freebsd-dev/sys/dev/ubsec/ubsecvar.h
John Baldwin c034143269 Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto).
- The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session
  initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct
  crypto_session_params.  This session includes a new mode to define
  how the other fields should be interpreted.  Available modes
  include:

  - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression)
  - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption)
  - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests)
  - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM)
  - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate)

  Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to
  support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode
  for that.  TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.)

  The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as
  before.  However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and
  switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs
  encryption key.  The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth
  keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher.  (Compression
  algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.)

- Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms.  This
  doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might
  support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined
  for ETA).  Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been
  added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers.  This
  method returns a negative value on success (similar to how
  device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick
  the "best" driver.  There are three constants for hardware
  (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software
  (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order.  One effect of this
  is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session,
  you will no longer get a session using accelerated software.
  Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software
  crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software.

  Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before.

- Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop'
  structure.  The linked list of descriptors has been removed.

  A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer
  in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add
  more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for
  zero-copy).  It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate
  input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this).

  Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane:

  - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv'
    member of the operation structure.  If this flag is not set, the
    IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset.

  - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated
    and stored into the data buffer.  This cannot be used with
    CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.

  If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it
  can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in
  the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set
  CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.

  The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop.
  crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD.
  Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range,
  but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext
  (and they had to be adjacent).

  crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of
  the plaintext/ciphertext.  Modes that only do a single operation
  (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the
  AAD region empty.

  If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting
  location is marked by crp_digest_start.

  Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction
  of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the
  operation to perform.  For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest
  mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the
  request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed
  digest.  GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode
  requires this for decryption.  The new ETA mode now also requires
  this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own
  authentication verification.  Simple DIGEST operations can also do
  this, though there are no in-tree consumers.

  To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session
  cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer
  set crp_sesssion directly.

- Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via
  crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq().  This permits the
  crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a
  driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight.

- crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and
  crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the
  first parameter instead of individual members.  This makes it easier
  to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as
  separate input and output buffers.  It's also simpler for driver
  writers to use.

- bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer.
  This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that
  use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types.

- Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD
  and OPAD.  This reduces some duplicated work among drivers.

- Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in
  device drivers.  However, session key buffers provided when a session
  is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the
  session.

- GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher
  key.  The redundant auth information is not needed or used.

- For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process'
  callback now invokes a function pointer in the session.  This
  function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it
  simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in
  'process'.

  It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there
  is some duplication.

- I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC
  as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it.

- Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA
  mode.  The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored.
  This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but
  the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST
  flag.

- I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for
  sessions.  I will probably do that at some point in the future as well
  as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support
  all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM.

- I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages
  of which many are written from scratch.

- I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified
  that they compile, but I have not tested all of them.  I have tested
  the following drivers:

  - cryptosoft
  - aesni (AES only)
  - blake2
  - ccr

  and the following consumers:

  - cryptodev
  - IPsec
  - ktls_ocf
  - GELI (lightly)

  I have not tested the following:

  - ccp
  - aesni with sha
  - hifn
  - kgssapi_krb5
  - ubsec
  - padlock
  - safe
  - armv8_crypto (aarch64)
  - glxsb (i386)
  - sec (ppc)
  - cesa (armv7)
  - cryptocteon (mips64)
  - nlmsec (mips64)

Discussed with:	cem
Relnotes:	yes
Sponsored by:	Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00

247 lines
7.9 KiB
C

/* $FreeBSD$ */
/* $OpenBSD: ubsecvar.h,v 1.35 2002/09/24 18:33:26 jason Exp $ */
/*-
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Theo de Raadt
* Copyright (c) 2001 Patrik Lindergren (patrik@ipunplugged.com)
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
* derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* Effort sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
* Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
* Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537.
*
*/
/* Maximum queue length */
#ifndef UBS_MAX_NQUEUE
#define UBS_MAX_NQUEUE 60
#endif
#define UBS_MAX_SCATTER 64 /* Maximum scatter/gather depth */
#ifndef UBS_MAX_AGGR
#define UBS_MAX_AGGR 5 /* Maximum aggregation count */
#endif
#define UBS_DEF_RTY 0xff /* PCI Retry Timeout */
#define UBS_DEF_TOUT 0xff /* PCI TRDY Timeout */
#define UBS_DEF_CACHELINE 0x01 /* Cache Line setting */
#ifdef _KERNEL
struct ubsec_dma_alloc {
u_int32_t dma_paddr;
caddr_t dma_vaddr;
bus_dma_tag_t dma_tag;
bus_dmamap_t dma_map;
bus_dma_segment_t dma_seg;
bus_size_t dma_size;
int dma_nseg;
};
struct ubsec_q2 {
SIMPLEQ_ENTRY(ubsec_q2) q_next;
struct ubsec_dma_alloc q_mcr;
struct ubsec_dma_alloc q_ctx;
u_int q_type;
};
struct ubsec_q2_rng {
struct ubsec_q2 rng_q;
struct ubsec_dma_alloc rng_buf;
int rng_used;
};
/* C = (M ^ E) mod N */
#define UBS_MODEXP_PAR_M 0
#define UBS_MODEXP_PAR_E 1
#define UBS_MODEXP_PAR_N 2
#define UBS_MODEXP_PAR_C 3
struct ubsec_q2_modexp {
struct ubsec_q2 me_q;
struct cryptkop * me_krp;
struct ubsec_dma_alloc me_M;
struct ubsec_dma_alloc me_E;
struct ubsec_dma_alloc me_C;
struct ubsec_dma_alloc me_epb;
int me_modbits;
int me_shiftbits;
int me_normbits;
};
#define UBS_RSAPRIV_PAR_P 0
#define UBS_RSAPRIV_PAR_Q 1
#define UBS_RSAPRIV_PAR_DP 2
#define UBS_RSAPRIV_PAR_DQ 3
#define UBS_RSAPRIV_PAR_PINV 4
#define UBS_RSAPRIV_PAR_MSGIN 5
#define UBS_RSAPRIV_PAR_MSGOUT 6
struct ubsec_q2_rsapriv {
struct ubsec_q2 rpr_q;
struct cryptkop * rpr_krp;
struct ubsec_dma_alloc rpr_msgin;
struct ubsec_dma_alloc rpr_msgout;
};
#define UBSEC_RNG_BUFSIZ 16 /* measured in 32bit words */
struct ubsec_dmachunk {
struct ubsec_mcr d_mcr;
struct ubsec_mcr_add d_mcradd[UBS_MAX_AGGR-1];
struct ubsec_pktbuf d_sbuf[UBS_MAX_SCATTER-1];
struct ubsec_pktbuf d_dbuf[UBS_MAX_SCATTER-1];
u_int32_t d_macbuf[5];
union {
struct ubsec_pktctx_long ctxl;
struct ubsec_pktctx ctx;
} d_ctx;
};
struct ubsec_dma {
SIMPLEQ_ENTRY(ubsec_dma) d_next;
struct ubsec_dmachunk *d_dma;
struct ubsec_dma_alloc d_alloc;
};
#define UBS_FLAGS_KEY 0x01 /* has key accelerator */
#define UBS_FLAGS_LONGCTX 0x02 /* uses long ipsec ctx */
#define UBS_FLAGS_BIGKEY 0x04 /* 2048bit keys */
#define UBS_FLAGS_HWNORM 0x08 /* hardware normalization */
#define UBS_FLAGS_RNG 0x10 /* hardware rng */
struct ubsec_operand {
bus_dmamap_t map;
bus_size_t mapsize;
int nsegs;
bus_dma_segment_t segs[UBS_MAX_SCATTER];
};
struct ubsec_q {
SIMPLEQ_ENTRY(ubsec_q) q_next;
int q_nstacked_mcrs;
struct ubsec_q *q_stacked_mcr[UBS_MAX_AGGR-1];
struct cryptop *q_crp;
struct ubsec_dma *q_dma;
struct ubsec_operand q_src;
struct ubsec_operand q_dst;
struct mbuf *q_dst_m;
int q_flags;
};
#define q_src_map q_src.map
#define q_src_nsegs q_src.nsegs
#define q_src_segs q_src.segs
#define q_src_mapsize q_src.mapsize
#define q_dst_map q_dst.map
#define q_dst_nsegs q_dst.nsegs
#define q_dst_segs q_dst.segs
#define q_dst_mapsize q_dst.mapsize
struct rndstate_test;
struct ubsec_softc {
device_t sc_dev; /* device backpointer */
struct resource *sc_irq;
void *sc_ih; /* interrupt handler cookie */
bus_space_handle_t sc_sh; /* memory handle */
bus_space_tag_t sc_st; /* memory tag */
struct resource *sc_sr; /* memory resource */
bus_dma_tag_t sc_dmat; /* dma tag */
int sc_flags; /* device specific flags */
int sc_suspended;
int sc_needwakeup; /* notify crypto layer */
u_int32_t sc_statmask; /* interrupt status mask */
int32_t sc_cid; /* crypto tag */
struct mtx sc_mcr1lock; /* mcr1 operation lock */
SIMPLEQ_HEAD(,ubsec_q) sc_queue; /* packet queue, mcr1 */
int sc_nqueue; /* count enqueued, mcr1 */
SIMPLEQ_HEAD(,ubsec_q) sc_qchip; /* on chip, mcr1 */
int sc_nqchip; /* count on chip, mcr1 */
struct mtx sc_freeqlock; /* freequeue lock */
SIMPLEQ_HEAD(,ubsec_q) sc_freequeue; /* list of free queue elements */
struct mtx sc_mcr2lock; /* mcr2 operation lock */
SIMPLEQ_HEAD(,ubsec_q2) sc_queue2; /* packet queue, mcr2 */
int sc_nqueue2; /* count enqueued, mcr2 */
SIMPLEQ_HEAD(,ubsec_q2) sc_qchip2; /* on chip, mcr2 */
struct callout sc_rngto; /* rng timeout */
int sc_rnghz; /* rng poll time */
struct ubsec_q2_rng sc_rng;
struct rndtest_state *sc_rndtest; /* RNG test state */
void (*sc_harvest)(struct rndtest_state *,
void *, u_int);
struct ubsec_dma sc_dmaa[UBS_MAX_NQUEUE];
struct ubsec_q *sc_queuea[UBS_MAX_NQUEUE];
SIMPLEQ_HEAD(,ubsec_q2) sc_q2free; /* free list */
};
#define UBSEC_QFLAGS_COPYOUTIV 0x1
struct ubsec_session {
u_int32_t ses_deskey[6]; /* 3DES key */
u_int32_t ses_mlen; /* hmac length */
u_int32_t ses_hminner[5]; /* hmac inner state */
u_int32_t ses_hmouter[5]; /* hmac outer state */
};
#endif /* _KERNEL */
struct ubsec_stats {
u_int64_t hst_ibytes;
u_int64_t hst_obytes;
u_int32_t hst_ipackets;
u_int32_t hst_opackets;
u_int32_t hst_invalid; /* invalid argument */
u_int32_t hst_badsession; /* invalid session id */
u_int32_t hst_badflags; /* flags indicate !(mbuf | uio) */
u_int32_t hst_nodesc; /* op submitted w/o descriptors */
u_int32_t hst_badalg; /* unsupported algorithm */
u_int32_t hst_nomem;
u_int32_t hst_queuefull;
u_int32_t hst_dmaerr;
u_int32_t hst_mcrerr;
u_int32_t hst_nodmafree;
u_int32_t hst_lenmismatch; /* enc/auth lengths different */
u_int32_t hst_skipmismatch; /* enc part begins before auth part */
u_int32_t hst_iovmisaligned; /* iov op not aligned */
u_int32_t hst_noirq; /* IRQ for no reason */
u_int32_t hst_unaligned; /* unaligned src caused copy */
u_int32_t hst_nomap; /* bus_dmamap_create failed */
u_int32_t hst_noload; /* bus_dmamap_load_* failed */
u_int32_t hst_nombuf; /* MGET* failed */
u_int32_t hst_nomcl; /* MCLGET* failed */
u_int32_t hst_totbatch; /* ops submitted w/o interrupt */
u_int32_t hst_maxbatch; /* max ops submitted together */
u_int32_t hst_maxqueue; /* max ops queued for submission */
u_int32_t hst_maxqchip; /* max mcr1 ops out for processing */
u_int32_t hst_mcr1full; /* MCR1 too busy to take ops */
u_int32_t hst_rng; /* RNG requests */
u_int32_t hst_modexp; /* MOD EXP requests */
u_int32_t hst_modexpcrt; /* MOD EXP CRT requests */
};