was not updated to pass CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT flag to opencrypto. This resulted in always using first key. We need to support providers created with this bug, so set special G_ELI_FLAG_FIRST_KEY flag for GELI provider in integrity mode with version smaller than 6 and pass the CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT flag to opencrypto only if G_ELI_FLAG_FIRST_KEY doesn't exist. Reported by: Anton Yuzhaninov <citrin@citrin.ru> MFC after: 1 week
545 lines
18 KiB
C
545 lines
18 KiB
C
/*-
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* Copyright (c) 2005-2011 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pawel@dawidek.net>
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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#include <sys/linker.h>
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#include <sys/module.h>
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#include <sys/lock.h>
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#include <sys/mutex.h>
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#include <sys/bio.h>
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <sys/malloc.h>
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#include <sys/kthread.h>
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#include <sys/proc.h>
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#include <sys/sched.h>
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#include <sys/smp.h>
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#include <sys/uio.h>
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#include <sys/vnode.h>
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#include <vm/uma.h>
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#include <geom/geom.h>
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#include <geom/eli/g_eli.h>
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#include <geom/eli/pkcs5v2.h>
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/*
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* The data layout description when integrity verification is configured.
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*
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* One of the most important assumption here is that authenticated data and its
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* HMAC has to be stored in the same place (namely in the same sector) to make
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* it work reliable.
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* The problem is that file systems work only with sectors that are multiple of
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* 512 bytes and a power of two number.
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* My idea to implement it is as follows.
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* Let's store HMAC in sector. This is a must. This leaves us 480 bytes for
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* data. We can't use that directly (ie. we can't create provider with 480 bytes
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* sector size). We need another sector from where we take only 32 bytes of data
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* and we store HMAC of this data as well. This takes two sectors from the
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* original provider at the input and leaves us one sector of authenticated data
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* at the output. Not very efficient, but you got the idea.
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* Now, let's assume, we want to create provider with 4096 bytes sector.
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* To output 4096 bytes of authenticated data we need 8x480 plus 1x256, so we
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* need nine 512-bytes sectors at the input to get one 4096-bytes sector at the
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* output. That's better. With 4096 bytes sector we can use 89% of size of the
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* original provider. I find it as an acceptable cost.
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* The reliability comes from the fact, that every HMAC stored inside the sector
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* is calculated only for the data in the same sector, so its impossible to
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* write new data and leave old HMAC or vice versa.
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*
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* And here is the picture:
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*
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* da0: +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+-----+
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* |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |256b |
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* |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data |
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* +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+-----+
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* |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |288 bytes |
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* +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ |224 unused|
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* +----------+
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* da0.eli: +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
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* |480b|480b|480b|480b|480b|480b|480b|480b|256b|
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* +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
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* | 4096 bytes |
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* +--------------------------------------------+
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*
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* PS. You can use any sector size with geli(8). My example is using 4kB,
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* because it's most efficient. For 8kB sectors you need 2 extra sectors,
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* so the cost is the same as for 4kB sectors.
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*/
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/*
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* Code paths:
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* BIO_READ:
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* g_eli_start -> g_eli_auth_read -> g_io_request -> g_eli_read_done -> g_eli_auth_run -> g_eli_auth_read_done -> g_io_deliver
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* BIO_WRITE:
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* g_eli_start -> g_eli_auth_run -> g_eli_auth_write_done -> g_io_request -> g_eli_write_done -> g_io_deliver
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*/
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MALLOC_DECLARE(M_ELI);
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/*
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* Here we generate key for HMAC. Every sector has its own HMAC key, so it is
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* not possible to copy sectors.
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* We cannot depend on fact, that every sector has its own IV, because different
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* IV doesn't change HMAC, when we use encrypt-then-authenticate method.
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*/
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static void
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g_eli_auth_keygen(struct g_eli_softc *sc, off_t offset, u_char *key)
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{
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SHA256_CTX ctx;
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/* Copy precalculated SHA256 context. */
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bcopy(&sc->sc_akeyctx, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
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SHA256_Update(&ctx, (uint8_t *)&offset, sizeof(offset));
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SHA256_Final(key, &ctx);
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}
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/*
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* The function is called after we read and decrypt data.
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*
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* g_eli_start -> g_eli_auth_read -> g_io_request -> g_eli_read_done -> g_eli_auth_run -> G_ELI_AUTH_READ_DONE -> g_io_deliver
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*/
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static int
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g_eli_auth_read_done(struct cryptop *crp)
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{
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struct g_eli_softc *sc;
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struct bio *bp;
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if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
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if (g_eli_crypto_rerun(crp) == 0)
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return (0);
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}
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bp = (struct bio *)crp->crp_opaque;
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bp->bio_inbed++;
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if (crp->crp_etype == 0) {
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bp->bio_completed += crp->crp_olen;
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G_ELI_DEBUG(3, "Crypto READ request done (%d/%d) (add=%jd completed=%jd).",
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bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children, (intmax_t)crp->crp_olen, (intmax_t)bp->bio_completed);
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} else {
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G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Crypto READ request failed (%d/%d) error=%d.",
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bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children, crp->crp_etype);
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if (bp->bio_error == 0)
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bp->bio_error = crp->crp_etype;
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}
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sc = bp->bio_to->geom->softc;
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g_eli_key_drop(sc, crp->crp_desc->crd_next->crd_key);
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/*
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* Do we have all sectors already?
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*/
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if (bp->bio_inbed < bp->bio_children)
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return (0);
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if (bp->bio_error == 0) {
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u_int i, lsec, nsec, data_secsize, decr_secsize, encr_secsize;
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u_char *srcdata, *dstdata, *auth;
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off_t coroff, corsize;
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/*
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* Verify data integrity based on calculated and read HMACs.
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*/
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/* Sectorsize of decrypted provider eg. 4096. */
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decr_secsize = bp->bio_to->sectorsize;
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/* The real sectorsize of encrypted provider, eg. 512. */
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encr_secsize = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer)->provider->sectorsize;
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/* Number of data bytes in one encrypted sector, eg. 480. */
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data_secsize = sc->sc_data_per_sector;
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/* Number of sectors from decrypted provider, eg. 2. */
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nsec = bp->bio_length / decr_secsize;
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/* Number of sectors from encrypted provider, eg. 18. */
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nsec = (nsec * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector) / encr_secsize;
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/* Last sector number in every big sector, eg. 9. */
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lsec = sc->sc_bytes_per_sector / encr_secsize;
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srcdata = bp->bio_driver2;
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dstdata = bp->bio_data;
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auth = srcdata + encr_secsize * nsec;
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coroff = -1;
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corsize = 0;
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for (i = 1; i <= nsec; i++) {
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data_secsize = sc->sc_data_per_sector;
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if ((i % lsec) == 0)
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data_secsize = decr_secsize % data_secsize;
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if (bcmp(srcdata, auth, sc->sc_alen) != 0) {
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/*
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* Curruption detected, remember the offset if
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* this is the first corrupted sector and
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* increase size.
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*/
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if (bp->bio_error == 0)
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bp->bio_error = -1;
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if (coroff == -1) {
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coroff = bp->bio_offset +
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(dstdata - (u_char *)bp->bio_data);
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}
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corsize += data_secsize;
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} else {
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/*
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* No curruption, good.
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* Report previous corruption if there was one.
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*/
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if (coroff != -1) {
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G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "%s: %jd bytes "
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"corrupted at offset %jd.",
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sc->sc_name, (intmax_t)corsize,
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(intmax_t)coroff);
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coroff = -1;
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corsize = 0;
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}
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bcopy(srcdata + sc->sc_alen, dstdata,
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data_secsize);
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}
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srcdata += encr_secsize;
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dstdata += data_secsize;
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auth += sc->sc_alen;
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}
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/* Report previous corruption if there was one. */
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if (coroff != -1) {
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G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "%s: %jd bytes corrupted at offset %jd.",
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sc->sc_name, (intmax_t)corsize, (intmax_t)coroff);
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}
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}
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free(bp->bio_driver2, M_ELI);
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bp->bio_driver2 = NULL;
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if (bp->bio_error != 0) {
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if (bp->bio_error == -1)
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bp->bio_error = EINVAL;
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else {
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G_ELI_LOGREQ(0, bp,
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"Crypto READ request failed (error=%d).",
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bp->bio_error);
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}
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bp->bio_completed = 0;
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}
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/*
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* Read is finished, send it up.
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*/
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g_io_deliver(bp, bp->bio_error);
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atomic_subtract_int(&sc->sc_inflight, 1);
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return (0);
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}
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/*
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* The function is called after data encryption.
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*
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* g_eli_start -> g_eli_auth_run -> G_ELI_AUTH_WRITE_DONE -> g_io_request -> g_eli_write_done -> g_io_deliver
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*/
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static int
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g_eli_auth_write_done(struct cryptop *crp)
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{
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struct g_eli_softc *sc;
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struct g_consumer *cp;
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struct bio *bp, *cbp, *cbp2;
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u_int nsec;
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if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
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if (g_eli_crypto_rerun(crp) == 0)
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return (0);
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}
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bp = (struct bio *)crp->crp_opaque;
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bp->bio_inbed++;
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if (crp->crp_etype == 0) {
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G_ELI_DEBUG(3, "Crypto WRITE request done (%d/%d).",
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bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children);
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} else {
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G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Crypto WRITE request failed (%d/%d) error=%d.",
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bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children, crp->crp_etype);
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if (bp->bio_error == 0)
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bp->bio_error = crp->crp_etype;
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}
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sc = bp->bio_to->geom->softc;
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g_eli_key_drop(sc, crp->crp_desc->crd_key);
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/*
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* All sectors are already encrypted?
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*/
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if (bp->bio_inbed < bp->bio_children)
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return (0);
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if (bp->bio_error != 0) {
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G_ELI_LOGREQ(0, bp, "Crypto WRITE request failed (error=%d).",
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bp->bio_error);
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free(bp->bio_driver2, M_ELI);
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bp->bio_driver2 = NULL;
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cbp = bp->bio_driver1;
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bp->bio_driver1 = NULL;
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g_destroy_bio(cbp);
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g_io_deliver(bp, bp->bio_error);
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atomic_subtract_int(&sc->sc_inflight, 1);
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return (0);
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}
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cp = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer);
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cbp = bp->bio_driver1;
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bp->bio_driver1 = NULL;
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cbp->bio_to = cp->provider;
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cbp->bio_done = g_eli_write_done;
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/* Number of sectors from decrypted provider, eg. 1. */
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nsec = bp->bio_length / bp->bio_to->sectorsize;
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/* Number of sectors from encrypted provider, eg. 9. */
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nsec = (nsec * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector) / cp->provider->sectorsize;
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cbp->bio_length = cp->provider->sectorsize * nsec;
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cbp->bio_offset = (bp->bio_offset / bp->bio_to->sectorsize) * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector;
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cbp->bio_data = bp->bio_driver2;
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/*
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* We write more than what is requested, so we have to be ready to write
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* more than MAXPHYS.
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*/
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cbp2 = NULL;
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if (cbp->bio_length > MAXPHYS) {
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cbp2 = g_duplicate_bio(bp);
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cbp2->bio_length = cbp->bio_length - MAXPHYS;
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cbp2->bio_data = cbp->bio_data + MAXPHYS;
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cbp2->bio_offset = cbp->bio_offset + MAXPHYS;
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cbp2->bio_to = cp->provider;
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cbp2->bio_done = g_eli_write_done;
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cbp->bio_length = MAXPHYS;
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}
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/*
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* Send encrypted data to the provider.
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*/
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G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, cbp, "Sending request.");
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bp->bio_inbed = 0;
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bp->bio_children = (cbp2 != NULL ? 2 : 1);
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g_io_request(cbp, cp);
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if (cbp2 != NULL) {
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G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, cbp2, "Sending request.");
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g_io_request(cbp2, cp);
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}
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return (0);
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}
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void
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g_eli_auth_read(struct g_eli_softc *sc, struct bio *bp)
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{
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struct g_consumer *cp;
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struct bio *cbp, *cbp2;
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size_t size;
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off_t nsec;
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bp->bio_pflags = 0;
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cp = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer);
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cbp = bp->bio_driver1;
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bp->bio_driver1 = NULL;
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cbp->bio_to = cp->provider;
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cbp->bio_done = g_eli_read_done;
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/* Number of sectors from decrypted provider, eg. 1. */
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nsec = bp->bio_length / bp->bio_to->sectorsize;
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/* Number of sectors from encrypted provider, eg. 9. */
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nsec = (nsec * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector) / cp->provider->sectorsize;
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cbp->bio_length = cp->provider->sectorsize * nsec;
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size = cbp->bio_length;
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size += sc->sc_alen * nsec;
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size += sizeof(struct cryptop) * nsec;
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size += sizeof(struct cryptodesc) * nsec * 2;
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size += G_ELI_AUTH_SECKEYLEN * nsec;
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size += sizeof(struct uio) * nsec;
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size += sizeof(struct iovec) * nsec;
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cbp->bio_offset = (bp->bio_offset / bp->bio_to->sectorsize) * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector;
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bp->bio_driver2 = malloc(size, M_ELI, M_WAITOK);
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cbp->bio_data = bp->bio_driver2;
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/*
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* We read more than what is requested, so we have to be ready to read
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* more than MAXPHYS.
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*/
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cbp2 = NULL;
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if (cbp->bio_length > MAXPHYS) {
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cbp2 = g_duplicate_bio(bp);
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cbp2->bio_length = cbp->bio_length - MAXPHYS;
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cbp2->bio_data = cbp->bio_data + MAXPHYS;
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cbp2->bio_offset = cbp->bio_offset + MAXPHYS;
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cbp2->bio_to = cp->provider;
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cbp2->bio_done = g_eli_read_done;
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cbp->bio_length = MAXPHYS;
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}
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/*
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* Read encrypted data from provider.
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*/
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G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, cbp, "Sending request.");
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g_io_request(cbp, cp);
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if (cbp2 != NULL) {
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G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, cbp2, "Sending request.");
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g_io_request(cbp2, cp);
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}
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}
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/*
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* This is the main function responsible for cryptography (ie. communication
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* with crypto(9) subsystem).
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*
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* BIO_READ:
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* g_eli_start -> g_eli_auth_read -> g_io_request -> g_eli_read_done -> G_ELI_AUTH_RUN -> g_eli_auth_read_done -> g_io_deliver
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* BIO_WRITE:
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* g_eli_start -> G_ELI_AUTH_RUN -> g_eli_auth_write_done -> g_io_request -> g_eli_write_done -> g_io_deliver
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*/
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void
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g_eli_auth_run(struct g_eli_worker *wr, struct bio *bp)
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{
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struct g_eli_softc *sc;
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struct cryptop *crp;
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struct cryptodesc *crde, *crda;
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struct uio *uio;
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struct iovec *iov;
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u_int i, lsec, nsec, data_secsize, decr_secsize, encr_secsize;
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off_t dstoff;
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int err, error;
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u_char *p, *data, *auth, *authkey, *plaindata;
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G_ELI_LOGREQ(3, bp, "%s", __func__);
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bp->bio_pflags = wr->w_number;
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sc = wr->w_softc;
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/* Sectorsize of decrypted provider eg. 4096. */
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decr_secsize = bp->bio_to->sectorsize;
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/* The real sectorsize of encrypted provider, eg. 512. */
|
|
encr_secsize = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer)->provider->sectorsize;
|
|
/* Number of data bytes in one encrypted sector, eg. 480. */
|
|
data_secsize = sc->sc_data_per_sector;
|
|
/* Number of sectors from decrypted provider, eg. 2. */
|
|
nsec = bp->bio_length / decr_secsize;
|
|
/* Number of sectors from encrypted provider, eg. 18. */
|
|
nsec = (nsec * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector) / encr_secsize;
|
|
/* Last sector number in every big sector, eg. 9. */
|
|
lsec = sc->sc_bytes_per_sector / encr_secsize;
|
|
/* Destination offset, used for IV generation. */
|
|
dstoff = (bp->bio_offset / bp->bio_to->sectorsize) * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector;
|
|
|
|
auth = NULL; /* Silence compiler warning. */
|
|
plaindata = bp->bio_data;
|
|
if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_READ) {
|
|
data = bp->bio_driver2;
|
|
auth = data + encr_secsize * nsec;
|
|
p = auth + sc->sc_alen * nsec;
|
|
} else {
|
|
size_t size;
|
|
|
|
size = encr_secsize * nsec;
|
|
size += sizeof(*crp) * nsec;
|
|
size += sizeof(*crde) * nsec;
|
|
size += sizeof(*crda) * nsec;
|
|
size += G_ELI_AUTH_SECKEYLEN * nsec;
|
|
size += sizeof(*uio) * nsec;
|
|
size += sizeof(*iov) * nsec;
|
|
data = malloc(size, M_ELI, M_WAITOK);
|
|
bp->bio_driver2 = data;
|
|
p = data + encr_secsize * nsec;
|
|
}
|
|
bp->bio_inbed = 0;
|
|
bp->bio_children = nsec;
|
|
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
for (i = 1; i <= nsec; i++, dstoff += encr_secsize) {
|
|
crp = (struct cryptop *)p; p += sizeof(*crp);
|
|
crde = (struct cryptodesc *)p; p += sizeof(*crde);
|
|
crda = (struct cryptodesc *)p; p += sizeof(*crda);
|
|
authkey = (u_char *)p; p += G_ELI_AUTH_SECKEYLEN;
|
|
uio = (struct uio *)p; p += sizeof(*uio);
|
|
iov = (struct iovec *)p; p += sizeof(*iov);
|
|
|
|
data_secsize = sc->sc_data_per_sector;
|
|
if ((i % lsec) == 0)
|
|
data_secsize = decr_secsize % data_secsize;
|
|
|
|
if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_READ) {
|
|
/* Remember read HMAC. */
|
|
bcopy(data, auth, sc->sc_alen);
|
|
auth += sc->sc_alen;
|
|
/* TODO: bzero(9) can be commented out later. */
|
|
bzero(data, sc->sc_alen);
|
|
} else {
|
|
bcopy(plaindata, data + sc->sc_alen, data_secsize);
|
|
plaindata += data_secsize;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
iov->iov_len = sc->sc_alen + data_secsize;
|
|
iov->iov_base = data;
|
|
data += encr_secsize;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_iov = iov;
|
|
uio->uio_iovcnt = 1;
|
|
uio->uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
|
|
uio->uio_resid = iov->iov_len;
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_sid = wr->w_sid;
|
|
crp->crp_ilen = uio->uio_resid;
|
|
crp->crp_olen = data_secsize;
|
|
crp->crp_opaque = (void *)bp;
|
|
crp->crp_buf = (void *)uio;
|
|
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IOV | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC | CRYPTO_F_REL;
|
|
if (g_eli_batch)
|
|
crp->crp_flags |= CRYPTO_F_BATCH;
|
|
if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_WRITE) {
|
|
crp->crp_callback = g_eli_auth_write_done;
|
|
crp->crp_desc = crde;
|
|
crde->crd_next = crda;
|
|
crda->crd_next = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
crp->crp_callback = g_eli_auth_read_done;
|
|
crp->crp_desc = crda;
|
|
crda->crd_next = crde;
|
|
crde->crd_next = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crde->crd_skip = sc->sc_alen;
|
|
crde->crd_len = data_secsize;
|
|
crde->crd_flags = CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT | CRD_F_IV_PRESENT;
|
|
if ((sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_FIRST_KEY) == 0)
|
|
crde->crd_flags |= CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT;
|
|
if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_WRITE)
|
|
crde->crd_flags |= CRD_F_ENCRYPT;
|
|
crde->crd_alg = sc->sc_ealgo;
|
|
crde->crd_key = g_eli_key_hold(sc, dstoff, encr_secsize);
|
|
crde->crd_klen = sc->sc_ekeylen;
|
|
if (sc->sc_ealgo == CRYPTO_AES_XTS)
|
|
crde->crd_klen <<= 1;
|
|
g_eli_crypto_ivgen(sc, dstoff, crde->crd_iv,
|
|
sizeof(crde->crd_iv));
|
|
|
|
crda->crd_skip = sc->sc_alen;
|
|
crda->crd_len = data_secsize;
|
|
crda->crd_inject = 0;
|
|
crda->crd_flags = CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT;
|
|
crda->crd_alg = sc->sc_aalgo;
|
|
g_eli_auth_keygen(sc, dstoff, authkey);
|
|
crda->crd_key = authkey;
|
|
crda->crd_klen = G_ELI_AUTH_SECKEYLEN * 8;
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_etype = 0;
|
|
err = crypto_dispatch(crp);
|
|
if (err != 0 && error == 0)
|
|
error = err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (bp->bio_error == 0)
|
|
bp->bio_error = error;
|
|
}
|