freebsd-dev/sys/kern/kern_jail.c
Robert Watson 30d239bc4c Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes
from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to
the following general forms:

  mac_<object>_<method/action>
  mac_<object>_check_<method/action>

The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly
reversed from the new scheme.  Also, make object types more
consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain
multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical
parsing easier.  Introduce a new "netinet" object type for
certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods.  Also simplify, slightly,
some entry point names.

All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules
not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to
conform to the new KPI.

Sponsored by:	SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X)
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00

986 lines
23 KiB
C

/*-
* ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
* "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42):
* <phk@FreeBSD.ORG> wrote this file. As long as you retain this notice you
* can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you think
* this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in return. Poul-Henning Kamp
* ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "opt_mac.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/priv.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/taskqueue.h>
#include <sys/jail.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/sx.h>
#include <sys/namei.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/queue.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/syscallsubr.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PRISON, "prison", "Prison structures");
SYSCTL_NODE(_security, OID_AUTO, jail, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
"Jail rules");
int jail_set_hostname_allowed = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, set_hostname_allowed, CTLFLAG_RW,
&jail_set_hostname_allowed, 0,
"Processes in jail can set their hostnames");
int jail_socket_unixiproute_only = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, socket_unixiproute_only, CTLFLAG_RW,
&jail_socket_unixiproute_only, 0,
"Processes in jail are limited to creating UNIX/IPv4/route sockets only");
int jail_sysvipc_allowed = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, sysvipc_allowed, CTLFLAG_RW,
&jail_sysvipc_allowed, 0,
"Processes in jail can use System V IPC primitives");
static int jail_enforce_statfs = 2;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, enforce_statfs, CTLFLAG_RW,
&jail_enforce_statfs, 0,
"Processes in jail cannot see all mounted file systems");
int jail_allow_raw_sockets = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, allow_raw_sockets, CTLFLAG_RW,
&jail_allow_raw_sockets, 0,
"Prison root can create raw sockets");
int jail_chflags_allowed = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, chflags_allowed, CTLFLAG_RW,
&jail_chflags_allowed, 0,
"Processes in jail can alter system file flags");
int jail_mount_allowed = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, mount_allowed, CTLFLAG_RW,
&jail_mount_allowed, 0,
"Processes in jail can mount/unmount jail-friendly file systems");
/* allprison, lastprid, and prisoncount are protected by allprison_lock. */
struct prisonlist allprison;
struct sx allprison_lock;
int lastprid = 0;
int prisoncount = 0;
/*
* List of jail services. Protected by allprison_lock.
*/
TAILQ_HEAD(prison_services_head, prison_service);
static struct prison_services_head prison_services =
TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(prison_services);
static int prison_service_slots = 0;
struct prison_service {
prison_create_t ps_create;
prison_destroy_t ps_destroy;
int ps_slotno;
TAILQ_ENTRY(prison_service) ps_next;
char ps_name[0];
};
static void init_prison(void *);
static void prison_complete(void *context, int pending);
static int sysctl_jail_list(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS);
static void
init_prison(void *data __unused)
{
sx_init(&allprison_lock, "allprison");
LIST_INIT(&allprison);
}
SYSINIT(prison, SI_SUB_INTRINSIC, SI_ORDER_ANY, init_prison, NULL);
/*
* struct jail_args {
* struct jail *jail;
* };
*/
int
jail(struct thread *td, struct jail_args *uap)
{
struct nameidata nd;
struct prison *pr, *tpr;
struct prison_service *psrv;
struct jail j;
struct jail_attach_args jaa;
int vfslocked, error, tryprid;
error = copyin(uap->jail, &j, sizeof(j));
if (error)
return (error);
if (j.version != 0)
return (EINVAL);
MALLOC(pr, struct prison *, sizeof(*pr), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
mtx_init(&pr->pr_mtx, "jail mutex", NULL, MTX_DEF);
pr->pr_ref = 1;
error = copyinstr(j.path, &pr->pr_path, sizeof(pr->pr_path), 0);
if (error)
goto e_killmtx;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, MPSAFE | FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF, UIO_SYSSPACE,
pr->pr_path, td);
error = namei(&nd);
if (error)
goto e_killmtx;
vfslocked = NDHASGIANT(&nd);
pr->pr_root = nd.ni_vp;
VOP_UNLOCK(nd.ni_vp, 0, td);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
error = copyinstr(j.hostname, &pr->pr_host, sizeof(pr->pr_host), 0);
if (error)
goto e_dropvnref;
pr->pr_ip = j.ip_number;
pr->pr_linux = NULL;
pr->pr_securelevel = securelevel;
if (prison_service_slots == 0)
pr->pr_slots = NULL;
else {
pr->pr_slots = malloc(sizeof(*pr->pr_slots) * prison_service_slots,
M_PRISON, M_ZERO | M_WAITOK);
}
/* Determine next pr_id and add prison to allprison list. */
sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
tryprid = lastprid + 1;
if (tryprid == JAIL_MAX)
tryprid = 1;
next:
LIST_FOREACH(tpr, &allprison, pr_list) {
if (tpr->pr_id == tryprid) {
tryprid++;
if (tryprid == JAIL_MAX) {
sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock);
error = EAGAIN;
goto e_dropvnref;
}
goto next;
}
}
pr->pr_id = jaa.jid = lastprid = tryprid;
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&allprison, pr, pr_list);
prisoncount++;
sx_downgrade(&allprison_lock);
TAILQ_FOREACH(psrv, &prison_services, ps_next) {
psrv->ps_create(psrv, pr);
}
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
error = jail_attach(td, &jaa);
if (error)
goto e_dropprref;
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
pr->pr_ref--;
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
td->td_retval[0] = jaa.jid;
return (0);
e_dropprref:
sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
LIST_REMOVE(pr, pr_list);
prisoncount--;
sx_downgrade(&allprison_lock);
TAILQ_FOREACH(psrv, &prison_services, ps_next) {
psrv->ps_destroy(psrv, pr);
}
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
e_dropvnref:
vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(pr->pr_root->v_mount);
vrele(pr->pr_root);
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
e_killmtx:
mtx_destroy(&pr->pr_mtx);
FREE(pr, M_PRISON);
return (error);
}
/*
* struct jail_attach_args {
* int jid;
* };
*/
int
jail_attach(struct thread *td, struct jail_attach_args *uap)
{
struct proc *p;
struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
struct prison *pr;
int vfslocked, error;
/*
* XXX: Note that there is a slight race here if two threads
* in the same privileged process attempt to attach to two
* different jails at the same time. It is important for
* user processes not to do this, or they might end up with
* a process root from one prison, but attached to the jail
* of another.
*/
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_JAIL_ATTACH);
if (error)
return (error);
p = td->td_proc;
sx_slock(&allprison_lock);
pr = prison_find(uap->jid);
if (pr == NULL) {
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
return (EINVAL);
}
pr->pr_ref++;
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(pr->pr_root->v_mount);
vn_lock(pr->pr_root, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
if ((error = change_dir(pr->pr_root, td)) != 0)
goto e_unlock;
#ifdef MAC
if ((error = mac_vnode_check_chroot(td->td_ucred, pr->pr_root)))
goto e_unlock;
#endif
VOP_UNLOCK(pr->pr_root, 0, td);
change_root(pr->pr_root, td);
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
newcred = crget();
PROC_LOCK(p);
oldcred = p->p_ucred;
setsugid(p);
crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
newcred->cr_prison = pr;
p->p_ucred = newcred;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
crfree(oldcred);
return (0);
e_unlock:
VOP_UNLOCK(pr->pr_root, 0, td);
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
pr->pr_ref--;
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
return (error);
}
/*
* Returns a locked prison instance, or NULL on failure.
*/
struct prison *
prison_find(int prid)
{
struct prison *pr;
sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SX_LOCKED);
LIST_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) {
if (pr->pr_id == prid) {
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
if (pr->pr_ref == 0) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
break;
}
return (pr);
}
}
return (NULL);
}
void
prison_free(struct prison *pr)
{
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
pr->pr_ref--;
if (pr->pr_ref == 0) {
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
TASK_INIT(&pr->pr_task, 0, prison_complete, pr);
taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &pr->pr_task);
return;
}
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
}
static void
prison_complete(void *context, int pending)
{
struct prison_service *psrv;
struct prison *pr;
int vfslocked;
pr = (struct prison *)context;
sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
LIST_REMOVE(pr, pr_list);
prisoncount--;
sx_downgrade(&allprison_lock);
TAILQ_FOREACH(psrv, &prison_services, ps_next) {
psrv->ps_destroy(psrv, pr);
}
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(pr->pr_root->v_mount);
vrele(pr->pr_root);
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
mtx_destroy(&pr->pr_mtx);
if (pr->pr_linux != NULL)
FREE(pr->pr_linux, M_PRISON);
FREE(pr, M_PRISON);
}
void
prison_hold(struct prison *pr)
{
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
KASSERT(pr->pr_ref > 0,
("Trying to hold dead prison (id=%d).", pr->pr_id));
pr->pr_ref++;
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
}
u_int32_t
prison_getip(struct ucred *cred)
{
return (cred->cr_prison->pr_ip);
}
int
prison_ip(struct ucred *cred, int flag, u_int32_t *ip)
{
u_int32_t tmp;
if (!jailed(cred))
return (0);
if (flag)
tmp = *ip;
else
tmp = ntohl(*ip);
if (tmp == INADDR_ANY) {
if (flag)
*ip = cred->cr_prison->pr_ip;
else
*ip = htonl(cred->cr_prison->pr_ip);
return (0);
}
if (tmp == INADDR_LOOPBACK) {
if (flag)
*ip = cred->cr_prison->pr_ip;
else
*ip = htonl(cred->cr_prison->pr_ip);
return (0);
}
if (cred->cr_prison->pr_ip != tmp)
return (1);
return (0);
}
void
prison_remote_ip(struct ucred *cred, int flag, u_int32_t *ip)
{
u_int32_t tmp;
if (!jailed(cred))
return;
if (flag)
tmp = *ip;
else
tmp = ntohl(*ip);
if (tmp == INADDR_LOOPBACK) {
if (flag)
*ip = cred->cr_prison->pr_ip;
else
*ip = htonl(cred->cr_prison->pr_ip);
return;
}
return;
}
int
prison_if(struct ucred *cred, struct sockaddr *sa)
{
struct sockaddr_in *sai;
int ok;
sai = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
if ((sai->sin_family != AF_INET) && jail_socket_unixiproute_only)
ok = 1;
else if (sai->sin_family != AF_INET)
ok = 0;
else if (cred->cr_prison->pr_ip != ntohl(sai->sin_addr.s_addr))
ok = 1;
else
ok = 0;
return (ok);
}
/*
* Return 0 if jails permit p1 to frob p2, otherwise ESRCH.
*/
int
prison_check(struct ucred *cred1, struct ucred *cred2)
{
if (jailed(cred1)) {
if (!jailed(cred2))
return (ESRCH);
if (cred2->cr_prison != cred1->cr_prison)
return (ESRCH);
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Return 1 if the passed credential is in a jail, otherwise 0.
*/
int
jailed(struct ucred *cred)
{
return (cred->cr_prison != NULL);
}
/*
* Return the correct hostname for the passed credential.
*/
void
getcredhostname(struct ucred *cred, char *buf, size_t size)
{
if (jailed(cred)) {
mtx_lock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx);
strlcpy(buf, cred->cr_prison->pr_host, size);
mtx_unlock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx);
} else
strlcpy(buf, hostname, size);
}
/*
* Determine whether the subject represented by cred can "see"
* status of a mount point.
* Returns: 0 for permitted, ENOENT otherwise.
* XXX: This function should be called cr_canseemount() and should be
* placed in kern_prot.c.
*/
int
prison_canseemount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp)
{
struct prison *pr;
struct statfs *sp;
size_t len;
if (!jailed(cred) || jail_enforce_statfs == 0)
return (0);
pr = cred->cr_prison;
if (pr->pr_root->v_mount == mp)
return (0);
if (jail_enforce_statfs == 2)
return (ENOENT);
/*
* If jail's chroot directory is set to "/" we should be able to see
* all mount-points from inside a jail.
* This is ugly check, but this is the only situation when jail's
* directory ends with '/'.
*/
if (strcmp(pr->pr_path, "/") == 0)
return (0);
len = strlen(pr->pr_path);
sp = &mp->mnt_stat;
if (strncmp(pr->pr_path, sp->f_mntonname, len) != 0)
return (ENOENT);
/*
* Be sure that we don't have situation where jail's root directory
* is "/some/path" and mount point is "/some/pathpath".
*/
if (sp->f_mntonname[len] != '\0' && sp->f_mntonname[len] != '/')
return (ENOENT);
return (0);
}
void
prison_enforce_statfs(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp, struct statfs *sp)
{
char jpath[MAXPATHLEN];
struct prison *pr;
size_t len;
if (!jailed(cred) || jail_enforce_statfs == 0)
return;
pr = cred->cr_prison;
if (prison_canseemount(cred, mp) != 0) {
bzero(sp->f_mntonname, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
strlcpy(sp->f_mntonname, "[restricted]",
sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
return;
}
if (pr->pr_root->v_mount == mp) {
/*
* Clear current buffer data, so we are sure nothing from
* the valid path left there.
*/
bzero(sp->f_mntonname, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
*sp->f_mntonname = '/';
return;
}
/*
* If jail's chroot directory is set to "/" we should be able to see
* all mount-points from inside a jail.
*/
if (strcmp(pr->pr_path, "/") == 0)
return;
len = strlen(pr->pr_path);
strlcpy(jpath, sp->f_mntonname + len, sizeof(jpath));
/*
* Clear current buffer data, so we are sure nothing from
* the valid path left there.
*/
bzero(sp->f_mntonname, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
if (*jpath == '\0') {
/* Should never happen. */
*sp->f_mntonname = '/';
} else {
strlcpy(sp->f_mntonname, jpath, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
}
}
/*
* Check with permission for a specific privilege is granted within jail. We
* have a specific list of accepted privileges; the rest are denied.
*/
int
prison_priv_check(struct ucred *cred, int priv)
{
if (!jailed(cred))
return (0);
switch (priv) {
/*
* Allow ktrace privileges for root in jail.
*/
case PRIV_KTRACE:
#if 0
/*
* Allow jailed processes to configure audit identity and
* submit audit records (login, etc). In the future we may
* want to further refine the relationship between audit and
* jail.
*/
case PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT:
case PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT:
case PRIV_AUDIT_SUBMIT:
#endif
/*
* Allow jailed processes to manipulate process UNIX
* credentials in any way they see fit.
*/
case PRIV_CRED_SETUID:
case PRIV_CRED_SETEUID:
case PRIV_CRED_SETGID:
case PRIV_CRED_SETEGID:
case PRIV_CRED_SETGROUPS:
case PRIV_CRED_SETREUID:
case PRIV_CRED_SETREGID:
case PRIV_CRED_SETRESUID:
case PRIV_CRED_SETRESGID:
/*
* Jail implements visibility constraints already, so allow
* jailed root to override uid/gid-based constraints.
*/
case PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS:
case PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS:
/*
* Jail implements inter-process debugging limits already, so
* allow jailed root various debugging privileges.
*/
case PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFCRED:
case PRIV_DEBUG_SUGID:
case PRIV_DEBUG_UNPRIV:
/*
* Allow jail to set various resource limits and login
* properties, and for now, exceed process resource limits.
*/
case PRIV_PROC_LIMIT:
case PRIV_PROC_SETLOGIN:
case PRIV_PROC_SETRLIMIT:
/*
* System V and POSIX IPC privileges are granted in jail.
*/
case PRIV_IPC_READ:
case PRIV_IPC_WRITE:
case PRIV_IPC_ADMIN:
case PRIV_IPC_MSGSIZE:
case PRIV_MQ_ADMIN:
/*
* Jail implements its own inter-process limits, so allow
* root processes in jail to change scheduling on other
* processes in the same jail. Likewise for signalling.
*/
case PRIV_SCHED_DIFFCRED:
case PRIV_SIGNAL_DIFFCRED:
case PRIV_SIGNAL_SUGID:
/*
* Allow jailed processes to write to sysctls marked as jail
* writable.
*/
case PRIV_SYSCTL_WRITEJAIL:
/*
* Allow root in jail to manage a variety of quota
* properties. These should likely be conditional on a
* configuration option.
*/
case PRIV_VFS_GETQUOTA:
case PRIV_VFS_SETQUOTA:
/*
* Since Jail relies on chroot() to implement file system
* protections, grant many VFS privileges to root in jail.
* Be careful to exclude mount-related and NFS-related
* privileges.
*/
case PRIV_VFS_READ:
case PRIV_VFS_WRITE:
case PRIV_VFS_ADMIN:
case PRIV_VFS_EXEC:
case PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP:
case PRIV_VFS_BLOCKRESERVE: /* XXXRW: Slightly surprising. */
case PRIV_VFS_CHFLAGS_DEV:
case PRIV_VFS_CHOWN:
case PRIV_VFS_CHROOT:
case PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID:
case PRIV_VFS_FCHROOT:
case PRIV_VFS_LINK:
case PRIV_VFS_SETGID:
case PRIV_VFS_STAT:
case PRIV_VFS_STICKYFILE:
return (0);
/*
* Depending on the global setting, allow privilege of
* setting system flags.
*/
case PRIV_VFS_SYSFLAGS:
if (jail_chflags_allowed)
return (0);
else
return (EPERM);
/*
* Depending on the global setting, allow privilege of
* mounting/unmounting file systems.
*/
case PRIV_VFS_MOUNT:
case PRIV_VFS_UNMOUNT:
case PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_NONUSER:
case PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_OWNER:
if (jail_mount_allowed)
return (0);
else
return (EPERM);
/*
* Allow jailed root to bind reserved ports and reuse in-use
* ports.
*/
case PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT:
case PRIV_NETINET_REUSEPORT:
return (0);
/*
* Conditionally allow creating raw sockets in jail.
*/
case PRIV_NETINET_RAW:
if (jail_allow_raw_sockets)
return (0);
else
return (EPERM);
/*
* Since jail implements its own visibility limits on netstat
* sysctls, allow getcred. This allows identd to work in
* jail.
*/
case PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED:
return (0);
default:
/*
* In all remaining cases, deny the privilege request. This
* includes almost all network privileges, many system
* configuration privileges.
*/
return (EPERM);
}
}
/*
* Register jail service. Provides 'create' and 'destroy' methods.
* 'create' method will be called for every existing jail and all
* jails in the future as they beeing created.
* 'destroy' method will be called for every jail going away and
* for all existing jails at the time of service deregistration.
*/
struct prison_service *
prison_service_register(const char *name, prison_create_t create,
prison_destroy_t destroy)
{
struct prison_service *psrv, *psrv2;
struct prison *pr;
int reallocate = 1, slotno = 0;
void **slots, **oldslots;
psrv = malloc(sizeof(*psrv) + strlen(name) + 1, M_PRISON,
M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
psrv->ps_create = create;
psrv->ps_destroy = destroy;
strcpy(psrv->ps_name, name);
/*
* Grab the allprison_lock here, so we won't miss any jail
* creation/destruction.
*/
sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
#ifdef INVARIANTS
/*
* Verify if service is not already registered.
*/
TAILQ_FOREACH(psrv2, &prison_services, ps_next) {
KASSERT(strcmp(psrv2->ps_name, name) != 0,
("jail service %s already registered", name));
}
#endif
/*
* Find free slot. When there is no existing free slot available,
* allocate one at the end.
*/
TAILQ_FOREACH(psrv2, &prison_services, ps_next) {
if (psrv2->ps_slotno != slotno) {
KASSERT(slotno < psrv2->ps_slotno,
("Invalid slotno (slotno=%d >= ps_slotno=%d",
slotno, psrv2->ps_slotno));
/* We found free slot. */
reallocate = 0;
break;
}
slotno++;
}
psrv->ps_slotno = slotno;
/*
* Keep the list sorted by slot number.
*/
if (psrv2 != NULL) {
KASSERT(reallocate == 0, ("psrv2 != NULL && reallocate != 0"));
TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(psrv2, psrv, ps_next);
} else {
KASSERT(reallocate == 1, ("psrv2 == NULL && reallocate == 0"));
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&prison_services, psrv, ps_next);
}
prison_service_slots++;
sx_downgrade(&allprison_lock);
/*
* Allocate memory for new slot if we didn't found empty one.
* Do not use realloc(9), because pr_slots is protected with a mutex,
* so we can't sleep.
*/
LIST_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) {
if (reallocate) {
/* First allocate memory with M_WAITOK. */
slots = malloc(sizeof(*slots) * prison_service_slots,
M_PRISON, M_WAITOK);
/* Now grab the mutex and replace pr_slots. */
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
oldslots = pr->pr_slots;
if (psrv->ps_slotno > 0) {
bcopy(oldslots, slots,
sizeof(*slots) * (prison_service_slots - 1));
}
slots[psrv->ps_slotno] = NULL;
pr->pr_slots = slots;
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
if (oldslots != NULL)
free(oldslots, M_PRISON);
}
/*
* Call 'create' method for each existing jail.
*/
psrv->ps_create(psrv, pr);
}
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
return (psrv);
}
void
prison_service_deregister(struct prison_service *psrv)
{
struct prison *pr;
void **slots, **oldslots;
int last = 0;
sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
if (TAILQ_LAST(&prison_services, prison_services_head) == psrv)
last = 1;
TAILQ_REMOVE(&prison_services, psrv, ps_next);
prison_service_slots--;
sx_downgrade(&allprison_lock);
LIST_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) {
/*
* Call 'destroy' method for every currently existing jail.
*/
psrv->ps_destroy(psrv, pr);
/*
* If this is the last slot, free the memory allocated for it.
*/
if (last) {
if (prison_service_slots == 0)
slots = NULL;
else {
slots = malloc(sizeof(*slots) * prison_service_slots,
M_PRISON, M_WAITOK);
}
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
oldslots = pr->pr_slots;
/*
* We require setting slot to NULL after freeing it,
* this way we can check for memory leaks here.
*/
KASSERT(oldslots[psrv->ps_slotno] == NULL,
("Slot %d (service %s, jailid=%d) still contains data?",
psrv->ps_slotno, psrv->ps_name, pr->pr_id));
if (psrv->ps_slotno > 0) {
bcopy(oldslots, slots,
sizeof(*slots) * prison_service_slots);
}
pr->pr_slots = slots;
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
KASSERT(oldslots != NULL, ("oldslots == NULL"));
free(oldslots, M_PRISON);
}
}
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
free(psrv, M_PRISON);
}
/*
* Function sets data for the given jail in slot assigned for the given
* jail service.
*/
void
prison_service_data_set(struct prison_service *psrv, struct prison *pr,
void *data)
{
mtx_assert(&pr->pr_mtx, MA_OWNED);
pr->pr_slots[psrv->ps_slotno] = data;
}
/*
* Function clears slots assigned for the given jail service in the given
* prison structure and returns current slot data.
*/
void *
prison_service_data_del(struct prison_service *psrv, struct prison *pr)
{
void *data;
mtx_assert(&pr->pr_mtx, MA_OWNED);
data = pr->pr_slots[psrv->ps_slotno];
pr->pr_slots[psrv->ps_slotno] = NULL;
return (data);
}
/*
* Function returns current data from the slot assigned to the given jail
* service for the given jail.
*/
void *
prison_service_data_get(struct prison_service *psrv, struct prison *pr)
{
mtx_assert(&pr->pr_mtx, MA_OWNED);
return (pr->pr_slots[psrv->ps_slotno]);
}
static int
sysctl_jail_list(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
struct xprison *xp, *sxp;
struct prison *pr;
int count, error;
if (jailed(req->td->td_ucred))
return (0);
sx_slock(&allprison_lock);
if ((count = prisoncount) == 0) {
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
return (0);
}
sxp = xp = malloc(sizeof(*xp) * count, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
LIST_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) {
xp->pr_version = XPRISON_VERSION;
xp->pr_id = pr->pr_id;
xp->pr_ip = pr->pr_ip;
strlcpy(xp->pr_path, pr->pr_path, sizeof(xp->pr_path));
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
strlcpy(xp->pr_host, pr->pr_host, sizeof(xp->pr_host));
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
xp++;
}
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, sxp, sizeof(*sxp) * count);
free(sxp, M_TEMP);
return (error);
}
SYSCTL_OID(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, list, CTLTYPE_STRUCT | CTLFLAG_RD,
NULL, 0, sysctl_jail_list, "S", "List of active jails");
static int
sysctl_jail_jailed(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
int error, injail;
injail = jailed(req->td->td_ucred);
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &injail, sizeof(injail));
return (error);
}
SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, jailed, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD,
NULL, 0, sysctl_jail_jailed, "I", "Process in jail?");