b0fefb25c5
The current approach of injecting manifest into mac_veriexec is to verify the integrity of it in userspace (veriexec (8)) and pass its entries into kernel using a char device (/dev/veriexec). This requires verifying root partition integrity in loader, for example by using memory disk and checking its hash. Otherwise if rootfs is compromised an attacker could inject their own data. This patch introduces an option to parse manifest in kernel based on envs. The loader sets manifest path and digest. EVENTHANDLER is used to launch the module right after the rootfs is mounted. It has to be done this way, since one might want to verify integrity of the init file. This means that manifest is required to be present on the root partition. Note that the envs have to be set right before boot to make sure that no one can spoof them. Submitted by: Kornel Duleba <mindal@semihalf.com> Reviewed by: sjg Obtained from: Semihalf Sponsored by: Stormshield Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19281
66 lines
2.5 KiB
C
66 lines
2.5 KiB
C
/*-
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* Copyright (c) 2017, Juniper Networks, Inc.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
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* "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
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* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
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* A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
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* OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
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* LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
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* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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/*
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* $FreeBSD$
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*/
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#ifndef _LIBSECUREBOOT_PRIV_H_
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#define _LIBSECUREBOOT_PRIV_H_
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/* public api */
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#include "libsecureboot.h"
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struct stat;
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typedef struct {
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unsigned char *data;
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size_t hash_size;
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} hash_data;
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size_t ve_trust_anchors_add(br_x509_certificate *, size_t);
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size_t ve_forbidden_anchors_add(br_x509_certificate *, size_t);
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void ve_forbidden_digest_add(hash_data *digest, size_t);
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char *fingerprint_info_lookup(int, const char *);
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br_x509_certificate * parse_certificates(unsigned char *, size_t, size_t *);
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int certificate_to_trust_anchor_inner(br_x509_trust_anchor *,
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br_x509_certificate *);
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int verify_rsa_digest(br_rsa_public_key *pkey,
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const unsigned char *hash_oid,
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unsigned char *mdata, size_t mlen,
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unsigned char *sdata, size_t slen);
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int is_verified(struct stat *stp);
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void add_verify_status(struct stat *stp, int status);
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int openpgp_self_tests(void);
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int efi_secure_boot_enabled(void);
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br_x509_certificate* efi_get_trusted_certs(size_t *count);
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br_x509_certificate* efi_get_forbidden_certs(size_t *count);
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hash_data* efi_get_forbidden_digests(size_t *count);
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#endif /* _LIBSECUREBOOT_PRIV_H_ */
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