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freebsd-dev/sys/security/audit/audit_private.h
Robert Watson e257c20ec1 Introduce support for per-audit pipe preselection independent from the 
global audit trail configuration.  This allows applications consuming
audit trails to specify parameters for which audit records are of
interest, including selecting records not required by the global trail.
Allowing application interest specification without changing the global
configuration allows intrusion detection systems to run without
interfering with global auditing or each other (if multiple are
present).  To implement this:

- Kernel audit records now carry a flag to indicate whether they have
  been selected by the global trail or by the audit pipe subsystem,
  set during record commit, so that this information is available
  after BSM conversion when delivering the BSM to the trail and audit
  pipes in the audit worker thread asynchronously.  Preselection by
  either record target will cause the record to be kept.

- Similar changes to preselection when the audit record is created
  when the system call is entering: consult both the global trail and
  pipes.

- au_preselect() now accepts the class in order to avoid repeatedly
  looking up the mask for each preselection test.

- Define a series of ioctls that allow applications to specify whether
  they want to track the global trail, or program their own
  preselection parameters: they may specify their own flags and naflags
  masks, similar to the global masks of the same name, as well as a set
  of per-auid masks.  They also set a per-pipe mode specifying whether
  they track the global trail, or user their own -- the door is left
  open for future additional modes.  A new ioctl is defined to allow a
  user process to flush the current audit pipe queue, which can be used
  after reprogramming pre-selection to make sure that only records of
  interest are received in future reads.

- Audit pipe data structures are extended to hold the additional fields
  necessary to support preselection.  By default, audit pipes track the
  global trail, so "praudit /dev/auditpipe" will track the global audit
  trail even though praudit doesn't program the audit pipe selection
  model.

- Comment about the complexities of potentially adding partial read
  support to audit pipes.

By using a set of ioctls, applications can select which records are of
interest, and toggle the preselection mode.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-06-05 14:48:17 +00:00

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/*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2005 Apple Computer, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of Apple Computer, Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of
* its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
* from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
* IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $FreeBSD$
*/
/*
* This include file contains function prototypes and type definitions used
* within the audit implementation.
*/
#ifndef _SECURITY_AUDIT_PRIVATE_H_
#define _SECURITY_AUDIT_PRIVATE_H_
#ifndef _KERNEL
#error "no user-serviceable parts inside"
#endif
#include <sys/ipc.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/ucred.h>
#ifdef MALLOC_DECLARE
MALLOC_DECLARE(M_AUDITBSM);
MALLOC_DECLARE(M_AUDITDATA);
MALLOC_DECLARE(M_AUDITPATH);
MALLOC_DECLARE(M_AUDITTEXT);
#endif
/*
* The AUDIT_EXCESSIVELY_VERBOSE define enables a number of gratuitously
* noisy printf's to the console. Due to the volume, it should be left off
* unless you want your system to churn a lot whenever the audit record flow
* gets high.
*/
//#define AUDIT_EXCESSIVELY_VERBOSE
#ifdef AUDIT_EXCESSIVELY_VERBOSE
#define AUDIT_PRINTF(x) printf x
#else
#define AUDIT_PRINTF(x)
#endif
/*
* Audit control variables that are usually set/read via system calls and
* used to control various aspects of auditing.
*/
extern struct au_qctrl audit_qctrl;
extern struct audit_fstat audit_fstat;
extern struct au_mask audit_nae_mask;
extern int audit_panic_on_write_fail;
extern int audit_fail_stop;
/*
* Success/failure conditions for the conversion of a kernel audit record to
* BSM format.
*/
#define BSM_SUCCESS 0
#define BSM_FAILURE 1
#define BSM_NOAUDIT 2
/*
* Defines for the kernel audit record k_ar_commit field. Flags are set to
* indicate what sort of record it is, and which preselection mechanism
* selected it.
*/
#define AR_COMMIT_KERNEL 0x00000001U
#define AR_COMMIT_USER 0x00000010U
#define AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL 0x00001000U
#define AR_PRESELECT_PIPE 0x00002000U
/*
* Audit data is generated as a stream of struct audit_record structures,
* linked by struct kaudit_record, and contain storage for possible audit so
* that it will not need to be allocated during the processing of a system
* call, both improving efficiency and avoiding sleeping at untimely moments.
* This structure is converted to BSM format before being written to disk.
*/
struct vnode_au_info {
mode_t vn_mode;
uid_t vn_uid;
gid_t vn_gid;
dev_t vn_dev;
long vn_fsid;
long vn_fileid;
long vn_gen;
};
struct groupset {
gid_t gidset[NGROUPS];
u_int gidset_size;
};
struct socket_au_info {
int so_domain;
int so_type;
int so_protocol;
in_addr_t so_raddr; /* Remote address if INET socket. */
in_addr_t so_laddr; /* Local address if INET socket. */
u_short so_rport; /* Remote port. */
u_short so_lport; /* Local port. */
};
union auditon_udata {
char *au_path;
long au_cond;
long au_flags;
long au_policy;
int au_trigger;
au_evclass_map_t au_evclass;
au_mask_t au_mask;
auditinfo_t au_auinfo;
auditpinfo_t au_aupinfo;
auditpinfo_addr_t au_aupinfo_addr;
au_qctrl_t au_qctrl;
au_stat_t au_stat;
au_fstat_t au_fstat;
};
struct posix_ipc_perm {
uid_t pipc_uid;
gid_t pipc_gid;
mode_t pipc_mode;
};
struct audit_record {
/* Audit record header. */
u_int32_t ar_magic;
int ar_event;
int ar_retval; /* value returned to the process */
int ar_errno; /* return status of system call */
struct timespec ar_starttime;
struct timespec ar_endtime;
u_int64_t ar_valid_arg; /* Bitmask of valid arguments */
/* Audit subject information. */
struct xucred ar_subj_cred;
uid_t ar_subj_ruid;
gid_t ar_subj_rgid;
gid_t ar_subj_egid;
uid_t ar_subj_auid; /* Audit user ID */
pid_t ar_subj_asid; /* Audit session ID */
pid_t ar_subj_pid;
struct au_tid ar_subj_term;
char ar_subj_comm[MAXCOMLEN + 1];
struct au_mask ar_subj_amask;
/* Operation arguments. */
uid_t ar_arg_euid;
uid_t ar_arg_ruid;
uid_t ar_arg_suid;
gid_t ar_arg_egid;
gid_t ar_arg_rgid;
gid_t ar_arg_sgid;
pid_t ar_arg_pid;
pid_t ar_arg_asid;
struct au_tid ar_arg_termid;
uid_t ar_arg_uid;
uid_t ar_arg_auid;
gid_t ar_arg_gid;
struct groupset ar_arg_groups;
int ar_arg_fd;
int ar_arg_fflags;
mode_t ar_arg_mode;
int ar_arg_dev;
long ar_arg_value;
void * ar_arg_addr;
int ar_arg_len;
int ar_arg_mask;
u_int ar_arg_signum;
char ar_arg_login[MAXLOGNAME];
int ar_arg_ctlname[CTL_MAXNAME];
struct sockaddr ar_arg_sockaddr;
struct socket_au_info ar_arg_sockinfo;
char *ar_arg_upath1;
char *ar_arg_upath2;
char *ar_arg_text;
struct au_mask ar_arg_amask;
struct vnode_au_info ar_arg_vnode1;
struct vnode_au_info ar_arg_vnode2;
int ar_arg_cmd;
int ar_arg_svipc_cmd;
struct ipc_perm ar_arg_svipc_perm;
int ar_arg_svipc_id;
void * ar_arg_svipc_addr;
struct posix_ipc_perm ar_arg_pipc_perm;
union auditon_udata ar_arg_auditon;
int ar_arg_exitstatus;
int ar_arg_exitretval;
};
/*
* Arguments in the audit record are initially not defined; flags are set to
* indicate if they are present so they can be included in the audit log
* stream only if defined.
*/
#define ARG_IS_VALID(kar, arg) ((kar)->k_ar.ar_valid_arg & (arg))
#define ARG_SET_VALID(kar, arg) do { \
(kar)->k_ar.ar_valid_arg |= (arg); \
} while (0)
/*
* In-kernel version of audit record; the basic record plus queue meta-data.
* This record can also have a pointer set to some opaque data that will be
* passed through to the audit writing mechanism.
*/
struct kaudit_record {
struct audit_record k_ar;
u_int32_t k_ar_commit;
void *k_udata; /* User data. */
u_int k_ulen; /* User data length. */
struct uthread *k_uthread; /* Audited thread. */
TAILQ_ENTRY(kaudit_record) k_q;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(kaudit_queue, kaudit_record);
/*
* Functions to manage the allocation, release, and commit of kernel audit
* records.
*/
void audit_abort(struct kaudit_record *ar);
void audit_commit(struct kaudit_record *ar, int error,
int retval);
struct kaudit_record *audit_new(int event, struct thread *td);
/*
* Functions relating to the conversion of internal kernel audit records to
* the BSM file format.
*/
struct au_record;
int kaudit_to_bsm(struct kaudit_record *kar, struct au_record **pau);
int bsm_rec_verify(void *rec);
/*
* Kernel versions of the libbsm audit record functions.
*/
void kau_free(struct au_record *rec);
void kau_init(void);
/*
* Return values for pre-selection and post-selection decisions.
*/
#define AU_PRS_SUCCESS 1
#define AU_PRS_FAILURE 2
#define AU_PRS_BOTH (AU_PRS_SUCCESS|AU_PRS_FAILURE)
/*
* Data structures relating to the kernel audit queue. Ideally, these might
* be abstracted so that only accessor methods are exposed.
*/
extern struct mtx audit_mtx;
extern struct cv audit_watermark_cv;
extern struct cv audit_worker_cv;
extern struct kaudit_queue audit_q;
extern int audit_q_len;
extern int audit_pre_q_len;
extern int audit_in_failure;
/*
* Flags to use on audit files when opening and closing.
*/
#define AUDIT_OPEN_FLAGS (FWRITE | O_APPEND)
#define AUDIT_CLOSE_FLAGS (FWRITE | O_APPEND)
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
/*
* Some of the BSM tokenizer functions take different parameters in the
* kernel implementations in order to save the copying of large kernel data
* structures. The prototypes of these functions are declared here.
*/
token_t *kau_to_socket(struct socket_au_info *soi);
/*
* audit_klib prototypes
*/
int au_preselect(au_event_t event, au_class_t class,
au_mask_t *mask_p, int sorf);
au_event_t flags_and_error_to_openevent(int oflags, int error);
void au_evclassmap_init(void);
void au_evclassmap_insert(au_event_t event, au_class_t class);
au_class_t au_event_class(au_event_t event);
au_event_t ctlname_to_sysctlevent(int name[], uint64_t valid_arg);
int auditon_command_event(int cmd);
int msgctl_to_event(int cmd);
int semctl_to_event(int cmr);
void canon_path(struct thread *td, char *path, char *cpath);
/*
* Audit trigger events notify user space of kernel audit conditions
* asynchronously.
*/
void audit_trigger_init(void);
int send_trigger(unsigned int trigger);
/*
* General audit related functions.
*/
struct kaudit_record *currecord(void);
void audit_free(struct kaudit_record *ar);
void audit_shutdown(void *arg, int howto);
void audit_rotate_vnode(struct ucred *cred,
struct vnode *vp);
void audit_worker_init(void);
/*
* Audit pipe functions.
*/
int audit_pipe_preselect(au_id_t auid, au_event_t event,
au_class_t class, int sorf, int trail_select);
void audit_pipe_submit(au_id_t auid, au_event_t event, au_class_t class,
int sorf, int trail_select, void *record, u_int record_len);
void audit_pipe_submit_user(void *record, u_int record_len);
#endif /* ! _SECURITY_AUDIT_PRIVATE_H_ */
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