5ac14ef177
by getaudit(2). Some applications such has su, id will interpret E2BIG as requiring the use of getaudit_addr(2) to pull extended audit state (ip6) from the kernel. This change un-breaks the ABI when auditing has been activated on a system and the users are logged in via ip6. This is a RELENG_7_1 candidate. MFC after: 1 day Discussed with: rwatson
760 lines
17 KiB
C
760 lines
17 KiB
C
/*-
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* Copyright (c) 1999-2005 Apple Inc.
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. Neither the name of Apple Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of
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* its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
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* from this software without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR
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* ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
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* IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
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* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include "opt_mac.h"
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/mount.h>
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#include <sys/namei.h>
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#include <sys/priv.h>
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#include <sys/proc.h>
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#include <sys/sysproto.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/vnode.h>
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#include <sys/jail.h>
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#include <bsm/audit.h>
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#include <bsm/audit_kevents.h>
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#include <security/audit/audit.h>
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#include <security/audit/audit_private.h>
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#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
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#ifdef AUDIT
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/*
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* System call to allow a user space application to submit a BSM audit record
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* to the kernel for inclusion in the audit log. This function does little
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* verification on the audit record that is submitted.
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*
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* XXXAUDIT: Audit preselection for user records does not currently work,
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* since we pre-select only based on the AUE_audit event type, not the event
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* type submitted as part of the user audit data.
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*/
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/* ARGSUSED */
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int
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audit(struct thread *td, struct audit_args *uap)
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{
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int error;
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void * rec;
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struct kaudit_record *ar;
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if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
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return (ENOSYS);
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error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_SUBMIT);
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if (error)
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return (error);
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if ((uap->length <= 0) || (uap->length > audit_qctrl.aq_bufsz))
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return (EINVAL);
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ar = currecord();
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/*
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* If there's no current audit record (audit() itself not audited)
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* commit the user audit record.
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*/
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if (ar == NULL) {
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/*
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* This is not very efficient; we're required to allocate a
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* complete kernel audit record just so the user record can
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* tag along.
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*
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* XXXAUDIT: Maybe AUE_AUDIT in the system call context and
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* special pre-select handling?
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*/
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td->td_ar = audit_new(AUE_NULL, td);
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if (td->td_ar == NULL)
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return (ENOTSUP);
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ar = td->td_ar;
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}
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if (uap->length > MAX_AUDIT_RECORD_SIZE)
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return (EINVAL);
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rec = malloc(uap->length, M_AUDITDATA, M_WAITOK);
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error = copyin(uap->record, rec, uap->length);
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if (error)
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goto free_out;
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/* Verify the record. */
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if (bsm_rec_verify(rec) == 0) {
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error = EINVAL;
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goto free_out;
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}
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#ifdef MAC
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error = mac_system_check_audit(td->td_ucred, rec, uap->length);
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if (error)
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goto free_out;
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#endif
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/*
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* Attach the user audit record to the kernel audit record. Because
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* this system call is an auditable event, we will write the user
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* record along with the record for this audit event.
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*
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* XXXAUDIT: KASSERT appropriate starting values of k_udata, k_ulen,
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* k_ar_commit & AR_COMMIT_USER?
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*/
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ar->k_udata = rec;
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ar->k_ulen = uap->length;
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ar->k_ar_commit |= AR_COMMIT_USER;
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/*
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* Currently we assume that all preselection has been performed in
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* userspace. We unconditionally set these masks so that the records
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* get committed both to the trail and pipe. In the future we will
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* want to setup kernel based preselection.
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*/
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ar->k_ar_commit |= (AR_PRESELECT_USER_TRAIL | AR_PRESELECT_USER_PIPE);
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return (0);
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free_out:
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/*
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* audit_syscall_exit() will free the audit record on the thread even
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* if we allocated it above.
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*/
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free(rec, M_AUDITDATA);
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return (error);
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}
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/*
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* System call to manipulate auditing.
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*/
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/* ARGSUSED */
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int
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auditon(struct thread *td, struct auditon_args *uap)
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{
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struct ucred *cred, *newcred, *oldcred;
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int error;
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union auditon_udata udata;
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struct proc *tp;
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if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
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return (ENOSYS);
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AUDIT_ARG(cmd, uap->cmd);
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#ifdef MAC
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error = mac_system_check_auditon(td->td_ucred, uap->cmd);
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if (error)
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return (error);
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#endif
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error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_CONTROL);
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if (error)
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return (error);
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if ((uap->length <= 0) || (uap->length > sizeof(union auditon_udata)))
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return (EINVAL);
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memset((void *)&udata, 0, sizeof(udata));
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/*
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* Some of the GET commands use the arguments too.
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*/
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switch (uap->cmd) {
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case A_SETPOLICY:
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case A_SETKMASK:
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case A_SETQCTRL:
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case A_SETSTAT:
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case A_SETUMASK:
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case A_SETSMASK:
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case A_SETCOND:
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case A_SETCLASS:
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case A_SETPMASK:
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case A_SETFSIZE:
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case A_SETKAUDIT:
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case A_GETCLASS:
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case A_GETPINFO:
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case A_GETPINFO_ADDR:
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case A_SENDTRIGGER:
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error = copyin(uap->data, (void *)&udata, uap->length);
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if (error)
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return (error);
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AUDIT_ARG(auditon, &udata);
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break;
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}
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/*
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* XXXAUDIT: Locking?
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*/
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switch (uap->cmd) {
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case A_GETPOLICY:
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if (!audit_fail_stop)
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udata.au_policy |= AUDIT_CNT;
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if (audit_panic_on_write_fail)
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udata.au_policy |= AUDIT_AHLT;
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if (audit_argv)
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udata.au_policy |= AUDIT_ARGV;
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if (audit_arge)
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udata.au_policy |= AUDIT_ARGE;
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break;
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case A_SETPOLICY:
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if (udata.au_policy & ~(AUDIT_CNT|AUDIT_AHLT|AUDIT_ARGV|
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AUDIT_ARGE))
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return (EINVAL);
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/*
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* XXX - Need to wake up waiters if the policy relaxes?
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*/
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audit_fail_stop = ((udata.au_policy & AUDIT_CNT) == 0);
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audit_panic_on_write_fail = (udata.au_policy & AUDIT_AHLT);
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audit_argv = (udata.au_policy & AUDIT_ARGV);
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audit_arge = (udata.au_policy & AUDIT_ARGE);
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break;
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case A_GETKMASK:
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udata.au_mask = audit_nae_mask;
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break;
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case A_SETKMASK:
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audit_nae_mask = udata.au_mask;
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break;
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case A_GETQCTRL:
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udata.au_qctrl = audit_qctrl;
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break;
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case A_SETQCTRL:
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if ((udata.au_qctrl.aq_hiwater > AQ_MAXHIGH) ||
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(udata.au_qctrl.aq_lowater >= udata.au_qctrl.aq_hiwater) ||
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(udata.au_qctrl.aq_bufsz > AQ_MAXBUFSZ) ||
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(udata.au_qctrl.aq_minfree < 0) ||
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(udata.au_qctrl.aq_minfree > 100))
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return (EINVAL);
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audit_qctrl = udata.au_qctrl;
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/* XXX The queue delay value isn't used with the kernel. */
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audit_qctrl.aq_delay = -1;
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break;
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case A_GETCWD:
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return (ENOSYS);
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break;
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case A_GETCAR:
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return (ENOSYS);
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break;
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case A_GETSTAT:
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return (ENOSYS);
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break;
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case A_SETSTAT:
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return (ENOSYS);
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break;
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case A_SETUMASK:
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return (ENOSYS);
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break;
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case A_SETSMASK:
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return (ENOSYS);
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break;
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case A_GETCOND:
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if (audit_enabled && !audit_suspended)
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udata.au_cond = AUC_AUDITING;
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else
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udata.au_cond = AUC_NOAUDIT;
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break;
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case A_SETCOND:
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if (udata.au_cond == AUC_NOAUDIT)
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audit_suspended = 1;
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if (udata.au_cond == AUC_AUDITING)
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audit_suspended = 0;
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if (udata.au_cond == AUC_DISABLED) {
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audit_suspended = 1;
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audit_shutdown(NULL, 0);
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}
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break;
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case A_GETCLASS:
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udata.au_evclass.ec_class = au_event_class(
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udata.au_evclass.ec_number);
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break;
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case A_SETCLASS:
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au_evclassmap_insert(udata.au_evclass.ec_number,
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udata.au_evclass.ec_class);
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break;
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case A_GETPINFO:
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if (udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid < 1)
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return (ESRCH);
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if ((tp = pfind(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid)) == NULL)
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return (ESRCH);
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if ((error = p_cansee(td, tp)) != 0) {
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PROC_UNLOCK(tp);
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return (error);
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}
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cred = tp->p_ucred;
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if (cred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6) {
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PROC_UNLOCK(tp);
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return (EINVAL);
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}
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udata.au_aupinfo.ap_auid = cred->cr_audit.ai_auid;
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udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_success =
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cred->cr_audit.ai_mask.am_success;
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udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_failure =
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cred->cr_audit.ai_mask.am_failure;
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udata.au_aupinfo.ap_termid.machine =
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cred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_addr[0];
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udata.au_aupinfo.ap_termid.port =
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(dev_t)cred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_port;
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udata.au_aupinfo.ap_asid = cred->cr_audit.ai_asid;
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PROC_UNLOCK(tp);
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break;
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case A_SETPMASK:
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if (udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid < 1)
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return (ESRCH);
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newcred = crget();
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if ((tp = pfind(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid)) == NULL) {
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crfree(newcred);
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return (ESRCH);
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}
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if ((error = p_cansee(td, tp)) != 0) {
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PROC_UNLOCK(tp);
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crfree(newcred);
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return (error);
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}
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oldcred = tp->p_ucred;
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crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
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newcred->cr_audit.ai_mask.am_success =
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udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_success;
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newcred->cr_audit.ai_mask.am_failure =
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udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_failure;
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td->td_proc->p_ucred = newcred;
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PROC_UNLOCK(tp);
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crfree(oldcred);
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break;
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case A_SETFSIZE:
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if ((udata.au_fstat.af_filesz != 0) &&
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(udata.au_fstat.af_filesz < MIN_AUDIT_FILE_SIZE))
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return (EINVAL);
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audit_fstat.af_filesz = udata.au_fstat.af_filesz;
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break;
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case A_GETFSIZE:
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udata.au_fstat.af_filesz = audit_fstat.af_filesz;
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udata.au_fstat.af_currsz = audit_fstat.af_currsz;
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break;
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case A_GETPINFO_ADDR:
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if (udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_pid < 1)
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return (ESRCH);
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if ((tp = pfind(udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_pid)) == NULL)
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return (ESRCH);
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cred = tp->p_ucred;
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udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_auid = cred->cr_audit.ai_auid;
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udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_mask.am_success =
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cred->cr_audit.ai_mask.am_success;
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udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_mask.am_failure =
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cred->cr_audit.ai_mask.am_failure;
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udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_termid = cred->cr_audit.ai_termid;
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udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_asid = cred->cr_audit.ai_asid;
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PROC_UNLOCK(tp);
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break;
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case A_GETKAUDIT:
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audit_get_kinfo(&udata.au_kau_info);
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break;
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case A_SETKAUDIT:
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if (udata.au_kau_info.ai_termid.at_type != AU_IPv4 &&
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udata.au_kau_info.ai_termid.at_type != AU_IPv6)
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return (EINVAL);
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audit_set_kinfo(&udata.au_kau_info);
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break;
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case A_SENDTRIGGER:
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if ((udata.au_trigger < AUDIT_TRIGGER_MIN) ||
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(udata.au_trigger > AUDIT_TRIGGER_MAX))
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return (EINVAL);
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return (audit_send_trigger(udata.au_trigger));
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default:
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return (EINVAL);
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}
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/*
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* Copy data back to userspace for the GET comands.
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*/
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switch (uap->cmd) {
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case A_GETPOLICY:
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case A_GETKMASK:
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case A_GETQCTRL:
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case A_GETCWD:
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case A_GETCAR:
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case A_GETSTAT:
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case A_GETCOND:
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case A_GETCLASS:
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case A_GETPINFO:
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case A_GETFSIZE:
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case A_GETPINFO_ADDR:
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case A_GETKAUDIT:
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error = copyout((void *)&udata, uap->data, uap->length);
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if (error)
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return (error);
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break;
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}
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return (0);
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}
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/*
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* System calls to manage the user audit information.
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*/
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/* ARGSUSED */
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int
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getauid(struct thread *td, struct getauid_args *uap)
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{
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int error;
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if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
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return (ENOSYS);
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error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT);
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if (error)
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return (error);
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return (copyout(&td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_auid, uap->auid,
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sizeof(td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_auid)));
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}
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/* ARGSUSED */
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int
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setauid(struct thread *td, struct setauid_args *uap)
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{
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struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
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au_id_t id;
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int error;
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if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
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return (ENOSYS);
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error = copyin(uap->auid, &id, sizeof(id));
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if (error)
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return (error);
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audit_arg_auid(id);
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newcred = crget();
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PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc);
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oldcred = td->td_proc->p_ucred;
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crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
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#ifdef MAC
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error = mac_proc_check_setauid(oldcred, id);
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if (error)
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goto fail;
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#endif
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error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT, 0);
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if (error)
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goto fail;
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newcred->cr_audit.ai_auid = id;
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td->td_proc->p_ucred = newcred;
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PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
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crfree(oldcred);
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return (0);
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fail:
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PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
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crfree(newcred);
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return (error);
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}
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/*
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* System calls to get and set process audit information.
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*/
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/* ARGSUSED */
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int
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getaudit(struct thread *td, struct getaudit_args *uap)
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|
{
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struct auditinfo ai;
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struct ucred *cred;
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int error;
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|
|
cred = td->td_ucred;
|
|
if (jailed(cred))
|
|
return (ENOSYS);
|
|
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return (error);
|
|
if (cred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6)
|
|
return (E2BIG);
|
|
bzero(&ai, sizeof(ai));
|
|
ai.ai_auid = cred->cr_audit.ai_auid;
|
|
ai.ai_mask = cred->cr_audit.ai_mask;
|
|
ai.ai_asid = cred->cr_audit.ai_asid;
|
|
ai.ai_termid.machine = cred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_addr[0];
|
|
ai.ai_termid.port = cred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_port;
|
|
return (copyout(&ai, uap->auditinfo, sizeof(ai)));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ARGSUSED */
|
|
int
|
|
setaudit(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
|
|
struct auditinfo ai;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
|
|
return (ENOSYS);
|
|
error = copyin(uap->auditinfo, &ai, sizeof(ai));
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return (error);
|
|
audit_arg_auditinfo(&ai);
|
|
newcred = crget();
|
|
PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc);
|
|
oldcred = td->td_proc->p_ucred;
|
|
crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
error = mac_proc_check_setaudit(oldcred, &ai);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
#endif
|
|
error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT, 0);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
bzero(&newcred->cr_audit, sizeof(newcred->cr_audit));
|
|
newcred->cr_audit.ai_auid = ai.ai_auid;
|
|
newcred->cr_audit.ai_mask = ai.ai_mask;
|
|
newcred->cr_audit.ai_asid = ai.ai_asid;
|
|
newcred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_addr[0] = ai.ai_termid.machine;
|
|
newcred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_port = ai.ai_termid.port;
|
|
newcred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_type = AU_IPv4;
|
|
td->td_proc->p_ucred = newcred;
|
|
PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
|
|
crfree(oldcred);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
fail:
|
|
PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
|
|
crfree(newcred);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ARGSUSED */
|
|
int
|
|
getaudit_addr(struct thread *td, struct getaudit_addr_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
|
|
return (ENOSYS);
|
|
if (uap->length < sizeof(*uap->auditinfo_addr))
|
|
return (EOVERFLOW);
|
|
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return (error);
|
|
return (copyout(&td->td_ucred->cr_audit, uap->auditinfo_addr,
|
|
sizeof(*uap->auditinfo_addr)));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ARGSUSED */
|
|
int
|
|
setaudit_addr(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_addr_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
|
|
struct auditinfo_addr aia;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
|
|
return (ENOSYS);
|
|
error = copyin(uap->auditinfo_addr, &aia, sizeof(aia));
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return (error);
|
|
audit_arg_auditinfo_addr(&aia);
|
|
if (aia.ai_termid.at_type != AU_IPv6 &&
|
|
aia.ai_termid.at_type != AU_IPv4)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
newcred = crget();
|
|
PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc);
|
|
oldcred = td->td_proc->p_ucred;
|
|
crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
error = mac_proc_check_setaudit_addr(oldcred, &aia);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
#endif
|
|
error = priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT, 0);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
newcred->cr_audit = aia;
|
|
td->td_proc->p_ucred = newcred;
|
|
PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
|
|
crfree(oldcred);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
fail:
|
|
PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
|
|
crfree(newcred);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Syscall to manage audit files.
|
|
*/
|
|
/* ARGSUSED */
|
|
int
|
|
auditctl(struct thread *td, struct auditctl_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
struct nameidata nd;
|
|
struct ucred *cred;
|
|
struct vnode *vp;
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
int flags, vfslocked;
|
|
|
|
if (jailed(td->td_ucred))
|
|
return (ENOSYS);
|
|
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_CONTROL);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
vp = NULL;
|
|
cred = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If a path is specified, open the replacement vnode, perform
|
|
* validity checks, and grab another reference to the current
|
|
* credential.
|
|
*
|
|
* On Darwin, a NULL path argument is also used to disable audit.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (uap->path == NULL)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | MPSAFE | AUDITVNODE1,
|
|
UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
|
|
flags = AUDIT_OPEN_FLAGS;
|
|
error = vn_open(&nd, &flags, 0, NULL);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return (error);
|
|
vfslocked = NDHASGIANT(&nd);
|
|
vp = nd.ni_vp;
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
error = mac_system_check_auditctl(td->td_ucred, vp);
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
vn_close(vp, AUDIT_CLOSE_FLAGS, td->td_ucred, td);
|
|
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
|
|
#endif
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
|
if (vp->v_type != VREG) {
|
|
vn_close(vp, AUDIT_CLOSE_FLAGS, td->td_ucred, td);
|
|
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
}
|
|
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
|
|
cred = td->td_ucred;
|
|
crhold(cred);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXXAUDIT: Should audit_suspended actually be cleared by
|
|
* audit_worker?
|
|
*/
|
|
audit_suspended = 0;
|
|
|
|
audit_rotate_vnode(cred, vp);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#else /* !AUDIT */
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
audit(struct thread *td, struct audit_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (ENOSYS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
auditon(struct thread *td, struct auditon_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (ENOSYS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
getauid(struct thread *td, struct getauid_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (ENOSYS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
setauid(struct thread *td, struct setauid_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (ENOSYS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
getaudit(struct thread *td, struct getaudit_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (ENOSYS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
setaudit(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (ENOSYS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
getaudit_addr(struct thread *td, struct getaudit_addr_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (ENOSYS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
setaudit_addr(struct thread *td, struct setaudit_addr_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (ENOSYS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
auditctl(struct thread *td, struct auditctl_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (ENOSYS);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* AUDIT */
|