
r = -1;
else {
sprintf(e->opt, "%s=%s", n, v);
e->next = optfirst;
optfirst = e;
r = 0;
}
return r;
}
void
auth_clropts(void)
{
struct authopts *e;
while ((e = optfirst) != NULL) {
optfirst = e->next;
free(e);
}
}
void
auth_rmfiles(void)
{
struct rmfiles *rm;
while ((rm = rmfirst) != NULL) {
unlink(rm->file);
rmfirst = rm->next;
free(rm);
}
}
#endif
/*
* auth_checknologin()
* Checks for the existance of a nologin file in the login_cap
* capability <lc>. If there isn't one specified, then it checks
* to see if this class should just ignore nologin files. Lastly,
* it tries to print out the default nologin file, and, if such
* exists, it exits.
*/
void
auth_checknologin(login_cap_t *lc)
{
char *file;
/* Do we ignore a nologin file? */
if (login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0))
return;
/* Note that <file> will be "" if there is no nologin capability */
if ((file = login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", "", NULL)) == NULL)
exit(1);
/*
* *file is true IFF there was a "nologin" capability
* Note that auth_cat() returns 1 only if the specified
* file exists, and is readable. E.g., /.nologin exists.
*/
if ((*file && auth_cat(file)) || auth_cat(_PATH_NOLOGIN))
exit(1);
}
/*
* auth_cat()
* Checks for the readability of <file>; if it can be opened for
* reading, it prints it out to stdout, and then exits. Otherwise,
* it returns 0 (meaning no nologin file).
*/
int
auth_cat(const char *file)
{
int fd, count;
char buf[BUFSIZ];
if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
return 0;
while ((count = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0)
(void)write(fileno(stdout), buf, count);
close(fd);
return 1;
}