freebsd-dev/lib/libsecureboot/h/verify_file.h
Simon J. Gerraty 666554111a Update libsecureboot
Preparation for updating bearssl, pull in updates to libsecureboot.

o fix handling of some out-of-memory cases

o allow more control over reporting of Verified/Unverified files.
  this helps boot time when console output is slow

  o recheck verbose/debug level after reading any unverified file

o more debug support for vectx

o hash_string to support fake stat for tftp

o tests/tvo add -v to simply verify signatures

o vets.c allow for HAVE_BR_X509_TIME_CHECK which will greatly simplify
  verification in loader

o report date when certificate fails validity period checks

Reviewed by: stevek
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks, Inc.
2022-04-18 12:54:15 -07:00

67 lines
2.8 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 2017-2018, Juniper Networks, Inc.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
* "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
* A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
* OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef _VERIFY_FILE_H_
#define _VERIFY_FILE_H_
#define VE_GUESS -1 /* let verify_file work it out */
#define VE_TRY 0 /* we don't mind if unverified */
#define VE_WANT 1 /* we want this verified */
#define VE_MUST 2 /* this must be verified */
#define VE_NOT_CHECKED -42
#define VE_VERIFIED 1 /* all good */
#define VE_UNVERIFIED_OK 0 /* not verified but that's ok */
#define VE_NOT_VERIFYING 2 /* we are not verifying */
/* suitable buf size for hash_string */
#ifndef SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
# define SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH 20
#endif
struct stat;
int verify_prep(int, const char *, off_t, struct stat *, const char *);
void ve_debug_set(int);
char *ve_error_get(void);
void ve_efi_init(void);
int ve_status_get(int);
int load_manifest(const char *, const char *, const char *, struct stat *);
int pass_manifest(const char *, const char *);
int pass_manifest_export_envs(void);
void verify_report(const char *, int, int, struct stat *);
int verify_file(int, const char *, off_t, int, const char *);
void verify_pcr_export(void);
int hash_string(char *s, size_t n, char *buf, size_t bufsz);
int is_verified(struct stat *);
void add_verify_status(struct stat *, int);
struct vectx;
struct vectx* vectx_open(int, const char *, off_t, struct stat *, int *, const char *);
ssize_t vectx_read(struct vectx *, void *, size_t);
off_t vectx_lseek(struct vectx *, off_t, int);
int vectx_close(struct vectx *, int, const char *);
#endif /* _VERIFY_FILE_H_ */