Release notes are available at https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-9.1 9.1 contains fixes for three minor memory safety problems; these have lready been merged to the copy of OpenSSH 9.0 that is in the FreeBSD base system. Some highlights copied from the release notes: Potentially-incompatible changes -------------------------------- * ssh(1), sshd(8): SetEnv directives in ssh_config and sshd_config are now first-match-wins to match other directives. Previously if an environment variable was multiply specified the last set value would have been used. bz3438 * ssh-keygen(8): ssh-keygen -A (generate all default host key types) will no longer generate DSA keys, as these are insecure and have not been used by default for some years. New features ------------ * ssh(1), sshd(8): add a RequiredRSASize directive to set a minimum RSA key length. Keys below this length will be ignored for user authentication and for host authentication in sshd(8). * sftp-server(8): add a "users-groups-by-id@openssh.com" extension request that allows the client to obtain user/group names that correspond to a set of uids/gids. * sftp(1): use "users-groups-by-id@openssh.com" sftp-server extension (when available) to fill in user/group names for directory listings. * sftp-server(8): support the "home-directory" extension request defined in draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00. This overlaps a bit with the existing "expand-path@openssh.com", but some other clients support it. * ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): allow certificate validity intervals, sshsig verification times and authorized_keys expiry-time options to accept dates in the UTC time zone in addition to the default of interpreting them in the system time zone. YYYYMMDD and YYMMDDHHMM[SS] dates/times will be interpreted as UTC if suffixed with a 'Z' character. Also allow certificate validity intervals to be specified in raw seconds-since-epoch as hex value, e.g. -V 0x1234:0x4567890. This is intended for use by regress tests and other tools that call ssh-keygen as part of a CA workflow. bz3468 * sftp(1): allow arguments to the sftp -D option, e.g. sftp -D "/usr/libexec/sftp-server -el debug3" * ssh-keygen(1): allow the existing -U (use agent) flag to work with "-Y sign" operations, where it will be interpreted to require that the private keys is hosted in an agent; bz3429 MFC after: 2 weeks Relnotes: Yes Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
161 lines
4.1 KiB
C
161 lines
4.1 KiB
C
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ed25519.c,v 1.10 2022/08/26 08:12:56 djm Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2013 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
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* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
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* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
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* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include "crypto_api.h"
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#include <string.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include "log.h"
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#include "sshbuf.h"
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#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
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#include "sshkey.h"
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#include "ssherr.h"
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#include "ssh.h"
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int
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ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
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const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
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{
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u_char *sig = NULL;
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size_t slen = 0, len;
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unsigned long long smlen;
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int r, ret;
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struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
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if (lenp != NULL)
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*lenp = 0;
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if (sigp != NULL)
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*sigp = NULL;
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if (key == NULL ||
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sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 ||
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key->ed25519_sk == NULL ||
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datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES)
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return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
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smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES;
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if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
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return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
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if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519(sig, &smlen, data, datalen,
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key->ed25519_sk)) != 0 || smlen <= datalen) {
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r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* XXX better error? */
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goto out;
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}
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/* encode signature */
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if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
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r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
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goto out;
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}
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if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-ed25519")) != 0 ||
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(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, smlen - datalen)) != 0)
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goto out;
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len = sshbuf_len(b);
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if (sigp != NULL) {
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if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
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r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
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goto out;
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}
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memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
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}
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if (lenp != NULL)
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*lenp = len;
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/* success */
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r = 0;
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out:
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sshbuf_free(b);
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if (sig != NULL)
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freezero(sig, slen);
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return r;
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}
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int
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ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
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const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
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const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
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{
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struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
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char *ktype = NULL;
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const u_char *sigblob;
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u_char *sm = NULL, *m = NULL;
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size_t len;
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unsigned long long smlen = 0, mlen = 0;
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int r, ret;
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if (key == NULL ||
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sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 ||
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key->ed25519_pk == NULL ||
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datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
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signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
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return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
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if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
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return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
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if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL)) != 0 ||
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(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &sigblob, &len)) != 0)
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goto out;
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if (strcmp("ssh-ed25519", ktype) != 0) {
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r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
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goto out;
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}
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if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
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r = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
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goto out;
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}
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if (len > crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) {
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r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
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goto out;
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}
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if (datalen >= SIZE_MAX - len) {
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r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
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goto out;
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}
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smlen = len + datalen;
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mlen = smlen;
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if ((sm = malloc(smlen)) == NULL || (m = malloc(mlen)) == NULL) {
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r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
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goto out;
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}
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memcpy(sm, sigblob, len);
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memcpy(sm+len, data, datalen);
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if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519_open(m, &mlen, sm, smlen,
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key->ed25519_pk)) != 0) {
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debug2_f("crypto_sign_ed25519_open failed: %d", ret);
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}
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if (ret != 0 || mlen != datalen) {
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r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
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goto out;
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}
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/* XXX compare 'm' and 'data' ? */
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/* success */
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r = 0;
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out:
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if (sm != NULL)
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freezero(sm, smlen);
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if (m != NULL)
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freezero(m, smlen); /* NB mlen may be invalid if r != 0 */
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sshbuf_free(b);
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free(ktype);
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return r;
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}
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