Release notes are available at https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-9.1 9.1 contains fixes for three minor memory safety problems; these have lready been merged to the copy of OpenSSH 9.0 that is in the FreeBSD base system. Some highlights copied from the release notes: Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * ssh(1), sshd(8): SetEnv directives in ssh_config and sshd_config are now first-match-wins to match other directives. Previously if an environment variable was multiply specified the last set value would have been used. bz3438 * ssh-keygen(8): ssh-keygen -A (generate all default host key types) will no longer generate DSA keys, as these are insecure and have not been used by default for some years. New features ------------ * ssh(1), sshd(8): add a RequiredRSASize directive to set a minimum RSA key length. Keys below this length will be ignored for user authentication and for host authentication in sshd(8). * sftp-server(8): add a "users-groups-by-id@openssh.com" extension request that allows the client to obtain user/group names that correspond to a set of uids/gids. * sftp(1): use "users-groups-by-id@openssh.com" sftp-server extension (when available) to fill in user/group names for directory listings. * sftp-server(8): support the "home-directory" extension request defined in draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00. This overlaps a bit with the existing "expand-path@openssh.com", but some other clients support it. * ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): allow certificate validity intervals, sshsig verification times and authorized_keys expiry-time options to accept dates in the UTC time zone in addition to the default of interpreting them in the system time zone. YYYYMMDD and YYMMDDHHMM[SS] dates/times will be interpreted as UTC if suffixed with a 'Z' character. Also allow certificate validity intervals to be specified in raw seconds-since-epoch as hex value, e.g. -V 0x1234:0x4567890. This is intended for use by regress tests and other tools that call ssh-keygen as part of a CA workflow. bz3468 * sftp(1): allow arguments to the sftp -D option, e.g. sftp -D "/usr/libexec/sftp-server -el debug3" * ssh-keygen(1): allow the existing -U (use agent) flag to work with "-Y sign" operations, where it will be interpreted to require that the private keys is hosted in an agent; bz3429 MFC after: 2 weeks Relnotes: Yes Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
138 lines
3.3 KiB
C
138 lines
3.3 KiB
C
/* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash.c,v 1.3 2022/04/20 16:00:25 millert Exp $ */
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/*
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hash.c version 20160722
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Andreas Hülsing
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Joost Rijneveld
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Public domain.
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#ifdef WITH_XMSS
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#include "xmss_hash_address.h"
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#include "xmss_commons.h"
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#include "xmss_hash.h"
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#include <stddef.h>
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#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
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# include <stdint.h>
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#endif
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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int core_hash_SHA2(unsigned char *, const unsigned int, const unsigned char *,
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unsigned int, const unsigned char *, unsigned long long, unsigned int);
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unsigned char* addr_to_byte(unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]){
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#if IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN==1
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int i = 0;
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for(i=0;i<8;i++)
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to_byte(bytes+i*4, addr[i],4);
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return bytes;
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#else
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memcpy(bytes, addr, 32);
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return bytes;
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#endif
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}
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int core_hash_SHA2(unsigned char *out, const unsigned int type, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen, unsigned int n){
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unsigned long long i = 0;
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unsigned char buf[inlen + n + keylen];
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// Input is (toByte(X, 32) || KEY || M)
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// set toByte
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to_byte(buf, type, n);
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for (i=0; i < keylen; i++) {
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buf[i+n] = key[i];
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}
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for (i=0; i < inlen; i++) {
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buf[keylen + n + i] = in[i];
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}
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if (n == 32) {
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SHA256(buf, inlen + keylen + n, out);
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return 0;
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}
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else {
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if (n == 64) {
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SHA512(buf, inlen + keylen + n, out);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/**
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* Implements PRF
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*/
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int prf(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen)
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{
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return core_hash_SHA2(out, 3, key, keylen, in, 32, keylen);
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}
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/*
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* Implemts H_msg
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*/
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int h_msg(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned int keylen, const unsigned int n)
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{
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if (keylen != 3*n){
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// H_msg takes 3n-bit keys, but n does not match the keylength of keylen
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return -1;
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}
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return core_hash_SHA2(out, 2, key, keylen, in, inlen, n);
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}
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/**
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* We assume the left half is in in[0]...in[n-1]
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*/
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int hash_h(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8], const unsigned int n)
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{
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unsigned char buf[2*n];
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unsigned char key[n];
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unsigned char bitmask[2*n];
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unsigned char byte_addr[32];
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unsigned int i;
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setKeyAndMask(addr, 0);
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addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr);
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prf(key, byte_addr, pub_seed, n);
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// Use MSB order
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setKeyAndMask(addr, 1);
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addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr);
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prf(bitmask, byte_addr, pub_seed, n);
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setKeyAndMask(addr, 2);
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addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr);
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prf(bitmask+n, byte_addr, pub_seed, n);
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for (i = 0; i < 2*n; i++) {
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buf[i] = in[i] ^ bitmask[i];
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}
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return core_hash_SHA2(out, 1, key, n, buf, 2*n, n);
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}
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int hash_f(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8], const unsigned int n)
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{
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unsigned char buf[n];
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unsigned char key[n];
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unsigned char bitmask[n];
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unsigned char byte_addr[32];
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unsigned int i;
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setKeyAndMask(addr, 0);
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addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr);
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prf(key, byte_addr, pub_seed, n);
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setKeyAndMask(addr, 1);
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addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr);
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prf(bitmask, byte_addr, pub_seed, n);
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for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
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buf[i] = in[i] ^ bitmask[i];
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}
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return core_hash_SHA2(out, 0, key, n, buf, n, n);
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}
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#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
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