freebsd-dev/sys/security/mac_seeotheruids/mac_seeotheruids.c
Robert Watson 5c8dd34218 Move to C99 sparse structure initialization for the mac_policy_ops
structure definition, rather than using an operation vector
we translate into the structure.  Originally, we used a vector
for two reasons:

(1) We wanted to define the structure sparsely, which wasn't
    supported by the C compiler for structures.  For a policy
    with five entry points, you don't want to have to stick in
    a few hundred NULL function pointers.

(2) We thought it would improve ABI compatibility allowing modules
    to work with kernels that had a superset of the entry points
    defined in the module, even if the kernel had changed its
    entry point set.

Both of these no longer apply:

(1) C99 gives us a way to sparsely define a static structure.

(2) The ABI problems existed anyway, due to enumeration numbers,
    argument changes, and semantic mismatches.  Since the going
    rule for FreeBSD is that you really need your modules to
    pretty closely match your kernel, it's not worth the
    complexity.

This submit eliminates the operation vector, dynamic allocation
of the operation structure, copying of the vector to the
structure, and redoes the vectors in each policy to direct
structure definitions.  One enourmous benefit of this change
is that we now get decent type checking on policy entry point
implementation arguments.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-30 18:48:51 +00:00

174 lines
5.4 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Robert N. M. Watson
* Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
*
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by NAI Labs,
* the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under
* DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA
* CHATS research program.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior written
* permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $FreeBSD$
*/
/*
* Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
* Prevent processes owned by a particular uid from seeing various transient
* kernel objects associated with other uids.
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/conf.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/mac.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
#include <sys/sysent.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <net/bpfdesc.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <net/if_types.h>
#include <net/if_var.h>
#include <vm/vm.h>
#include <sys/mac_policy.h>
SYSCTL_DECL(_security_mac);
SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, seeotheruids, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
"TrustedBSD mac_seeotheruids policy controls");
static int mac_seeotheruids_enabled = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_seeotheruids, OID_AUTO, enabled, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_seeotheruids_enabled, 0, "Enforce seeotheruids policy");
/*
* Exception: allow credentials to be aware of other credentials with the
* same primary gid.
*/
static int primarygroup_enabled = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_seeotheruids, OID_AUTO, primarygroup_enabled,
CTLFLAG_RW, &primarygroup_enabled, 0, "Make an exception for credentials "
"with the same real primary group id");
/*
* Exception: allow processes with a specific gid to be exempt from the
* policy. One sysctl enables this functionality; the other sets the
* exempt gid.
*/
static int specificgid_enabled = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_seeotheruids, OID_AUTO, specificgid_enabled,
CTLFLAG_RW, &specificgid_enabled, 0, "Make an exception for credentials "
"with a specific gid as their real primary group id or group set");
static gid_t specificgid = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_seeotheruids, OID_AUTO, specificgid, CTLFLAG_RW,
&specificgid, 0, "Specific gid to be exempt from seeotheruids policy");
static int
mac_seeotheruids_check(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2)
{
if (!mac_seeotheruids_enabled)
return (0);
if (primarygroup_enabled) {
if (u1->cr_rgid == u2->cr_rgid)
return (0);
}
if (specificgid_enabled) {
if (u1->cr_rgid == specificgid || groupmember(specificgid, u1))
return (0);
}
if (u1->cr_ruid == u2->cr_ruid)
return (0);
return (ESRCH);
}
static int
mac_seeotheruids_check_cred_visible(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2)
{
return (mac_seeotheruids_check(u1, u2));
}
static int
mac_seeotheruids_check_proc_signal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc,
int signum)
{
return (mac_seeotheruids_check(cred, proc->p_ucred));
}
static int
mac_seeotheruids_check_proc_sched(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc)
{
return (mac_seeotheruids_check(cred, proc->p_ucred));
}
static int
mac_seeotheruids_check_proc_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc)
{
return (mac_seeotheruids_check(cred, proc->p_ucred));
}
static int
mac_seeotheruids_check_socket_visible(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket,
struct label *socketlabel)
{
return (mac_seeotheruids_check(cred, socket->so_cred));
}
static struct mac_policy_ops mac_seeotheruids_ops =
{
.mpo_check_cred_visible = mac_seeotheruids_check_cred_visible,
.mpo_check_proc_debug = mac_seeotheruids_check_proc_debug,
.mpo_check_proc_sched = mac_seeotheruids_check_proc_sched,
.mpo_check_proc_signal = mac_seeotheruids_check_proc_signal,
.mpo_check_socket_visible = mac_seeotheruids_check_socket_visible,
};
MAC_POLICY_SET(&mac_seeotheruids_ops, trustedbsd_mac_seeotheruids,
"TrustedBSD MAC/seeotheruids", MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK, NULL);