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freebsd-dev/sys/mips/nlm/hal/nlmsaelib.h
John Baldwin c034143269 Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). 
- The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session
  initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct
  crypto_session_params.  This session includes a new mode to define
  how the other fields should be interpreted.  Available modes
  include:

  - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression)
  - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption)
  - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests)
  - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM)
  - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate)

  Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to
  support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode
  for that.  TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.)

  The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as
  before.  However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and
  switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs
  encryption key.  The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth
  keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher.  (Compression
  algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.)

- Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms.  This
  doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might
  support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined
  for ETA).  Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been
  added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers.  This
  method returns a negative value on success (similar to how
  device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick
  the "best" driver.  There are three constants for hardware
  (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software
  (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order.  One effect of this
  is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session,
  you will no longer get a session using accelerated software.
  Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software
  crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software.

  Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before.

- Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop'
  structure.  The linked list of descriptors has been removed.

  A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer
  in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add
  more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for
  zero-copy).  It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate
  input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this).

  Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane:

  - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv'
    member of the operation structure.  If this flag is not set, the
    IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset.

  - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated
    and stored into the data buffer.  This cannot be used with
    CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.

  If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it
  can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in
  the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set
  CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.

  The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop.
  crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD.
  Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range,
  but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext
  (and they had to be adjacent).

  crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of
  the plaintext/ciphertext.  Modes that only do a single operation
  (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the
  AAD region empty.

  If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting
  location is marked by crp_digest_start.

  Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction
  of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the
  operation to perform.  For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest
  mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the
  request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed
  digest.  GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode
  requires this for decryption.  The new ETA mode now also requires
  this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own
  authentication verification.  Simple DIGEST operations can also do
  this, though there are no in-tree consumers.

  To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session
  cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer
  set crp_sesssion directly.

- Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via
  crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq().  This permits the
  crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a
  driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight.

- crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and
  crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the
  first parameter instead of individual members.  This makes it easier
  to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as
  separate input and output buffers.  It's also simpler for driver
  writers to use.

- bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer.
  This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that
  use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types.

- Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD
  and OPAD.  This reduces some duplicated work among drivers.

- Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in
  device drivers.  However, session key buffers provided when a session
  is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the
  session.

- GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher
  key.  The redundant auth information is not needed or used.

- For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process'
  callback now invokes a function pointer in the session.  This
  function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it
  simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in
  'process'.

  It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there
  is some duplication.

- I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC
  as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it.

- Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA
  mode.  The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored.
  This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but
  the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST
  flag.

- I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for
  sessions.  I will probably do that at some point in the future as well
  as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support
  all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM.

- I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages
  of which many are written from scratch.

- I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified
  that they compile, but I have not tested all of them.  I have tested
  the following drivers:

  - cryptosoft
  - aesni (AES only)
  - blake2
  - ccr

  and the following consumers:

  - cryptodev
  - IPsec
  - ktls_ocf
  - GELI (lightly)

  I have not tested the following:

  - ccp
  - aesni with sha
  - hifn
  - kgssapi_krb5
  - ubsec
  - padlock
  - safe
  - armv8_crypto (aarch64)
  - glxsb (i386)
  - sec (ppc)
  - cesa (armv7)
  - cryptocteon (mips64)
  - nlmsec (mips64)

Discussed with:	cem
Relnotes:	yes
Sponsored by:	Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00

608 lines
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/*-
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD
*
* Copyright (c) 2003-2012 Broadcom Corporation
* All Rights Reserved
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY BROADCOM ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
* WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL BROADCOM OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
* BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
* WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
* OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN
* IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $FreeBSD$
*/
#ifndef _NLM_HAL_CRYPTO_H_
#define _NLM_HAL_CRYPTO_H_
#define SAE_CFG_REG 0x00
#define SAE_ENG_SEL_0 0x01
#define SAE_ENG_SEL_1 0x02
#define SAE_ENG_SEL_2 0x03
#define SAE_ENG_SEL_3 0x04
#define SAE_ENG_SEL_4 0x05
#define SAE_ENG_SEL_5 0x06
#define SAE_ENG_SEL_6 0x07
#define SAE_ENG_SEL_7 0x08
#define RSA_CFG_REG 0x00
#define RSA_ENG_SEL_0 0x01
#define RSA_ENG_SEL_1 0x02
#define RSA_ENG_SEL_2 0x03
#define nlm_read_sec_reg(b, r) nlm_read_reg(b, r)
#define nlm_write_sec_reg(b, r, v) nlm_write_reg(b, r, v)
#define nlm_get_sec_pcibase(node) nlm_pcicfg_base(XLP_IO_SEC_OFFSET(node))
#define nlm_get_sec_regbase(node) \
(nlm_get_sec_pcibase(node) + XLP_IO_PCI_HDRSZ)
#define nlm_read_rsa_reg(b, r) nlm_read_reg(b, r)
#define nlm_write_rsa_reg(b, r, v) nlm_write_reg(b, r, v)
#define nlm_get_rsa_pcibase(node) nlm_pcicfg_base(XLP_IO_RSA_OFFSET(node))
#define nlm_get_rsa_regbase(node) \
(nlm_get_rsa_pcibase(node) + XLP_IO_PCI_HDRSZ)
#define nlm_pcibase_sec(node) nlm_pcicfg_base(XLP_IO_SEC_OFFSET(node))
#define nlm_qidstart_sec(node) nlm_qidstart_kseg(nlm_pcibase_sec(node))
#define nlm_qnum_sec(node) nlm_qnum_kseg(nlm_pcibase_sec(node))
/*
* Since buffer allocation for crypto at kernel is done as malloc, each
* segment size is given as page size which is 4K by default
*/
#define NLM_CRYPTO_MAX_SEG_LEN PAGE_SIZE
#define MAX_KEY_LEN_IN_DW 20
#define left_shift64(x, bitshift, numofbits) \
((uint64_t)(x) << (bitshift))
#define left_shift64_mask(x, bitshift, numofbits) \
(((uint64_t)(x) & ((1ULL << (numofbits)) - 1)) << (bitshift))
/**
* @brief cipher algorithms
* @ingroup crypto
*/
enum nlm_cipher_algo {
NLM_CIPHER_BYPASS = 0,
NLM_CIPHER_DES = 1,
NLM_CIPHER_3DES = 2,
NLM_CIPHER_AES128 = 3,
NLM_CIPHER_AES192 = 4,
NLM_CIPHER_AES256 = 5,
NLM_CIPHER_ARC4 = 6,
NLM_CIPHER_KASUMI_F8 = 7,
NLM_CIPHER_SNOW3G_F8 = 8,
NLM_CIPHER_CAMELLIA128 = 9,
NLM_CIPHER_CAMELLIA192 = 0xA,
NLM_CIPHER_CAMELLIA256 = 0xB,
NLM_CIPHER_MAX = 0xC,
};
/**
* @brief cipher modes
* @ingroup crypto
*/
enum nlm_cipher_mode {
NLM_CIPHER_MODE_ECB = 0,
NLM_CIPHER_MODE_CBC = 1,
NLM_CIPHER_MODE_CFB = 2,
NLM_CIPHER_MODE_OFB = 3,
NLM_CIPHER_MODE_CTR = 4,
NLM_CIPHER_MODE_AES_F8 = 5,
NLM_CIPHER_MODE_GCM = 6,
NLM_CIPHER_MODE_CCM = 7,
NLM_CIPHER_MODE_UNDEFINED1 = 8,
NLM_CIPHER_MODE_UNDEFINED2 = 9,
NLM_CIPHER_MODE_LRW = 0xA,
NLM_CIPHER_MODE_XTS = 0xB,
NLM_CIPHER_MODE_MAX = 0xC,
};
/**
* @brief hash algorithms
* @ingroup crypto
*/
enum nlm_hash_algo {
NLM_HASH_BYPASS = 0,
NLM_HASH_MD5 = 1,
NLM_HASH_SHA = 2,
NLM_HASH_UNDEFINED = 3,
NLM_HASH_AES128 = 4,
NLM_HASH_AES192 = 5,
NLM_HASH_AES256 = 6,
NLM_HASH_KASUMI_F9 = 7,
NLM_HASH_SNOW3G_F9 = 8,
NLM_HASH_CAMELLIA128 = 9,
NLM_HASH_CAMELLIA192 = 0xA,
NLM_HASH_CAMELLIA256 = 0xB,
NLM_HASH_GHASH = 0xC,
NLM_HASH_MAX = 0xD
};
/**
* @brief hash modes
* @ingroup crypto
*/
enum nlm_hash_mode {
NLM_HASH_MODE_SHA1 = 0, /* Only SHA */
NLM_HASH_MODE_SHA224 = 1, /* Only SHA */
NLM_HASH_MODE_SHA256 = 2, /* Only SHA */
NLM_HASH_MODE_SHA384 = 3, /* Only SHA */
NLM_HASH_MODE_SHA512 = 4, /* Only SHA */
NLM_HASH_MODE_CMAC = 5, /* AES and Camellia */
NLM_HASH_MODE_XCBC = 6, /* AES and Camellia */
NLM_HASH_MODE_CBC_MAC = 7, /* AES and Camellia */
NLM_HASH_MODE_CCM = 8, /* AES */
NLM_HASH_MODE_GCM = 9, /* AES */
NLM_HASH_MODE_MAX = 0xA,
};
/**
* @brief crypto control descriptor, should be cache aligned
* @ingroup crypto
*/
struct nlm_crypto_pkt_ctrl {
uint64_t desc0;
/* combination of cipher and hash keys */
uint64_t key[MAX_KEY_LEN_IN_DW];
uint32_t cipherkeylen;
uint32_t hashkeylen;
uint32_t taglen;
};
/**
* @brief crypto packet descriptor, should be cache aligned
* @ingroup crypto
*/
struct nlm_crypto_pkt_param {
uint64_t desc0;
uint64_t desc1;
uint64_t desc2;
uint64_t desc3;
uint64_t segment[1][2];
};
static __inline__ uint64_t
nlm_crypto_form_rsa_ecc_fmn_entry0(unsigned int l3alloc, unsigned int type,
unsigned int func, uint64_t srcaddr)
{
return (left_shift64(l3alloc, 61, 1) |
left_shift64(type, 46, 7) |
left_shift64(func, 40, 6) |
left_shift64(srcaddr, 0, 40));
}
static __inline__ uint64_t
nlm_crypto_form_rsa_ecc_fmn_entry1(unsigned int dstclobber,
unsigned int l3alloc, unsigned int fbvc, uint64_t dstaddr)
{
return (left_shift64(dstclobber, 62, 1) |
left_shift64(l3alloc, 61, 1) |
left_shift64(fbvc, 40, 12) |
left_shift64(dstaddr, 0, 40));
}
/**
* @brief Generate cypto control descriptor
* @ingroup crypto
* hmac : 1 for hash with hmac
* hashalg, see hash_alg enums
* hashmode, see hash_mode enums
* cipherhalg, see cipher_alg enums
* ciphermode, see cipher_mode enums
* arc4_cipherkeylen : length of arc4 cipher key, 0 is interpreted as 32
* arc4_keyinit :
* cfbmask : cipher text for feedback,
* 0(1 bit), 1(2 bits), 2(4 bits), 3(8 bits), 4(16bits), 5(32 bits),
* 6(64 bits), 7(128 bits)
*/
static __inline__ uint64_t
nlm_crypto_form_pkt_ctrl_desc(unsigned int hmac, unsigned int hashalg,
unsigned int hashmode, unsigned int cipheralg, unsigned int ciphermode,
unsigned int arc4_cipherkeylen, unsigned int arc4_keyinit,
unsigned int cfbmask)
{
return (left_shift64(hmac, 61, 1) |
left_shift64(hashalg, 52, 8) |
left_shift64(hashmode, 43, 8) |
left_shift64(cipheralg, 34, 8) |
left_shift64(ciphermode, 25, 8) |
left_shift64(arc4_cipherkeylen, 18, 5) |
left_shift64(arc4_keyinit, 17, 1) |
left_shift64(cfbmask, 0, 3));
}
/**
* @brief Generate cypto packet descriptor 0
* @ingroup crypto
* tls : 1 (tls enabled) 0(tls disabled)
* hash_source : 1 (encrypted data is sent to the auth engine)
* 0 (plain data is sent to the auth engine)
* hashout_l3alloc : 1 (auth output is transited through l3 cache)
* encrypt : 1 (for encrypt) 0 (for decrypt)
* ivlen : iv length in bytes
* hashdst_addr : hash out physical address, byte aligned
*/
static __inline__ uint64_t
nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc0(unsigned int tls, unsigned int hash_source,
unsigned int hashout_l3alloc, unsigned int encrypt, unsigned int ivlen,
uint64_t hashdst_addr)
{
return (left_shift64(tls, 63, 1) |
left_shift64(hash_source, 62, 1) |
left_shift64(hashout_l3alloc, 60, 1) |
left_shift64(encrypt, 59, 1) |
left_shift64_mask((ivlen - 1), 41, 16) |
left_shift64(hashdst_addr, 0, 40));
}
/**
* @brief Generate cypto packet descriptor 1
* @ingroup crypto
* cipherlen : cipher length in bytes
* hashlen : hash length in bytes
*/
static __inline__ uint64_t
nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc1(unsigned int cipherlen, unsigned int hashlen)
{
return (left_shift64_mask((cipherlen - 1), 32, 32) |
left_shift64_mask((hashlen - 1), 0, 32));
}
/**
* @brief Generate cypto packet descriptor 2
* @ingroup crypto
* ivoff : iv offset, offset from start of src data addr
* ciperbit_cnt : number of valid bits in the last input byte to the cipher,
* 0 (8 bits), 1 (1 bit)..7 (7 bits)
* cipheroff : cipher offset, offset from start of src data addr
* hashbit_cnt : number of valid bits in the last input byte to the auth
* 0 (8 bits), 1 (1 bit)..7 (7 bits)
* hashclobber : 1 (hash output will be written as multiples of cachelines, no
* read modify write)
* hashoff : hash offset, offset from start of src data addr
*/
static __inline__ uint64_t
nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc2(unsigned int ivoff, unsigned int cipherbit_cnt,
unsigned int cipheroff, unsigned int hashbit_cnt, unsigned int hashclobber,
unsigned int hashoff)
{
return (left_shift64(ivoff , 45, 16) |
left_shift64(cipherbit_cnt, 42, 3) |
left_shift64(cipheroff, 22, 16) |
left_shift64(hashbit_cnt, 19, 3) |
left_shift64(hashclobber, 18, 1) |
left_shift64(hashoff, 0, 16));
}
/**
* @brief Generate cypto packet descriptor 3
* @ingroup crypto
* designer_vc : designer freeback fmn destination id
* taglen : length in bits of the tag generated by the auth engine
* md5 (128 bits), sha1 (160), sha224 (224), sha384 (384),
* sha512 (512), Kasumi (32), snow3g (32), gcm (128)
* hmacpad : 1 if hmac padding is already done
*/
static __inline__ uint64_t
nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc3(unsigned int designer_vc, unsigned int taglen,
unsigned int arc4_state_save_l3, unsigned int arc4_save_state,
unsigned int hmacpad)
{
return (left_shift64(designer_vc, 48, 16) |
left_shift64(taglen, 11, 16) |
left_shift64(arc4_state_save_l3, 8, 1) |
left_shift64(arc4_save_state, 6, 1) |
left_shift64(hmacpad, 5, 1));
}
/**
* @brief Generate cypto packet descriptor 4
* @ingroup crypto
* srcfraglen : length of the source fragment(header + data + tail) in bytes
* srcfragaddr : physical address of the srouce fragment
*/
static __inline__ uint64_t
nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc4(uint64_t srcfraglen,
unsigned int srcfragaddr )
{
return (left_shift64_mask((srcfraglen - 1), 48, 16) |
left_shift64(srcfragaddr, 0, 40));
}
/**
* @brief Generate cypto packet descriptor 5
* @ingroup crypto
* dstfraglen : length of the dst fragment(header + data + tail) in bytes
* chipherout_l3alloc : 1(cipher output is transited through l3 cache)
* cipherclobber : 1 (cipher output will be written as multiples of cachelines,
* no read modify write)
* chiperdst_addr : physical address of the cipher destination address
*/
static __inline__ uint64_t
nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc5(unsigned int dstfraglen,
unsigned int cipherout_l3alloc, unsigned int cipherclobber,
uint64_t cipherdst_addr)
{
return (left_shift64_mask((dstfraglen - 1), 48, 16) |
left_shift64(cipherout_l3alloc, 46, 1) |
left_shift64(cipherclobber, 41, 1) |
left_shift64(cipherdst_addr, 0, 40));
}
/**
* @brief Generate crypto packet fmn message entry 0
* @ingroup crypto
* freeback_vc: freeback response destination address
* designer_fblen : Designer freeback length, 1 - 4
* designerdesc_valid : designer desc valid or not
* cipher_keylen : cipher key length in bytes
* ctrldesc_addr : physicall address of the control descriptor
*/
static __inline__ uint64_t
nlm_crypto_form_pkt_fmn_entry0(unsigned int freeback_vc,
unsigned int designer_fblen, unsigned int designerdesc_valid,
unsigned int cipher_keylen, uint64_t cntldesc_addr)
{
return (left_shift64(freeback_vc, 48, 16) |
left_shift64_mask(designer_fblen - 1, 46, 2) |
left_shift64(designerdesc_valid, 45, 1) |
left_shift64_mask(((cipher_keylen + 7) >> 3), 40, 5) |
left_shift64(cntldesc_addr >> 6, 0, 34));
}
/**
* @brief Generate crypto packet fmn message entry 1
* @ingroup crypto
* arc4load_state : 1 if load state required 0 otherwise
* hash_keylen : hash key length in bytes
* pktdesc_size : packet descriptor size in bytes
* pktdesc_addr : physicall address of the packet descriptor
*/
static __inline__ uint64_t
nlm_crypto_form_pkt_fmn_entry1(unsigned int arc4load_state,
unsigned int hash_keylen, unsigned int pktdesc_size,
uint64_t pktdesc_addr)
{
return (left_shift64(arc4load_state, 63, 1) |
left_shift64_mask(((hash_keylen + 7) >> 3), 56, 5) |
left_shift64_mask(((pktdesc_size >> 4) - 1), 43, 12) |
left_shift64(pktdesc_addr >> 6, 0, 34));
}
static __inline__ int
nlm_crypto_get_hklen_taglen(enum nlm_hash_algo hashalg,
enum nlm_hash_mode hashmode, unsigned int *taglen, unsigned int *hklen)
{
if (hashalg == NLM_HASH_MD5) {
*taglen = 128;
*hklen = 64;
} else if (hashalg == NLM_HASH_SHA) {
switch (hashmode) {
case NLM_HASH_MODE_SHA1:
*taglen = 160;
*hklen = 64;
break;
case NLM_HASH_MODE_SHA224:
*taglen = 224;
*hklen = 64;
break;
case NLM_HASH_MODE_SHA256:
*taglen = 256;
*hklen = 64;
break;
case NLM_HASH_MODE_SHA384:
*taglen = 384;
*hklen = 128;
break;
case NLM_HASH_MODE_SHA512:
*taglen = 512;
*hklen = 128;
break;
default:
printf("Error : invalid shaid (%s)\n", __func__);
return (-1);
}
} else if (hashalg == NLM_HASH_KASUMI_F9) {
*taglen = 32;
*hklen = 0;
} else if (hashalg == NLM_HASH_SNOW3G_F9) {
*taglen = 32;
*hklen = 0;
} else if (hashmode == NLM_HASH_MODE_XCBC) {
*taglen = 128;
*hklen = 0;
} else if (hashmode == NLM_HASH_MODE_GCM) {
*taglen = 128;
*hklen = 0;
} else if (hashalg == NLM_HASH_BYPASS) {
*taglen = 0;
*hklen = 0;
} else {
printf("Error:Hash alg/mode not found\n");
return (-1);
}
/* TODO : Add remaining cases */
return (0);
}
/**
* @brief Generate fill cryto control info structure
* @ingroup crypto
* hmac : 1 for hash with hmac
* hashalg: see above, hash_alg enums
* hashmode: see above, hash_mode enums
* cipherhalg: see above, cipher_alg enums
* ciphermode: see above, cipher_mode enums
*
*/
static __inline__ int
nlm_crypto_fill_pkt_ctrl(struct nlm_crypto_pkt_ctrl *ctrl, unsigned int hmac,
enum nlm_hash_algo hashalg, enum nlm_hash_mode hashmode,
enum nlm_cipher_algo cipheralg, enum nlm_cipher_mode ciphermode,
const unsigned char *cipherkey, unsigned int cipherkeylen,
const unsigned char *hashkey, unsigned int hashkeylen)
{
unsigned int taglen = 0, hklen = 0;
ctrl->desc0 = nlm_crypto_form_pkt_ctrl_desc(hmac, hashalg, hashmode,
cipheralg, ciphermode, 0, 0, 0);
memset(ctrl->key, 0, sizeof(ctrl->key));
if (cipherkey)
memcpy(ctrl->key, cipherkey, cipherkeylen);
if (hashkey)
memcpy((unsigned char *)&ctrl->key[(cipherkeylen + 7) / 8],
hashkey, hashkeylen);
if (nlm_crypto_get_hklen_taglen(hashalg, hashmode, &taglen, &hklen)
< 0)
return (-1);
ctrl->cipherkeylen = cipherkeylen;
ctrl->hashkeylen = hklen;
ctrl->taglen = taglen;
/* TODO : add the invalid checks and return error */
return (0);
}
/**
* @brief Top level function for generation pkt desc 0 to 3 for cipher auth
* @ingroup crypto
* ctrl : pointer to control structure
* param : pointer to the param structure
* encrypt : 1(for encrypt) 0(for decrypt)
* hash_source : 1(encrypted data is sent to the auth engine) 0(plain data is
* sent to the auth engine)
* ivoff : iv offset from start of data
* ivlen : iv length in bytes
* hashoff : hash offset from start of data
* hashlen : hash length in bytes
* hmacpad : hmac padding required or not, 1 if already padded
* cipheroff : cipher offset from start of data
* cipherlen : cipher length in bytes
* hashdst_addr : hash destination physical address
*/
static __inline__ void
nlm_crypto_fill_cipher_auth_pkt_param(struct nlm_crypto_pkt_ctrl *ctrl,
struct nlm_crypto_pkt_param *param, unsigned int encrypt,
unsigned int hash_source, unsigned int ivoff, unsigned int ivlen,
unsigned int hashoff, unsigned int hashlen, unsigned int hmacpad,
unsigned int cipheroff, unsigned int cipherlen, unsigned char *hashdst_addr)
{
param->desc0 = nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc0(0, hash_source, 1, encrypt,
ivlen, vtophys(hashdst_addr));
param->desc1 = nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc1(cipherlen, hashlen);
param->desc2 = nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc2(ivoff, 0, cipheroff, 0, 0,
hashoff);
param->desc3 = nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc3(0, ctrl->taglen, 0, 0,
hmacpad);
}
/**
* @brief Top level function for generation pkt desc 0 to 3 for cipher operation
* @ingroup crypto
* ctrl : pointer to control structure
* param : pointer to the param structure
* encrypt : 1(for encrypt) 0(for decrypt)
* ivoff : iv offset from start of data
* ivlen : iv length in bytes
* cipheroff : cipher offset from start of data
* cipherlen : cipher length in bytes
*/
static __inline__ void
nlm_crypto_fill_cipher_pkt_param(struct nlm_crypto_pkt_ctrl *ctrl,
struct nlm_crypto_pkt_param *param, unsigned int encrypt,
unsigned int ivoff, unsigned int ivlen, unsigned int cipheroff,
unsigned int cipherlen)
{
param->desc0 = nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc0(0, 0, 0, encrypt, ivlen, 0ULL);
param->desc1 = nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc1(cipherlen, 1);
param->desc2 = nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc2(ivoff, 0, cipheroff, 0, 0, 0);
param->desc3 = nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc3(0, ctrl->taglen, 0, 0, 0);
}
/**
* @brief Top level function for generation pkt desc 0 to 3 for auth operation
* @ingroup crypto
* ctrl : pointer to control structure
* param : pointer to the param structure
* hashoff : hash offset from start of data
* hashlen : hash length in bytes
* hmacpad : hmac padding required or not, 1 if already padded
* hashdst_addr : hash destination physical address
*/
static __inline__ void
nlm_crypto_fill_auth_pkt_param(struct nlm_crypto_pkt_ctrl *ctrl,
struct nlm_crypto_pkt_param *param, unsigned int hashoff,
unsigned int hashlen, unsigned int hmacpad, unsigned char *hashdst_addr)
{
param->desc0 = nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc0(0, 0, 1, 0, 1,
vtophys(hashdst_addr));
param->desc1 = nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc1(1, hashlen);
param->desc2 = nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc2(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, hashoff);
param->desc3 = nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc3(0, ctrl->taglen, 0, 0,
hmacpad);
}
static __inline__ unsigned int
nlm_crypto_fill_src_seg(struct nlm_crypto_pkt_param *param, int seg,
unsigned char *input, unsigned int inlen)
{
unsigned off = 0, len = 0;
unsigned int remlen = inlen;
for (; remlen > 0;) {
len = remlen > NLM_CRYPTO_MAX_SEG_LEN ?
NLM_CRYPTO_MAX_SEG_LEN : remlen;
param->segment[seg][0] = nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc4(len,
vtophys(input + off));
remlen -= len;
off += len;
seg++;
}
return (seg);
}
static __inline__ unsigned int
nlm_crypto_fill_dst_seg(struct nlm_crypto_pkt_param *param,
int seg, unsigned char *output, unsigned int outlen)
{
unsigned off = 0, len = 0;
unsigned int remlen = outlen;
for (; remlen > 0;) {
len = remlen > NLM_CRYPTO_MAX_SEG_LEN ?
NLM_CRYPTO_MAX_SEG_LEN : remlen;
param->segment[seg][1] = nlm_crypto_form_pkt_desc5(len, 1, 0,
vtophys(output + off));
remlen -= len;
off += len;
seg++;
}
return (seg);
}
#endif
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