c034143269
- The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session
initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct
crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define
how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes
include:
- COMPRESS (for compression/decompression)
- CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption)
- DIGEST (computing and verifying digests)
- AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM)
- ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate)
Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to
support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode
for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.)
The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as
before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and
switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs
encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth
keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression
algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.)
- Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This
doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might
support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined
for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been
added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This
method returns a negative value on success (similar to how
device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick
the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware
(e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software
(cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this
is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session,
you will no longer get a session using accelerated software.
Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software
crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software.
Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before.
- Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop'
structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed.
A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer
in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add
more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for
zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate
input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this).
Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane:
- CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv'
member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the
IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset.
- CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated
and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with
CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.
If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it
can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in
the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set
CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.
The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop.
crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD.
Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range,
but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext
(and they had to be adjacent).
crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of
the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation
(COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the
AAD region empty.
If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting
location is marked by crp_digest_start.
Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction
of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the
operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest
mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the
request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed
digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode
requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires
this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own
authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do
this, though there are no in-tree consumers.
To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session
cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer
set crp_sesssion directly.
- Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via
crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the
crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a
driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight.
- crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and
crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the
first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier
to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as
separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver
writers to use.
- bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer.
This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that
use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types.
- Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD
and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers.
- Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in
device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session
is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the
session.
- GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher
key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used.
- For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process'
callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This
function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it
simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in
'process'.
It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there
is some duplication.
- I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC
as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it.
- Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA
mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored.
This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but
the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST
flag.
- I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for
sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well
as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support
all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM.
- I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages
of which many are written from scratch.
- I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified
that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested
the following drivers:
- cryptosoft
- aesni (AES only)
- blake2
- ccr
and the following consumers:
- cryptodev
- IPsec
- ktls_ocf
- GELI (lightly)
I have not tested the following:
- ccp
- aesni with sha
- hifn
- kgssapi_krb5
- ubsec
- padlock
- safe
- armv8_crypto (aarch64)
- glxsb (i386)
- sec (ppc)
- cesa (armv7)
- cryptocteon (mips64)
- nlmsec (mips64)
Discussed with: cem
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
100 lines
3.5 KiB
C
100 lines
3.5 KiB
C
/* $OpenBSD: xform.c,v 1.16 2001/08/28 12:20:43 ben Exp $ */
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/*-
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* The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org),
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* Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr),
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* Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de) and
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* Damien Miller (djm@mindrot.org).
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*
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* This code was written by John Ioannidis for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece,
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* in November 1995.
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*
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* Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996,
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* by Angelos D. Keromytis.
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*
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* Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis
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* and Niels Provos.
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*
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* Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis.
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*
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* AES XTS implementation in 2008 by Damien Miller
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis,
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* Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos.
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2001, Angelos D. Keromytis.
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2008, Damien Miller
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* Copyright (c) 2014 The FreeBSD Foundation
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Portions of this software were developed by John-Mark Gurney
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* under sponsorship of the FreeBSD Foundation and
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* Rubicon Communications, LLC (Netgate).
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee
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* is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in
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* all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or
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* modification of this software.
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* You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please
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* contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license
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* so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to
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* all.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY
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* REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE
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* MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE.
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include <opencrypto/gmac.h>
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#include <opencrypto/xform_auth.h>
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/* Encryption instances */
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struct enc_xform enc_xform_aes_nist_gmac = {
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CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC, "AES-GMAC",
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AES_ICM_BLOCK_LEN, AES_GCM_IV_LEN, AES_MIN_KEY, AES_MAX_KEY,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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};
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/* Authentication instances */
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struct auth_hash auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_128 = {
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CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC, "GMAC-AES-128",
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AES_128_GMAC_KEY_LEN, AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN, sizeof(struct aes_gmac_ctx),
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GMAC_BLOCK_LEN,
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(void (*)(void *)) AES_GMAC_Init,
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(void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_GMAC_Setkey,
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(void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_GMAC_Reinit,
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(int (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_GMAC_Update,
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(void (*)(u_int8_t *, void *)) AES_GMAC_Final
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};
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struct auth_hash auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_192 = {
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CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC, "GMAC-AES-192",
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AES_192_GMAC_KEY_LEN, AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN, sizeof(struct aes_gmac_ctx),
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GMAC_BLOCK_LEN,
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(void (*)(void *)) AES_GMAC_Init,
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(void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_GMAC_Setkey,
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(void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_GMAC_Reinit,
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(int (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_GMAC_Update,
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(void (*)(u_int8_t *, void *)) AES_GMAC_Final
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};
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struct auth_hash auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_256 = {
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CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC, "GMAC-AES-256",
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AES_256_GMAC_KEY_LEN, AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN, sizeof(struct aes_gmac_ctx),
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GMAC_BLOCK_LEN,
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(void (*)(void *)) AES_GMAC_Init,
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(void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_GMAC_Setkey,
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(void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_GMAC_Reinit,
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(int (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_GMAC_Update,
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(void (*)(u_int8_t *, void *)) AES_GMAC_Final
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};
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