8f85b6caad
Andrew Korty's pam_ssh. The most notable difference is that this uses commas rather than colons to separate items in the "keyfiles" option. Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
641 lines
17 KiB
C
641 lines
17 KiB
C
/*-
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* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Andrew J. Korty
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* All rights reserved.
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* Copyright (c) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Portions of this software were developed for the FreeBSD Project by
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* ThinkSec AS and NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network
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* Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
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* ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
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* products derived from this software without specific prior written
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* permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* $Id: pam_ssh.c,v 1.23 2001/08/20 01:44:02 akorty Exp $
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <sys/wait.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <pwd.h>
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#include <signal.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#define PAM_SM_AUTH
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#define PAM_SM_ACCOUNT
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#define PAM_SM_SESSION
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#define PAM_SM_PASSWORD
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#include <security/pam_appl.h>
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#include <security/pam_modules.h>
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#include <security/pam_mod_misc.h>
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#include <openssl/dsa.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include "key.h"
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#include "authfd.h"
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#include "authfile.h"
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#include "log.h"
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#include "pam_ssh.h"
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/*
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* Generic cleanup function for OpenSSH "Key" type.
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*/
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void
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key_cleanup(pam_handle_t *pamh, void *data, int error_status)
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{
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if (data)
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key_free(data);
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}
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/*
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* Generic PAM cleanup function for this module.
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*/
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void
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ssh_cleanup(pam_handle_t *pamh, void *data, int error_status)
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{
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if (data)
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free(data);
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}
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/*
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* Authenticate a user's key by trying to decrypt it with the password
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* provided. The key and its comment are then stored for later
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* retrieval by the session phase. An increasing index is embedded in
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* the PAM variable names so this function may be called multiple times
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* for multiple keys.
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*/
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static int
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auth_via_key(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *file, const char *dir,
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const struct passwd *user, const char *pass)
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{
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char *comment; /* private key comment */
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char *data_name; /* PAM state */
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static int index = 0; /* for saved keys */
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Key *key; /* user's key */
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char *path; /* to key files */
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int retval; /* from calls */
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uid_t saved_uid; /* caller's uid */
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/* locate the user's private key file */
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if (!asprintf(&path, "%s/%s", dir, file)) {
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openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
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return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
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}
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saved_uid = getuid();
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/* Try to decrypt the private key with the passphrase provided. If
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success, the user is authenticated. */
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comment = NULL;
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(void) setreuid(user->pw_uid, saved_uid);
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key = key_load_private(path, pass, &comment);
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(void) setuid(saved_uid);
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free(path);
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if (!comment)
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comment = strdup(file);
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if (!key) {
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free(comment);
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return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
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}
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/* save the key and comment to pass to ssh-agent in the session
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phase */
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if (!asprintf(&data_name, "ssh_private_key_%d", index)) {
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openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
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free(comment);
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return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
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}
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retval = pam_set_data(pamh, data_name, key, key_cleanup);
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free(data_name);
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if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
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key_free(key);
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free(comment);
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return retval;
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}
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if (!asprintf(&data_name, "ssh_key_comment_%d", index)) {
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openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
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free(comment);
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return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
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}
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retval = pam_set_data(pamh, data_name, comment, ssh_cleanup);
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free(data_name);
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if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
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free(comment);
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return retval;
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}
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++index;
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return PAM_SUCCESS;
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}
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/*
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* Add the keys stored by auth_via_key() to the agent connected to the
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* socket provided.
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*/
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static int
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add_keys(pam_handle_t *pamh, char *socket)
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{
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AuthenticationConnection *ac; /* connection to ssh-agent */
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char *comment; /* private key comment */
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char *data_name; /* PAM state */
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int final; /* final return value */
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int index; /* for saved keys */
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Key *key; /* user's private key */
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int retval; /* from calls */
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/*
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* Connect to the agent.
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*
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* XXX Because ssh_get_authentication_connection() gets the
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* XXX agent parameters from the environment, we have to
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* XXX temporarily replace the environment with the PAM
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* XXX environment list. This is a hack.
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*/
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{
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extern char **environ;
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char **saved, **evp;
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saved = environ;
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if ((environ = pam_getenvlist(pamh)) == NULL) {
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environ = saved;
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openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
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return (PAM_BUF_ERR);
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}
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ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
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for (evp = environ; *evp; evp++)
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free(*evp);
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free(environ);
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environ = saved;
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}
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if (!ac) {
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openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %s: %m", MODULE_NAME, socket);
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return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
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}
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/* hand off each private key to the agent */
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final = 0;
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for (index = 0; ; index++) {
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if (!asprintf(&data_name, "ssh_private_key_%d", index)) {
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openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
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ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
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return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
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}
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retval = pam_get_data(pamh, data_name, (const void **)&key);
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free(data_name);
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if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
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break;
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if (!asprintf(&data_name, "ssh_key_comment_%d", index)) {
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openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
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ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
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return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
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}
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retval = pam_get_data(pamh, data_name,
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(const void **)&comment);
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free(data_name);
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if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
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break;
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retval = ssh_add_identity(ac, key, comment);
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if (!final)
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final = retval;
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}
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ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
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return final ? PAM_SUCCESS : PAM_SESSION_ERR;
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}
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PAM_EXTERN int
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pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc,
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const char **argv)
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{
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int authenticated; /* user authenticated? */
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char *dotdir; /* .ssh dir name */
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char *file; /* current key file */
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char *keyfiles; /* list of key files to add */
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int options; /* options for pam_get_pass() */
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const char *pass; /* passphrase */
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const struct passwd *pwent; /* user's passwd entry */
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struct passwd *pwent_keep; /* our own copy */
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int retval; /* from calls */
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const char *user; /* username */
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keyfiles = DEF_KEYFILES;
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options = 0;
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for (; argc; argc--, argv++)
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if (strncmp(*argv, OPT_KEYFILES "=", sizeof OPT_KEYFILES)
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== 0) {
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if (!(keyfiles = strchr(*argv, '=') + 1))
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return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
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} else if (strcmp(*argv, OPT_TRY_FIRST_PASS) == 0)
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options |= PAM_OPT_TRY_FIRST_PASS;
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else if (strcmp(*argv, OPT_USE_FIRST_PASS) == 0)
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options |= PAM_OPT_USE_FIRST_PASS;
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if ((retval = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL)) != PAM_SUCCESS)
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return retval;
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if (!((pwent = getpwnam(user)) && pwent->pw_dir))
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return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
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/* pass prompt message to application and receive passphrase */
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if ((retval = pam_get_pass(pamh, &pass, NEED_PASSPHRASE, options))
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!= PAM_SUCCESS)
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return retval;
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OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); /* required for DSA */
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/* any key will authenticate us, but if we can decrypt all of the
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specified keys, we'll do so here so we can cache them in the
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session phase */
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if (!asprintf(&dotdir, "%s/%s", pwent->pw_dir, SSH_CLIENT_DIR)) {
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openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
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return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
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}
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authenticated = 0;
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keyfiles = strdup(keyfiles);
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for (file = strtok(keyfiles, SEP_KEYFILES); file;
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file = strtok(NULL, SEP_KEYFILES))
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if (auth_via_key(pamh, file, dotdir, pwent, pass) ==
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PAM_SUCCESS)
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authenticated++;
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free(keyfiles);
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if (!authenticated)
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return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
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/* copy the passwd entry (in case successive calls are made) and
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save it for the session phase */
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if (!(pwent_keep = malloc(sizeof *pwent))) {
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openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%m");
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return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
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}
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(void) memcpy(pwent_keep, pwent, sizeof *pwent_keep);
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if ((retval = pam_set_data(pamh, "ssh_passwd_entry", pwent_keep,
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ssh_cleanup)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
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free(pwent_keep);
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return retval;
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}
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return PAM_SUCCESS;
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}
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PAM_EXTERN int
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pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
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{
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return PAM_SUCCESS;
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}
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PAM_EXTERN int
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pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc,
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const char **argv)
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{
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char *agent_socket; /* agent socket */
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char *env_end; /* end of env */
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FILE *env_read; /* env data source */
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char env_string[BUFSIZ]; /* environment string */
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char *env_value; /* envariable value */
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int env_write; /* env file descriptor */
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char hname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; /* local hostname */
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int no_link; /* link per-agent file? */
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char *per_agent; /* to store env */
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char *per_session; /* per-session filename */
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const struct passwd *pwent; /* user's passwd entry */
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int retval; /* from calls */
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uid_t saved_uid; /* caller's uid */
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int start_agent; /* start agent? */
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const char *tty; /* tty or display name */
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/* dump output of ssh-agent in ~/.ssh */
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if ((retval = pam_get_data(pamh, "ssh_passwd_entry",
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(const void **)&pwent)) != PAM_SUCCESS)
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return retval;
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/*
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* Use reference counts to limit agents to one per user per host.
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*
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* Technique: Create an environment file containing
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* information about the agent. Only one file is created, but
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* it may be given many names. One name is given for the
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* agent itself, agent-<host>. Another name is given for each
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* session, agent-<host>-<display> or agent-<host>-<tty>. We
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* delete the per-session filename on session close, and when
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* the link count goes to unity on the per-agent file, we
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* delete the file and kill the agent.
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*/
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/* the per-agent file contains just the hostname */
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(void) gethostname(hname, sizeof hname);
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if (asprintf(&per_agent, "%s/.ssh/agent-%s", pwent->pw_dir, hname)
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== -1) {
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openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
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return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
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}
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/* save the per-agent filename in case we want to delete it on
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session close */
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if ((retval = pam_set_data(pamh, "ssh_agent_env_agent", per_agent,
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ssh_cleanup)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
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free(per_agent);
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return retval;
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}
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/* take on the user's privileges for writing files and starting the
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agent */
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saved_uid = geteuid();
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(void) seteuid(pwent->pw_uid);
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/* Try to create the per-agent file or open it for reading if it
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exists. If we can't do either, we won't try to link a
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per-session filename later. Start the agent if we can't open
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the file for reading. */
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env_write = no_link = 0;
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env_read = NULL;
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if ((env_write = open(per_agent, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY,
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S_IRUSR)) < 0 && !(env_read = fopen(per_agent, "r")))
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no_link = 1;
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if (env_read) {
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start_agent = 0;
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(void) seteuid(saved_uid);
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} else {
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start_agent = 1;
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env_read = popen(SSH_AGENT, "r");
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(void) seteuid(saved_uid);
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if (!env_read) {
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openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %s: %m", MODULE_NAME,
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SSH_AGENT);
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if (env_write >= 0)
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(void) close(env_write);
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free(per_agent);
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return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
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}
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}
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/* save environment for application with pam_putenv() */
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agent_socket = NULL;
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while (fgets(env_string, sizeof env_string, env_read)) {
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/* parse environment definitions */
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if (env_write >= 0)
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(void) write(env_write, env_string,
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strlen(env_string));
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if (!(env_value = strchr(env_string, '=')) ||
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!(env_end = strchr(env_value, ';')))
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continue;
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*env_end = '\0';
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/* pass to the application */
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if (!((retval = pam_putenv(pamh, env_string)) ==
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PAM_SUCCESS)) {
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if (start_agent)
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(void) pclose(env_read);
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else
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(void) fclose(env_read);
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if (env_write >= 0)
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(void) close(env_write);
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if (agent_socket)
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free(agent_socket);
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free(per_agent);
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return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
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}
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*env_value++ = '\0';
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/* save the agent socket so we can connect to it and add
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the keys as well as the PID so we can kill the agent on
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session close. */
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if (strcmp(&env_string[strlen(env_string) -
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strlen(ENV_SOCKET_SUFFIX)], ENV_SOCKET_SUFFIX) == 0 &&
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!(agent_socket = strdup(env_value))) {
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openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
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if (start_agent)
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(void) pclose(env_read);
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else
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(void) fclose(env_read);
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if (env_write >= 0)
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(void) close(env_write);
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if (agent_socket)
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free(agent_socket);
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free(per_agent);
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return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
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} else if (strcmp(&env_string[strlen(env_string) -
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strlen(ENV_PID_SUFFIX)], ENV_PID_SUFFIX) == 0 &&
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(retval = pam_set_data(pamh, "ssh_agent_pid",
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env_value, ssh_cleanup)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
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if (start_agent)
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(void) pclose(env_read);
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else
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(void) fclose(env_read);
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if (env_write >= 0)
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(void) close(env_write);
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if (agent_socket)
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free(agent_socket);
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free(per_agent);
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return retval;
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}
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}
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if (env_write >= 0)
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(void) close(env_write);
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if (start_agent) {
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switch (retval = pclose(env_read)) {
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case -1:
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openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %s: %m", MODULE_NAME,
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SSH_AGENT);
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if (agent_socket)
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free(agent_socket);
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free(per_agent);
|
|
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
|
|
case 0:
|
|
break;
|
|
case 127:
|
|
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: cannot execute %s",
|
|
MODULE_NAME, SSH_AGENT);
|
|
if (agent_socket)
|
|
free(agent_socket);
|
|
free(per_agent);
|
|
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
|
|
default:
|
|
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %s exited %s %d",
|
|
MODULE_NAME,
|
|
SSH_AGENT, WIFSIGNALED(retval) ? "on signal" :
|
|
"with status", WIFSIGNALED(retval) ?
|
|
WTERMSIG(retval) : WEXITSTATUS(retval));
|
|
if (agent_socket)
|
|
free(agent_socket);
|
|
free(per_agent);
|
|
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
(void) fclose(env_read);
|
|
|
|
if (!agent_socket) {
|
|
free(per_agent);
|
|
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (start_agent && (retval = add_keys(pamh, agent_socket))
|
|
!= PAM_SUCCESS) {
|
|
free(per_agent);
|
|
return retval;
|
|
}
|
|
free(agent_socket);
|
|
|
|
/* if we couldn't access the per-agent file, don't link a
|
|
per-session filename to it */
|
|
|
|
if (no_link)
|
|
return PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
/* the per-session file contains the display name or tty name as
|
|
well as the hostname */
|
|
|
|
if ((retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, (const void **)&tty))
|
|
!= PAM_SUCCESS) {
|
|
free(per_agent);
|
|
return retval;
|
|
}
|
|
if (asprintf(&per_session, "%s/.ssh/agent-%s-%s", pwent->pw_dir,
|
|
hname, tty) == -1) {
|
|
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
|
|
free(per_agent);
|
|
return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* save the per-session filename so we can delete it on session
|
|
close */
|
|
|
|
if ((retval = pam_set_data(pamh, "ssh_agent_env_session",
|
|
per_session, ssh_cleanup)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
|
|
free(per_session);
|
|
free(per_agent);
|
|
return retval;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
(void) unlink(per_session); /* remove cruft */
|
|
(void) link(per_agent, per_session);
|
|
free(per_agent);
|
|
free(per_session);
|
|
|
|
return PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
PAM_EXTERN int
|
|
pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc,
|
|
const char **argv)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *env_file; /* ssh-agent environment */
|
|
pid_t pid; /* ssh-agent process id */
|
|
int retval; /* from calls */
|
|
const char *ssh_agent_pid; /* ssh-agent pid string */
|
|
struct stat sb; /* to check st_nlink */
|
|
|
|
if ((retval = pam_get_data(pamh, "ssh_agent_env_session",
|
|
(const void **)&env_file)) == PAM_SUCCESS && env_file)
|
|
(void) unlink(env_file);
|
|
|
|
/* Retrieve per-agent filename and check link count. If it's
|
|
greater than unity, other sessions are still using this
|
|
agent. */
|
|
|
|
if ((retval = pam_get_data(pamh, "ssh_agent_env_agent",
|
|
(const void **)&env_file)) == PAM_SUCCESS && env_file &&
|
|
stat(env_file, &sb) == 0) {
|
|
if (sb.st_nlink > 1)
|
|
return PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
(void) unlink(env_file);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* retrieve the agent's process id */
|
|
|
|
if ((retval = pam_get_data(pamh, "ssh_agent_pid",
|
|
(const void **)&ssh_agent_pid)) != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
/* Kill the agent. SSH's ssh-agent does not have a -k option, so
|
|
just call kill(). */
|
|
|
|
pid = atoi(ssh_agent_pid);
|
|
if (ssh_agent_pid <= 0)
|
|
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
|
|
if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) != 0) {
|
|
openpam_log(PAM_LOG_ERROR, "%s: %s: %m", MODULE_NAME,
|
|
ssh_agent_pid);
|
|
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PAM_EXTERN int
|
|
pam_sm_acct_mgmt(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc,
|
|
const char **argv)
|
|
{
|
|
return (PAM_IGNORE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PAM_EXTERN int
|
|
pam_sm_chauthtok(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc,
|
|
const char **argv)
|
|
{
|
|
return (PAM_IGNORE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PAM_MODULE_ENTRY(MODULE_NAME);
|