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freebsd-dev/crypto/openssh/auth1.c
Assar Westerlund 1f131ac4bd fix renamed options in some of the code that was #ifdef AFS 
also print an error if krb5 ticket passing is disabled

Submitted by:	Jonathan Chen <jon@spock.org>
2001-09-04 13:27:04 +00:00

576 lines
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/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.22 2001/03/23 12:02:49 markus Exp $");
RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "rsa.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "mpaux.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-pam.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include <login_cap.h>
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#ifdef KRB5
extern krb5_context ssh_context;
krb5_principal tkt_client = NULL; /* Principal from the received ticket.
Also is used as an indication of succesful krb5 authentization. */
#endif
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
/*
* convert ssh auth msg type into description
*/
char *
get_authname(int type)
{
static char buf[1024];
switch (type) {
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD:
return "password";
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA:
return "rsa";
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA:
return "rhosts-rsa";
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS:
return "rhosts";
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS:
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE:
return "challenge-response";
#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS:
return "kerberos";
#endif
}
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "bad-auth-msg-%d", type);
return buf;
}
/*
* read packets, try to authenticate the user and
* return only if authentication is successful
*/
void
do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
int authenticated = 0;
u_int bits;
RSA *client_host_key;
BIGNUM *n;
char *client_user, *password;
char info[1024];
u_int dlen;
int plen, nlen, elen;
u_int ulen;
int type = 0;
struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
login_cap_t *lc;
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
#ifdef USE_PAM
struct inverted_pam_cookie *pam_cookie;
#endif /* USE_PAM */
#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) || defined(LOGIN_ACCESS)
const char *from_host, *from_ip;
from_host = get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check);
from_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP || LOGIN_ACCESS */
#if 0
#ifdef KRB5
{
krb5_error_code ret;
ret = krb5_init_context(&ssh_context);
if (ret)
verbose("Error while initializing Kerberos V5.");
krb5_init_ets(ssh_context);
}
#endif /* KRB5 */
#endif
debug("Attempting authentication for %s%.100s.",
authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ", authctxt->user);
/* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */
if (options.password_authentication &&
#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
(!options.kerberos_authentication
#if defined(KRB4)
|| options.krb4_or_local_passwd
#endif
) &&
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
auth_pam_password(authctxt, "")
#else
auth_password(authctxt, "")
#endif
) {
auth_log(authctxt, 1, "without authentication", "");
return;
}
/* Indicate that authentication is needed. */
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
client_user = NULL;
for (;;) {
/* default to fail */
authenticated = 0;
info[0] = '\0';
/* Get a packet from the client. */
type = packet_read(&plen);
/* Process the packet. */
switch (type) {
#ifdef AFS
#ifndef KRB5
case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT:
if (!options.krb4_tgt_passing) {
/* packet_get_all(); */
verbose("Kerberos v4 tgt passing disabled.");
break;
} else {
/* Accept Kerberos v4 tgt. */
char *tgt = packet_get_string(&dlen);
packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
if (!auth_krb4_tgt(pw, tgt))
verbose("Kerberos v4 tgt REFUSED for %.100ss", authctxt->user);
xfree(tgt);
}
continue;
#endif /* !KRB5 */
case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN:
if (!options.afs_token_passing || !k_hasafs()) {
verbose("AFS token passing disabled.");
break;
} else {
/* Accept AFS token. */
char *token_string = packet_get_string(&dlen);
packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
if (!auth_afs_token(pw, token_string))
verbose("AFS token REFUSED for %.100s", authctxt->user);
xfree(token_string);
}
continue;
#endif /* AFS */
#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS:
if (!options.kerberos_authentication) {
verbose("Kerberos authentication disabled.");
break;
} else {
/* Try Kerberos authentication. */
u_int len;
char *tkt_user = NULL;
char *kdata = packet_get_string(&len);
packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + len, type);
if (!authctxt->valid) {
/* Do nothing. */
} else if (kdata[0] == 4) { /* 4 == KRB_PROT_VERSION */
#ifdef KRB4
KTEXT_ST auth;
auth.length = len;
if (auth.length < MAX_KTXT_LEN)
memcpy(auth.dat, kdata, auth.length);
authenticated = auth_krb4(pw->pw_name, &auth, &tkt_user);
if (authenticated) {
snprintf(info, sizeof info,
" tktuser %.100s", tkt_user);
xfree(tkt_user);
}
#else
verbose("Kerberos v4 authentication disabled.");
#endif /* KRB4 */
} else {
#ifndef KRB5
verbose("Kerberos v5 authentication disabled.");
#else
krb5_data k5data;
k5data.length = len;
k5data.data = kdata;
#if 0
if (krb5_init_context(&ssh_context)) {
verbose("Error while initializing Kerberos V5.");
break;
}
krb5_init_ets(ssh_context);
#endif
/* pw->name is passed just for logging purposes */
if (auth_krb5(pw->pw_name, &k5data, &tkt_client)) {
/* authorize client against .k5login */
if (krb5_kuserok(ssh_context,
tkt_client,
pw->pw_name))
authenticated = 1;
}
#endif /* KRB5 */
}
xfree(kdata);
}
break;
#endif /* KRB4 || KRB5 */
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS:
if (!options.rhosts_authentication) {
verbose("Rhosts authentication disabled.");
break;
}
/*
* Get client user name. Note that we just have to
* trust the client; this is one reason why rhosts
* authentication is insecure. (Another is
* IP-spoofing on a local network.)
*/
client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + ulen, type);
/* Try to authenticate using /etc/hosts.equiv and .rhosts. */
authenticated = auth_rhosts(pw, client_user);
snprintf(info, sizeof info, " ruser %.100s", client_user);
break;
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA:
if (!options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) {
verbose("Rhosts with RSA authentication disabled.");
break;
}
/*
* Get client user name. Note that we just have to
* trust the client; root on the client machine can
* claim to be any user.
*/
client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
/* Get the client host key. */
client_host_key = RSA_new();
if (client_host_key == NULL)
fatal("RSA_new failed");
client_host_key->e = BN_new();
client_host_key->n = BN_new();
if (client_host_key->e == NULL || client_host_key->n == NULL)
fatal("BN_new failed");
bits = packet_get_int();
packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->e, &elen);
packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->n, &nlen);
if (bits != BN_num_bits(client_host_key->n))
verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: "
"actual %d, announced %d", BN_num_bits(client_host_key->n), bits);
packet_integrity_check(plen, (4 + ulen) + 4 + elen + nlen, type);
authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(pw, client_user, client_host_key);
RSA_free(client_host_key);
snprintf(info, sizeof info, " ruser %.100s", client_user);
break;
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA:
if (!options.rsa_authentication) {
verbose("RSA authentication disabled.");
break;
}
/* RSA authentication requested. */
n = BN_new();
packet_get_bignum(n, &nlen);
packet_integrity_check(plen, nlen, type);
authenticated = auth_rsa(pw, n);
BN_clear_free(n);
break;
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD:
if (!options.password_authentication) {
verbose("Password authentication disabled.");
break;
}
/*
* Read user password. It is in plain text, but was
* transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is
* not visible to an outside observer.
*/
password = packet_get_string(&dlen);
packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
#ifdef USE_PAM
/* Do PAM auth with password */
authenticated = auth_pam_password(authctxt, password);
#else /* !USE_PAM */
/* Try authentication with the password. */
authenticated = auth_password(authctxt, password);
#endif /* USE_PAM */
memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
xfree(password);
break;
#ifdef USE_PAM
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS:
debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS: Trying PAM");
pam_cookie = ipam_start_auth("csshd", pw->pw_name);
/* We now have data available to send as a challenge */
if (pam_cookie->num_msg != 1 ||
(pam_cookie->msg[0]->msg_style != PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF &&
pam_cookie->msg[0]->msg_style != PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON)) {
/* We got several challenges or an unknown challenge type */
ipam_free_cookie(pam_cookie);
pam_cookie = NULL;
break;
}
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
packet_put_string(pam_cookie->msg[0]->msg, strlen(pam_cookie->msg[0]->msg));
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
continue;
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE:
debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE");
if (pam_cookie == NULL)
break;
{
char *response = packet_get_string(&dlen);
packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
pam_cookie->resp[0]->resp = strdup(response);
xfree(response);
authenticated = ipam_complete_auth(pam_cookie);
ipam_free_cookie(pam_cookie);
pam_cookie = NULL;
}
break;
#elif defined(SKEY)
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS:
debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS");
if (options.challenge_reponse_authentication == 1) {
char *challenge = get_challenge(authctxt, authctxt->style);
if (challenge != NULL) {
debug("sending challenge '%s'", challenge);
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
packet_put_cstring(challenge);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
continue;
}
}
break;
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE:
debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE");
if (options.challenge_reponse_authentication == 1) {
char *response = packet_get_string(&dlen);
debug("got response '%s'", response);
packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response);
memset(response, 'r', dlen);
xfree(response);
}
break;
#else
case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS:
/* TIS Authentication is unsupported */
log("TIS authentication unsupported.");
break;
#endif
#ifdef KRB5
case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT:
/* Passing krb5 ticket */
if (!options.krb5_tgt_passing
/*|| !options.krb5_authentication */) {
verbose("Kerberos v5 tgt passing disabled.");
break;
}
if (tkt_client == NULL) {
/* passing tgt without krb5 authentication */
}
{
krb5_data tgt;
u_int tgtlen;
tgt.data = packet_get_string(&tgtlen);
tgt.length = tgtlen;
if (!auth_krb5_tgt(pw->pw_name, &tgt, tkt_client))
verbose ("Kerberos V5 TGT refused for %.100s", pw->pw_name);
xfree(tgt.data);
break;
}
#endif /* KRB5 */
default:
/*
* Any unknown messages will be ignored (and failure
* returned) during authentication.
*/
log("Unknown message during authentication: type %d", type);
break;
}
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (pw != NULL) {
lc = login_getpwclass(pw);
if (lc == NULL)
lc = login_getclassbyname(NULL, pw);
if (!auth_hostok(lc, from_host, from_ip)) {
log("Denied connection for %.200s from %.200s [%.200s].",
pw->pw_name, from_host, from_ip);
packet_disconnect("Sorry, you are not allowed to connect.");
}
if (!auth_timeok(lc, time(NULL))) {
log("LOGIN %.200s REFUSED (TIME) FROM %.200s",
pw->pw_name, from_host);
packet_disconnect("Logins not available right now.");
}
login_close(lc);
lc = NULL;
}
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
#ifdef LOGIN_ACCESS
if (pw != NULL && !login_access(pw->pw_name, from_host)) {
log("Denied connection for %.200s from %.200s [%.200s].",
pw->pw_name, from_host, from_ip);
packet_disconnect("Sorry, you are not allowed to connect.");
}
#endif /* LOGIN_ACCESS */
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
if (authctxt->as) {
auth_close(authctxt->as);
authctxt->as = NULL;
}
#endif
if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
authctxt->user);
/* Special handling for root */
if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
!auth_root_allowed(get_authname(type)))
authenticated = 0;
if (pw != NULL && pw->pw_uid == 0)
log("ROOT LOGIN as '%.100s' from %.100s",
pw->pw_name,
get_canonical_hostname(options.reverse_mapping_check));
/* Log before sending the reply */
auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, get_authname(type), info);
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (authenticated && !do_pam_account(pw->pw_name, client_user))
authenticated = 0;
#endif
if (client_user != NULL) {
xfree(client_user);
client_user = NULL;
}
if (authenticated)
return;
if (authctxt->failures++ > AUTH_FAIL_MAX)
packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user);
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
}
}
/*
* Performs authentication of an incoming connection. Session key has already
* been exchanged and encryption is enabled.
*/
void
do_authentication()
{
Authctxt *authctxt;
struct passwd *pw;
int plen;
u_int ulen;
char *user, *style = NULL;
/* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_USER);
/* Get the user name. */
user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
packet_integrity_check(plen, (4 + ulen), SSH_CMSG_USER);
if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
*style++ = 0;
authctxt = authctxt_new();
authctxt->user = user;
authctxt->style = style;
/* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
pw = getpwnam(user);
if (pw && allowed_user(pw)) {
authctxt->valid = 1;
pw = pwcopy(pw);
} else {
debug("do_authentication: illegal user %s", user);
pw = NULL;
}
authctxt->pw = pw;
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (pw != NULL)
start_pam(pw);
#endif
setproctitle("%s", pw ? user : "unknown");
/*
* If we are not running as root, the user must have the same uid as
* the server.
*/
if (getuid() != 0 && pw && pw->pw_uid != getuid())
packet_disconnect("Cannot change user when server not running as root.");
/*
* Loop until the user has been authenticated or the connection is
* closed, do_authloop() returns only if authentication is successful
*/
do_authloop(authctxt);
/* The user has been authenticated and accepted. */
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
/* Perform session preparation. */
do_authenticated(authctxt);
}
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