freebsd-dev/sys/dev/random/fortuna.c
Conrad Meyer 878a05a4e6 random(4): Remove "EXPERIMENTAL" verbiage from concurrent operation
No functional change.

Add a verbose comment giving an example side-by-side comparison between the
prior and Concurrent modes of Fortuna, and why one should believe they
produce the same result.

The intent is to flip this on by default prior to 13.0, so testing is
encouraged.  To enable, add the following to loader.conf:

    kern.random.fortuna.concurrent_read="1"

The intent is also to flip the default blockcipher to the faster Chacha-20
prior to 13.0, so testing of that mode of operation is also appreciated.
To enable, add the following to loader.conf:

    kern.random.use_chacha20_cipher="1"

Approved by:	secteam(implicit)
2019-08-15 00:39:53 +00:00

817 lines
27 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 2017 W. Dean Freeman
* Copyright (c) 2013-2015 Mark R V Murray
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
* in this position and unchanged.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
/*
* This implementation of Fortuna is based on the descriptions found in
* ISBN 978-0-470-47424-2 "Cryptography Engineering" by Ferguson, Schneier
* and Kohno ("FS&K").
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/limits.h>
#ifdef _KERNEL
#include <sys/fail.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/random.h>
#include <sys/sdt.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <machine/cpu.h>
#else /* !_KERNEL */
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <threads.h>
#include "unit_test.h"
#endif /* _KERNEL */
#include <crypto/chacha20/chacha.h>
#include <crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.h>
#include <crypto/sha2/sha256.h>
#include <dev/random/hash.h>
#include <dev/random/randomdev.h>
#ifdef _KERNEL
#include <dev/random/random_harvestq.h>
#endif
#include <dev/random/uint128.h>
#include <dev/random/fortuna.h>
/* Defined in FS&K */
#define RANDOM_FORTUNA_NPOOLS 32 /* The number of accumulation pools */
#define RANDOM_FORTUNA_DEFPOOLSIZE 64 /* The default pool size/length for a (re)seed */
#define RANDOM_FORTUNA_MAX_READ (1 << 20) /* Max bytes from AES before rekeying */
#define RANDOM_FORTUNA_BLOCKS_PER_KEY (1 << 16) /* Max blocks from AES before rekeying */
CTASSERT(RANDOM_FORTUNA_BLOCKS_PER_KEY * RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE ==
RANDOM_FORTUNA_MAX_READ);
/*
* The allowable range of RANDOM_FORTUNA_DEFPOOLSIZE. The default value is above.
* Making RANDOM_FORTUNA_DEFPOOLSIZE too large will mean a long time between reseeds,
* and too small may compromise initial security but get faster reseeds.
*/
#define RANDOM_FORTUNA_MINPOOLSIZE 16
#define RANDOM_FORTUNA_MAXPOOLSIZE INT_MAX
CTASSERT(RANDOM_FORTUNA_MINPOOLSIZE <= RANDOM_FORTUNA_DEFPOOLSIZE);
CTASSERT(RANDOM_FORTUNA_DEFPOOLSIZE <= RANDOM_FORTUNA_MAXPOOLSIZE);
/* This algorithm (and code) presumes that RANDOM_KEYSIZE is twice as large as RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE */
CTASSERT(RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE == sizeof(uint128_t));
CTASSERT(RANDOM_KEYSIZE == 2*RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE);
/* Probes for dtrace(1) */
#ifdef _KERNEL
SDT_PROVIDER_DECLARE(random);
SDT_PROVIDER_DEFINE(random);
SDT_PROBE_DEFINE2(random, fortuna, event_processor, debug, "u_int", "struct fs_pool *");
#endif /* _KERNEL */
/*
* This is the beastie that needs protecting. It contains all of the
* state that we are excited about. Exactly one is instantiated.
*/
static struct fortuna_state {
struct fs_pool { /* P_i */
u_int fsp_length; /* Only the first one is used by Fortuna */
struct randomdev_hash fsp_hash;
} fs_pool[RANDOM_FORTUNA_NPOOLS];
u_int fs_reseedcount; /* ReseedCnt */
uint128_t fs_counter; /* C */
union randomdev_key fs_key; /* K */
u_int fs_minpoolsize; /* Extras */
/* Extras for the OS */
#ifdef _KERNEL
/* For use when 'pacing' the reseeds */
sbintime_t fs_lasttime;
#endif
/* Reseed lock */
mtx_t fs_mtx;
} fortuna_state;
/*
* This knob enables or disables Concurrent Reads. The plan is to turn it on
* by default sometime before 13.0 branches.
*
* The benefit is improved concurrency in Fortuna. That is reflected in two
* related aspects:
*
* 1. Concurrent devrandom readers can achieve similar throughput to a single
* reader thread.
*
* 2. The rand_harvestq process spends much less time spinning when one or more
* readers is processing a large request. Partially this is due to
* rand_harvestq / ra_event_processor design, which only passes one event at
* a time to the underlying algorithm. Each time, Fortuna must take its
* global state mutex, potentially blocking on a reader. Our adaptive
* mutexes assume that a lock holder currently on CPU will release the lock
* quickly, and spin if the owning thread is currently running.
*
* The concern is that the reduced lock scope might results in a less safe
* random(4) design. However, the reduced-lock scope design is still
* fundamentally Fortuna. This is discussed below.
*
* Fortuna Read() only needs mutual exclusion between readers to correctly
* update the shared read-side state: just C, the 128-bit counter, and K, the
* current cipher key.
*
* In the Fortuna design, the global counter C should provide an independent
* range of values per generator (CTR-mode cipher or similar) invocation.
*
* Under lock, we can save a copy of C on the stack, and increment the global C
* by the number of blocks a Read request will require.
*
* Still under lock, we can save a copy of the key K on the stack, and then
* perform the usual key erasure K' <- Keystream(C, K, ...). This does require
* generating 256 bits (32 bytes) of cryptographic keystream output with the
* global lock held, but that's all; none of the user keystream generation must
* be performed under lock.
*
* At this point, we may unlock.
*
* Some example timelines below (to oversimplify, all requests are in units of
* native blocks, and the keysize happens to be equal or less to the native
* blocksize of the underlying cipher, and the same sequence of two requests
* arrive in the same order). The possibly expensive consumer keystream
* generation portion is marked with '**'.
*
* Status Quo fortuna_read() Reduced-scope locking
* ------------------------- ---------------------
* C=C_0, K=K_0 C=C_0, K=K_0
* <Thr 1 requests N blocks> <Thr 1 requests N blocks>
* 1:Lock() 1:Lock()
* <Thr 2 requests M blocks> <Thr 2 requests M blocks>
* 1:GenBytes() 1:stack_C := C_0
* 1: Keystream(C_0, K_0, N) 1:stack_K := K_0
* 1: <N blocks generated>** 1:C' := C_0 + N
* 1: C' := C_0 + N 1:K' := Keystream(C', K_0, 1)
* 1: <- Keystream 1: <1 block generated>
* 1: K' := Keystream(C', K_0, 1) 1: C'' := C' + 1
* 1: <1 block generated> 1: <- Keystream
* 1: C'' := C' + 1 1:Unlock()
* 1: <- Keystream
* 1: <- GenBytes()
* 1:Unlock()
*
* Just prior to unlock, shared state is identical:
* ------------------------------------------------
* C'' == C_0 + N + 1 C'' == C_0 + N + 1
* K' == keystream generated from K' == keystream generated from
* C_0 + N, K_0. C_0 + N, K_0.
* K_0 has been erased. K_0 has been erased.
*
* After both designs unlock, the 2nd reader is unblocked.
*
* 2:Lock() 2:Lock()
* 2:GenBytes() 2:stack_C' := C''
* 2: Keystream(C'', K', M) 2:stack_K' := K'
* 2: <M blocks generated>** 2:C''' := C'' + M
* 2: C''' := C'' + M 2:K'' := Keystream(C''', K', 1)
* 2: <- Keystream 2: <1 block generated>
* 2: K'' := Keystream(C''', K', 1) 2: C'''' := C''' + 1
* 2: <1 block generated> 2: <- Keystream
* 2: C'''' := C''' + 1 2:Unlock()
* 2: <- Keystream
* 2: <- GenBytes()
* 2:Unlock()
*
* Just prior to unlock, shared state is still identical:
* ------------------------------------------------------
*
* C'''' == (C_0 + N + 1) + M + 1 C'''' == (C_0 + N + 1) + M + 1
* K'' == keystream generated from K'' == keystream generated from
* C_0 + N + 1 + M, K'. C_0 + N + 1 + M, K'.
* K' has been erased. K' has been erased.
*
* Finally, in the new design, the two consumer threads can finish the
* remainder of the generation at any time (including simultaneously):
*
* 1: GenBytes()
* 1: Keystream(stack_C, stack_K, N)
* 1: <N blocks generated>**
* 1: <- Keystream
* 1: <- GenBytes
* 1:ExplicitBzero(stack_C, stack_K)
*
* 2: GenBytes()
* 2: Keystream(stack_C', stack_K', M)
* 2: <M blocks generated>**
* 2: <- Keystream
* 2: <- GenBytes
* 2:ExplicitBzero(stack_C', stack_K')
*
* The generated user keystream for both threads is identical between the two
* implementations:
*
* 1: Keystream(C_0, K_0, N) 1: Keystream(stack_C, stack_K, N)
* 2: Keystream(C'', K', M) 2: Keystream(stack_C', stack_K', M)
*
* (stack_C == C_0; stack_K == K_0; stack_C' == C''; stack_K' == K'.)
*/
static bool fortuna_concurrent_read __read_frequently = false;
#ifdef _KERNEL
static struct sysctl_ctx_list random_clist;
RANDOM_CHECK_UINT(fs_minpoolsize, RANDOM_FORTUNA_MINPOOLSIZE, RANDOM_FORTUNA_MAXPOOLSIZE);
#else
static uint8_t zero_region[RANDOM_ZERO_BLOCKSIZE];
#endif
static void random_fortuna_pre_read(void);
static void random_fortuna_read(uint8_t *, size_t);
static bool random_fortuna_seeded(void);
static bool random_fortuna_seeded_internal(void);
static void random_fortuna_process_event(struct harvest_event *);
static void random_fortuna_init_alg(void *);
static void random_fortuna_deinit_alg(void *);
static void random_fortuna_reseed_internal(uint32_t *entropy_data, u_int blockcount);
struct random_algorithm random_alg_context = {
.ra_ident = "Fortuna",
.ra_init_alg = random_fortuna_init_alg,
.ra_deinit_alg = random_fortuna_deinit_alg,
.ra_pre_read = random_fortuna_pre_read,
.ra_read = random_fortuna_read,
.ra_seeded = random_fortuna_seeded,
.ra_event_processor = random_fortuna_process_event,
.ra_poolcount = RANDOM_FORTUNA_NPOOLS,
};
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
random_fortuna_init_alg(void *unused __unused)
{
int i;
#ifdef _KERNEL
struct sysctl_oid *random_fortuna_o;
#endif
RANDOM_RESEED_INIT_LOCK();
/*
* Fortuna parameters. Do not adjust these unless you have
* have a very good clue about what they do!
*/
fortuna_state.fs_minpoolsize = RANDOM_FORTUNA_DEFPOOLSIZE;
#ifdef _KERNEL
fortuna_state.fs_lasttime = 0;
random_fortuna_o = SYSCTL_ADD_NODE(&random_clist,
SYSCTL_STATIC_CHILDREN(_kern_random),
OID_AUTO, "fortuna", CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
"Fortuna Parameters");
SYSCTL_ADD_PROC(&random_clist,
SYSCTL_CHILDREN(random_fortuna_o), OID_AUTO,
"minpoolsize", CTLTYPE_UINT | CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
&fortuna_state.fs_minpoolsize, RANDOM_FORTUNA_DEFPOOLSIZE,
random_check_uint_fs_minpoolsize, "IU",
"Minimum pool size necessary to cause a reseed");
KASSERT(fortuna_state.fs_minpoolsize > 0, ("random: Fortuna threshold must be > 0 at startup"));
SYSCTL_ADD_BOOL(&random_clist, SYSCTL_CHILDREN(random_fortuna_o),
OID_AUTO, "concurrent_read", CTLFLAG_RDTUN,
&fortuna_concurrent_read, 0, "If non-zero, enable "
"feature to improve concurrent Fortuna performance.");
#endif
/*-
* FS&K - InitializePRNG()
* - P_i = \epsilon
* - ReseedCNT = 0
*/
for (i = 0; i < RANDOM_FORTUNA_NPOOLS; i++) {
randomdev_hash_init(&fortuna_state.fs_pool[i].fsp_hash);
fortuna_state.fs_pool[i].fsp_length = 0;
}
fortuna_state.fs_reseedcount = 0;
/*-
* FS&K - InitializeGenerator()
* - C = 0
* - K = 0
*/
fortuna_state.fs_counter = UINT128_ZERO;
explicit_bzero(&fortuna_state.fs_key, sizeof(fortuna_state.fs_key));
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
random_fortuna_deinit_alg(void *unused __unused)
{
RANDOM_RESEED_DEINIT_LOCK();
explicit_bzero(&fortuna_state, sizeof(fortuna_state));
#ifdef _KERNEL
sysctl_ctx_free(&random_clist);
#endif
}
/*-
* FS&K - AddRandomEvent()
* Process a single stochastic event off the harvest queue
*/
static void
random_fortuna_process_event(struct harvest_event *event)
{
u_int pl;
RANDOM_RESEED_LOCK();
/*-
* FS&K - P_i = P_i|<harvested stuff>
* Accumulate the event into the appropriate pool
* where each event carries the destination information.
*
* The hash_init() and hash_finish() calls are done in
* random_fortuna_pre_read().
*
* We must be locked against pool state modification which can happen
* during accumulation/reseeding and reading/regating.
*/
pl = event->he_destination % RANDOM_FORTUNA_NPOOLS;
/*
* We ignore low entropy static/counter fields towards the end of the
* he_event structure in order to increase measurable entropy when
* conducting SP800-90B entropy analysis measurements of seed material
* fed into PRNG.
* -- wdf
*/
KASSERT(event->he_size <= sizeof(event->he_entropy),
("%s: event->he_size: %hhu > sizeof(event->he_entropy): %zu\n",
__func__, event->he_size, sizeof(event->he_entropy)));
randomdev_hash_iterate(&fortuna_state.fs_pool[pl].fsp_hash,
&event->he_somecounter, sizeof(event->he_somecounter));
randomdev_hash_iterate(&fortuna_state.fs_pool[pl].fsp_hash,
event->he_entropy, event->he_size);
/*-
* Don't wrap the length. This is a "saturating" add.
* XXX: FIX!!: We don't actually need lengths for anything but fs_pool[0],
* but it's been useful debugging to see them all.
*/
fortuna_state.fs_pool[pl].fsp_length = MIN(RANDOM_FORTUNA_MAXPOOLSIZE,
fortuna_state.fs_pool[pl].fsp_length +
sizeof(event->he_somecounter) + event->he_size);
RANDOM_RESEED_UNLOCK();
}
/*-
* FS&K - Reseed()
* This introduces new key material into the output generator.
* Additionally it increments the output generator's counter
* variable C. When C > 0, the output generator is seeded and
* will deliver output.
* The entropy_data buffer passed is a very specific size; the
* product of RANDOM_FORTUNA_NPOOLS and RANDOM_KEYSIZE.
*/
static void
random_fortuna_reseed_internal(uint32_t *entropy_data, u_int blockcount)
{
struct randomdev_hash context;
uint8_t hash[RANDOM_KEYSIZE];
const void *keymaterial;
size_t keysz;
bool seeded;
RANDOM_RESEED_ASSERT_LOCK_OWNED();
seeded = random_fortuna_seeded_internal();
if (seeded) {
randomdev_getkey(&fortuna_state.fs_key, &keymaterial, &keysz);
KASSERT(keysz == RANDOM_KEYSIZE, ("%s: key size %zu not %u",
__func__, keysz, (unsigned)RANDOM_KEYSIZE));
}
/*-
* FS&K - K = Hd(K|s) where Hd(m) is H(H(0^512|m))
* - C = C + 1
*/
randomdev_hash_init(&context);
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, zero_region, RANDOM_ZERO_BLOCKSIZE);
if (seeded)
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, keymaterial, keysz);
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, entropy_data, RANDOM_KEYSIZE*blockcount);
randomdev_hash_finish(&context, hash);
randomdev_hash_init(&context);
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, hash, RANDOM_KEYSIZE);
randomdev_hash_finish(&context, hash);
randomdev_encrypt_init(&fortuna_state.fs_key, hash);
explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
/* Unblock the device if this is the first time we are reseeding. */
if (uint128_is_zero(fortuna_state.fs_counter))
randomdev_unblock();
uint128_increment(&fortuna_state.fs_counter);
}
/*-
* FS&K - RandomData() (Part 1)
* Used to return processed entropy from the PRNG. There is a pre_read
* required to be present (but it can be a stub) in order to allow
* specific actions at the begin of the read.
*/
void
random_fortuna_pre_read(void)
{
#ifdef _KERNEL
sbintime_t now;
#endif
struct randomdev_hash context;
uint32_t s[RANDOM_FORTUNA_NPOOLS*RANDOM_KEYSIZE_WORDS];
uint8_t temp[RANDOM_KEYSIZE];
u_int i;
KASSERT(fortuna_state.fs_minpoolsize > 0, ("random: Fortuna threshold must be > 0"));
RANDOM_RESEED_LOCK();
#ifdef _KERNEL
/* FS&K - Use 'getsbinuptime()' to prevent reseed-spamming. */
now = getsbinuptime();
#endif
if (fortuna_state.fs_pool[0].fsp_length < fortuna_state.fs_minpoolsize
#ifdef _KERNEL
/*
* FS&K - Use 'getsbinuptime()' to prevent reseed-spamming, but do
* not block initial seeding (fs_lasttime == 0).
*/
|| (__predict_true(fortuna_state.fs_lasttime != 0) &&
now - fortuna_state.fs_lasttime <= SBT_1S/10)
#endif
) {
RANDOM_RESEED_UNLOCK();
return;
}
#ifdef _KERNEL
/*
* When set, pretend we do not have enough entropy to reseed yet.
*/
KFAIL_POINT_CODE(DEBUG_FP, random_fortuna_pre_read, {
if (RETURN_VALUE != 0) {
RANDOM_RESEED_UNLOCK();
return;
}
});
#endif
#ifdef _KERNEL
fortuna_state.fs_lasttime = now;
#endif
/* FS&K - ReseedCNT = ReseedCNT + 1 */
fortuna_state.fs_reseedcount++;
/* s = \epsilon at start */
for (i = 0; i < RANDOM_FORTUNA_NPOOLS; i++) {
/* FS&K - if Divides(ReseedCnt, 2^i) ... */
if ((fortuna_state.fs_reseedcount % (1 << i)) == 0) {
/*-
* FS&K - temp = (P_i)
* - P_i = \epsilon
* - s = s|H(temp)
*/
randomdev_hash_finish(&fortuna_state.fs_pool[i].fsp_hash, temp);
randomdev_hash_init(&fortuna_state.fs_pool[i].fsp_hash);
fortuna_state.fs_pool[i].fsp_length = 0;
randomdev_hash_init(&context);
randomdev_hash_iterate(&context, temp, RANDOM_KEYSIZE);
randomdev_hash_finish(&context, s + i*RANDOM_KEYSIZE_WORDS);
} else
break;
}
#ifdef _KERNEL
SDT_PROBE2(random, fortuna, event_processor, debug, fortuna_state.fs_reseedcount, fortuna_state.fs_pool);
#endif
/* FS&K */
random_fortuna_reseed_internal(s, i);
RANDOM_RESEED_UNLOCK();
/* Clean up and secure */
explicit_bzero(s, sizeof(s));
explicit_bzero(temp, sizeof(temp));
}
/*
* This is basically GenerateBlocks() from FS&K.
*
* It differs in two ways:
*
* 1. Chacha20 is tolerant of non-block-multiple request sizes, so we do not
* need to handle any remainder bytes specially and can just pass the length
* directly to the PRF construction; and
*
* 2. Chacha20 is a 512-bit block size cipher (whereas AES has 128-bit block
* size, regardless of key size). This means Chacha does not require re-keying
* every 1MiB. This is implied by the math in FS&K 9.4 and mentioned
* explicitly in the conclusion, "If we had a block cipher with a 256-bit [or
* greater] block size, then the collisions would not have been an issue at
* all" (p. 144).
*
* 3. In conventional ("locked") mode, we produce a maximum of PAGE_SIZE output
* at a time before dropping the lock, to not bully the lock especially. This
* has been the status quo since 2015 (r284959).
*
* The upstream caller random_fortuna_read is responsible for zeroing out
* sensitive buffers provided as parameters to this routine.
*/
enum {
FORTUNA_UNLOCKED = false,
FORTUNA_LOCKED = true
};
static void
random_fortuna_genbytes(uint8_t *buf, size_t bytecount,
uint8_t newkey[static RANDOM_KEYSIZE], uint128_t *p_counter,
union randomdev_key *p_key, bool locked)
{
uint8_t remainder_buf[RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE];
size_t chunk_size;
if (locked)
RANDOM_RESEED_ASSERT_LOCK_OWNED();
else
RANDOM_RESEED_ASSERT_LOCK_NOT_OWNED();
/*
* Easy case: don't have to worry about bullying the global mutex,
* don't have to worry about rekeying Chacha; API is byte-oriented.
*/
if (!locked && random_chachamode) {
randomdev_keystream(p_key, p_counter, buf, bytecount);
return;
}
if (locked) {
/*
* While holding the global lock, limit PRF generation to
* mitigate, but not eliminate, bullying symptoms.
*/
chunk_size = PAGE_SIZE;
} else {
/*
* 128-bit block ciphers like AES must be re-keyed at 1MB
* intervals to avoid unacceptable statistical differentiation
* from true random data (FS&K 9.4, p. 143-144).
*/
MPASS(!random_chachamode);
chunk_size = RANDOM_FORTUNA_MAX_READ;
}
chunk_size = MIN(bytecount, chunk_size);
if (!random_chachamode)
chunk_size = rounddown(chunk_size, RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE);
while (bytecount >= chunk_size && chunk_size > 0) {
randomdev_keystream(p_key, p_counter, buf, chunk_size);
buf += chunk_size;
bytecount -= chunk_size;
/* We have to rekey if there is any data remaining to be
* generated, in two scenarios:
*
* locked: we need to rekey before we unlock and release the
* global state to another consumer; or
*
* unlocked: we need to rekey because we're in AES mode and are
* required to rekey at chunk_size==1MB. But we do not need to
* rekey during the last trailing <1MB chunk.
*/
if (bytecount > 0) {
if (locked || chunk_size == RANDOM_FORTUNA_MAX_READ) {
randomdev_keystream(p_key, p_counter, newkey,
RANDOM_KEYSIZE);
randomdev_encrypt_init(p_key, newkey);
}
/*
* If we're holding the global lock, yield it briefly
* now.
*/
if (locked) {
RANDOM_RESEED_UNLOCK();
RANDOM_RESEED_LOCK();
}
/*
* At the trailing end, scale down chunk_size from 1MB or
* PAGE_SIZE to all remaining full blocks (AES) or all
* remaining bytes (Chacha).
*/
if (bytecount < chunk_size) {
if (random_chachamode)
chunk_size = bytecount;
else if (bytecount >= RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE)
chunk_size = rounddown(bytecount,
RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE);
else
break;
}
}
}
/*
* Generate any partial AES block remaining into a temporary buffer and
* copy the desired substring out.
*/
if (bytecount > 0) {
MPASS(!random_chachamode);
randomdev_keystream(p_key, p_counter, remainder_buf,
sizeof(remainder_buf));
}
/*
* In locked mode, re-key global K before dropping the lock, which we
* don't need for memcpy/bzero below.
*/
if (locked) {
randomdev_keystream(p_key, p_counter, newkey, RANDOM_KEYSIZE);
randomdev_encrypt_init(p_key, newkey);
RANDOM_RESEED_UNLOCK();
}
if (bytecount > 0) {
memcpy(buf, remainder_buf, bytecount);
explicit_bzero(remainder_buf, sizeof(remainder_buf));
}
}
/*
* Handle only "concurrency-enabled" Fortuna reads to simplify logic.
*
* Caller (random_fortuna_read) is responsible for zeroing out sensitive
* buffers provided as parameters to this routine.
*/
static void
random_fortuna_read_concurrent(uint8_t *buf, size_t bytecount,
uint8_t newkey[static RANDOM_KEYSIZE])
{
union randomdev_key key_copy;
uint128_t counter_copy;
size_t blockcount;
MPASS(fortuna_concurrent_read);
/*
* Compute number of blocks required for the PRF request ('delta C').
* We will step the global counter 'C' by this number under lock, and
* then actually consume the counter values outside the lock.
*
* This ensures that contemporaneous but independent requests for
* randomness receive distinct 'C' values and thus independent PRF
* results.
*/
if (random_chachamode) {
blockcount = howmany(bytecount, CHACHA_BLOCKLEN);
} else {
blockcount = howmany(bytecount, RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE);
/*
* Need to account for the additional blocks generated by
* rekeying when updating the global fs_counter.
*/
blockcount += RANDOM_KEYS_PER_BLOCK *
(blockcount / RANDOM_FORTUNA_BLOCKS_PER_KEY);
}
RANDOM_RESEED_LOCK();
KASSERT(!uint128_is_zero(fortuna_state.fs_counter), ("FS&K: C != 0"));
/*
* Save the original counter and key values that will be used as the
* PRF for this particular consumer.
*/
memcpy(&counter_copy, &fortuna_state.fs_counter, sizeof(counter_copy));
memcpy(&key_copy, &fortuna_state.fs_key, sizeof(key_copy));
/*
* Step the counter as if we had generated 'bytecount' blocks for this
* consumer. I.e., ensure that the next consumer gets an independent
* range of counter values once we drop the global lock.
*/
uint128_add64(&fortuna_state.fs_counter, blockcount);
/*
* We still need to Rekey the global 'K' between independent calls;
* this is no different from conventional Fortuna. Note that
* 'randomdev_keystream()' will step the fs_counter 'C' appropriately
* for the blocks needed for the 'newkey'.
*
* (This is part of PseudoRandomData() in FS&K, 9.4.4.)
*/
randomdev_keystream(&fortuna_state.fs_key, &fortuna_state.fs_counter,
newkey, RANDOM_KEYSIZE);
randomdev_encrypt_init(&fortuna_state.fs_key, newkey);
/*
* We have everything we need to generate a unique PRF for this
* consumer without touching global state.
*/
RANDOM_RESEED_UNLOCK();
random_fortuna_genbytes(buf, bytecount, newkey, &counter_copy,
&key_copy, FORTUNA_UNLOCKED);
RANDOM_RESEED_ASSERT_LOCK_NOT_OWNED();
explicit_bzero(&counter_copy, sizeof(counter_copy));
explicit_bzero(&key_copy, sizeof(key_copy));
}
/*-
* FS&K - RandomData() (Part 2)
* Main read from Fortuna, continued. May be called multiple times after
* the random_fortuna_pre_read() above.
*
* The supplied buf MAY not be a multiple of RANDOM_BLOCKSIZE in size; it is
* the responsibility of the algorithm to accommodate partial block reads, if a
* block output mode is used.
*/
void
random_fortuna_read(uint8_t *buf, size_t bytecount)
{
uint8_t newkey[RANDOM_KEYSIZE];
if (fortuna_concurrent_read) {
random_fortuna_read_concurrent(buf, bytecount, newkey);
goto out;
}
RANDOM_RESEED_LOCK();
KASSERT(!uint128_is_zero(fortuna_state.fs_counter), ("FS&K: C != 0"));
random_fortuna_genbytes(buf, bytecount, newkey,
&fortuna_state.fs_counter, &fortuna_state.fs_key, FORTUNA_LOCKED);
/* Returns unlocked */
RANDOM_RESEED_ASSERT_LOCK_NOT_OWNED();
out:
explicit_bzero(newkey, sizeof(newkey));
}
#ifdef _KERNEL
static bool block_seeded_status = false;
SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_random, OID_AUTO, block_seeded_status, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
&block_seeded_status, 0,
"If non-zero, pretend Fortuna is in an unseeded state. By setting "
"this as a tunable, boot can be tested as if the random device is "
"unavailable.");
#endif
static bool
random_fortuna_seeded_internal(void)
{
return (!uint128_is_zero(fortuna_state.fs_counter));
}
static bool
random_fortuna_seeded(void)
{
#ifdef _KERNEL
if (block_seeded_status)
return (false);
#endif
if (__predict_true(random_fortuna_seeded_internal()))
return (true);
/*
* Maybe we have enough entropy in the zeroth pool but just haven't
* kicked the initial seed step. Do so now.
*/
random_fortuna_pre_read();
return (random_fortuna_seeded_internal());
}